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Conceptual Frameworks in Psychology: Modified
Kuhnian Analysis for the Emergence of
Double Bind Family Therapy
May, 1978
Denise J. Gelinas, B.A., University of Massachusetts
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard Gadlin
The presence of a felt crisis in psychology is reviewed in its
various manifestations: concern about lack of long-term progress, ques-
tions of sub-disciplinary identity and the presence of long-standing
"sterile" controversy. Previous attempts to use Thomas Kuhn's schema
for scientific change to interpret this situation have met with little
success because no provisions had been made to modify the schema for use
with a social science. In the present investigation, these provisions
were made and the modified Kuhnian analysis was used to interpret events
leading up to, during, and immediately after the emergence of family
therapy. This Kuhnian analysis made it possible to see that family
therapy had arisen in reaction to classical psychoanalysis' inability to
deal with certain clinical phenomena, including neurotic complementarities
among married couples, the precipitation of psychoses in borderline per-
sonalities, and the homeostatic dynamics in the families of schizophrenic
patients. Controversies between classical analysts and Sullivanian
analysts in the 1950 's are interpreted in Kuhnian disciplinary matrix
viii
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terms rather than methodological terms.
The development of the "double bind hypothesis" by Bateson, Jack-
son, Haley, and Weakland is interpreted as meeting the necessary criteria
for a Kuhnian revolutionary paradigm. Then the ten-year formal history
of Bateson's research group is reviewed and interpreted in disciplinary
matrix terms. The elaboration of the communicational and homeostatic
aspects of the paradigm and the major lines of activity are documented,
as well as the 1959 split. Interpretation in disciplinary matrix terms
also helps to explain how the group was able to continue productive work
for several years after splitting in 1959.
Certain elaborations of the Kuhnian analysis are then offered and
found to be helpful in understanding the inception and development of
the double bind paradigm and disciplinary matrix. These modifications
emphasized the group structure of these activities and the importance of
a shared disciplinary matrix for communication and the resolution of con-
troversy. Several ostensibly methodological controversies involving
classical and Sullivanian psychoanalysts and double bind adherents were
interpreted as controversies between disciplinary matrices and there-
fore not resolvable if argued on the methodological level. In a Kuhnian
analysis, methodology is not independent from a disciplinary matrix.
Also, an emphasis on the group structure of scientific activity combined
with the paradigm concept allowed an interpretation of the relationship
among the classical psychoanalysts, the Sullivanian analysts and family
therapists during the early 1950's.
Two new concepts were proposed. The first was termed the "border
of applicability"; it provides a criterion, created by emerging anomalies
by which to recognize the reasonable limits of usefulness for a particular
paradigm. The second proposed concept was the "meta-disciplinary matrix"'
the meta-disciplinary matrix is a philosophical/ conceptual constellation
which includes a philosophical orientation (e.g., logical positivism, or
dialectics) level of phenomena of focus (e.g., behavioral, or phenomenolo-
gical)
,
value systems (e.g., predictive, or interpretive understanding),
and models of explanation (e.g., mechanistic, organismic, or formalistic)
.
It was proposed as an explanation of why several family therapy disci-
plinary matrices "clustered" together. As an example, the double bind
matrix was shown to share the same mechanistic^ behavioral and predictive
preferences as Minuchin's structural family therapy group.
The meta-disciplinary matrix concept was also used to help explain
along what dimension the first "cluster" differed from the second "clus-
ter" identified - one formed by the disciplinary matrices of Ackerman,
Boszormenyi-Nagy , and Laing. This second cluster is characterized by a
preference for phenomenological plus behavioral thinking, and a pre-
ference for interpretive understanding. The meta-disciplinary matrix
is seen as preceding and subsuming paradigms and disciplinary matrices.
It was proposed that the present felt crisis in psychology was amenable
to a modified Kuhnian analysis if one focused on the differences and
relationships among, paradigm, method, disciplinary matrix, and meta-
disciplinary matrix.
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INTRODUCTION
During the several chapters following, I hope to demonstrate there
is a felt crisis in the discipline of psychology, and to propose a
modified Kuhnian analysis to interpret this felt crisis. As will be
seen the presence of a felt crisis is being expressed in a number of
ways. Some are concerned about a lack of long-term progress, while
others point to an episodic quality in the development of the discipline
whereby research results and conceptualizations rise and fall but very
seldom accumulate with a consensually validated, lasting body of know-
ledge. Similarly, others have drawn attention to crises of identity,
either in the discipline as a whole, or in sub-disciplines. Finally,
other authors are challenging a number of philosophical and methodological
characteristics of the discipline, identifying areas of repeated problems
and suggesting alternatives.
During the development of the discipline and these issues, contro-
versy and debate have been rife, and not always productive; further, some
of this type of accompanying controversy has seemed somewhat beside the
point though very characteristic of the period. Several authors (Burgess,
1972; Watson, 1974; Stierlin, 1977) have used the conceptual schema
originated and developed by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1970b) to understand change and progress in science. How-
ever, there are problems in using Kuhn's work for psychology - these
will be discussed at length in the ensuing chapters. It is important to
note here, however, that Kuhn's ideas have often been used uncritically
xiii
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and without taking into account his subsequent important revisions;
nor has his framework been critically reviewed and adapted for use in
psychology. Consequently, his schema has occasionally been used as a
weapon in just the sort of sterile controversy already mentioned.
Burgess (1972, p. 193) documents just one such sequence; referring
to the publication and revision of Scientific Revolutions
, Burgess
comments
:
In one sense, at least, this publication has united all kinds of
psychologists. Anti-behaviourists now believe they have the final
weapon with which they will eventually demolish that monolithic
anti-Humanitarian monster—Behaviourism (Jenkins, 1968; Koch,
1964). Behaviourists now believe they have fired the last salvo
in their battle against "extinct" Psychoanalysts (e.g. Krasner,
1971), and so it progresses. One wonders, however, whether these
theorists are not attacking straw men which they have erected them-
selves (a favourite armchair pasttime of psychologists who have
managed to identify with one or other "father-figure-school").
Of more importance though is whether psychologists generally have
read Kuhn correctly or are showing a familiar bandwagon effect
(as Koch, (1964) has shown for the early learning theorists in
their slavish imitation of the logical positivitists)
. It seems
that Psychologists are especially susceptible to this sort of
thing, i.e. picking up a thread midway, being neither prepared
to return to the original ball of string or to see where eventually
their thread leads or to what it is attached.
Despite these problems regarding Kuhn's schema for psychology, his
work may potentially provide insight and a structure within which to
interpret events. Of particular interest for the present felt crisis in
psychology is Kuhn's emphasis on crisis, disagreement, and development
rather than accretion, in science.
In the following chapters, I will use a modified Kuhnian analysis
for one substantive area in which there occurred a felt crisis, to see
if the "application" of the Kuhnian schema allows us to interpret or
XV
understand a crisis situation in psychology, and especially if Kuhn
allows us to interpret events in a different manner than previously,
or even to find sense in heretofore senseless or random-seeing processes.
The "substantive area" of focus will be the emergence of family
therapy, specifically the emergence of the double bind hypothesis and
double bind (DB) family therapy. I have used the term "substantive area"
rather than "discipline" because, while family therapy is a subdiscipline
in psychology, it is also a sub-discipline in psychiatry, social work,
nursing, and education with some adherents and practitioners are also
occasionally found in anthropology, sociology, and psychosomatic medicine,
The criteria for defining the area and the individual's inclusion within
it, is neither based upon credentials of training nor discipline, but
rather on adherence to the idea that within the family lie the processes
to which we can attribute the etiology, maintenance, and potential for
amelioration of psychological (and some think, psychosomatic) disorder.
This set of ideas is a marked departure from intra-psychic formulations
based upon and within the individual. It should be acknowledged that
family therapists have little trouble recognizing each other, though
agreeing with each other is more of a problem. This larger complex
of family therapists occurs across disciplines, in terms of their
own perceptions of the family field and who "belongs" in it, and also
because almost any substantive area in psychology cuts across formal
disciplinary lines and can be found in neighboring disciplines. The
substantive area rather than the disciplinary name is the more
xvi
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sensible boundary for the present analysis.
The emergence of DB family therapy was chosen for a number of reaso,
With its recent differentiation from individual psychotherapy during the
past quarter-century, family therapy has a fairly accessible history; it
is relatively well-documented, with many, though not all, of its
originators currently active in the field.
Family therapy in its entirety, however, was not chosen as the
focus of analysis because it is constituted by a number of groups, theories
and sets of practice, so that, as an area, it is also subject to some
degree of disagreement and controversy. It seems not surprising that
within only a quarter-century, there has already emerged debate and groups
in disagreement. Also, it is apparent that the term "family therapy" is
applicable to a wide range of practices, and that it is used in a broad,
rather vaguely defined manner (Freeman, 1964, p. 55). For these reasons,
one of the family therapy frameworks, rather than the entire discordant
field, appeared preferable for a detailed analysis. Double-bind family
therapy was one of the frameworks that developed during the 1950 's and
1960's, and an argument will be made that it constituted the first systems
approach and the first family framework to embody the full characteristics
of family therapy rather than merely transitional elements. Double-bind
family therapy is commonly, and justifiably, regarded as constituting a
unit in itself, having internal consistency and generally recognized
characteristics. Hence, it was chosen for analysis.
It could be pointed out that, unlike the physical sciences, family
therapy is constituted not only by research and theory, but also by
xvii
clinical practice. There are questions as to whether it is legitimate
to use a schema designed from, and for, the physical sciences, as Kuhn's
is, for a social science area that also includes a clinical practice
component. It would be possible to make an argument that clinical
practice itself can constitute a legitimate form of research, and some
(Raush, 1974; Sullivan, 1953) have done so. As this particular point is
not the primary focus of this dissertation, however, I will remain with
the original issue about the use of Kuhn for areas which include clinical
practice; specifically, will it "work" when I attempt a Kuhnian analysis
for family therapy, or will such an application strain the Kuhnian schema
such that it can be inferred the analysis is not appropriate. This
appears to be a question best answered by attempting the application.
Procedurally, a modified Kuhnian analysis will be used to interpret
the events, processes, and controversies surrounding the emergence and
development of DB family therapy. Hopefully, this analysis will shed
light, or meaning, on events which had previously appeared merely random.
If successful, this will indirectly suggest where the Kuhnian framework
is appropriate for psychology and similar disciplines, and where the
schema needs revision in view of difficulties encountered in the process
of such an application. It is very probable that, in applying the Kuhnian
schema to family therapy, information about his schema will also emerge.
It is expected that use of the framework will highlight its strengths and
weaknesses as well as providing information about a sub-discipline par-
tially within psychology; that is, the process of examining a framework
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in psychology will in turn reveal information about the conceptual tools
originally used for the analysis, and these secondary findings will also
be discussed.
This method, in which the process of examining the primary subject
area, in turn reveals information about the conceptual tools, is a variant
of what Radnitzky (1973) refers to as "tacking." (Radnitzky discusses
dialectical theory as proceeding in "turns" first emphasizing the empiri-
cal human sciences and then emphasizing critical social theory, alternat-
ing or "tacking" back and forth, so that they shed light on each other)
.
Some of this tacking back and forth has already taken place; for
instance, the attempt to apply Kuhn's work to the informational sciences
resulted in Masterman's (1970) revision of Kuhn's work on a multiple-
paradigm issue. (See Chapter II). This differs from the situation in
which Masterman explicitly addresses the paradigm concept to critique it.
Though "tacking" entails a certain amount of methodological complexity,
the information reflected back upon the conceptual tools should not be
left by the wayside but should instead be considered a secondary or sub-
sidiary focus.
Schematically, in Chapter I the felt crisis in psychology will be
explicated. In the second chapter, Kuhn's framework regarding scientific
developments will be reviewed, along with critiques and revisions from
the literature, and necessary modifications to allow legitimate appli-
cation of the scheme to the social sciences. In the third and fourth
chapters, the focus will shift to examine the developments in psycho-
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analysis leading up to the introduction of the DB framework.
Chapters V and VI will explicate the inception of DB family therapy
as a Kuhnian revolutionary paradigm, then trace the development of the
DB developers as a research and clinical group. In the seventh chapter,
the analysis carried out thus far will be examined as to its strengths
and weaknesses, and used to interpret several controversies in which
the DB group members had engaged.
Finally, in the eighth chapter, proposals for further modifications
in the Kuhnian schema will be forwarded, as well as suggestions for fur-
ther analyses regarding psychology's felt crisis.
CHAPTER I
FELT CRISIS IN PSYCHOLOGY AS A DISCIPLINE
con-
It will become evident during the course of this chapter that there
is currently a felt crisis in psychology (Becker, 1968; Farberow, 1973;
Warren, 1971)
.
Psychologists cannot agree on past achievements and
tinue to debate about fundamentals (Burgess, 1972, p. 198). Taking a
reviewer's perspective. Buss (1975, p. 977) states that.
While reading current issues of psychological journals ...
which promote discussion of general topics, trends, and
controversies within the discipline (e.g., the American
Psychologist ) , we cannot help but conclude that there are
a significant number of professional psychologists con-
cerned with where we are, how we got there, and where we
are going from here.
Lest we think these considerations are rather complacent or of
recent origin, Hudson (1972, p. 73) points out that the criticisms and
concerns have become,
increasingly vociferous. Fifteen years ago, the vast majority
of those working in psychological departments here and in the
United States shared the belief that their discipline was robust,
that their efforts embodied the onward march of Science. How-
ever, in the early 1960 's a number of the informed and eminent,
Sigmund Koch, for instance, were making sounds of misgiving,
suggesting that for reasons of scientific insecurity, psychology
was in retreat from its historically constituted subject-matter.
It would appear, further, that the perception of crisis spans the sub-
disciplines of psychology, and is one of the few non-parochial elements
of the discipline; it should be further noted, though, that within these
sub-disciplines, it is primarily those who are investigating human ac-
tions (or cognition, relationships, etc.) rather than animal behavior
1
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or neuropsychology, for example, that are most concerned about this
crisis
.
Naturally, different authors address themselves to different aspects
of the crisis (or perceive different crises?) in psychology's develop-
ment as a discipline; while this undoubtedly reflects psychology's
history of factionalism, it also suggests the depth and extent of the
crisis
Lack of long-term progress and episodic patterns
. Several perceive a
crisis because of a lack of long-term progress in the discipline.
"Some thirty years ago, research in psychology became dedicated
to the quest for nomothetic theory ... model building and hypo-
thesis testing became the ruling ideal, and research problems
were increasingly chosen to fit that mode. Taking stock today,
I think most of us judge theoretical progress to have been dis-
appointing (Cronbach, 1975, p. 116)."
Vitelis (1972, p. 601) is of the opinion that during the past 50-75 years
what psychologists have learned with any confidence about human behavior,
is considerably more limited than might be anticipated from the number
of publications in psychology.
Singer, in a lesson in brevity, states, "Some thirty years have passe
and we do not as yet have a developed, self-conscious discipline of a
science of science (1971, p. 1010)." A partial solution to this state
of affairs has been proposed by Elms (1975, p. 974) whereby, temporarily,
"educative" articles examining the discipline's scientific and philosoph-
ical foundations would replace the usual empirical research reports in
journals. Limitation of empirical research reports to coherent series
3of studies, or to pre-planned strategic replications could free the
space necessary for the non-empirical articles. He feels Moscovici's
(1972) suggestion that data collection temporarily halt might be extreme,
The authors concerned about lack of long-term progress have voiced
their disquietude and occasionally their recommendations, from essen-
tially a sympathetic position. There have been others, sharing their
concern, who have been more sharply critical and distanced: C. Rogers
for example (1973, p. 379),
Psychology, for all its thousands of experiments, its
multitudes of white rats, its vast enterprises involving
laboratories, computers, electronic equipment, highly
sophisticated statistical measures, and the like, is in
my estimation slipping backward as a significant science.
We have failed dismally to heed Robert Oppenheimer '
s
warning, addressed to the APA in 1956, when he pointed
out that the worst thing psychology might do would be
"to model itself after a physics which is not there any
more, which has been outdated [p. 134]."
Trenchant comment is also found within the experimental psychology
tradition. Hudson (1972, p. 168) points out that as early as 1956, O.L.
Zangwill believed that "Experimental psychology has produced many facts,
a few generalizations, and even an occasional 'law.' But it has so far
failed to produce anything resembling a coherent and generally accepted
body of scientific theory." Similarly, Hilgard and Bower (1966, p. 424)
in one of their textbooks on learning — an unusual place for such a
statement — assert:
The argument has been made that more complex behaviors — thinking
and problem solving — could be more easily understood once
simple behaviors under especially simplified conditions were
better understood
. . After some thirty or forty years without
striking advances in our understanding of the capabilities
of the human mind, this argument has begun to have a hollow
ring.-L
There are a small number, as yet, who are calling attention to a
specific pattern in this lack of long-term progress. Raush (personal
communication, 1976) has pointed to a peculiar episodic quality to
research and theory in psychology, specifically, to a pattern whereby
theories or research lines are not necessarily invalidated and put aside
for explicit reasons, but rather are "dropped" or are allowed to wither,
so that a decade later, one wonders a bit "Whatever happened to ?"
The point is that there results no closure on this line of investigation;
it is neither disconfirmed and then dropped, nor supported and consis-
tently followed as a fruitful line of research. In a very clear example
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that not only psychology
but all of the social sciences have been faulted for the lack of progress
in the face of so much productivity:
Measured against the needs of the times, there is nothing
remotely resembling a science of man [sic]; there are only
mountains of disciplinary journals, and hordes of busy
specialists; what is the effectiveness in relation to the
momentous problems of survival and human dignity in our time?
To ask the question is already to answer it; taken separately,
most of the disciplinary activity in the social sciences
represent trivial work. True, it is hard-working, certainly
well-intentioned, at times deeply hopeful and anxious — but
still, somehow very much besides the point ... (Becker, 1968).
While I agree with Becker entirely, I will restrict my context to psy-
chology, and my focus to a sub-discipline of psychology in the Interests
of clarity, manageability and commonsense.
5of this sort of thing, Hilgard and Bower^ in their 1966 revision, ex-
plicitly note the elimination of a theory from their text because of
lack of Interest, and not because the theory had been empirically dis-
credited. Similarly, Bonneau (1975, p. 799) laments the "clusters of
specialized research problems that arch gloriously through the higher
intellectual atmosphere of scientific meetings and then like the Nehru
shirt fade away to remain only in the memories of a few." Hudson's
(1972, p. 55) Cult of the Fact returns to this episodic pattern a
number of times, addressing several of its aspects:
Psychology proceeds more by fits and starts; a series oflunges into the surrounding darkness... a subject, or series
of 8, in which one research fashion succeeds another,
leaving little behind it as a residue of reusable knowledge
(p. 55).. the impression is one of impermanence
. There is
change certainly; one vogue follows another. But the move-
ment is less cumulative than cyclic; and more subject than
in the other sciences to that 'Great Prime Mover of all
intellectual acitivity , the Zeitgeist, without whom no man
[sic] would think as he does, nor have his thoughts make
sense (p. 156) . '
^
Crises of identity
. Another group of authors has come to cite crisis,
not so much because of lack of substantial progress, as because they
perceive a crisis of identity, either in the discipline as a unit or
within their particular sub-disciplines. Engineering psychology is
Hilgard and Bower, 1966, pp. V, Vi and Vii.
3
Hudson quoting from E.G. Boring, Sensation and perception in the
history of experimental psychology ; New York; Appleton Century Crofts,
1949, p. XI.
6felt to be "in jeopardy" (Adams, 1972, p. 615); and while the problem
in personality is "pressing," it is as urgent in cognitive (Cronbach,
1975, p. 120)."^ Social psychologists appear to be questioning fundamen-
tal commitments to research approaches (Fried, et al
. , 1973, p. 155),
and Elms (1975, p. 968) documents the "widespread self-doubts with
goals, methods, and accomplishments" in personality research, develop-
mental psychology, and clinical psychology, as well as social psychology.
Among clinical psychologists, Albee (1970) has questioned the viability
of the scientist-practitioner identity while Farberow (1973, p. 391)
has offered a compromise in the practitioner-scientist model, and has
advocated a significant change in APA structure because of its size and
fragmentation.
The issue of the scientist-practitioner model and practice has not
yet been resolved to some people's satisfaction, that is, to the satis-
faction of those, usually, who have at least one foot in the practitioner's
realm. Tyler (1973) and Hudson (1972) bring up particularly interesting
points pertinent to the longevity of the dissatisfactions with this
model
.
It was recognized, of course, that there was such a thing
as applied psychology, and applied psychologists of the
clinical, counseling, industrial, school, and other varieties
were trained in universities. These specialized kinds of
4Cronbach cites Newell (1972) on the fragmentation in information
processing research alone, where the latter counted 59 different
"colonies" of investigators, each collecting data on their own narrowly
defined task.
7activity, however, were not accorded the prestige that
went^with pure scientific work. Words like "do-gooder"
and tender-minded" often served to express and perpetuatethe disparagement felt for those who were mainly interes-
ted in what psychology could do to help people and improvethe human condition
... It is hardly strange, under these
circumstances, that serious conflicts have developed be-
tween "scientific" psychologists and "professional",
especially clinical psychologists. (Tyler, 1973, p.'l021.)^
Hudson goes on to give a fascinating possible reason behind this
"remarkable" insistence upon scientific status:
When a teaching department's projection of a professional
identity is unusually insistent, one's impulse, whether
or not one has truck with Jungian ideas, is to look for
sources of professional anxiety. In the case of psychology
these are not hard to find. Psychologists have a marginal
position in the academic community, poised near the border-
line between the humane and the scientific disciplines; we
have a farouche professional past, redolent of mesmerism,
even of witch-doctoring; and there still exist widespread
misgivings—both in academic life and with society at large
—
with any attempt to examind the mind's contents. Our response,
professionally, has been to over-react; to observe all the
outward signs of scientific respectability, taking as our
model, incidentally, the Victorian conception of the physical
sciences, a model that physical scientists themselves have
For another view of the same pattern: "Among British scientists,
and with few exceptions, the pure look down on the applied, the physi-
cal, on the biological. And all continue to look down on the social,
or "Mickey Mouse" scientists who are scarcely scientists at all...
Psychology stands low in this pecking order, and contains a pecking
order within it. Again, the pure look down on the applied, and the
clean on the messy. The experimental, usually physical or biological
in background, look down on the social, industrial, clinical, and edu-
cational. The psychologist of high status works in a laboratory, and
studies either a sub-human species—rat, pigeon, monkey—or some
simple aspect of human skill. The psychologist of low status works with
human beings in their natural habitat, and studies them in their full
complexity. The psychologist of high status works on problems that to
the untutored eye seem trivial; the one of low status, on problems that
laymen are more likely to understand. (Hudson, 1972, p. 53)
8of I Irnft 1 one has the impressiona p o essional group plunging, in search of an identityfrom one extreme to another. A sense of orderly growth is'lacking; so too is any awareness that urging propoundedtheses usually carry their own negation buried within them. (p. 54)
This disparity between what the novice wants to learn and what
he/she is told is good and right for him/her to learn, remains and is
reflected in the disparity of prestige between "scientists" and "prac-
titioners"; it contributes to the sense of crisis regarding identity.
After all what should clinical (or social, developmental, cognitive, or
engineering) psychology be? What should "it" study? How? ^^at could
it study? Is "study" science?, etc. Sometimes involved in this complex
of questions is a group questioning whether psychology is, has ever
been, should be (could be) "pure" science, purity being juxtaposed here
with either "applied science" or scholarship involving public policy.
There are some who cite an identity crisis (Viteles, 1972, p. 604)
because of what they term the "uncertainty" as to whether the discipline
at this stage is to be primarily "science or action; fact or fiction;
cult or knowledge; a scholarly discipline or a medium for frequently
premature application of views and methods of highly doubtful validity.."
When Viteles states his position in certain terras ("service or research;
community action or enhancement of knowledge; participation in movements
or firming up the foundations of academe; the advancement of science or
the construction of 'instant Utopia'") there is little doubt regarding
his views on the scientist-practitioner model. Regarding his views as
to the conduct of science, he comes down squarely for what is often
9considered a "value-free" objective, Newtonian model as the way out of
the woods. The tendency on the part of psychologists to confound
speculation with scientific content, and to inject value judgments.
in a manner that makes it increasingly difficult, especiallyfor the student and the layman, to determine when the psy-
chologist is dealing with facts and principles derived from
experiments, or when he is merely presenting his own valuejudgments. It has, in other words, become exceedingly
difficult to know when the psychologist speaks with the
authority of science, or when he is playing the role of the
social reformer while clothed—or even disguised—in the
garb of the scientist. (Viteles, 1972, p. 605)
He is essentially espousing a return to psychology's dominant model
and philosophy of research as a procedure for extricating ourselves from
our collective identity crisis. Hudson, on the other hand, (as might be)
expected by now), would disagree with Vitele's recommendations, as he has
already stated that.
If we are to recover our pristine vigour, a major change
is in store; not at the periphery, nor in detail, but at
our corporate hub—a change in our conception of what we
are about. And such a change must hinge on the emergence
of a new model with which we can epitomize ourselves; a
new root metaphor from which our more day-to-day activities
will flow (Hudson, 1972, p. 157).
Operations in research philosophy and method . The identity crisis issue
is related to divergences in research philosophy; what psychologists do
in the daily practice of their discipline, determines who and what their
identity as psychologists might be. This last major concern appears to
be the most complicated and acrimonious. Cronbach (1975, p. 116) con-
fesses some pessimism regarding psychology's predominant norms and pro-
cedures, then mentions the questioning of others (e.g., Gergen, 1973;
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Glass, 1972; Israel and Tajfel, 1972; McGuire, 1973; Newell, 1972).
Methodological challenges. The first set of concerns regarding
scientific method revolves about the appropriateness and efficacy of
the current experimental model. The rules of statistical analysis and
instrumentation have been challenged on methodological grounds. Sig-
norelli (1974, p. 866) questions the position that psychology is
evolving as a science, because it is increasingly using statistical
analyses to evaluate its postulates. His point here is well taken, as
it is usually those who are most enthusiastic in claiming progress be-
cause of statistical procedures, who also hearken to the physical scien-
ces for their procedural models. Signorelli points out that the use
of mathematical procedures in the development of the physical sciences
bears little resemblance to the current use of statistics in psychology;
moreover, instrumentation in the physical sciences is designed in
accordance with, and to test, physical concepts, whereas in psychology,
the situation is reversed, that is, instrumentation is heavily influenced
by statistical concepts. For example.
The Skinner box is designed not to measure the presence of
such theoretical factors as intensity of drive or reinforce-
ment; rather, it is designed primarily to measure the frequency
of the response. Intelligence tests and personality and
diagnostic scales require the compilation of averages and
correlative statistics to produce classifications and to
demonstrate reliability and validity of the scale; the
factor under measure is inferred from the power of the
statistical results (Signorelli, 1974, p. 869).
In addition to statistically-based instrumentation and concepts,
theory construction, and validation or falsification also appear to be
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increasingly oriented to statistical formulation. Reliance on statis-
tical significance, for instance, frequently obscures implications of
experimental results, leading to controversies that are not resolvable
at the level in which they are conducted. Signorelli (1974, pp. 867-
868) reports an interesting study trying to decide between two formula-
tions about the precise nature of reinforcement - one based on response
characteristics, the other on drive-reduction. A series of experiments
attempting to demonstrate the superiority of one formulation over the
other was inconclusive - significant results supported each formulation.
Signorelli suggests that if the obvious is accepted— that the two formu-
lations are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, neither further
experimentation nor controversy would be necessary, while an integrating
formulation is.
Statistics are also cited as increasingly becoming the basis around
which theory is constructed as well as tested; Signorelli (1974, p. 866)
highlights Estes' learning theory, Feigenbaum and Simon's formulation of
the serial position curve and John's hypothesis regarding memory storage.
It should be noted that while Signorelli particularly takes issue with
experimental psychology, he absolves none of the sub-disciplines.
His points are reminiscent of those made by Koch that the develop-
ment of psychology as a science "was unique in the extent to which its
institutionalization preceded its content and its method preceded the
problem." (Quoted by Gadlin and Ingle, 1975, p. 795). Gadlin and Ingle
(1975, p. 795) state that they share Koch's contention that many of the
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current problems in the discipline are a consequence of "method pre-
ceding content" and I would agree.
Paucity of theory. The second issue regarding scientific philo-
sophy relates to the paucity of theory in the discipline. Elms (1975,
p. 970) laments that theories have not fared well under empirical test
and is of the opinion that any "would be" theorist today would find it
difficult to propose any level of integrative theory in social psychology,
with reasonable confidence in its longevity. Similarly, others (e.g.,
Bonneau, 1975, p. 800) are articulating the need for "major frameworks,"
or schema, to tie together and relate the various bits of information
we have.
Besides worrying about the longevity of a proposed theory, it would
be appropriate to worry about its reception and treatment. Theories in
psychology are "critiqued" into oblivion. At times, the glee of the
combat is all too evident. Why not, in fact, rather than refute, con-
struct tests whereby hypotheses, as well as being capable of refutation
or confirmation, can be confirmed only in such and such conditions , or
can be made exceptions, inclusions or subsumptions? In short — that X
holds under these conditions, not under those. This approach, which
would retain the confirmed material and integrate, if not "correct" the
other, would have the virtues of continuity (in time and across subject
matter) and less wasted time in re-discovery. Some interesting insights
into why commonsense has, once again, not prevailed, are afforded by
Hudson. It becomes apparent that the socialization process into psycholo
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fosters such an approach (1972, p. 103).
The education I myself received undoubtedly had the effect
[Marcuse] predicts: I was equipped neither with the language,
nor the concepts, nor the self-confidence, to phrase
questions of a general kind. We were taught to dismantle,
but not to reconstruct; the doctrines of the philosophers
acting—as Bertrand Russell has said as a 'corrosive
solvent' of the great systems of the past, yet putting
nothing, beyond a mood of skeptical complacency, in their
stead
.
Another insight, this time into the perpetuation rather than origin
of such a pattern, is forwarded by Elms (1975, p. 973); "The typical
procedure... of ten seems more effective in producing professional pub-
lications than in locating and explaining important aspects of human
social interaction."
Another exploration relates to psychology's uncertain scientific
status. In the spirit of minority-group process, we can be more critical
of our own theories than anyone else, before they are.
Suffice it to say, there is growing disillusionment with the experi-
mental method as the dominant scientific procedure for the discipline.
As Pereboom has summarized (1971, p. 439):
The application of the experimental approach to a multi-
dimensional discipline presupposes that it will work, that
control and analysis will generate explanations which will
lead to a unified theory for a restricted behavior domain,
and that there will be a fundamental basis for our concepts,
scales and methods which will justify the measurable
generalization of that theory. This has not yet happened.
Objectivity and subject-object split
.
Experimental procedures have
also been criticized on philosophical and ethical grounds as well as the
procedural and consequential previously reviewed. Since they are con-
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slderably more complex, philosophical issues will be just briefly re-
viewed in the present context. A primary area of criticism has been the
traditional stance of objectivity and the resulting subject-object split
in research. Because of the nearly total dominance of the experimental
method and its philosophical context a number of consequences have
gradually evolved. These include the assumption of independence between
subject-matter and method (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975, p. 793), such that
any variety of phenomena could be investigated by the same method, essen-
tially without questions regarding the appropriateness of said method.
Gadlin and Ingle (1975) have addressed themselves to several of the
ramifications of such a meta-method. This includes, due to the emphasis
on "objectivity", a split between experimenter and subject, such that
the experimenter was purportedly "neutral" and the subject became object;
that is, the subject necessarily became objectified as a manipulable
entity, i.e., "thing."
This approach both denies the relational aspect of research (by
objectification) and mitigates against its recognition. Gadlin and
Ingle (1975, p. 796) suggest that the attempt to deny the relational
aspect of research be abandoned and that it be actively attended to and
investigated, such that,
the relationship between investigator and subject is overtly
recognized as influencing the data. The relationship is seen
as e.stablishing a condition for the data to emerge, and
examination of the relationship between investigator and
subjects becomes part of the data analysis itself. (H.
Raush, personal communication, quoted by Gadlin and Ingle,
1975, p. 796).
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As such, the relational aspect of research would be regarded as
necessity rather than unavoidable epiphenomenon or artefact.
A proposed model includes a research relationship in which "research-
ers and participants mutually explore psychological phenomena." (p. 796).
Additionally reflexivity can be created by acknowledging
that the study of human behavior necessarily includes thebehavior of psychologists. This recognition implies, of
course, that the psychologist is as prone to psychological
processes as anyone else and should be especially self-
conscious of this fact when acting as a scientist. This
self-consciousness includes the psychologist's awareness
ot his relationship to and with his subject matter and the
awareness of his own role with respect to his inquiry. Theknowledge that derives from such reflexivity is a tripartiteknowledge—about the subject, about the researcher, and
about the knowledge itself. Little has been written about
such matters in the psychological journals, but there does
exist a small if obscure literature known as critical social
science theory. The works of Habermas, Ratner, and Hork-
heimer can provide an introduction for those interested
(Gadlin and Ingle, 1975, p. 796).
Obviously, an existing model embodying reflexivity of "investigator"
and "subject" is found in psychotherapy as it is practiced by the relational
therapists—for example, Rogerians, psychoanalytic therapists, and es-
pecially Sullivanians. H.S. Sullivan's articulation of the relational
aspects of personality development, psychopathology and the therapist
and researcher as participant-observers, remain paradigmatic for relational
conceptualization and practice.
This is not to imply that all psychotherapies are necessarily re-
lational or relationally-based ; for instance, the theory, if not always
the practice, of behavioral modifications, token economies, and rational-
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emotive therapy are not. In fact, behavioral theory is explicitly based
on the method and meta-method of the dominant research framet^ork which
is presently under criticism for its denial of relational aspects. The
question of relational accountability echoes throughout the discipline,
whether in research or therapy, and will be seen, in ensuing chapters,
to be a focus of interest with regard to the crisis in psychology and
attempts to use a Kuhnian classification for a social science.
Related to the issue of subject-object split are questions from a
variety of perspectives about the validity of assuming that science is
value-free, in its problem choices, methods, and the uses to which it
is put. Buss (1975, p. 986) refers to a change from "voices in the dark"
to "a growing army of psychologists who... "can no longer subscribe to
the notion of a "pure" or "value-free" science.
Traditional view of scientific "producer" and "consumer"
. The
traditional view of the relationship between scientific "producer" and
"consumer" has also come under fire. Garner (1972, p. 942) describes,
albeit facetiously, this relationship and terms it a fable.
There is a fable, carefully nurtured over the centuries
by the basic scientists, particularly those who see basic
as pure, about the relation between the scientist who acquires
information and the problem solver who applies that inform-
ation. The fable is that scientists acquire the knowledge,
that this knowledge goes into the public domain, and that when
a problem solver needs some knowledge to solve his problem,
he extracts it from the public domain, uttering words of
gratitude as he does so, and solves his problem. The actuality
that the scientist has provided knowledge needed by the
problem solver occurs in some mysterious fashion. Mysterious
though the process is, it is so effective that no tampering
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must be allowed, and in fact, the less contact the
scientist has with the problems of the problem solverthe more apt he will be to fill the public domain withknowledge of ultimately greatest import to the problem
solver. This is the fable, but... It does not work that
way at all (Garner, 1972, p. 942).
Raush (1974) has addressed this line of concern in some depth,
challenging the conventional wisdom that research is produced by scien-
tists, the information from which filters "down" to practitioners, who
used it and at times may tentatively make observations which serve as
hypotheses to the scientific community. Raush (1974, p. 678) contends,
rather, that "The consumers for formal, statistical psychological re-
search and for the laboratory experiment are other researchers
. An over-
view suggests that research clearly influences research. .. So far as one
can see, again with the possible exception of behavior modification
approaches,^ research has not influenced practice", [emphasis added]
Related to this issue is why there has been so little substantive
knowledge and contribution from these well established traditional re-
search lines. Raush (1974, p. 679), however, makes the interesting point
that such substantive contributions have come from non-psychologists or
from those psychologists " and here I include not only Erikson and
Rogers, but others like Fromm, Maslow, and May — who have dissociated
At another point, Raush notes that even among some of those well
disposed to behavioral modification, questions have been raised as to
the nature of the relation between operant research and behavior modifi-
cation (1974, p. 678).
\
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themselves from formal psychological research methods
.. .Does formal
research, as reported in our journals, offer little for application?"
This self-dissociation would appear to be a contributor to the
failure of integration between practice and traditional psychological
research methods. Another contributor would seem to be the status
differential which invests the practitioner with lower prestige than the
academic, scientific psychologist.
Raush's (1974, p. 679) suggestion is that,
it is not research that is being rejected, but one kind
of research. The practitioner, whether as producer or
consumer, rejects the traditional model of statistical
research because it is of no value to him. The academic
psychologist deplores this rejection and misinterprets
it as a rejection of science itself. It is as though the
rejection of a particular political platform meant that
people did not want government.
The continuing rejection by practitioners of the traditional psychological
research method is due to "fundamental inadequacies of those research
methods for tackling issues open to the practitioner." (p. 681).
Essentially, Raush advocates a pluralism in officially legitimized
research. While he would not eliminate traditional approaches, he is
urging the legitimizing (through acrediting agencies and such institu-
tions as journals and training programs) of alternate research approaches,
designed specifically for the contingencies of psychological practice
(p. 679). That is, models of research appropriate to the investigation
of human and inter-human processes must be developed and legitimized as
important in their own right, (and not as bastard children to "real
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science" fit only for the service of broaching hypotheses, but not in
succession with legitimate status in the scientific establishment)
. One
such conceptualization of a different role for the psychologist in such
a research process would be as a participant-conceptualizer
, rather than
scientist-practitioner
.
(a conceptualization suggested in 1965 at the
Swampscott Conference [Raush, p. 680] and probably based upon H.S,
Sullivan's concept of participant-observer.'^ Interestingly, Sullivan
was one of those who stood outside the traditional research approach,
and as a practitioner, made significant clinical and scientific contri-
butions, integrating the two and arguing explicitly for this view of
science receiving full legitimacy.).
External validity. Questions regarding the limits of experimentally
derived knowledge have also arisen, particularly with regard to whether
people behave in markedly different ways in experimental situations than
"outside" during their usual living (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975, p. 791). A
related concern is whether experimental situations investigate, and of
course measure, what is purportedly the subject of investigation.
Similarly, the choice of subject matters has spiraled inward, under the
necessity of meeting experimental conditions and controls, until the
subject matter is largely trivial, or irrelevant. Hudson faults psychology
Dr. Harold Jarman has pointed out that participant-observant
approaches have multiple roots, including a substantial tradition in
cultural anthropology and in 19th and early 20th century society.
Sullivan's work, mentioned here, was a probable root in clinical psy-
chiatry.
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for the practice wherein we "lift people from the context in which they
live and set them down in our departments and laboratories — where we
are at ease and they are not. Or we avoid the human race altogether,
and settle for the monkey or the rat ..." (Hudson, 1972, pp. 152-153).
He feels that, to a degree that is "astounding," academic psychologists
have shunned not only actual contact with people, but the ideas about
people that would evolve from such contact, preferring simple abstractions,
in what he regards as the flight "from our historically constituted
subject-matter." (pp. 151-152).
Repudiation of method seen as repudiation of science
. With such a
variety of criticisms, some of them fundamental to the research process,
it is perhaps an object of wonder that the experimental method has not
been abandoned, or at least transmutated . One such reason (among many
fully as significant) is that abandoning the experimental model means a
good deal more than abandoning merely a method (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,
p. 793); it would be essentially abandoning science itself as it is
currently practiced and construed. The experiment is virtually synono-
mous with good scientific practice and has been the overwhelmingly
8
dominant, and successful, form of science to date. To challenge it as
^Gadlin and Ingle (1975, p. 793) have stated that: "Abandoning the
experiment would be much more than the abandonment of a prevailing
method; it would be desertion of a paradigm." From their import, they
apparently refer to an orientation toward practice as well as that prac-
tice itself. While the present author would agree with their contention,
and obviously has, it is well to point out that their use of "paradigm"
here is no longer appropriate, as will be made clear in the next
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a method carries the direct implication of challenge to the dominant prac-
tice in science, and practically, to science itself. The significance of
the situation is compounded by the fact that, since this method is con-
strued as science itself, there is no way in terras of methodology, to
stand outside the practice to critique and change it; and with its
dominant philosophy of science eschewing such critique and historically
addressing questions of method, while assuming precisely the present areas
of criticism (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975) the crisis is very real, and per-
haps fundamental.
A number of people have dealt with their concern on just such a
fundamental level. Tyler (1973, p. 1024) contends that we require both
new guidelines for research and "some new models for research, not just
adapted from physics or biology, but created especially for the sciences
in which scientist, subject, and consumer all belong to the same species."
The disillusionment with the traditional framework is thoroughgoing (see
Hud son, 1972, pp. 11 and 75), as is the repudiation of a philosophy of
science that has engendered a form of science termed futile (Signorelli,
1974, p. 869). The intensive exploration of alternate methodologies
has been recommended (Raush, 1974; Gadlin and Ingle, 1975), rather than
the "simple" abandonment of the experimental method, which would indeed
be tantamount to "scientific suicide" (as it is essentially synonymous
chapter regarding the schema proposed by Thomas Kuhn about the develop-
ment of science. It will also be apparent that most people using the
paradigm term have fallen prey to this problem, helped along in no small
measure by Kuhn's acknowledged inconsistencies with regard to the term.
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with science). Some feel that psychology is in an era of Kuhnian revolu-
tion (Palermo, 1971, p. 136) and others^are calling for a new Kuhnian
paradigm ~ in this sense, a new framework for scientific theory and
practice (Elms, 1975; Gadlin and Ingle, 1975).
It is apparent that the crisis in psychology has emerged from a
number of contexts and is by now challenging the fundamentals of scienti-
fic conceptualization and practice. The criticisms have been of essen-
tially two types, the first by psychologists (and others in allied fields)
who are making methodological criticisms from within the same framework
as the research they are addressing. The second type of critique poses
a more serious crisis; this critique is by individuals who have stood,
or are beginning to stand, outside the framework of the experimental
method. They are critiquing not only the method, but the assumptions,
premises, goals, and philosophy of the dominant scientific framework.
It is probable that at present with the depth and extent of the present
crisis, the differences between competing frameworks will begin to be
articulated on a disciplinary level, and the controversy (regarding
both method and framework) will increase.
As a discipline, psychology has not been averse to fervent and often
chronic controversy; this history of acrimonious and usually fruitless
controversy bears a direct relationship to the lack of general recog-
nition that psychologists do not always share the same framework, and
not want the same things.
At Oxford, we were initiated into the joke about the
introspective psychologists who, in the early years of
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the century, fell into furious debate over whether green
was in truth a yellowish blue, or a blueish yellow. The
example is trivial, but the epistomological difficulties
such a story parodies are real enough, because the science
in which no two scientists can agree on the evidence is
no science at all (Hudson, 1972, p. 144).
Not only can psychologists not agree on the evidence, we usually
cannot agree on the questions.
Presence of sterile controversy . While psychology as a discipline has
had a history of active controversy, by no means have all of these con-
troversies proved productive. In fact, many of them have been charac-
terized as evangelical rather than scientific in that people regard
their arguments as directed towards ways of life rather than methods of
doing science (Sutherland, 1973). Still other controversies appear no
closer to resolution than they were when introduced scientific generations
ago, and in fact, though continuing in one variant or another, no longer
shed new light on the issues and may be termed "sterile." If the contro-
versants were not so intensely committed to their views, the debates
would by now sound quite stale. As it is, with some controversies, it
is quite difficult to ascertain what their role can be in the develop-
ment of psychology.
In view of this history of active controversy, and in the context
of a felt crisis where authors differ about preferable solutions to this
crisis, it may help to see if there are consistent characteristics which
distinguish successful from unsuccessful controversies in research and
practice. What are the characteristics of those controversies that
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have been resolved or appear be progressing to resolution. What are
the Characteristics of controversies that, though not being resolved
seem at least to shed light on the areas of debate' r,r, =a oace. Can some characteris
tics of the perpetual, unresolved, i.e., "sterile" debates be identifiedT
Are any particular types of controversy especially facilitating or
Impeding in the development of psychology?
CHAPTER II
KUHNIAN CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA, REVISIONS AND COMMENTS
Early Formulations and Reception
Kuhn's early formulation of paradigm, revolution, and normal science
met an interesting disparity of reactions: on the one hand enthusiasm
and application by scientists (Grinker, 1967; Stierlin, 1977; von
Bertalanffy, 1968), and on the other, extensive criticism by philosophers
(see Shapere, 1964; and especially Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). One of
these philosophers, Masterman (1970, p. 59-60), draws attention to this
and offers a possible origin for this disparity.
It is being widely read, and increasingly appreciated, by
actual research workers in the sciences, so that it must be
(to a certain extent) scientifically perspicuous. On the
other hand, it is being given widely diverse interpretations
by philosophers, which give some reason to think that it is
philosophically obscure. The reason for this double reaction,
in my view, derives from the fact that Kuhn looked at actual
science, several fields, instead of confining his field or
reading to that of the history and philosophy of science, i.e.
to one field. Insofar, therefore, as his material is recog-
nizable and familiar to actual scientists, they find his
thinking about it easy to understand. Insofar as the same
material is strange and unfamiliar to philosophers of science,
they find any thinking that is based on it opaque.
Kuhn's (1970a, p. 271) responses to most of the philosophical critique
indicate that he was convinced his position had been largely misunder-
stood and/or distorted. For instance.
It is now four years since Professor Watkins and I exchanged
mutually impenetrable views . . . rereading our contributions
together with those that have accreted to them, I am tempted
to posit the existence of two Thomas Kuhns, Kuhn-]^ is the
25.
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author of this essay and of an earlier piece in thisvolume. He also published in 1962 a book called T^el^iucpe of Scientific Revolutions, the one whicPteand Mxss Masterman discuss above. Kuhn, is the authorof another book with the same title. It is the onehere cxted repeatedly by Sir Karl Popper as well as by
That both books bear the same title cannot be altogether
accidental, for the views they present often overlap
and are, xn any case, expressed in the same words. Buttheir central concerns are, I conclude, usually verydifferent. As reported by his critics (his original has
unfortunately been unavailable to me)
,
Kuhn, seems on
occasion to make points that subvert essential aspects
of the position outlined by his namesake.
Kuhn attributes this mutual impenetrability to the kind of "Gestalt-
switch- he discusses in scientific revolutions and regards the misunder-
standings as "an extended example of what [he has] elsewhere called
partial or incomplete communication — the talking-through-each-other
that regularly characterizes discourse between participants in incommen-
surable points of view" (pp. 231-232).
Kuhn's position was that, since most of his critics had not under-
stood his schema, their critiques were largely irrelevant.
Masterman' s critique was the exception. It is significant, I think,
that Kuhn uses Masterman' s criticism so thoroughly. He at no point
accuses Masterman of distorting his material, acquieses with most of the
criticisms a'nd goes on to base his revisions on them. His reason for
this seemed to be his perception that Masterman' s critique was the only
one that understood his schema, making that Gestalt-switch he emphasizes
He pointed out (1970a, p. 234) that they approached the problem (that is
the necessary revision of the paradigm concept), in the same spirit.
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though, "my present position differs from hers in many details."
Masterman does indeed take the position of sympathetic critic which
is perhaps attributable to the stand she explicitly takes as a "workir
scientist" rather than philosopher. It was Masterman, in fact, who first
pointed out the very different receptions accorded Kuhn's work by scien-
tists and philosophers. Masterman has no trouble understanding Kuhn's
concept of normal science, regards his paradigm idea as scientifically
useful, and perceives its current use by scientists. She also manages
to take a swipe at two of Kuhn's more notable detractors. As Masterman
states (1970, p. 60-61),
That there is normal science — and that is exactly as Kuhn
says it is — is the outstanding, the crashingly obvious
fact which confronts and hits any philosophers of science
who set out, in a practical or technological manner, to do
any scientific research. It is because Kuhn — at last —
has noticed the central fact about all real science .. mainly
that it is a normally habit-governed, puzzle-solving activity,
not a fundamentally upheaving or falsifying activity (not, in'
other words, a philosophical activity), but actual scientists
are now, increasingly reading Kuhn instead of Popper; to such
an extent indeed that, in the new scientific field particularly,
'paradigm' and not 'hypothesis' is now the 'okay word.' It
is thus scientifically urgent, as well as philosophically
important, to try to find out what a Kuhnian paradigm is.
Since my overall viewpoint is scientific, this paper also
measures that science as it is actually done, i.e., science
roughly as Kuhn describes it — is also science as it ought
to be done .
.
For the one thing working scientists are not
going to do is change their ways of thinking, in doing science,
_ex more philosophico
, because they have Popper and Feyerabend
pontificating at them like eighteenth-century divines; par-
ticularly as both Popper and Feyerabend normally pontificate
at even more than eighteenth-century length...
This preface is, I fear, a shade aggressive; compression of
material and indignation with what I shall call in the paper
'philosophy-of-science-aetherialism' have caused this. In
any case, in view especially of some of the more interesting
28
phrases used by Watkins, a little pro-Kuhn aggressiveness
injected into the symposium will not do any harm.
Lest we begin to think Masterman an uncritical sympathizer
, it
should be noted that she explicitly agrees with Kuhn in one major area,
that of paradigm concept, but disagrees with him in another major area,
i.e., verification (1970, p. 61) and twice takes him to task for lack
of clarity: first, for confusion about multiple-paradigm science and
disregard of the role of technology in science, and secondly, for his
posing two incompatible solutions for his inability to find the rules
for puzzle-solving.
Masterman's Critique
Masterman begins her critique by raising a most interesting point ~
"... it is curious, that, up to now, no attempt has been made to eluci-
date this notion of paradigm, which is central to Kuhn's whole view of
science" (1970, p. 59). When she examines his 1962 usage of the term,
she found that Kuhn used 'paradigm' "in not less than twenty-one different
senses ... possibly more, not less" (1970, p. 61). Textual analysis
concerned with possible commonalities, with anything definite or general
about the paradigm idea, indicated that Kuhn's twenty-one usages of
paradigm fall into three large groups. And this is the heart of para-
digm revision (1970, p. 61).
For when he equates "paradigm" with a set of beliefs (p. 4)
with a myth (p. 2), with a successful metaphysical speculation
(p. 15), with a standard (p. 102), with a new way of seeing
(pp. 117-121), with an organizing principle governing percep-
tion itself (p. 120), with a map (p. 108), and with something
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which determines a large area of reality (p. 128) itis clearly a metaphysical notion or entity, rather than
a scientific one, which he has in his mind. I shall
therefore call paradigms of this philosophical sort
metaphysical paradigms
, or metaparadigms
: and these arethe only kind of paradigm which, to my knowledge, Kuhn's
philosophical critics have referred. Kuhn's second main
sense of "paradigm" however, which is given by another
group of uses, is a sociological sense. Thus he defines
paradigm as a universally recognized scientific achieve-
ment (p. X) as a concrete scientific achievement (pp. 10-
11) as like a set of political institutions (p. 91), and
as like also to an accepted judicial decision (p. 23). I
shall call paradigms of this sociological sort sociological
paradigms. Finally, Kuhn uses the "paradigm" in a more
concrete way still, as an actual textbook for classical
work (p. 10), as supplying tools, (pp. 37 and 76), as
actual instrumentation (pp. 58-60); more linguistically,
as a grammatical paradigm (p. 23), illustratively, as an
analogy (p.g. on p. 14); and more psychologically, as a
Gestalt-figure and as an anomalous pack of cards (pp. 63
and 85)
.
I shall call paradigms of this last sort artefact
paradigms or construct paradigms
.
Of these three major types, Masterman chooses the third, the arte-
fact or construct paradigm, as the fundamental sense of the concept,
what she calls the "initial practical trick-which-works-suf ficiently-
for-the-choice-of-it-to-embody-a-potential-insight" (1970, p. 70). It
is the concrete problem solution, the new way of seeing the problem
which allows it to be solved and which can then be extended to other
similar phenomena. The construct or artefact paradigm is a concrete
picture that is then used analogically. The paradigm then has two func-
tions: one which solves the original problem and the other "that being
a picture of one thing ... is used to represent another — for example,
a geometric model made of wire and beads, though it is primarily a glori-
fication of a well known kind of child's toy, is used in science to
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represent a protein molecule" (1970, pp. 76-77). The construct or arte-
fact paradigm antedates the research program and theory, it is the way
of seeing something, the flash of insight, that cracks the problem.
Often, this paradigm is supplied by what Masterman refers to as "some
rank outsiders with a quite different viewpoint and rudimentary tech-
niques [who] succeed." (1970, p. 84), in large part because of their
different perspectives and the crudeness of their technique. Masterman
considers most paradigms to be relatively crude, to have a basic quality
of concreteness (1970, p. 67). The paradigms are nothing if not practical,
usable, and rather primitive. They are unelaborated
,
unrefined, but
rather inspired insights.
Paradigm Revised
Kuhn's revision of the paradigm concept relies heavily on Masterman's
analysis and recommendation though he used a somewhat different structure.
Masterman assigned the 21 paradigm senses to three categories, the con-
struct or artefact, the sociological and metaphysical paradigm. She then
identified the artefact paradigm as the meaning she thought was fundamen-
tal to Kuhn's schema."^
1
I^t seems to me that Masterman is correct but for reasons other than
those she forwarded. She makes a case for the artefact sense being fun-
damental because: if a paradigm must come before normal science, if nor-
mal science is a fundamentally "puzzle-solving" activity, and if artefacts
solve puzzles, then the paradigms needed to solve the puzzle are the arte-
fact paradigms. Her argument can be damanged by terming normal science a
"problem-solving" venture, although I do prefer "puzzle-solving" for its
connotations. But it does seem to me that this argument of Masterman's
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Kuhn splits his original broad usage of paradigm into two inter-
related concepts: a construct or artefact paradigm and a disciplinary
matrix (DM).^ He thus retained Masterman's artefact paradigm as his
primary conceptualization of the term and assigned all the previous
meanings of the paradigm to the DM category. "All of the objects of
commitment described in my Scientific Revolution as paradigms, parts
of paradigms, or paradigmatic would find a place in the disciplinary
matrix, but they would not be lumped together as paradigms, individually
or collectively (1970a, p. 271). The DM defines a community and provides
those constructs and methods that "enable [adherents] to solve puzzles
and that accounted for their relative unarainlty in problem choice and in
the evaluation of problem solutions" (1970a, p. 271). As Kuhn points
out, the DM is essentially Masterman's social paradigm.
To explicate the revised paradigm concept first; retaining Master-
man's artefact or construct paradigm, Kuhn re-defined his paradigm as
"exemplar" (1970a, p. 271): "a universally recognized scientific achieve-
ment that for a time provides model problems and solutions to a community
is not nearly so solid as her points regarding the three categories, the
priority of paradigm to theory (66) and to the sociological paradigm
(69-70), and the artefact paradigms used as a way of seeing (73), ana-
logically (77), from the original picture solution to the operational
reinterpretation, while she seems to like the play on words about puzzle,
I am more impressed by other of her arguments.
"Disciplinary because it is common to the practitioners of a speci-
fic discipline, and 'matrix' because it consists of ordered elements which
require individual specification." (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 271).
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of practitioners" (1970b: viii)
. Paradigms are concrete problem
solutions and at least some of the very early technical problems
solutions (1970b, p. 18). As Masterman points out, Kuhn assigns the
central place "in real science, to a concrete achievement" rather than
to "an abstract theory" (1970a, p. 66). Kuhn and Masterman point out
here and there that these achievements must have three more characteris-
tics to function as paradigms, as opposed to problem solutions only.
They must be "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of
adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity" and they must
be sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the re-
defined group of practitioners to solve. Without these two requirements,
the paradigm could not exist, as a paradigm must point the way while
attracting followers, otherwise there would be no identifiable group with
which it is associated, nor, any subsequent line of investigation which
articulates it as a paradigm.
Finally, to function as a paradigm, a concrete problem solution must
be usable as an analogue; it must provide a Gestalt with which to "see"
3
new problems as subjects for the application of similar techniques.
This enables adherents to see some problems as "like each other" and
therefore apply an interpretation of the model solution. It would appear
3
This dual aspect of paradigm, as simultaneously solution and exem-
plar, occasionally causes trouble. For instance, ". . .Pavlovian con-
ditioning is limited as a paradigm-spawning exemplar for two reasons."
(Lipsey, 1974, p. 408). Examplars do not "spawn" paradigms, they are
paradigms
.
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that this process simultaneously: 1) solves the new problem, 2) extends
the range of the paradigm's applicability; and 3) demonstrates the
efficacy of that paradigm. Kuhn provides a very nice example of this
dual function of solution and analogy, in Galileo's solution of the ball
rolling down an inclined plane and the subsequent use of this solution
as an analogue.
Galileo found that a ball rolling down an incline acquiresjust enough velocity to return it to the same vertical height
on a second incline of any slope, and he learned to see that
experimental situation as like the pendulum with a point-mass
for a bob. Huyghens then solved the problem of the center of
oscillation of a physical pendulum by imagining that the ex-
tended body of the latter was composed of Galilean point-
pendula, the bobs between which could be released at any
point in the swing. After the bobs were released, the
individual point-pendula would swing freely, but their
collective center of gravity when each was at its highest
point, would be only at the height from which the center of
gravity of the extended pendulum had begun to fall. Finally,
Daniel Bernoulli, still with no aid from Newton's Laws, dis-'
covered how to make the flow of water from an orifice in a
storage tank resemble Huyghens' pendulum, determined the
descent of the center of gravity of the water and tank and
jet during an infinitesimal period of time. Next imagine that
each particle of water afterwards moves separately upward to
the maximum height obtainable with the velocity it possessed
at the end of the interval of descent. The ascent of the
center of gravity of the separate particles must then equal
the descent of the center of gravity of the water in tank and
jet. From that view of the problem the long sought speed of
efflux followed at once. These examples display what Miss
Masterman has in mind when she speaks of a paradigm as fun-
damentally an artefact which transforms problems to puzzles
and enables them to be solved even in the absence of an ade-
quate body of theory.
Is it clear that we are back to language and its attachments
to nature? Only one law was used in all of the proceeding
examples; known as the Principle of vis viva , it was generally
stated as 'Actual descent equals potential ascent. ' (1970a,
pp. 273-274).
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Besides demonstrating the solution-analogue functions of a paradigm,
Kuhn's example also speaks to the function of a paradigm in the absence
of theory, a point which causes difficulty for some of his readers.
Kuhn remarks that physicists share few rules by which they make
that transition from the Gestalt to the specific form of it demanded by
the individual problem, and. instead, exposure to a series of exemplary
problem-solutions teaches them to "see" different physical situations
as like each other. Once a number of problem situations are seen this
way, the individual "can write down ad lib " the interpretation of the
Gestalt required by the characteristics of the particular new problem.
Participating in this way of seeing teaches the individual what the
words mean and how they "... attach to nature; equally, it is part of
learning how the world behaves. The two cannot be separated..." (1970a,
p. 274). The acquisition of a new paradigm as insight and method seems
also to be the acquisition of a way of seeing "how the world is." Thus,
"facts" about some phenomenon in one paradigm would be different than
the "facts" about that phenomenon as construed by another paradigm.
The Disciplinary Matrix
Differentiation from paradigm
. Kuhn's 1962 Structure of Scientific
Revolutions obviously combined the paradigm and DM concepts. Thus, Kuhn
cites as paradigmatic, several works which served for a time to implicitly
define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeed-
ing generations of practitioners. He includes Aristotle's Physica
,
Ptolemy'
Almagest
,
Newton's Principia and Opticks
,
Franklin's Electricity
,
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Lavoisier's Chemistry and Lyell's Geography (1970b, p. 10).
They were able to do so because they were both sufficiently un-
precedented to attract adherents and sufficiently open-ended to leave
problems for solution. But then Kuhn continues:
[These] accepted examples of actual scientific practice —
examples which include law, theory, application, and
instrumentation together — provide models from which
spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.
These are the traditions which the historian describes under
such rubrics as 'Ptoleraic astronomy' (or ' Copernican' )
,
'Aristotelian dynamics' (or 'Newtonian'), 'corpuscular'
optics' (or 'wave optics'), and so on (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 10).
The "coherent research traditions" should not be seen as identical
to the technical problems solutions. The latter are the paradigms (e.g.
the Almagest
,
or the Principia ) which precede
,
serve as exemplars for,
and from which are derived
,
the coherent traditions. These traditions
are what Kuhn later termed disciplinary matrices (DMs) with characteris-
tics, origins and functions all their own. This 1962 presentation in
quotations indicates the point at which the 1970 revision separates the
disciplinary matrix concept from the paradigm.
In separating the DM concept from the paradigm concept, Kuhn (1970a,
p. 271) asked: "what its members shared that enabled them to solve
puzzles and that accounted for their relative unanimity in problem choic
and in the evaluation of problem-solutions?" Here he is essentially con
ceptualizing the DM as a constellation of group commitments (1970b, p. 1
It is a strong network of such commitments "conceptual, theoretical, and
methodological" (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 42), which defines a community (Kuhn,
1970b, p. 177). This is the perspective within which Kuhn feels the DM
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is what makes it possible for the members of a coherent tradition of
research to have relative fullness in their professional communication
with each other, and relative unanimity in their professional judgments
(1970b, p. 182). It is important to recognize that a DM governs the
practitioners and not the subject matter (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 180). Seen
sociologically, the DM is "a set of scientific habits
... [which] may be
intellectual, verbal, behavioral, mechanical, technological" (Masterman,
1970, p. 66).
Internal structure
.
When addressing the disciplinary matrix "from the
outside," trying to see what it does, what functions it serves, Kuhn
seems more successful than when he tries to articulate a DM's internal
structure. Here, when talking about internal structure, he pares the DM
down to four constituents: paradigm or exemplar, shared symbolic generali-
zations, shared models whether heuristic or metaphysical, and shared
values.
A DM is much broader than, and derives from, a paradigm. Kuhn is
quite clear that the concrete scientific achievement must not be identi-
fied with, but must be seen as "prior to the various concepts, laws,
theories, the points of view that may be extracted from it" (Kuhn, 1970b,
p. 11). The paradigm is the concrete problem-solution used as analogue
whereas the disciplinary matrix is the line of investigation founded
upon that paradigm or paradigm-set which bind the practitioners.
Symbolic generalizations, another DM component, are those expressions
deployed without question or dissent by group members, which can be
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readily cast into logical form (1970b, p. 182). Sometimes these can be
expressed in symbolic form, as in: f = ma (force is equal to mass X .
^acceleration). Other symbolic generalizations are more easily expressed
with words such as "action equals reaction." These symbolic generali-
zations allow group members to attach their logical and mathematical
manipulations to consensual sign posts, as well as functioning as laws
and definitions for the symbols used. The symbolic generalizations are
developed as the paradigm is articulated and are consensually validated
within the DM.
The third major component of any DM is the shared belief in particular
models "whether metaphysical, like atomism, or heuristic like the hydro-
dynamic model of the electric circuit" (Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 271-272). The
heuristic model for molecules of gas regards them as behaving like tiny
elastic billiard balls in random motion. The metaphysical models portray
phenomena in such a way as to indicate what types of approaches are per-
missible. For example, with regard to metaphysical models as is pointed
out in Marx and Hillix (1963, p. 180).
...there are two extreme views of the physical world and the
role of systems in it. One view is that the world is composed
of independent additive parts whose total constitutes reality.
The other view is that everything is related to everything
else, and there are no independent systems. The Gestaltists
held neither of these extreme views, although they leaned
toward the latter.
The metaphysical paradigms as presented by Kuhn address both episteraolo-
gical and ontological concerns.
Finally the last component Kuhn discusses at any length (and that is
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not much) are values. Kuhn feels that values are more widely shared
among different communities than either symbolic generalizations or
models, and that they do much toward providing a sense of community to
natural scientists as a whole. Probably the most deeply held rules con-
cern predictions: they should be accurate, quantitative measures are
preferable to qualitative, etc. There are also values to be used in
judging whole theories, e.g., theories should permit puzzle formulation
and solution, it should be as simple as possible, self-consistent, and
plausible (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 185). The issue of value seems to me poorly
articulated; for instance, if values are more widely shared amon^ different
communities than the other DM constituents, and if they do more toward
providing a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole, it seems
as though in some ways values function outside the DM as well as inside
the DM. How else could they provide a sense of community across DM's if
these values did not, in some sense, also operate outside DMs? This is
an area which deserves more scrutiny. It is also obvious that when Kuhn
refers to values, he is using the term in the narrow sense, in relation
to theory choice and construction.
After listing and discussing rather briefly the four components of
the DM, Kuhn states, "...and other elements of the sort" (Kuhn, 1970a,
p. 272). These "...other elements of the sort" while most certainly
not elucidated by Kuhn here in his second approach (the internal structure
of the DM), are included in the first approach (the function of the DM)
—
that is what it seems to do "for" practitioners. These mentioned, but
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not developed, other components then, must include "scientific habits"
in theory, method, and instrumentation/ technology
. All of which above
have been mentioned as part and parcel of the DM by Kuhn and Masterman
as they Initially approached the DM concept. They then presumably in-
cluded these concerns only under "other elements of the sort."
It is obvious, however, that they are necessary and should be
articulated as to function and relationship with components of the DM.
Kuhn places both paradigm and some aspects of disciplinary matrix prior
to theory. For instance (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 271)
When I speak of knowledge embedded in terms and phrases
learned by some non-linguistic process like ostension,
I am making the same point that my book aimed to make
by repeated reference to the role of paradigms as con-
crete problem solutions, the exemplary objects of an
ostension. When I speak of that knowledge as consequen-
tial for science and for theory-construction, I am
identifying what Miss Masterman underscores about para-
digms by saying that they 'can function when the theory
is not there.
'
His points regarding paradigm solutions as exemplary objects of ostension,
and as operating prior to theory are nicely spelled out in the previously
presented quotation regarding Galileo, Huyghens, et al
. ,
using the para-
digm in the absence of Newtonian theory, but with the picture-insight
to guide them. Masterman (1970, p. 66) makes the further point that, by
assigning the central place in actual science to concrete achievements,
that is, the paradigm rather than the theory, "Kuhn, alone among philo-
sophers of science, puts himself in a position to dispel the worry which
so besets the working scientist confronted for the first time with pro-
fessional philosophy of science, 'How can I be using a theory which isn't
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there'"?
Relation Between Paradigm and DM
It is also clear that paradigms must initially precede DMs, since
the paradigm provides the initial insight, and the normal science which
articulates that paradigm must clearly exist subsequent to, and not
prior to, the paradigm. But what does the scientist use in terms of
method or perspective to develop a paradigm? Given the emphasis Kuhn
places on technical problem solutions, the individual scientist might
well be "importing" a technique or approach from a different DM. The
insights or techniques of the normal science of a different DM are
adapted and brought to bear on the problem at hand. In fact, Masterman
alludes to this process when she talks about a paradigm being constructed
by "rank outsiders" in a different field who come up with a crude, but
useful, paradigm. (As we will see, this is precisely what occurred in
the construction of the double bind paradigm.) If the technique, or
"trick," is successful, the individual has a problem solution, and if
that problem solution meets the criteria of unprecedented success, open-
endedness, and possibility of analogic use as Gestalt or exemplar, s/he
also has a new paradigm; at this point, the "imported" technique, or
"trick," if it remains useful, becomes the starting point and part of
the new DM, and will become translated and modified through time to meet
the requirements of the problems encountered. Those techniques or tricks
not an aid in constructing the paradigm, or subsequently articulating it.
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are obviously not part of the new DM.
During the early elaboration and articulation of the paradigm by
DM adherents, the sequence is linear; that is. the paradigm exists,
and being elaborated, forms a DM through normal science activity and the
flow of "events- is from paradigms to DM. (Actually, this is necessarily
the case, as the paradigm precedes the DM in time and function). As both
components become developed, however, the linear quality changes; DM
components reflect "back" onto the original paradigm, necessitating modi-
fications. For instance, some refinement of instrumentation may require
a change of paradigm quantification values (if the paradigm has been ex-
pressed in numbers), or, the elaboration of a theory might highlight
necessary reformulation of a basic process in the paradigm. It is
supposed that if paradigms are constructed in such a manner that makes
modification impossible, the DM must eventually wither; whether this has
actually occurred seems an interesting, and important point, though one
which is tangential to present purposes.
Kuhn does not address himself to this loss of linearity, and there-
by unrealistically limits his schema. The concept of "ref lexivity" as
developed by the ethonomethodologists (Mehan and Wood, 1975) appears to
describe the actual relationship of the paradigm and DM, after the
initial development of the DM. That is, both the paradigm and DM become
defined by the adherents with respect to each other and as each becomes
defined, the definition serves a defensive or confirming purpose for the
other. In such a way the adherents maintain some "purity" of definition
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and some overall coheslveness In the DM.
Similarly. U>a use o£ new Instrumentation a, well as old techniques
and methods may also allow new problems and solutions to emerge, e.g..
as Kuhn points out. use of the cathode ray made the discovery of x-rays
possible. The cathode ray and Its use were Instrumentation and methodol-
ogy respectively but the solution to the problem remains the insight,
that is the paradigm, not the instrument. At times, the two have been
confused; for Instance the concept of "instrumental paradigms" such as
the shuttle box and rotary pursuit apparatus have been forwarded
(Welmer and Palermo, 1973. p. 242. their footnote M,
. While Welmer and
Palermo indicate that these devices function within the paradigm and
meet exemplar requirements
.
It seems that they confuse the issue some-
what. These Instruments may well be a part of a problem-solution that
also serves as an analogue, and thus In part constitute a paradigm, but
it appears unnecessary and potentially confusing to refer to them as
"instrumental paradigms."
In a similar point. Lipaey (1974. pp. 407-408) takes them to task
for arguing that behaviorlstlc methods and techniques were exemplars,
Lipsey's point is that they are not the same as a concrete problem-
solution "resulting from the use of a particular method or technique."
This point seems equivocal to me. For instance, if a familiar technique
solves a problem, this seems to me to be normal science and therefore
not the creation of a paradigm. If, on the other hand, a familiar method
or technique is adapted to solve a new problem such that the solution
A3
meets paradigm requirements, that adapted method-and-solution combination
appear to be the relevant unit, and then, the method does indeed par-
tially constitute the paradigm.
Functions of DMs
Gatekeeping
.
Kuhn considered some of the other important functions
(beyond guidance functions previously discussed) of the DM. The first
of these, essentially a gatekeeping function, involves the achievement
of unanimity regarding the problem-choice and solution.
...One of the things a scientific community acquires with
a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that
while the paradigm is taken for granted, it can be assumed
to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only
problems that the community will admit as scientific or
encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, in-
cluding many that had previously been standard, are'
rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another dis-
cipline, as sometimes just too problematic to be worth
the time (Kuhn, 1962, p. 37, cited by Masterman, 1970,
pp. 82-83, footnote).
Weimer and Palermo (1973, pp. 223-224) give an exposition of a DM
development, particularly with respect to its gatekeeping functions and
institutionalization.
In sum, the paradigmatic and normal science nature of structural
psychology is evident from a number of its distinctive
characteristics. It specified a rigorous subject matter
(consciousness and its contents) and a rigorous method
(selbstbeobachtung) such that anyone studying another
subject or employing another method was automatically not
doing 'experimental psychology.' Laboratories were
founded for the experimental study of the subject matter,
while universities offered courses in the 'New Psychology',
and departments gradually appeared as separate entities
from physiology and philosophy. Professional initiates were
4A
trained m these departments and laboratories. Professionaljournals, such as the Philosophische Studien (founded in
1881), appeared for the dissemination of research findingsLikewise, psychological professional societies developed^
'
tor the purpose of fostering communication within thegroup A certain amount of 'brass instrument' equipment
specific to the psychological laboratory, was developed
'
Despite the many conceptual and theoretical issues takenfor granted (e.g., the utility and validity of studying
the contents of the adult mind), there were numerous
°
within the ring' (to use Titchener's turn of phrase) con-troversies concerning specific issues of fundamental
theoretical if not paradigmatic import (such as whether theAusfragemethode was a legitimate form of introspection)
Throughout all of this, some basic metaphysical directives
such as 'Associationism is the mechanism of the mind', were
endorsed unquestioningly
.
(Weimer and Palermo, 1973, pp. 223-224).
Communication and consensus. Kuhn also considers the communicational
function of a disciplinary matrix; this appears to be a major function
with respect to conducting normal science activities, to the maintenance
of research communities, and to the perception and conceptualization
of phenomena and decisions about how they should be researched.
One of the things upon which the practive of normal science
depends is a learned ability to group objects and situations
into similarity classes which are primitive in the sense that
the grouping is done without the answer to the question,
'similar with respect to what?' One aspect of every revolution
is then that some of these similarity relations change. Objects
which were grouped in the same set before were grouped in
different sets afterwards and visa versa
. Think of the sun,
moon, Mars, and Earth before and after Copernicus; of free
fall, pendular, and planetary motion before and after Galileo,
or of salts, alloys, and a sulpher-iron filing mix before
and after Bolton. Since most objects within even the altered
sets continue to be grouped together, the names of the sets
are generally preserved. Nevertheless
, the transfer of a
subset can critically affect the network of interrelations
among the sets
.
Transferring the metals from the set of
compounds to the set of elements was part of a new theory of
combustion, of acidity, and of the difference between physical
45
and chemical combination. In short ordpr ^hoo uhad spread through all of cUejtstry Zn ^h a' ^df^trrbution of objects a.ong slmilarLy sets occurs itomen whose discourse had proceeded for some time"ur
responding to the same stimulus with Incompatible des-criptions or generalizations. Just because neither canthen say "I use the word element (or mixture, or pLne?
?heTur:r:f":he'b"':H*tne source of the breakdown In their communication may
xy/ua, pp. Z75-276) [emphasis added]
Without insisting that there is no recourse in such situations,
Kuhn does emphasize that these differences are very deep, not merely
about definition, names or theory, but "equally and inseparably about
nature. We cannot say with any assurance that the two men even see the
same thing, possess the same data, but identify or interpret it differen-
tly" (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 276).
Kuhn's work here, it seems to me, is quite important with regard
to controversy in psychology and so I will continue at some length.
The source of communication breakdowns now being considered
are likely evidence that the men involved are processing
certain stimuli differently, receiving different data from
them, seeing different things or the same things differently
Nevertheless, there must be recourse. Though they have no
direct access to it, the stimuli to which the participants
in a communication breakdown respond are, under pain of
solipsism, the same. So is their general neutral apparatus,
however different the program. Furthermore, except in small,
if all-important areas of experience, programming must be
the same, for the men involved share a history (except the
immediate past), a language, and an everyday world, and most
of a scientific one. Given what they share, they can find
out much about how they differ. At least they can do so if
they have sufficient will, patience, and tolerance of
threatening ambiguity, characteristics which, in matters of
this sort, cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the sorts of
therapeutic efforts to which I now turn are rarely carried
far by scientists.
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cln l^Trn '
'^^'^ experiencing communication breakdowna discover by experiment-sometimes by thought-experiment
arm-chaxr science-the area in which it occurs. O^enthe linguistic center of the difficulty will involve a setof terms, like element and compound, which both men deploy
unproblematically but which it can now be seen they attach
I£ Iiature in different ways. For each, these are teT^^Ti^ abasic vocabulary, at least in the sense that their normal
mtra-group use elicits no discussion
, request for explication
or disagreement. Having discovered, however, thIF for intra-
^roup discussion, these words are the locus o^ special
difficulties
,
our men may resort to their shared everyday
vocabularies in a further attempt to elucidate their troubles.Each may, that is, try to discover what the other would see
and say when presented with a stimulus to which his visual
and verbal responses would be different. With time and skill
they may become very good predictors of each others' be-
havior, something that the historian regularly learns to do(or should) when dealing with older scientific theories
(Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 276-277; emphasis added)
It is important to emphasize here Kuhn's points regarding differen-
ces in perception as well as meaning. Within one DM, this sort of
communicational breakdown is necessarily impossible since the adherents
share paradigms (ways of seeing the problem of interest which help to
constitute the DM), symbolic generalizations (i.e., shared language and
codes, where the same symbol or word means the same thing and is related
to the same phenomenon for both people) and shared values, that is
shared ideas about what is important; there may be degrees of differen-
ces but they are within the same framework. This does not imply lack
of controversy within DMs; there can be vehement debates regarding
theoretical issues, methods, interpretations of results, etc., but since
the framework is shared, these controversies resolve. But communication
between two such frameworks is very difficult though not impossible.
since the same words might mean different things or refer to different
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phenomena, or refer to the same phenomena in different ways. There is
not necessarily any agreement about what is important and the indivi-
duals do not share important Gestalts through which they see the world.
(For, after all, if they did, they would share a DM). Clearly, defi-
nitional fights can be resolved within a DM, but are almost irresol-
vable between two DMs as there is not the shared language, values or
phenomena, nor is the interrelationship of language and phenomena the
same.
With this sort of elaboration, it becomes clear that the differen-
ces between the two different DMs are more than a matter of differing
paradigms, though that in itself can be rather confusing. Differing
paradigms means that the same name may be used for different phenomena.
Further, just to make matters more complicated, two different paradigms
in all probability stand in different relation to their DMs, that is,
no two paradigms are articulated in the same manner by their DMs. Keeping
this difference in mind can help us to avoid certain mistakes which appear
repeatedly in controversies.
For instance, in an attempt to present some of the difficulties in
deciding among the various theoretical formulations of learning theory,
Weimer and Palermo (1973, p. 230) state that,
...all these theorists utilized the 'empirical fact' of rein-
forcement in their behavioral equation, regardless of whether
it was 'theoretically necessary' or not. As is by now common
knowledge, the difficulty in deciding between the various theo-
retical formulations of 'learning theory' was that, despite
their different appearances, all these theories 'predicted'
(or, more often, postdicted) the same behavioral results,
[their emphasis].
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It might well be that the theories predicted the same results and
that complicated the choice. But surely, when competing lines of re-
search talk about the "empirical fact" of reinforcement, it is obvious
that they are not necessarily talking about the same thing. Thus, as
Weimer and Palermo (1973, p. 229) note:
As is well known, Hull related reinforcement directly todrive reduction and deemed it necessary for learning.
Guthrie, by contrast, said that reinforcement was not
necessary for learning (that learning was nothing but
association by contiguity), and that it had an effect
upon momentary performance only. Skinner was a strict
reinforcement theorist (for operant behaviour) but con-
sidered it to be an experimental operation only, shunning
all attempts to identify the nature of reinforcement with
physiological (or other) variables. Tolman acknowledged
the necessity of reinforcement for certain types of learning
situations, but denied its relevance to others. Spence,
remained noncommital throughout the controversy .
Though all of the above learning theorists used the term "rein-
forcement" and referred to its presence as an empirical fact, it is
clear they had different conceptualizations for the term, and actually,
the identical term referred to different phenomena. However, in those
DMs where reinforcement was regarded as essential to learning itself
(rather than merely for performance)
, the reinforcement concept would
be more important and would very probably be articulated and supported
in a different manner than when reinforcement was regarded as useful only
in eliciting the performance of the already learned response.
A related point is, that "further research" does not suffice to
resolve controversies across DMs and in fact, cannot . Burgess (1972,
p. 197) has also recognized this; he is speaking with reference to the
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long-standing controversy between cognitive psychology versus Skinnerian
psychology.
^h^n they note that research
will be the final arbiter between these two approachesthis surely constitutes a misinterpretation of Kuhn
nothing could be further from the truth. Research doesnot determine a paradigm change - it is a Gestalt switchand since few Skinnerians or cognitists discuss their
mutual problems this Gestalt switch seems far off.
Take for example, a controversy cited where a transposition experi-
ment with two discriminable stimuli was agreed upon by both factions as
an adequate instrument with which to test the alternative approaches.
"The neobehaviouristic orthodoxy won this conflict by the simple, yet
beautifully effective, expedient of ' operationalizing ' the controversy
in terms of their own experimental design," (Weimer and Palermo, 1973,
pp. 230-231). By allowing the controversy to be couched in neobehaviouris-
tic terms and methods, the cognitive proponents could not possibly "win."
They had allowed the others to define the problem, conditions, methods
of testing and acceptable solution, i.e., they had allowed the problem
to be put into the neobehaviouristic DM, and, as such, had capitulated
the fight before the fight. It is a bit like those expositions of the
Socratic method wherein the "learner" answers questions so phrased that
only one answer is possible, only to be drawn inevitably to the foregone
conclusion. Allowing a debate to be entered only within one DM or another
pre-empts the testing factor altogether.
In addition, the differences in values, meaning and language as well
as choice of heuristic or metaphysical model, makes settling of terms
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between two people who do not share a DM, exceedingly troublesome and
improbable. This is not to say that communication and resolution is
impossible; for example, areas of disagreement can be identified and
discussed (although agreement is unlikely); however, discussion about
the content of any of the intra-DM constituents by tt^o people who do
not share a DM is doubly difficult. First, they lack a shared frame-
work of problems and meanings. Secondly, each constituent of a DM is
not independent but rather is inter-dependent on the others; thus, the
other constituents are often brought in to clarify a point about the con-
stituent in question, but if they are, the entire DM and not merely one
component, will be debated and that is fruitless. Here I think is one
of the reasons Kuhn talks about conversion experiences.
In summary, the consensual aspects of the DM are of fundamental
importance in facilitating normal science activities and ease of communi-
cation within a DM. Across DMs, however, this consensual aspect is
lacking (by definition), and this deficit facilitates mis-understanding
in a number of areas. First, semantic difficulties may arise because
identical words have different meanings in different DMs. Secondly,
different DMs may look at what appears to be the same phenomenon, but
perceive very different problems and conceptualize different approaches;
if these differences in perception are not recognized, mis-understandings
are likely. Thirdly, the difficulty in understanding and communication
is exacerbated by the fact that paradigms are not necessarily developed
and elaborated in the same way by their respective DMs; thus, what one
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DM may regard as the obvious next step and definitive trial may seem
irrelevant, or even misguided to the other DM. Because of this, argu-
ments about such activities as verification or disconf irmation, across
DMs, are usually fruitless. Fourth, the inter-dependence of DM con-
stituents often means that it is very difficult to fully discuss any
one constituent without bringing in some others. Thus, it may be
impractical to attempt to explain a DM's paradigm without also mentioning
those values or models which help to articulate it; similarly, it would
be very difficult to debate one's models without using the DM's symbolic
generalization. Unfortunately, the debate then involves large regions
of the respective DMs rather than isolated segments. Finally, mis-
understandings across DM lines is fostered by the belief that these
debates are resolvable by "further research". This belief is based on
the premise that method and research are independent of DMs. This is
clearly not the case. Perception and conceptualization of the phenomenon,
language, models, instrumentation and methodology are DM-related. As
such, further research rather than resolving the debate between two DMs,
perpetuates and elaborates two parallel lines of research in disagree-
ment. Communication and consensual understanding are DM functions for
the adherents of each specific DM; this consensuality breaks down across
DM boundaries, that is, consensuality is not a perogative of those who
do not share a framework.
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Normal Science, Anomaly, Crisis, and Revo1nf.-nn
Normal science
_.
Conceptualizing scientific activity and progress. Kuhn
distinguishes between his own and Karl Popper's. Kuhn Cl970a, pp. 242-
243) argues that Popper's idea of 'revolutions in permanence':
...does not, anymore than 'square-circle', describe aphenomenon that could exist. Frameworks ^ust be livedwith and explored before they can be broken. But Hatdoes not imply that scientists ought not aim at the
^oaf "rpv unobtainable that
fnf.-H
^^^°l"tion m permanence' could name an importanta d Ideological imperative. If Sir Karl and I disagreeat all about normal science, it is over this point. Heand his group argue that the scientist should try at alltimes to be a critic and a proliferator of alternatetheories. I urge the desirability of alternate strategywhich reserves such behavior for special occasions.
Specifically. Kuhn conceptualizes scientific activity in terms of
alternations between periods in which normal science is the dominant mode
of activity, interspersed with revolutionary periods emerging when normal
science has uncovered problems which are unsolvable in the usual concep-
tual-procedural structure. That is, normal science and revolutionary
science alternate, but neither is dispensible in scientific activity.
Normal science consists of those research activities which articulate,
elaborate and extend the paradigm or paradigm set. by engaging in puzzle-
solving behavior. The paradigm is used in its various functions, is re-
fined and clarified, and the limits of its applicability began to be
sensed. Essentially, lines of research originate from the paradigms and
develop into DMs. Normal science activities investigate phenomena both
deemed important by the value system of the developing DM and seen as
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solvable by practitioners using the particular paradigm (and subsequent
methodology and concepts built up by the DM thus far.) The paradigm
is used in its Gestalt function and becomes progressively more "power-
ful" as a scientific tool.
During these periods of normal science, practitioners can take the
current theory for granted, exploiting it rather than criticizing it;
practitioners in the mature sciences are free to investigate their
phenomena to "an esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimaginable"
(Kuhn, 1970a, p. 247). It is at these times, that theories are inves-
tigated and extended, adding information to the body of knowledge al-
ready acquired; the journal article is the primary source of information,
primary vehicle of information processing, and the mode of programs is
cumulative, that is data build up and add to what has been previously
articulated.
Kuhn points out that there is an aspect of normal science that is
fundamentally conservative, in which normal science "seems an attempt
to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible boxes that
the paradigm provided" (1970b, p. 24). During normal science phases,
there is really no sort of activity which is directed to eliciting new
sorts of phenomena; new information about recognized phenomena, yes, but
that is altogether different than revealing and having to deal with new
phenomena. In fact, those phenomena that not fit into the paradigm-
DM complex are either not seen at all (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 24), or are "rele-
gated" to other DMs, or to metaphysics. Despite this conservative aspect.
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which makes possible investigation without constant glancing over one's
shoulder, change does occur. At times in all substantive areas revolu-
tionary science develops because of a rather specific developmental
pattern. It is probably important to emphasize here that these revolu-
tionary phases emerged from certain developments in normal science, that
revolutionary science establishes the paradigms which are later articula-
ted and which make normal science necessary and possible; suffice it to
say that both forms of scientific activity are indispensible
.
Anomaly. During the articulation and extension of the paradigms, that
is during normal science activity, there sometimes occur obdurate dis-
crepancies between paradigm-based prediction and actual empirical
findings, i.e., anomalies. With replications, if these disparities pre-
sist, they result in a felt crisis, with resulting changes in the
activities and goals of science, and the eventual establishment of a
new paradigm or set of related paradigms, which initiates another period
of normal science activity.
Kuhn (1970a, pp. 256-257) gives a rather nice example of this dis-
parity between paradigm-induced expectation and empirical finding, in
his summary of the origin of the Bohr atom.
...the background was an entirely normal puzzle. Bohr set
out to improve the physical approximations .. .of the energy
lost by charged particles passing through matter. In the
process he made what was to him the surprising discovery that
the Rutherford atom. . .was mechanically unstable and that a
Planck-like ad hoc device for stabilizing it proved a promising
explanation of the periodicities in Mendeleev's table, some-
thing else for which he had not been looking . At that point
his model still had no excited states, nor was Bohr yet con-
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cerned to apply it to atomic spectra; those steps followedhowever as he attempted to reconcile his model with the
'
apparently incompatible one developed by J.W. Nicholson
and in the process, encountered Balmer
' s formula. Like
much of the research that produces revolution, Bohr'sbiggest achievement in 1913 are products, therefore, of a
research program directed to goals very different from those
^^'^^^"^^
••• ^"'^ illustrates with particular clariTTThrT^olu-tionary efficacy of normal research puzzles, (emphasis added)
Kuhn's explication aptly illustrates the manner in which anomalies crop
up during the course of normal science activity, directed elsewhere, and
how efficient or productive normal research puzzles prove to be for just
this sort of thing. He makes this latter point several times, for in-
stance, "... in developing sciences ... it is technical puzzles that
provide the usual occasions and often the concrete material for revolu-
tion. Their availability together with the information and signals they
provide account in large part for the special nature of scientific pro-
gress." (1970a, p. 247)
Since an anomaly is a discrepancy between paradigm-induced expect-
ation and actual observation (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 52), it is important to
realize, as Masterman points out, (1970, pp. 82-83) that:
[Kuhn's] essential point is that an anomaly is an untruth, or
a should-be-soluable-but-is-insoluable problem, or a germane
but unwelcome result, or a contradiction, or an absurdity,
which is thrown up by the paradigm itself being pushed too
far ; not just an incidental counter-argument to the theory,
or an awkward fact, which Kuhn correctly characterizes is
merely an 'irritant'. Neither is it an extra-paradigmatic
novelty nor a problem which used to exist in the field at an
earlier stage, but which the developers of the paradigm have
now suppressed and rendered invisible, because it is incom-
patible with the paradigms "basic commitment." The anomaly,
to be a true anomaly, has got to be introduced from within
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4the paradigm. [her emphasis]
Efforts are made to "correct" the situation, at times by adjusting
the analogy function of the paradigm, or alternatively, to produce var-
iants of the theories which can accomodate the anomaly, or if worse comes
to worse to "dig out the theory's fundamental assumptions, to try to
make the analogy fit again" (Masterman, 1970, p. 83).
Obviously, anomalies will have different impact depending upon how
important a point in a DM they challenge. An anomaly of theory for in-
stance, may necessitate changes in a theory, without challenging the
paradigm or other primary DM components. If the paradigm is challenged
by the anomalies, however, then clearly they are very significant and
will probably induce a relatively greater sense of difficulty.
Crisis. If the anomalies continue, if for instance there are several of
them and they make the inadequacies of the present framework clear, or
if the anomalies, though not numerous, are embarrassing because they
counter critical parts of the DM, a period of crisis emerges. As Master-
man develops the important point (1970, pp. 83-84)
...it is not only the case that a fully extended paradigm
or theory, reaches the point where further extensions of
it produce diminishing returns. The situation is worse.
4
See Kuhn's example of obdurate anomalies in early twentieth cen-
tum physics, 1970, p. 257.
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ac iTthf complexity and conf^sJon n
?oo fafLr^J/!^ --^^ -alogy does, if pressed
I Llrl V P"^"" "^like the way in which1 !T °^ P"^^ mathematics does, when it yieLs un-decx abi ormuli or contradictions, or fails to^^ld
^^^^^^^^^
No philosopher of science before Kuhn had described thisdeterioration. All had blamed the gradual coUapse ofvarious scientific theories on the Let ?hat thov
eventually falsified in experience by sav t^P
""^"^
of new farf<?- i o ^
^^""-^^"^^ °y» y, he emergence
,?nr» ^^ °L f ''^^"'^ '"^'^^^ commitments, andsi ce the effect of these paradigms Is drastlcaUy
by their own make up... '
This process, of emerging anomalies which increasingly demonstrate
the inadequacies of the all important (to scientific activity) framework,
where the paradigm "gets pushed too far" and collapses from within, have
some of the tragicomic quality of the well-known cartoon character
looking down and realizing he has run off the cliff and didn't know it.
There's a ring of some of the same surprise, betrayal, incipient outrage,
and dawning awful conviction that there's going to be hell to pay.
This sense of outraged and chagrined shock seems to me an earmark of
that transition from normal science to revolutionary science. Awareness
of the problem is necessary, for there is no crisis in Kuhn's framework
without awareness. Crisis is induced by this awareness among adherents
that anomalies exist and despite persistent efforts, will not conform
to paradigmatic expectations (Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 67-68). Without such
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awareness, there can be no crisis, though there ™ay be anomalous
findings
.
Kuhn discusses some historical situations in which solutions to
problems have been ignored for a time because no one knew they were
needed; thus there was no crisis, but no new solution either, until
awareness of anomaly induced crisis and the idea was dusted off to see
if it would fit. The most famous of these situations is probably the
anticipation of Copernicus by Aristarchus in the third century B.C.
His work on the heliocentric solar system was ignored, as no one really
needed it. It explained nothing then that the geocentric system did not,
and there existed no felt crisis. Only after repeated failures of the
Ptolemaic system did it become clear that an alternative was needed
(summarized from Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 75-76).
A bit closer to home, Weimer and Palermo (1973, p. 232) present a
similar situation. They regard K. Lashley's 1951 Hixton Symposium
paper on serial order as
a coup de grace from which no behaviourism worthy of the
name will ever recover
... [but J it is only recently (nearly
twenty years after the fact) that Lashley's monumental
paper is receiving recognition. With behaviourism in sway,
it was initially ignored even at Harvard (Lashley's own
institution) which was subsequently the birthplace of the
new psycholinguistics during the early 1960 's.
(Lashley's paper was directly relevant to the psycholinguistic position).
Besides awareness, there are a number of other earmarks to the crisis
phase, that is, the transition from normal science to revolutionary
science. These include, "the proliferation of competing articulations,
the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent.
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the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals (Kuhn,
1962, p. 90, quoted by Masterman, 1970, p. 83, in a footnote). The pro-
liferation of theories is an attempt to include the anomalies in the DM
framework, with many of them more than a little plausible. Further
characteristics of crisis are investigation of phenomena formerly con-
sidered beyond the confines of legitimacy, with a concomittant loosening
of the rules of research, and debate about these rules of normal science.
.
Kuhn points out that it is not coincidental that the emergence of
Newtonian physics in the 17th century, and relativity and quantum
mechanics in the 20th, were preceded and accompanied by fundamental and
philosophical investigations of the respective contemporary research
traditions. It would seem that such periods of crisis must be interes-
ting times in which to be a philosopher, and difficult times for most
scientists
.
Revolution. Crisis remains until someone formulates a paradigm that
uses the anomalies as the base for his/her paradigm. Paradigms are often
formulated, as Masterman points out (1970, p. 83) by "outsiders" who
have a different viewpoint and a different set of techniques which they
bring to bear on the anomalous phenomena and in the process of doing so,
also create a paradigm and a new line of research. This does not mean
that someone comes in, from another field, and incorporates the anomalies
into his/her own original field; this is clearly not a revolution nor is
the problem solution necessarily a paradigm; it may be just a problem
solution. To be revolutionary, the new solution must serve as a paradigm
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and begin a new line of research through normal science.
A new paradigm or paradigm set in revolutionary science demands
that the conceptual and procedural commitments of the group fundamental
to the practice of the relevant specialty be jettisoned and replaced
(Kuhn, 1970a, p. 250); this often necessitates a redefinition of the
relevant science (1970b, p. 102). Because the paradigm and subsequent
DM are more than theory or model, some fundamental ways of seeing the
world, and structuring phenomena, have changed.
Each revolution has consequences with ramifications for the past
as well as the future.
The extraordinary episodes in which that shift in pro-
fessional commitment occurs are. .. scientific revolutions.
They are the tradition-shattering complements to the
tradition-bound activity of normal science...
Each scientific revolution necessitated the community's
rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor
of another incompatible with it. Each produced a con-
sequent shift in the problems available for scientific
scrutiny and of the standards by which the profession
determined what should count as an admissible problem
or as a legitimate problem solution. Each transformed
the scientific imagination in ways that we will ultimately
need to describe as transformation of the world within
which scientific work was done. Such changes, together
with the controversies that almost always accompanied
them, are the defining characteristics of scientific
revolution (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 6).
It is necessary to emphasize that revolutions are part of a developmen-
tal sequence, a part that is non-cumulative, in which the older, estab-
lished paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new
one (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 91).
Some questions need to be raised at this junction. For instance,
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what is revolutionary and what is Just an extension of nor.al science.
One aspect of this question was addressed above; if anomalies are ab-
sorbed by so.e other DM, a proble. solution is not revolutionary. If
the anomalies provide the base for a paradig. on their own, then revolu-
tionary science is occurring. Kuhn approaches this question from a
different angle (1970a, p. 251),
sharld "^r'
articulations and extensions ofe belief from changes which involve reconstruction^The answer in extreme cases is obviously yes
. . . Copernican
oT:~tll revolutionary but'the caloric JhLryOf adiabatic compression was not. These examples are, how-ever, too extreme to be fully informative; there are ^oomany differences between the people contrasted, and the
revolutionary changes affected too many people. Fortunatelyhowever, we are not restricted to them:
.. .Lavoisier
' s dL
friri
oxygen... was revolutionary, for it was inseparableom a new theory of combustion and acidity. The discovery
of neon, however, was not, for helium had supplied both thenotion of an inert gas and the needed column of the periodictable.
Another relevant question might be: Revolutionary for whom? Again,
Kuhn (1970a, p. 242),
Sometimes the answer is easy: Copernical astronomy was a
revolution for everyone; oxygen was a revolution for chemistsbut not for, say, mathematical astronomers
... For the latter
group, oxygen was simply another gas, and its discovery was
merely an increment to their knowledge; nothing essential to
them as astronomers had to be changed in the discovery's
assimilation. It is not, however, usually possible to
identify groups who share cognitive commitments simply by
naming a scientific subject matter—astronomy
,
chemistry,
mathematics, or the like. Some scientific subjects, for
example, the study of heat have belonged to several different
scientific communities at different times, sometimes to
several at once without becoming the special province of
any.
It should be noted here that "crisis" does not always refer to the
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discipline as a whole. This DarM-^n,, jinx p tially depends upon the significance of
the ano.alies-the greater their significance, the greater the probability
that a large group of scientists is affected. It is important to recog-
nize that the relevant group here is that group of practitioners con-
stituting and working in the DM that the anomalies are challenging. If
a discipline is comprised of several DMs, one or perhaps more may be
experiencing crisis, but not necessarily all of them.
Similarly, as Kuhn alluded above, it is necessary to know the nature
and structure of group commitments before being able to signify those to
whom a paradigm is a revolution. It would seem that those who responded
vociferously to the paradigm, either positively or negatively, would be
the scientists most involved in the fate and consequences of the issue,
(though unfortunately, this criteria would fail to pick up those prac-
titioners who, maintaining a stoney silence, hope the offending party
will go away if ignored long enough). At times there is an easily iden-
tified community, while for other phenomena, interested scientists are
dispersed over a variety of disciplines, and meet primarily at special-
ized conferences.
Kuhn very clearly feels that the "unit of analysis" with regard to
revolutions are DMs, that is,
...the practitioners of a given specialty, men [sicj bound
together by common elements in their education and apprentice-
ship, aware of each other's work, and characterized by the
relative fullness their professional communication and
relative unanimity of their professional judgment. In the
mature sciences the members of such communities would
ordinarily see themselves and be seen by others as the
men exclusively responsible for a given subject matter
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and a gxven set of goals. Including the training of theirsuccessors Research would, however, disclose the exis-
leTsl In X ^^P^^^^ co^nities't
of a hund^^H
scientific scene, may consistred members, sometimes significantly fewer.Individuals, particularly the ablest, may belong toseveral such groups, either simultaneously or in
succession and they will change or at least adjust theirthinking caps as they go from one to another.
Groups like these should, I suggest, be regarded as theunits which produce scientific knowledge...
This is also the body which decides the fate of the new paradigm, and
articulates it into a line of research if it is accepted.
Changing paradigms also directly implies changing from an estab-
lished DM to a developing DM. with all this involves in changes of per-
ception, meaning, and relevant phenomena. In changing DMs, a scientist,
while usually doing so on intellectual grounds, is also by implication
deciding between systems which heavily influence his/her perception and
experience, as well as theory-building. It is not surprising that new
DMs are often resisted; depending upon the scientist's present DM, new
DMs must seem more or less congenial. The congeniality of developing
DMs would vary widely, depending upon how closely the scientist's present
DM approached the various emerging DMs in their influence on perception
and experience of the world, as well as for purely logical considerations
in theory-building and such.
Discussing these problems regarding paradigm choice, Kuhn describes
the issues as:
...about techniques of persuasion or about the argument or
counter-argument in a situation in which. . .neither proof
nor error is at issue. The transfer of allegiance from
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paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that
cannot be forced. Life-long resistance
... is not a
violation of scientific standards but an index to the
nature of scientific research itself
.. .Though the his-torian can always find men—Priestley
, for instance—
who were unreasonable to resist for as long as they did,he will not find a point at which resistance becomes
Illogical or unscientific (1970a, p. 260).
Precisely because allegiance is in part illogical, the continued resis-
tance to change is not, in an illogical context, an illogical process.
Continued resistance to change, or decision to make the change, cannot
be judged, nor decided, using purely logical criteria because, commit-
ment to a DM means scientific research itself is not always logical to
a DM.
Kuhn points out that in the debate about DM choice,
...neither party has access to an argument vrhich resembles
a proof in logic or formal mathematics. In the latter,
both premises and rules of inference are stipulated in'
advance. If there is disagreement about conclusions, the
parties to the debate can retrace their steps one by one,
checking each against prior stipulation. At the end of
that process, one or the other must concede that at an
isolable point in the argument he has made a mistake,
violated or misapplied a previously accepted rule. After
that concession he has no recourse, and his opponents'
proof is then compelling. Only if the two discover that
they differ about the meaning or applicability of a
stipulated rule, that their prior agreement does not provide
a sufficient basis for proof, does the ensuing debate
resemble what inevitably occurs in science (1970a, pp.
260-261).
This state of affairs is directly attributable to two factors: the fact
that decision and commitment to paradigm and DM involve other processes
than the purely logical, and secondly, that these not-logical processes
are more fundamental than the ejq)licitly articulated theory. Since the
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level of debate is equally restricted to this latter theoretical level,
the non-logical material continues its influence and the debate con-
tinues, without resolution and at the wrong level.
However, people do in fact make paradigm decisions, based in part
on these not-logical processes. Kuhn feels these choices are based on
reasons which include "accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and
the like- (1970b, pp. 261-262). He goes on to emphasize the importance
of scientists being taught to value these characteristics and being pro-
vided with examples that illustrate them in actual use; if scientists
did not hold such values for guidance obviously their disciplines, and
scientific activity, would develop very differently. So Kuhn is saying
that values constitute the differential criteria for paradigm choice.
I am.
. .insisting that such reasons constitute values to
be used in making choices rather than rules of choice
.
Scientists who share them may nevertheless make different
choices in the same concrete situations. Two factors
are deeply involved. First, in many concrete situations,
different values, though all constituitive of good reasons,
dxctate different conclusions, different choices. In such
cases of value-conflict (e.g., one theory is simpler but
the other is more accurate) the relative weight placed on
different values by different individuals can play a
decisive role in individual choice. More important,
though scientists share these values and must continue
to do so if science is to survive, they do not all apply
them in the same way. Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness
,
and even accuracy can be judged quite differently (which
is not to say that they may be judged arbitrarily) by
different people. Again, they may differ in their con-
clusions without violating any accepted rule (1970a,
p. 262; emphasis added)
Kuhn further specifies that once a DM is in existence, it is the pre-
rogative and the responsibility of that community of scientists to formu-
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late scientific values for their DM and then to both apply and accept
responsibility for those value applications.
Problems with Using the Kuhniam Schema
Textual difficulties. Kuhn's 1970 revision is primarily directed toward
differentiation of his original paradigm notion into paradigm and DM.
Unfortunately, he presented this revision in a postscript to his 1970
edition of The Structure of Sc ientific Revolutions
, where it was often
overlooked, and where he allowed it to exist in isolation from the rest
of the volume; that is, Kuhn did not revise his schema in light of the
paradigm-DM differentiation. His 1970 edition is essentially his 1962
schema, and a postscript containing the DM revision, with no reworking
of the text of the book.
This has had an unfortunate effect, in that most who used Kuhn's
schema either did not or could not integrate the revision into their
work and thus have perpetuated and elaborated the ambiguities, e.g.,
the comments by Burgess (1972, p. 193) regarding polemic in psychology
(already cited), or Palermo (1971, pp. 136 & 138). Similarly, see M.
Brewster Smith (1973a, p. 464) in Elms (1975, p. 967), "Our best scien-
tists are floundering in the search for a visible paradigm." These,
among others, have encountered difficulties because Kuhn, for whatever
reason, did not adequately revise his 1970 publication. It is clear,
however, that enough confusion and ambiguity has been engendered in
psychology for Lipsey (1974, p. 406) to decry the use of Kuhn as a
template.
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Even careful authors have run into difficulties which appear to
originate not because the revision was unknown to them, but rather becaus
its ramifications were in no way articulated by Kuhn. For instance.
Warren (1971, p. 407) and Palermo (1971) both use earlier versions of
the schema, while it appears they knew of the revision. Weimer and
Palermo (1973, p. 273, footnote B)
, divide the Masterman-Kuhn paradigm
usages into "exemplar" and "sociological," the latter of which can be
divided into "theoretical" and "metaphysical", it is difficult to under-
stand where they arrived at these "exemplar" and "sociological" cate-
gories, as both Masterman and Kuhn clearly use "artefact" (roughly
analogous to exemplar) "sociological" and "metaphysical". Similarly
Warren (1974, p. 409) mentions "sub-paradigms." What are they? Watson
notices the ambiguities in the paradigm concept (1974, p. 52), but
ambiguities in his presentation remain because of the paradigm-DM split
not being articulated. And it should be emphasized, the above-named
authors have been among the careful and their problems with Kuhn are
relatively minor. With others, the problems are considerable. Palermo
(1971, p. 138) argues that psychology has had two paradigms (he apparent-
ly means DMs). Lipsey (1974, p. 407) argues that psychology is mis-
paradigmatic, rather than pre- or post-paradigmatic; though he, again,
is semantically inaccurate, his point will receive corroboration in
later chapters.
Conceptual difficulties
.
Power of paradigm concept . A number of conceptual difficulties
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remain. D. Shapere raises a series of criticisms about Kuhn's DM
revision, some of which are relevant. Shapere examines the implications
of Kuhn's 1970 revisions for the latter's original framework.^ First,
he finds the paradigm-DM differentiation of little help for those who
originally found Kuhn's paradigm concept obscure, as neither version
clarified how the remaining factors covered by the paradigm term were
related to or embodied in the historical examples in such a way that the
whole outlook of the tradition could be conveyed. In other words, what
were the routes and processes by which concrete paradigms were linked to
scientific traditions? It would seem that Shapere 's criticism is ans-
wered in part by the DM concept itself, in which paradigm is articulated
into a more encompassing and complicated network of method, commitment
and theory.
Shapere contends that Kuhn has not yet clarified the ways in which
the physical science's
-general" or "over-arching" paradigm determines
the course of scientific research and judgment. Shapere perceived Kuhn's
paradigm concept to be
a single overarching Weltanschauung, a disciplinary Zeitgeist,
that determined the way scientists of a given tradition viewed
and dealt with the world, that would determine what they would
consider to be a legitimate problem, a piece of evidence, a
good reason, an acceptable solution and so on." (1972, p. 707).
Shapere (1972, p. 706) makes several other charges, most notably
about paradigm's ambiguity and relativism. Masterman had more than
adequately dealt with the first and Shapere 's charges regarding rela-
tivism lose a good deal of their efficacy because he refuses to regard
the role of values in science.
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Shapere notes (1972, p. 707) that it was "precisely the unity, and the
controlling status of paradigms that constituted the appeal and the
challenge of Kuhn's original view". It is Shapere 's opinion that, if
Kuhn abandons the controlling status of the paradigm, he will have aban-
doned what was one of the most provocative and influential aspects of
his earlier view.
Shapere has raised an interesting point. Kuhn's original concept of
paradigm did indeed have the type of controlling status to which Shapere
refers. By revision to a concrete problem solution with analogue func-
tions, the paradigm concept has been removed from the more general, implicit,
and thus influential role, leaving a conceptual vacuum for precisely this
over-arching concept already described. In examining the family work
area, interestingly enough, there are indications of the need for such a
concept at this broader, general level. Such a concept would label
several processes and characteristics of what appear to be two major
groups of family therapists that differ in their commitments to exactly
something like a Weltanschauung. (These two groups and identification of
their points of difference, as well as some implications for Kuhn's
schema, will be reviewed at length in Chapter VIII).
Another of Shapere 's criticisms, which seems to me related, concerns
Kuhn's short treatment of the DM. He in fact spends a good deal of that
cursory treatment distinguishing among the four DM components he identi-
fies, without discussing any unity underlying them (1972, p. 707). While
I would take issue with Shapere and point out that the paradigm set con-
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stitutes a fir. source of unity, it is also clear that Shapere's point
is well taken. Kuhn's DM concept is neither set into context, described
in terms of unifying themes or processes, nor related very well to such
things as theory or instrumentation (though some attempt to start the
latter was attempted here in Chapter II). Consideration of these issues
will most likely benefit Kuhn's schema.
^^i^^^iHslv^^eri^^
conceptual difficulties
relates to what can be termed the "inclusive perimeter" of a DM. How "bi,
is a DM; that is, what is the size of a DM and what are the criteria that
determine this? Is the
-size" determined by number of adherents or
breadth of the paradigm application? Kuhn is quite ambiguous in this
regard. He states that communities of practitioners
...exist, of course at numerous levels. The most global isthe community of all natural scientists. At an only slightlylower level, the main scientific professional groups are
communities: physicists, chemists, astronomers, zoologists,
and the like. For these major groupings community membership
IS readily established except at the fringes
... Similar tech-
niques will also isolate subgroups: organic chemists, andperhaps protein chemists among them, solid state and high
energy physicists, radio astronomers, and so on. It is only
at the next lower level that empirical problems emerge. How
to take a contemporary example, would one have isolated thephase group, prior to its public acclaims? For their purpose
one must have recourse to attendance at special conferences,
to the distribution of draft manuscripts or galley proofs
prior to publication, and above all, to formal and informal
communication networks including those discovered in corres-
pondence and the linkages among citations
.. .Typically , it may
yield communities of perhaps one hundred members, occasionally
significantly fewer (Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 177-178).
The first difficulty is in trying to identify the extent of what
will be called the "inclusive perimeter." Which of these communities
71
is co-extensive with the term DM? If the DM governs a group of prac-
titioners and not the subject matter, what level of group, then, does
it govern? Does Kuhn's DM concept include the system of all-natural
scientists-and-their-network-of commitments, or is it rather at the
levels of all-biologists-with-their-commitments, or all vertebrate bio-
logists, etc.? Are all of these DMs and is the term DM infinitely ex-
tensible to all levels and if so, what are the consequences? Should
the use of the term "DM" be reserved, rather, for some relatively
specific level of community and a new term be found for something like
all-natural-scientists?
There are several considerations in support of this latter sugges-
tion. If the paradigm is the concrete problem solution, then its arti-
culation in the form of a DM would also be fairly specific. For example,
from earlier in the chapter, Galileo's solution of the ball rolling down
the inclined plane helped him to solve the pendulum problem (by con-
sidering the bob as a point-mass); Huyghens then used Galileo's solution
on the problem of the center of oscillation and Bernoulli in turn used
Huyghen's solution for the flow of water from an orifice. The paradig-
matic use of the original solution remains very specific, grounded in
concrete problems. It is usually possible to name the practitioners who
are active in lines of research, and it appears that it is usually a
relatively small group of practitioners who share paradigms and other DM
constituents. Henceforth, the inclusive perimeter of DMs as referred to
here, will be the standard in later chapters during discussions of the
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family therapy DMs. Conclusions can be made later whether such usag.
was helpful or not.
Lem
Use with the social sciences
. Of greater significance is the proble
that the Kuhnian framework was developed for the natural sciences, not
the social sciences. In fact it was Kuhn's observation that in contrast
to natural scientists the controversies among social scientists regarding
fundamentals led him to develop the paradigm concept (Kuhn, 1970b, p. viii)
And actually, when one looks at what subject matter he addresses himself
to, Kuhn has remained within the mature physical sciences — astronomy,
physics, chemistry, electricity, and though only occasionally, geology
(he mentions Lyell)
.
Others have also noticed Kuhn's focus on the established sciences.
Palermo (1971, p. 138) notes that in fact Kuhn appears unsure of the
status of the social sciences in general, at times implying that they
have not yet reached the maturity of paradigmatic-status. Warren (1971,
p. 408) concurs with Palermo and points out that it was the contrast
"between the social processes of the physical and the behavioral sciences"
that provided the impetus to Kuhn's theorizing.
This proved to be an important point, as it is becoming painfully
obvious that the social sciences in general, and psychology specifically,
does not have the same basic consensus that the mattyre physical sciences
do regarding fundamentals of value, problem choice, and appropriate
approach. The extensively documented felt crisis and the issues con-
tained therein testify to that, as do certain authors who, in relation
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to a Kuhnian analysis, have directed attention to this. Watson (1974,
P. 52) puts it in terns of psychology lacking "this universal agreement
about the nature of our contentual paradig. [sicj." He points out that
there regains debate over fundamentals and in research,
"findings stir
little argument but the overall framework is still very much contested."
Burgess (1972, p. 196) is of the same opinion.
Fortunately, in taking Kuhn to task for his confused view of prepara-
digm science, Masterman addresses the issue of what she terms "multiple-
paradigm" science. She states that he fails to distinguish three states:
•Wparadigm science, multiple-paradigm science, and dual-paradigm
science. Non-paradigm science is the state of affairs right at the be-
ginning of the process of thinking about any aspect of the world..."
(1970, p. 73).
Masterman (1970, p. 75) simplifies the position, by saying squarely
that when "normal science sets in," anywhere there you have science, and
where it does not set in, there you have philosophy, or something else,
not science and that it is always some construct using, puzzle-solving
trick which starts off normal science" [her emphasis]. She considers
the mature physical sciences as having one "vast paradigm" and to have
created through the convergence of a number of paradigm-guided research
lines, i.e., DMs, which mutually threw light on one another (1970, p. 75).
This can be seen in juxtapositon
•••_"lth multiple-paradigm science
, with that state of affairs
which, far from there being no paradigm, there are on the
contrary, too many. (This is the present overall situation in
'
the psychological, social, and information sciences.) Here,
within the subfield defined by each paradigmatic technique,'
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technology can sometimes be quite advanced, and normal
research puzzle-solving can progress. But each sub-field
as defined by its technique is so obviously more trivial
and narrow than the field as defined by intuition, and
also the various operational definitions given by the
techniques are so grossly discordant with one another,
that discussion on fundamentals remains, and long run
progress (as opposed to local progress) fails to occur.
This state of affairs is brought to an end when someone
invents a deeper, though cruder (p. 23) paradigm, which
gives a more central insight into the nature of the field
making research into it more rigid, esoteric, and precise
(p. 18 and 37). This (p. 16) either by causing rival,
more shallow paradigms to collapse, or alternatively, by
attaching them somehow or other to itself, triumphs over
the rest, so advanced scientific work can set in, with
only one total paradigm. Thus, multiple-paradigm science
is full science, on Kuhn's own criteria; with the proviso
that these criteria have to be applied by treating each
sub-field as a separate field (p. 74).
Masterman is of the opinion that multiple-paradigm science is full
science and may be treated to a Kuhnian analysis by treating each sub-
field as a separate field. Burgess (1972, p. 196) concurs with Master-
man that psychology is multiple-paradigmatic; for instance.
What paradigms (in the sense of multiple-paradigms noted
above) exist in psychology? Litchenstein; adopting a
Kuhnian model mentions a number (1971): Fechner's psycho-
physics; Tichener's structuralism; Pavlov's conditioned
response; Hull's hypothetico-deductive model; Kohler's
isomorphism and finally Skinner's operant (1971, p. 6). Krasner
(1971) has a different view, he believes behaviour therapy
constitutes a paradigm. Katahn and Koplin (1968) believe
that the clash between Breger and McGaugh (1965) on the one
hand and Weist (1967) on the other represents a paradigm
clash, while Keehn (1969) believes the Skinner's 3-term
contingency (S^-R-S^) constitutes a paradigm. Clearly,
there are differences here. The models used by Lichtenstein,
Katahn and Koplin are far more general than that used by
Krasner. What can we say of the choice made? Clearly, it
was not Hull's hypothetico-deductive model that was attacked,
it was his drive-reduction hypothesis as well as his strong
interpretation of or reliance on reinforcement. His clashes
with Tolman and his followers (why does Tolman's inter-
pretation not qualify as a paradigm?) did not centre around
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Hull s use of the hypothetico-deductive method, theycentred around the role of reinforcement (henc; TlTthe studies on latent learning) and on drive-reduction(on drxye induction and explanatory behavior etc etc -vide Bolles (1967). 'etc., .
Burgess believes that Masterman's "analysis of paradlg™ has essentially
saved this concept for psychology - especially her three-fold historical
division of scientific development" (1972, p. 196); I „ould concur with
Burgess' opinions. Warren (1971 n An f^^*- _ ndL u^/i, p. 411, footnote) apparently agrees,
and uses the revision appropriately.
The analysis regarding normal science and multiple-paradigm disci-
plines is quite appropriate for psychology and theoretically at least
allows for a Kuhnian analysis, as long as the focus is on a sub-field.
This is obviously another reason to have limited the focus of Kuhnian
analysis to one of the family therapy "schools", as the analysis continues,
it will become more clear that the particular "school" constitutes a
Kuhnian DM, with its own paradigm, DM components and developments.
CHAPTER III
ANOMALIES AND THE ATIE>ffI AT ACCOMODATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
The purpose of .Ms section Is to demonstrate that the emergence
and development of the D-B fe.U, therapy
"school., can be productively
analysed In Kuhnlan, terms
.
Emergence of the BB DM was a response to
anomalies which developed as traditional psychoanalytic theory and
practice and were extended to new clinical phenomena. For these
reasons, the Inception of the clinical psychoanalytic DM will be
Sketched to provide a conceptual starting point and a contrast against
which the emergence of these psychoanalytic anomalies can be seen.
Though psychoanalysis was the dominant and virtually undisputed, clini-
cal approach for a half-century (a situation, many would argue, which
continues into the present), only the early elaborations of the classi-
cal psychoanalytic paradigm, and then the relevant anomalies will be
addressed; the task of tracing the comprehensive psychoanalytic elabora-
tion has not been the Intention of this author, and is beyond the scope
of the present work.^ a Kuhnlan analysis of the entire psychoanalytic
analvtJc m""!""
necessary to be circumspect in speaking of "the psycho-y i DM as at present. It appears that there is none, or ratherthat there are several. For the purpose of this dissertation, I wllibe using the very early Freudian paradigm (henceforth referred to asthe classical or interpretatlonlst paradigm, and DM) which Freuddeveloped^ regarded as bounded In time, and summarized, by Freud's 1914paper on Recollection, Repetition, and Working Through'.; after thisphase, both technique and conceptualization changed. The anomalies
relevant to the emergence of family therapy, however, occurred with
respect to Freud's classical paradigm and DM, so I will review only itsinception and early development. It should be noted here that the'
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framework will nnt hc^ c ^be a focus here, In part because It Is not strictly
relevant, and in part to avoid the Infinite regression of "DB fro„
psychoanalytic ano^alies^ psychoanalysis fro. neurolosy's ano^lies,
neurology from.
.
Freud ''s Revolutions r-^, Paradigm
^^^^i-^lJiy--ia. The psychoanalytic DM developed around the prob-
lem of hysteria. During the middle and late 19th century, hysteria was
the province of neurology, spurred on by its resounding success in having
found a biological etiology for general paresis. Neurology was con-
centrating its efforts on biological explanations and the attacks of
hysteria with very little success. By the late 19th century, hysteria
as a disorder constituted an important medical problem. In Kuhnian terms,
it also constituted an anomaly for neurology. Also in Kuhnian terms,
the problem Freud faced was the treatment or "cure" of hysteria. At
the relevant point in Freud's life, when he was a practicing clinician
(in neurology) doing private work, the problem to which he was primarily
original classical paradigm continued to be elaborated by one groupthe mterpretationists, yet was also modified by other groups into anumber of other DMs which developed in parallel to the classicarorinterpretationists position. Thus the work of the ego analysts con-
stitutes a separate DM as does the work of Melanie Klein Thesetwo DMs were clearly developments in psychoananalysts thought and prac-tice, but they differed sufficiently from the classical DM with respect
to paradigms, symbolic generalizations, models and values, to constitute
separate DMs in their own right. As the anomalies relevant to familytherapy s emergence are not directly relevant to these later parallel
psychoanalytic DMs, these DMs will be acknowledged, but not explicated.
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addressing hi.self was the cure of hysteria, and explanation or tech-
nical innovation were l^ the service o£ such a cure. This cure would
constitute the solution to the problem, and If used analogically (which
it was for other neuroses), the paradigm.
At that ttoe, a "cure" for hysteria was quite Mportant for Freud.
Upon his return In 1886 from studying with Charcot in Paris, Freud
specialized In nervous diseases, with hysteria providing the clinical
picture In a large proportion of his patients. Initially he relied
upon the current methods of treatment, including,
reft-curf'^'R, t'^h'^Z^""""^ ^"^^ "eir-Mltchells e. But when these proved unsatisfactory his thoughtsturned elsewhere. 'During the last few weeks,' he writes ?ohis friend FUess on December 28, 1887, 'I have taken up
(s?rTi;:y:i95rp'ii)" ^-^^^ "-^-^^^"^
Apparently, from his own subsequent account, Freud began to use
hypnosis to achieve recollection and later also catharsis in the patient
rather than for its standard use as a suggestion technique (Strachey,
2
1955, p. XI). Freud first began to use the new method sometime between
1886 and 1893 (Strachey, 1955, p. XII).
First technical innovation: role of recollection
. Freud's first tech-
nical innovation, by approximately 1887, was the use of hypnosis for
Although there are a number of definitions and conceptualizations
of "catharsis", there is agreement that catharsis is a process i^herein
an individual emotionally experiences or re-experiences something, and
to some extent releases or purges pent-up affect or emotion.
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recollecclon or recall, which „as conceptualized as the operative pro-
cess Of change. While hypnotised, the patient would be induced to
recollect repressed material and with that recollection, the repressed
was remembered and symptoms were no longer "needed" to express the
material. Freud's later account of this appears quite matter-of-fact
considering the reception it gained him from colleagues.
Now In those days of hypnotic treatment
'recollection' tooka very simple form. The patient put himself backing an
the pr'es^it"'"™'
"''""^
^""'^^ '° confou^d Si^hesent, gave an account of the mental processes be-
r?iif 'h " '° '^^^ and "pended
wha had """'^ f-^™ "^"'"8 conscLust before been unconscious. (S. Freud, 19Ua, p. 367).
Breuer and Freud later supplied the rationale for the mechanism
of change. In 1892, in their "...Theory of hysterical attacks," they
Stated
:
The memory which forms the content of the hysterical attackIS an unconscious, one, or, more correctly, it is part of thesecond state of conscious which is present in more or lesshighly organized shape in every hysteria. Accordingly that
memory is either wholly absent from the patient's recollection
when he is in his normal state, or is present only in a
summary way. If we can succeed in bringing such a memory
entirely into normal consciousness, it ceases to be capable
of producing attacks
... the psychical events during his attack
remain hidden from him. They can, however, be awakened at
any time by hypnosis. (Breuer and Freud, 1892, Vol. V, p. 29).
The operative process was recollection, which allowed the isolated
memory to be associated with other cognitive material, in a sort of
"network" and gradually lose its power and isolation through repeated
references and associative ties. Emphasis was directed toward those
events which excited symptom-formulation. "Reproduction of the mental
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processes" evoked in the particular situation „ere thought to "htlns
about a release of the„ through conscious operations." (.teud, 19Ua.
p. 368)
^"""'^^-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-t^^
^3,3_ ^^^^
of affect had become
.ore clear, m their "Preliminary Co„unicatlon",
Breuer and Freud noted:
th^t e'v^rin'th'
''''''' "'^^ P^^-^^ had de'r^bed'
afLct in^o 'T'""' ^^^^il had put the
invarxailv n"°.
^^-Hection without affect almosti b y produces no result. (1893, Vol. II, p. 6)
The operative process of cure, or mechanism of change of catharsis
was now added to the original recollection formulation.
It brings to an end the operative force of the idea whichwas not abreacted in the first instance, by allowing its
strangulated affect to find a way out through speech; andIt subjects It to associative correction by introducingIt into normal consciousness (under light hypnosis) or by
removing it through the physician's suggestion, as is donein somnabulism accompanied by amnesia. (Breuer and Freud,
1893, Vol. II, p. 17)
Freud's later, stable defintion of abreaction held that "quantities
of affect pent up by repression
... (1914a, p. 376) are released, identified
and articulated.
Third technical innovation; free association and repetition
. Though
hypnosis allowed him all this, Freud realized that he was not particularly
successful at its induction, and gradually gave it up, contenting him-
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-If With packing patients Into a state of concentration", using
occasionally a gentle pressure on the forehead. (This was the case
by approximately 1395 as he mentions this in Stndie, o, (pp.
107-108) with an engaging mixture of chagrim and pride)
.
With the virtual abandonment of hypnosis and the development of
free association. Freud's technical innovations reached the third
phase; the continuation of technical innovation and exploratory con-
cepts provided him with a stable and effective method for curing^^
hysteria.
It was Strachey's (1955. Vol. II. p. XVII) opinion that this
shift from hypnosis to free association revealed the presence of
"resistance" and this essentially constituted a cricical choice point
for Freud
How was this unwillingness to be dealt with? Was it to beshouted down or suggested away? Or was it, like other
mental phenoraana, simply to be investigated? Freud's
choice of this second path led him directly into the un-
charted world which he was to spend his whole life exploring.
Having made his decision to explore rather than subdue resistance,
Freud concentrated on two phenomena which promised to be helpful: dreams
and the resistances themselves (as phenomena rather than obstacles)?
Dream analysis provided both a method with which to investigate primary
3
Also, the death of his father prompted Freud to begin analyzing
his own dreams; a good deal of this work went into Freud's 1897
Interpretation of Dreams.
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process, ana also
.He ,„n.e„ee o. p.l^.,
.^..^s on conscious
.Ho..,,
(-e., .Ha connecions be.ween pn„a., an. seconda.. process,. s.^acHey
C"35. vol.
„. p. xvill) Has poin.ed ou.
.Ha.
.His In pu. P.eud
-
in possession of a new
.ecHnlcal device - In.erpre.a.lon." (The
subsequent importance of ^hp f,„.o^- r •t e function of interpretation will be reviewed)
Drea. analysis allowed Preud to carr. out his own analysis, to formulate
the Oedipus complex and infantile sexuality, and to recognize, albeit
dimly, the obstacles and therapeutic potentials of "transference".
(Strachey, 1955, Vol. n, p. XVIII)
.
The emergence of the importance of interpretation as a technique
and transference as a phenomenon, were underscored by their similar
centrality when Freud attempted to investigate resistances as phenomena.
Because of the importance of resistances and relatively little control
over the patient's locutions during free association, Freud was forced
to deal with the patient's compulsion to repeat; he eventually set out
to induce repetitions as a method of dealing with the resistances.
Freud describes the compulsion to repeat as a process wherein, rather
than remembering what has been repressed, the patient
bS^'irhi.'b it not in his memoryut n his behavior; he repeats it, without of courseKnowing that he is repeating it.
For instance, the patient does not say that he remembers howdefiant and critical he used to be in regard to the authority
of his parents, but he behaves in that way toward the phy-
sician. (Freud, 1914a, p. 369).
By inducing these repetitions, the hitherto unconscious conflict became
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-nifest to the analyst and also beca.e
-p.esenf in actual life, and
therefore accessible to intervention. The repetitions were induced
by heightening the transference of the patient; for example, by re-
maining relatively silent, or giving very little personal reality based
inforrnation, and by not allowing the patient to see facial expression.
In contrast to hypnosis, the repetition compulsion was viewed as
a "piece of real life" (1914a, p. 371) and therefore not always an
indifferent or trivial phenomena. At times, this could result in an
exacerbation of symptoms during treatment (1914a, p. 371); this point
became particularly cogent and important later for patients charac-
terized as latent schizophrenic or borderline (one class of later
anomalies), where exacerbation often provoked frank psychoses. Also,
it became clear that the repetitions were evident not only in the trans-
ference, but also in all other aspects of the person's life (1914a, p. 37
We must be prepared to find, therefore, that the patient[repeats] also in all other matters occupying and in-
teresting him at the time, for instance, when he falls inlove or sets about any project during treatment. (Freud
1914a, p. 370).
This was the reason for invoking the psychoanalytic injunction against
major life changes during analysis. Since the resistances were even-
tually regarded as determining the succession of repetitions (p. 371)
and also, since the greater the resistance, the more extensively the
repetition compulsion replaced the capacity or willingness to insight
(or recollection), (p. 370), resistances became the focus of attention;
once elicited, the analyst used interpretation to reveal the relation
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between
.e=...„ees du^.n, a.soc.aUon, a„a unconsc.ous
.«e..al
allowin,
.He paUen.
.o
.h.oush- .He resistances. I„
.His
.Hira
phase,
the analyst abandons concentration nr. o
nxzmg
.He resistances wHich coL up n regard to hjr°'"
-terxal and .aWng tHe patient awaje c£"tS (l1l4t P.
It would appear that recollection is once again the ai. of analysis
but Freud is emphatically clear that this is not the case. He stresses
that the repetition compulsion and its shielding resistance as expressed
in the transference
.ust be "worked through." The first step in over-
coming the resistance is
made... by the analyst's discovering the resistance x.hich
witrir ^^^^^^^^ acquaintingth It Now It seems that beginners in analytic practiceare inclined to look upon this as the end of ^he wo"naming the resistance could not result in its immedSt;
suspension. One must allow the patient time to get Lknow this resistance of which he is ignorant, to 'work
In Zt \ ' '° it, by continuing the work accordingto the analytic rule in defiance of it. Only when it hascome to Its height can one, with the patient's cooperation,discover the repressed instinctual trends which are feedingthe resistance; and only by living them through in this "
way will the patient be convinced of their existence andtheir power. (1914a, p. 375).
The working through of the resistances as they arise in the trans-
ference was regarded by Freud as the process that affected the great-
est changes in the patient and that could be correlated theoretically,
with the change function of abreaction in the earliest formulation.
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(1914a. p. 376). 'Vo.Un, through" involved emotional element., and
recollections once the resi^tanrf.c u^a t,stances had been overcome (p. 375). in all
his formulations of cure, Freud included a recollection .0l xi component, and
an emotional "reliving" of so.e sort. In thl. third phase, the role
Of interpretation assumes technical importance because of its function
with regard to the shielding resistances; interpretation became the
technique which induced the working through of resistances, by which
the therapeutic emotional and insightful aspects were elicited.
The paradigm and its revol „tn„n... development of
free association and the change mechanism of working through, Freud
re-conceptualized hysteria and his problem solution constituted a revoU
tionary paradigm.
It should be emphasized that the series of technical innovations
(hypnosis for recollection, then for recollection with catharsis, then
free association and interpretation) preceded any re-conceptualization
of a change mechanism or of the disorder of hysteria. It is these tech-
nical innovations and supporting conceptualizations which constitute
the classical Freudian or psychoanalytic paradigm.
The technical innovations are supported by their respective
mechanisms of change, and then by the re-conceptualization of hysteria
as a psychological rather than biological disorder. Strictly speaking,
the third-phase innovations constitute the paradigm; the techniques
and change processes of the first two phases were successful in a
limited way in comparison to the innovations of free association and
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interpretations. Also, either of the first two phases would have
difficulty as a theory-practice system if used as an analogue and
extended to other neuroses. First, theoretically because they were
too circumscribed and secondly, empirically, because hypnosis is
rarely successful with obsessional or paranoid individuals. Finally,
for Freud to develop this series so rapidly, despite the successes of
the first two phases, one can infer that he felt, or recognized, some
inadequacies in the earlier phases that induced - allowed him to
develop the third, then stay with it.
The technical innovations of free association which elicits the
"raw data" of psychoanalysis, and of interpretation, which supplies
the tool to deal with such data, constitute the relevant paradigm
techniques. Freud's postulation that the mechanism of change was
repeatedly working through both the cognitive and emotional aspects
in the transference provided the conceptualization of cure which
accompanied the new techniques. Similarly, both the techniques and
change mechanisms were useful in the amelioration or cure of other type
of neuroses, i.e., obsessional and phobic. Thus, Freud's problem-
solution admirably filled its paradigmatic "analogue" function for new
phenomena
.
Finally, the innovations induced a re-conceptualization of the
hysteria, in stages. First, Freud and Brewer wrote in 1893 that the
symptoms of hysteria were meaningful and not random as hitherto
conceptualized
.
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Let us keep firmly in mind the fact that it ^hdxstressing antithetic ideas (inhibited L^ec^dby normal consciouqnpcc^ ttK-j u ^ 't^jtjccea
moment of emergence ofIhf. ^^e
^.n^ ^- / ™^8^"c the disposition to hysteria
Shf^i f precisely well-brought-up and~^-behaved boys who suffer from hysterical attacks in
Ive'ryS o'f ^ ^° ^^^^^ ^^^^ of^owdi Ls,e e kind f wild escapade and bad conduct. It isthe suppressed- the laboriously suppressed-groups
of Ideas that are brought into action in these cases
sub,ectTarf''?i °' ' °' counter-will, when h^'
vlriZ ^^^^^11^^ ^ ^i^tim to hysterical exhaustion,
one ?o; ihfh V'''
connection may be a more intima e
by thf Lboriouf condition may perhaps be producede la orious suppression; but in the present '^I^
of that"' h"' the psychological featuresat condition. Here I am merely concerned withexplaining why — assuming the presence of the dis-
^or^T'' u°
- the symptoms take the particularf m m which we m fact observe them. (1893, p. 53).
The contention that hysteria was of psychological etiology came only
later in 1895 (Strachey, 1955, p. XXIV). In 1893, Freud was still
writing of "the agency of somatic innervations" (p. 40) and "physical
modification corresponding to [inhibited intentions]" (p. 44). Up to
that time, neurology had regarded the disorder as organic. With Freud's
removal of hysteria from this organic realm, the problem-solution was
revolutionary in its formulation.
Hysteria can be regarded as a persistent anomaly which refused
to respond to neurological treatment, and for which the new germ-
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theory class of formulation was unsuccessful. Neurology's eagerly
anticipated breakthrough, in „hich hysteria would be demonstrated
to occur. Freud moved to a radically different solution from his
early acceptance of biological etiology, one which was based on his
technical therapeutic innovations, drew from a different framework than
neurology, which in turn created its own framework.*
Freud came to regard hysteria as a disorder of the cognitive/emotional
sphere, with symptoms as meaningful as the symbolic expression of Ideas
and emotions forgotten" and operating at a not-conscious level, which
were related to forbidden material from early in life. This formulation
needed obviously, the ideas of the unconscious, of repression, of psy-
chical trauma and the genetic principle to provide continuity from the
past to the onset of symptoms, which Freud later developed. With this
set of concepts accompanying the original Insight that hysteria was
psychological. Freud's solution had reached full revolutionary status,
with all that implies regarding the usual reception of revolutionary
formulations in Kuhn's schema.
Strachey reported (1955, V. II, p. XV) that Studies on Hj^sterla
was unfavorably received in German medical circles; it was, for In-
stance, very critically reviewed by Adolf von Strumpell, the well-known
4 For an interesting argument as to where Freud s perspective
°j^^|i"3ted, see D. Bakan's Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition
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neurologist." This makes a good deal of sense, particularly that latter
point that an eminent neurologist Should Wit. In Kuhn's schema it
is precisely the group for whom the paradigm is revolutionary, that is
.est threatened and resistant, with some of its members never adopting
the new paradigm. P.eud's resignation from professional associations
was requested, his puhlic presentations were poorly received and his
colleagues were confounded and alienated.
^'^^'^^^^^^^^-^^^^
The
technique of interpretation gained enormous importance in psychoanalysis.
As previously mentioned, the classical paradigm was undisputed and
relatively unchanged until approximately 1914. After this point, Freud,
and others, made some major changes in the DM with two results. First,
some of these changes made by others induced the development of differen-
tiable DMs within the psychoanalytic rubric (e.g., Kleinians)
; secondly,
there remained a group of analysts committed to the original, classical
paradigm. Thus, for instance, they eschewed work with other than neuro-
tics, and they regarded interpretation as the analyst's ultimate (and
for some of the more dedicated- the only legitimate) tool. While in-
terpretation was important to all the analysts, it was the lodestone
for these classical or interpretational analysts.
Freud (1937)^ differentiated between interpretation proper, such
^ Freud (1937) Constructions in analysis; Collected Papers, Vol. VCited by Loewenstein, 1958, p. 209.
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, Two
as those Of a drea. or a parapraxis. and a "genetic" interpretation
or reconstruction of a remote and repressed event or fantasy, or an
impulse or reaction which remained repressed but active. Loewenstein
continued the differentiation among types of interpretation which he
regarded as the "specific tool of the psychoanalyst.
. ."(p. 205),
1958 (two years after the inception of the double-bind paradigm)
years before the double-bind. Stone (1954) was identifying interpre-
tation as one of the "technical instrumentalities
.. .which is ultimately
relied on for the distinctively psycho-analytic effect."
We would while acknowledging that other psychotherapeutic
agents play an important role in the psychoanalytic processassign to interpretation the unique and distinctive place
'
in Its ultimate therapeutic effect. We would, I think re-quire that the interpretations achieve this effect throughthe communication of awareness of facts about himself to
the patient, with the sense of emotional reality that comes
only with technically correct preparation, rather than through
certain other possible effects in the transference counter-
transference system which occur so frequently in other psycho-therapies. (Certainly, they occur also in psychoanalysis,
but^they are^regarded as miscarriage s of effort). (Stone,'
Comparing Loewenstein or Stone's views with other analysis re-
veals that they are actually rather flexible in their orientation. For
instance, Loewenstein (1958, p. 208) includes confrontation and clari-
fication as important, "preliminary to interpretation." In other
words, they are willing to give a role to other verbal techniques.
Other analysts of that same period, however, are considerably more in-
flexible. Eissler (1953) regarded the ideal case as one in which in-
terpretations alone are used and prove sufficient; any other activities
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tKe pa„
.He anal... a.e
.e™e. ^.a^e... an.
,„,Uca.cn
stand a. occasionaXl, nnavoidaMe. „
.nfo^.na...
„o.„ieat.ons
'
technique
.
Analysts of .Kls period, whether flexible or Inflexible „Uh
regard to Interpretation elearl. helonged to the ^lnstrea„ of psycho-
analytical development and represented the do^nant forms of concep-
tual framework and clinical practice. They worked almost exclusively
with neurotics and based their formulations In direct evolution from
Freud's early classical paradigm and DM.
^!^^-££HM™^L-£clsslsm. Narcissism constituted a problem
relatively early m psychoanalysis for a number of reasons directly
related to the paradigm and the role of transference and Interpre-
tations and working through. Part of the almost exclusive occupation
with neurotics by this dominant group was related to the fact that
Freud's formulations had been based on hysteria, then extended to
phobic and obsessional neuroses^- all of which were regarded as trans-
ference neuroses and thus all amenable to the same type of dynamic
Freud and Bre-uer's formulations of hysteria were in 1892 and 1895culminating in 1895 's Studies on Hj^s^eria; Freud
, however had anarticle published in 189A (The Defc^teuro-Psyihoses in'NeuroU.lsches
k"k
^° "hlch he connects with "hysteria "m^ny
'
?nhob1c''
"^sessions " in fact signifying that "observLio":f the e[phobic and obsessional] patients had resulted in a contribution Co thetheory of hysteria (1955, Vol. 1, pp. 59-75). Henceforth, these wereregarded as transference phenomena.
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f-e„ce, l„terp.e.a.io„. and „o.,i„,
^^^^^
^^^^^
Pracueal and theoretical rea.on.
.e^in,„,
neuroses. There were al.o
.Keore.lcal reasons -
„osr
..por.anrl.
-eud.s .SU paper on narcissU.. B. .He
.H.rd pHase o.
.He para^;,.
set,
.He strength of positive transference was regarded as crucial
When the positive transference had developed to "a sufficiently strong
attachment, the treatment [„as, In a position to prevent all the „ore
Of the patient's repetition-actions and to .ake use of his Intentions
alone..... (p. 373). This point was highlighted
,y those patients who
were perceived, Hy Freud and then others, of being Incapable of forcing
this strong transference reaction because of a preponderance of nar-
cissism; this was the case with schizophrenics and particularly border-
line personalities.
A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the conception
iLri'V^ narcissism arose when the attempt wasmade to bring our knowledge of dementia praecox (Kraeoelin^or schizophrenia (Bleuler)
,
into line with thrhySsLupon whxch the libido theory is based. Such patientsdisplay two fundamental characteristics; they suffer f^c^m
iTrlTl^^^^^^^^^^^ ^'^'^ inLres"^frfm°theexternal world (people and things). In consequence of thislatter change m them, they are inaccessible to the influence
Vol^T^rlT: ~ endeavor^! (19Ub,
Schizophrenic patients were perceived as having withdrawn their
attachments to the external world, without replacing them by phantasy
substitutes, and as such were incapable of forming either the essen-
tial transference relationship, or concomitantly the repetitions in
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cal cu.e as the
.hange agent would be e.clu.ea. na.cissis™
„o„X, also
preclude an, eont.ol
..e anal.s. of .he compulsion
.o
.epea. ou.iae
situation.
The ecbination of the historical precedence of the transference
neuroses, then the differentiation Between transference and narcissism
xn oh.ect-choice, proved crucial in the development of the psychoanalytic
DM. As has been mentioned, most analysts remained focused on trans-
ference neuroses, and emphasized interpretation as the primary thera-
peutic technique; this group can be regarded as the direct successors
to the early Freudian paradigms. Not all the analysts, however, per-
petuated the focus on the paradigmatic phenomena.
Anomalies in the Traditior^P^ Pop.n.r.-^
R^Pil.£xtension of paradigm to^^e^hen^ Relatively early, clini-
cians began to apply psychoanalytic insights and techniques to very
different phenomena. Freud himself had made some extensions, notably
to obsession and phobias, allowing insights gained during the appli-
cation to modify his hysteria formulations. As all these disorders
are easily dealt with by a transference formulation, Freud's extension
served to elaborate and refine the paradigm and DM. His 1914 article
on narcissism can be seen as an attempt to demarcate those clinical
phenomena for which he felt psychoanalysis was appropriate and could
be held accountable, and those for which it could not, and therefore
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could no. lesUi.a.el,
.e faulted ,or d„ae„Ules 1„ .he appUeaUo„
With regard
.0 .hi. point, of course, he „as entirely correct; there
-
no reason a fra.ewcrk should be faulted when It was applied by
Others to phenomena for which it tt^. r,^^nx n I was
-not constructed. Yet this is
exactly the sort of extension that too. place, one which the Kuhnlanfra„ essentially predicts - the extension of paradigm or ana-
logue to new phenomena:
;b;a"arbegafto^Jelt'ln'^ h""""^^ °' psychoanalysis thatufcig n o tr a manic-depressive psychosis nq971and not too long before Simmel [1929] opened a i^v.i i' •sanitorium where he treated very severe neuroLr'^^
'''"'
psychotic conditions, and addiction"! A^o ear ; ca^e'^he'
h 1^1^53^ IT'V: ^'r^'^'^ ^^.^^.j^i^;^^nimseit L19 3 follox.ed by the distinguished contributionsof Jones and Abraham. However, character analysis as aspecial technical problem was precipitated sharp" "to
IrilllTnri °' ^r""'^ '"'^^^^^ ^il^^l- Reich's
^n l noJ.T =^^™^l^ting, although still controversialbook [1947]. With Anna Freud's book on The Ego and Jhe
^£^ML^£f [1946], one Mght^ ifr,—.^.enttoward the broadening and multiplication of the psycho-analytic spheres of interest in the personality, and an
IZlrllTna
°f psychoanalytic technique, foundgene a and secure acceptance. (Stone, 1954, pp. 567-568).
By 1919, what was referred to as borderline neuroses and psychoses
had been addressed (Clark) as had dementia praecox (Kempf ) ; both were
treated within a modified psychoanalytic therapy. Aichhorn had adapted
the traditional technique to treat delinquents and Anna Freud in the
twenties began formal analysis of children (1928). Federn's work
with psychosis implied further technical modifications. The extensions
proliferated to the point that Anna Freud began to be concerned about
the distribution of effort (1954, pp. 610-611).
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For years now, our most experienced and finest analystshave concentrated their efforts on opening up new fields
tor the application of analysis by making the psychoticdisorders, the severe depressions, the borderline cases,
addictions, perversions, delinquency, etc., amenable to
treatment. I have no wish to underestimate the resulting
benefits to patients, nor the resulting considerable
gains to analysis as a therapy and science. But I regret
sometimes that so much interest and effort has been with-
drawn from the hysteria, phobic and compulsive disorders,
leaving their treatment to the beginners or the less
knowledgeable and adventurous analytic practitioners.
If all the skill, knowledge and pioneering effort which
was spent on widening the scope of application of
psychoanalysis had been employed instead on intensifying
and improving our technique in the original field, I
cannot help but feel that, by now, we would find the
treatment of the common neuroses child's play, instead
of struggling with their technical problems as we have
^
continued to do. (A. Freud, 1954, pp. 610-611).
Interestingly, her recommendation appears to be, not a return to the
former spheres of application, but an increase in the number of psycho-
analysts. "Let us hope that the future analysts, who occupy our Train-
ing Institutes now as candidates, will be numerous enough to spread
their energies over both fields." (p. 611).
With the extension of the paradigm to new clinical phenomena, a
number of anomalies emerged and eventually challenged the integrity of
the Freudian paradigm. Similarly, in the enormous literature and prac-
tice in the traditional clinical phenomena, anomalies also arose. Those
anomalies that engendered the sense of crisis immediately prior to the
inception of the double-bind family therapy paradigm are relevant to
the present purposes and so will be reviewed here.
Unsolved problems of individual psychoanalyses
. Anomalies in the
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traditional psychoanalytic population emerged gradually and slowly,
treatment of neuroses gained a history. Contrary to expectation, it
was not the case that one group drew attention to an anomaly, while
another group proposed a solution or accomodation; rather, the same
individual or group, would point out an anomaly and at the same time
propose a solution.
One of the most notable analysts in this regard was Clarence Obern-
dorf. His awareness of problems arose in two areas (the second of which
will be reviewed later in the discussion of anomalies). He proposed,
that it become a custom endorsed as good practice that a
case be reviewed in consultation if the patient has been
under classical psychoanalytic-treatment 4-5 hours a week
for more than, let us say, three hundred hours. Such groups[of 3 experienced analysts] might reach an opinion as to
whether the case should continue with the same analyst, be
discontinued as not well adapted to psychoanalysis and some
other method attempted, or be referred to a second analyst
because of transference difficulties leading to therapeutic
stasis. (1950, p. 403).
Oberndorf was here addressing himself to the increasingly obvious situa-
tion that psychoanalytic treatment results had not always warrented the
time, money, and effort put into them. He reviewed the two foremost
psychoanalytic journals (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis
and The Psychoanalytic Quarterly ) for the preceding decade and found
that "practically no articles have been devoted to the results of
psychoanalytic treatment and very few deal with therapy directly. One
of the most recent books on technique also fails to mention results,
except in fragmentary cases and the question of unsatisfactory results
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is not considered." (1950, p. 394).
The unsatisfactory results took a number of forms. One was the
presence of a "distressing recurrence of illness in treated patients"
(Gralnick. 1962. p. 517); this, of course, should not have occurred
according to the psychoanalytic formulation of therapy and change.
If both catharsis and recollection had transpired, these processes
would insure the neurosis (with respect to the particular conflictual
material treated in the analysis) would not recur. And apparently, th
frequency of relapses was greater than one could assume to be the case
if they were explained by incomplete analyses.
Alternatively, the analysis may have been technically successful,
but the person's social relations remain as bad as before analysis.
Facetiously speaking, everything in the patient is cured except his
human relations. Or in the phrase of one analyst, "On completion of
analysis, the patient is wiser, but sadder and lonelier." (Ackerman,
1954, p. 362). Or perhaps more painful yet, patient and analyst may
vary in their opinion regarding success of treatment, or the
results might be entirely unacceptable to relatives and
associates close to the patient. Results in which all
are concerned (the patient, his environment, and the
physician) are content with the outcome are frequent.
On the other hand, there are many instances when none of
these participants in an analysis is satisfied..."
(Oberndorf, 1950, p. 395).
These situations constitute anomalies because they counter either
psychoanalytic practice or theory. For instance, though analysis cer-
tainly does not promise happiness, it does directly imply greater
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understanding of one's needs and motivations, as well as greater con-
trol over one's behavior in relation to significant others (by the
working through of the repetition compulsions via the transference).
The above difficulties clearly counter this direct implication. Which
is not to indicate that all difficulties which arise are anomalies; for
instance, Stern (1938, p. 475) discussed a type of intellectualizing
patient as a technical difficulty.
It is among these patients [those convinced they are inferior
individuals] that one frequently finds (the bane of the
analyst's existence) those who get a thorough psychoanalytic
education through being analyzed and remain quite sick people.
They have the intellectual equipment to accumulate knowledge
and unless the analyst is on his guard, will use this know-
ledge not to unravel sources of their feelings of inferiority,
but neurotically to bolster up their ego, with pseudo-
therapeutic results.
This sort of difficulty is not anomalous as it can be accounted for,
easily, by psychoanalytic practice or theory. For instance, it can be
said that such patients, though recollecting and free associating away,
have maintained the dissociation of intellect and affect, and as such,
have undergone little or no catharsis. As such, they cannot be said,
with the framework, to have been successfully analyzed. The solution
lies in technique, that is, how to induce the patient, probably through
deprivation, (of reality markers, of response to overtures, etc.) to
couple recollection with appropriate affect.
Bona fide anomalies however, continued to emerge. Such were the
situations in which the identified patients became healthier, and a
family member reciprocally, became "sicker." This state of affairs
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was not always obvious since analysts eschewed contact with family
members, but It did occasionally reach report (and was subsequently
documented as a frequent occurrence by family therapists). For Instance,
within the child-guidance context, which used psychoanalytic theory and
practice, such reports had begun publicly by at least 1942. Burgum
reports that.
Occasional murmurs about the father as a factor in childguidance treatment echo through the field. The fact thatthe niother is the person most involved in responsibility
±n\T.^ , t
^"""^ difficulties, and also most accessiblei terms of her own time and agency working hours, tends tofocus attention on her both in diagnostic and treatment
considerations The father is not entirely neglected, yetthe full significance of his role in the treatment situationis rarely adequately realized. (Burgum, 1942, p. 4/4).
What makes the situation particularly significant is that the treatment
was in the traditional individual model (with mother seen as adjunct),
(p. 481), and the reciprocities in health followed a general pattern
(implying the situation was not idiosyncratic).''
The pattern was one in which the presenting problem was construed
as mother s difficulty in controlling a young child, with accompanying
mutual antagonism and the child's possible destructive behavior, poor
school adjustment or irritability. Father
"on the other hand either lurks in the background at
time of referral or comes forward as the child's champion
[and] has taken on the role of child's protector. If the
mother requests placement, the father asks that an attempt
be made to work out the problems in the home... He comforts
[the child] against the mother's abuse, becomes his last
refuge, and sometimes takes over, under strict matriarchal
surveillance, a large share of the maternal case." (p. 474).
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Neurotic compll.en rarities
.
Finally, a series of articles regarding the
protraction of neuroses among marital couples appeared. Again, it was
Clarence Oberndorf who appears to have initiated this set of concerns.
In 1934, he published an account of his
, treatment of "a case" of folie
a deux, wherein he reformulated some of the traditional ideas regarding
this "sharing" of psychoses. The term "folie ^ deux" had traditionally
been used to refer to psychotic manifestations shared by two people.
Generally, it is applied to the so-called induction(contagion, infection) of a second person by a primary
mentally sick person living in close proximity. The
xnductor suffers from paranoid ideas, excitements or
depressions which are transmitted to the second person.
Those who are induced, are usually blood relations
(siblings, or parents and their children); less frequently
the second member of a married couple. This circumstance
IS interpreted by Bleuler to 'throw light on the familial
disposition to the disease.' (Oberndorf, 1934, p. 14).
His reformulation is to the effect that: first, the tendency for
folie a deux to appear in blood relations is less due to "constitutional
predisposition" than to the "possibility for early and intense identifi-
cation of children with parents to each other" which especially affects
"ideal formation and self-appraisal." Secondly, Oberndorf highlights
the presence of two initially neurotic conditions, which complement
each other, and develop "mutual symptomatology" only after marriage.
It is a matter of frequent observation that when the induced
person is removed from the inductor the symptoms in the
former disappear. Exception to this result has been noted,
which again led Bleuler to comment that the second person
sometimes suffers from an independent disease in which only
certain manifestations, such as the content of the delusions,
are determined through induction. I believe this to be the
case far more frequently than it is possible to demonstrate
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xn advance folie a deux. In the case of neurosis adeux whxch I present, the pre-existent individualneuroses could be thoroughly established; the^utualsyrnptomatology developed only after marriage!(Oberndorf, 1934, p. 14). ^
It can be inferred that this case n.ay have sparked Oberndorf 's
interest in complementary neurotic processes in couples, as he addressed
this pattern repeatedly and some of his conclusions presage his later
writings.^ ^
^e.g
In the latter [folie a deux] we have the psychologicalinterplay of a group of two. In nearly all of the morepermanent and stubborn neurotic compulsions one findsthat the condition is often nourished by a lesser neurotictendency on the part of the individual principally in-
volved xn the patient's neurosis. At times the attitude
of domination or indulgence of the patient by the comple-
mentary person may be so patent that the layman correctlyinterprets the patient's father, mother, etc., as the main
cause for the continuity of the neurosis. (Oberndorf, 1934
p . 15) . ' '
9
100?^^'""'^°''^'^ perceptiveness regarding family dynamics is remarkable,in 1934, at a time when essentially no one was writing of current familydynamics, Oberndorf had the prescience to address them repeatedly. Forinstance, i-^i.
In pathological interlocking familial situations often
the only reason why the one person comes for treatment
and the other does not, rests in the circumstances that
the sick person is consciously struggling to break the
abnormal situation which he unconsciously desires, whereas
the person who is considered well desires consciously to
maintain it, without necessarily appreciating its patho-
logical aspect. From the strictly technical interpretation
of induced psychopathology, the inductor in neurotic
familial situations is often the individual who considers
himself and is often considered the normal person. This
leads to the very frequent comment on the part of psychia-
trists dealing with childhood psychiatric problems that
102
Oberndorf then discussed his analysis of each
.ember of nine
couples, both individuals of which eventually entered analysis with '
him. He reported on nine such cases in twenty-five years practice.
He stated that after varying periods of time, the spouse would enter
analysis, in several instances because improvement in the first member
(first in analysis) would convince the second person that s/he must
change for the marriage to continue.
His article is fascinating in part because of his style of presen-
tation. Published in 1938, when perhaps the press for space in Journals
was not so great as it is today, Oberndorf 's account includes many pages
of case history and comparative information which makes for a vivid
picture of the processes he was trying to explain. Also his initial
paragraphs are careful, methodical arguments, paving the say to his
slightly heretical material; he began with "The theory of the psycho-
analytic school attributes the origin of neuroses to a conflict between
conscious strivings and unconscious longings or to a wholly unconscious
conflict of purpose." (p. 453), and proceeded to Oedipal aspects of
development, occasional inability to relinquish parental attachment,
and later difficulties in the psychic or sexual life of the adult. All
the parents need to be treated rather than the child.
(Oberndorf, 1934, p. 16).
The only other instance encountered during reviewing this literature,
of such perspicacity regarding family dynamics is Kempf's 1919 article
on psychoanalytic modification in the treatment of psychoses (cited
later with regard to anomalies in non- traditional psychoanalytic
populations) .
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this was preamble to his contentions that marital difficultieB
..par-
ticularly sexual problems and infidelities, were often the re^pf
the transposed incest prohibitions, that is of the persistence
incest prohibitions after marriage that have been "transferred'
parent to the spouses precluding guiltless sexual contact between |
espouses. He believed that the degree to' which the Oedipus complex
had waned in both partners was the single most important psychological
factor influencing the success, or failure, of a marriage (1938, p. 464).
As determinedly psychoanalytic as his 1934 presentation was, there
are clear passages that presage his later work on neurotic complemen-
tarities. For instance, while discussing "conscious feelings of in-
feriority in women... associated with the castration complex (penis
envy)...", Oberndorf comments that
This type of woman with a psychological masculine urge
may find herself powerless to refrain from attempting to
assert leadership over her husband at critical moments
in connection with generally accepted masculine prerogatives.
In consequence the man may feel himself humiliated and
react with a refusal to be subjected by his wife or to
acknowledge his own proclivity to feminine subordination.
If he is unable to defend his masculinity or to find
assuaging compensations for his latent femininity, he
may seek escape in divorce. He often rationalizes his
flights with such reasons and causes as incompatibility
of temperament, social inequality, or difference of re-
ligion. The above mechanism was operative in the wife
of one of the couples reported by the author (1934, p. 16).
Of course, marriages are well known where mutual inversions
of minor degree have happily complemented each other. This
mechanism was operative in one of the couples reported as
"Folie a deux." (1934, p. 15).
He considered the technical problems "knotty" but not insurmountable.
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With regard to transference, he wrote that these patient's should he
treated as any other; with regard to each patient using the analyst
as a source of resistance, the analyst should maintain his position
of neutrality with utmost inviolability.
Bela Mittelman, citing Oberndorf 's work with couples' neurotic
ccplexnentarities, began writing in the 40's about what he termed
"neurotic circular interpersonal reactions." (1944, p. 480). m a
study of fifteen couples, Mittelman reconstructed the complementary
neurotic reactions by which "partners followed an intrapsychic vicious
circle of reactions which they acted out in an external viscious cir-
cle" (p. 483). (Interestingly enough, Mittelman was discussing here,
a couple in which "...as a result of psychotherapy, the patient's
behavior suddenly changed, the partner felt that he was now really
being abandoned and punished for all his past aggression. He reacted
by cutting his wrist..." (p. 483) (which can be seen as a variant to
reciprocity in health anomaly!).
It was his contention that because of the continuous and intimate
nature of marriage, every neurosis in a married patient was "strongly
anchored in the marriage relationship" and that the presence of a
compleLmentary neurotic reaction in the partner contributed to the pro-
tracted nature of the patient's neurosis and should be addressed in
treatment. An example, for instance of such a complementarity is the
common pattern of an attempt at self-sufficiency through
emotional detachment on the part of one partner (usually
the man), and an intense, open demand for love on the part
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of the other (usually the woman). When the woman'.
fe: r'heTr' ^-^^^^^ -^-s
ttll L. I """^^ detached while she evaluates
and fear o^";!' T ' ^^^il-^^-S rejection. Her guilt
her demand
Pace with the violence o
off K ? .
C°^'^°"^itantly, the man, who is wardinghxs desxre for dependency and submission, becomesafraid of being completely dominated by thes; excessivedemands for affection and defends himsllf brin'easJnghxs detachment. At the same time this detachment Jsan expression of his anger toward her, aroused bj Ms
frustratxo'n"?
"-"^--^ criticism as at n of hxs own need to be loved. The comple-mentary reactions are further overdetermined by the
mutlnf partners project the guilt from their
luT //J^'T^^^ attitudes and blame each other forthexr diffxculties. (Mittelman, 1944, p. 484).
(Mlttelman provides several more such patterns but one will probably
suffice at this point.)
Mittelman stated that in treatment he analyzed only one partner
of each couple, though he interviewed each partner at least twice and
occasionally gave "weekly psychotherapeutic interviews", i.e., not
analysis. The analysis of a partner, when necessary, was invariably
conducted by another analyst (p. 491), though he cites Oberndorf's con-
current analysis and recognizes the advantages to knowing in detail of
each partner's reactions. Mittelman emphasized that "he must be care-
ful to limit his activity to analytic interpretations and avoid taking
sides or rendering judgment on the qualities of either mate" (p. 490),
demonstrating himself to be both wise, but orthodox with regard to the
role of interpretations. If the patient's analysis was successful,
the complementary reaction of the partner often subsided without any
sort of direct treatment (p. 490); and if the complementarity was not
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of a serious nature, it was often enough to explain to the patient,
using daily material, how his/her behavior affected the partner (p. 489).
In a later (1948) report, he considers the advantages of problems
of concurrent analysis of twelve couples. Each partner received analysis
for four of the couples, and for the remaining eight couples, one part-
ner was analyzed and their partners received between two and twenty
sessions of intervals from one week to several months; it should be
emphasized that treatment was concurrent, not conjoint, that is, each
individual in the couple was seen, but the couple was not seen together
as a couple. Couples were adjured not to "mix" their analyses (p. 193).
He felt that the primary advantage in this mode of treatment was
that both the realities and the neurotic interactions of the partner's
behavior became clear.
Current reactions of dependency, guilt, hostility, anxiety,
and superiority are revealed in a clearer light, and at
times one of the mates gives information about crucial
trends in the other mate. These trends may be so under-
played by the other mate that they would not otherwise be
adequately recognized by the analyst, although their
investigation is imperative for the success of the treat-
ment
.. .Simultaneous treatment of married couples was
successful in eleven of twelve instances, including two
which ended in divorces satisfactory to both parties.
In four of the twelve couple, both mates were analyzed,
in eight, one mate was analyzed, the other received
briefer psychotherapy. (Mittelman, 1948, pp. 196-197).
"The treatment" here, it should be understood, refers to the
analysis of the primary patient; the treatment might well be directed
to the two partners, but only in the service of breaking the complemen-
tarity and allowing the primary patient to begin working in analysis.
\
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By this ti.e, mttel^an was experienced enough in concurrent analysis
to provide indications, contraindications, and technical pointers to
the reader. It is also clear, however, that he was construing this
as an adjunct to treatment, i.e., as a preliminary and/or "e.tra"
treatment designed to rob the complementarity o£ its effects and allow
the patient to get on with analysis All t-^.^ ^ -> •. the formulations were psycho-
analytic, as was the treatment format.
The efforts of Oberndorf and Mittelman can be regarded as those
of psychoanalytic adherents who recognized problems arising in the
treatment of neuroses by classical analysis, problems which could not
be accomodated by traditional practice, which was based upon the in-
timacy of individual analysis and a careful putting aside of reality
factors. Ignoring reality issues was necessary, technically ~ to
enhance the transference, and theoretically - as neuroses were caused
in the past and could be cured only by addressing the past, whether
through recall, abreaction, or working through repetitions in the trans-
ference. The presence of contemporaneous, reality factors which
decidedly influenced neuroses, and which at times were amenable to
advice, constituted an embarrassment, and an anomaly. Classical theory
was unable to explain why simply direction and reflection of behavior
and reaction could change the patient's behavior and his or her spouse's
Contemporaneous events and relationships were exerting enormous in-
fluence over the neuroses of patients in a way psychoanalytic theory
could not account for, nor deal with in the traditional manner.
108
As this became more obvious, greater effort was directed toward
the problem areas, and the rate of publications addressing them accelera-
ted. During the 30's Oberndorf was virtually alone among analysts In
dealing with neurotic complementarity and, couples; Mlttelman had than
extended Oberndorf 's work In 1944, 1948, and 1952!°
In 1953, P. Martin and H.W. Bird published "An approach to the
psychotherapy of married partners: the stereoscopic techniques" In which
they advocated the close cooperation between the analysts or therapists
who are each treating the individual partners in a marriage. The ex-
pected regular and frequent contact between the therapists was regarded
as leading to a more accurate perception of the marital relationship.
This, of course, is an extension of Mittelman's position, wherein he
saw both members of a couple to better assess their neurotic reactions
to each other. Though his focus remains essentially intrapsychic (he
speaks of neurotic reactions rather than relationships) his approach
does show clear relational elements. The shift to a relational focus
is clearer still in Martin and Bird. (It should be noted that they
emphasize the relationship between therapists must be friendly and in-
formative for the stereoscopic technique to work) (cited in Grotjahn,
1960, pp. 39-40).
Significantly, in a laudatory and affectionate obituary written
at Oberndorf 's death in 1954, his work outside the mainstream of psycho-
analytic theory and practice is not once mentioned, though his main-
stream activities, of which there were many, were cited and discussed.
It can be inferred that the writer of the obituary and editors of the
Psychoanalytic Quarterly were uncomfortable enough with that material
to exclude it completely.
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Then in 1956 Alexander Thomas reported his work with eight couples,
each partner of which was treated in one or two weekly sessions to about
150 sessions per partner. (At no time did both partners of any couple
meet simultaneously with Thomas.) He points out that the therapist
should
Behave, as if he knew nothing about the other individual...
No guarantee for a solution should be offered... It must be
made clear that each partner will have to resolve his or
her neurotic functioning in the marriage in order to make
a go of it... [and] in simultaneous psychotherapy, the
transference situation between patient and therapist
tends to become secondary and the emphasis to shift from
the therapeutic situation toward the marriage relation-
ship. (Grotjahn, 1960, p. 44).
Martin Grotjahn's modification
. Some of the work of Martin Grotjahn
may be said to culminate this trend toward tec^inical modifications in
classical clinical practice. Grotjahn developed in greatest detail,
the techniques for using "marginal interviews", i.e., interview of the
patient's spouse, to further the analysis of the patient . He is quite
clear that these marginal interviews are an adjunct to "the therapy",
that is, the analysis of the individual patient, and information gleaned
from them is used in the service of the individual analysis (1960,
p. 172; p. 238) which is regarded as the basis of psychotherapy (p. 9).
There is no pretense of couples or family therapy. His theory remains
strictly psychoanalytic, though his practice bends the clinical rules.
For instance, he discusses not reaction complementarities but"family
neuroses," and states that "there are cases in which seeing the marriage
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partner is strongly indicated for sound analytic reasons..." (I960,
p. 169).
He began seeing marital partners when, doing the training analyses
of analytic candidates he found that the
favorite defence of many physicians
... is isolation ofinsight from emotional experience
... [whichj frequently"
renders their training analysis therapeutically ineffectiveThey learn everything and change nothing. I found thatto involve a physician's marriage partner, directly orindirectly, and under favorable circumstances, was aneffective way to combat this fateful tendency
.. .and Idecided that this technique might also be applicable tothe treatment of other resistive patients with similardefenses.
.. (I960, p. 162).
These and subsequent interviews were planned to "reinforce, stimulate,
or to safeguard therapeutic progress" in the patient's analysis. Occa-
sionally marginal interviews led to "collateral psychotherapeutic-
treatment with regular interviews" (p. 169), but, it appears, not to
concurrent analysis. If analysis of Grotjahn's partner were indicated,
that partner would be referred to another analyst (1960, p. 236); in
fact, Grotjahn would not accept in analysis, the partner of a patient
even if treatment had been terminated, so that if re-analysis were
required, he would be free to accept back the former patient (1960,
p. 236). It was made clear that he had never conducted "the simul-
taneous analysis of two married partners." (p. 233) At other times,
marital partners were referred to group psychotherapy (Klein, 1965,
p. 26). "In certain emergencies" (p. 295) or "in rare cases" (p. 179)
a family conference may be called; however, it is clearly an extra-
ordinary measure and one that is isolated and not part of a series.
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Grotjahn was at pains to point out that his work was psychoanalytic,
and involved a "new direction in analytic technique" (p. 279), but not
theory. He pointed out that
the emphasis is on the analysis of the individual neurosis
as anchored in the complementary neuroses of the family...
This method employs the main analytic concepts of trans-
ference and resistance, of interpretation, lifting of
repression, insight, and final interpretation. In my
opinion family therapy is analytic therapy although its
approach differs from the standardized formal analytic
approach described in textbooks of psychoanalytic tech-
nique, (p. 275)
His formulations revolved around the ideas of complementary neuroses
which were anchored in the family collective unconscious and the family
neurosis (p. 272). The family collective unconscious was comprised of
the projective extensions of both the conscious and unconscious. For
instance, the marriage neurosis (between marital partners and not chil-
dren, depending upon presence or absence of children or their ages)
may be defined as the transfer and projection of unresolved,
unconscious conflicts from the parts of both partners into
the present; that is, from children of families into the
marriage situation. As long as the neurotic unrealistic^
aspects of this transfer remain unconscious, the prognosis
is gloomy. In a neurotic marriage, the bond repeats old
infantile patterns. The female may unconsciously see an
image of her father or brother in her husband. On deeper
levels she may also see in him her mother or sister, a
circumstance which complicates matters endlessly. A man
may easily realize he represents his wife's father ~
it
is a different matter for him to understand he has
been
cast in the role of his own mother-in-law. (pp.
92-93).
While clearly psychoanalytic with regard to formulation
and change
processes (he explicitly deals, for instance, with
interrupting repeti-
tions and beginning new learning in marriages) (p. 213),
Grotjahn's
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work in practice was clinically far enough beyond the pale by a summary
work in 1960, to draw criticism from dominant psychoanalytic circles.
"Psychoanalysts like Edward Glover, Karl Menninger, and Leon Saul more
or less warned against [analysis of the family neurosis] as dangerous
or detrimental to a pure transference neurosis." (p. 281) Kubie is
cited (pp. 68-69) as thinking it unwise for the same analyst to conduct
the analyses of both marital partners simultaneously because that one
or another of the partners will lose confidence in the analyst's impart-
iality.
A third set of criticisms from the more traditional psychoanalysts
concerned the perceived destruction of the one-to-one relationship of
classical treatment. This was regarded as the basis of analysis and
its disruption was ascribed to attempts to correct countertransference
difficulties in the analyst him- or herself.
Finally, the analyst's "unresolved" countertransference difficulties
may be criticized more personally.
It may be hinted darkly that he has an unresolved interest
in watching the primal scene. He may be accused of having
a "papa complex," or of attempting to become the pater
familiae, who God-like guides his flock of sheep. He may
Grotjahn dealt quite nicely with another obvious problem here,
the emergence of paranoid ideation, by requiring either separate analysts
at the first sign of paranoid reaction, or planning a "joint family
interview" of patient, partner and analyst. He felt that this tech-
nique made paranoid distortions and misinterpretations less "malignant,
although it cannot prevent argument and misinterpretation. It safe-
guards the sanity of the sane family member by giving him some
orientation in the reality of the treatment." (p. 273)
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be accused of a great unconscious need to play the
omnipotent, omniscient, all-powerful, God-like-father-
mother. Because of the dependency phobia of our time,
he may even be suspected of trying to enslave whole
families. The perfect psychoanalyst will thus be con-
trasted with the image of the imperfect, depreciated,
and deplorable psychotherapist whom we meet in the funny
papers and mystery shows. There is no doubt that such
therapists do exist; but this cannot be avoided in a
time of transition, when well-organized training is
limited, and above all, slow. (Grotjahn, 1960, pp.
276-277)
Grotjahn 's rejoiner was that by dealing exclusively in counter-
transference consideration critics were ignoring the presence and role
of the complementary family neurosis, which had its own structure and
dynamics, and required analytic conceptualizations and treatment.
Psychoanalytic family treatment was regarded as stimulating the process
of working through, especially in those cases that tended to isolate
analytic insight from affect, (p. 274)
What is quite obvious is that a sufficient number of analysts had
bolted from the mainstream, so that they, in some sense, constituted a
threat. These criticisms can be regarded as attempts to discredit the
increasingly influential techniques on theoretical and personal grounds,
or to redefine the techniques as "not psychoanalysis" and thereby main-
tain the purity of the DM-"purity" here, not being meant perjoratively
,
but rather in the sense of "uncontaminated" or "wrong-to-the-spirit"
of the framework. (The double-bind DM will be observed to attempt the
same type of probably necessary maneuver and Freud's 1914 paper may be
seen similarly). This would seem to be an almost inevitable development
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as members of a DM, with all that implies in perception and self-
identity attempt to keep the set of commitments in which they have in-
vested, stable and consonant with their total framework of commitments.
It is an attempt to correct what are seen as faulty thinking, as well
as an attempt to keep the ground from shifting out from under one's feet.
The process is an attempt to stave off a sort of betrayal from a DM
that is beginning to deteriorate from within.
Grotjahn's work with the family neurosis represents the most develop
response within psychoanalytic conceptualization, to the anomalies emerg-
ing from within the traditional clinical populations of psychoanalyses
—
the transference neuroses. He addressed the resistant cases (resistance
with regard to isolation of affect, to lack of change in treatment, to
relapse) and bent the techniques without breaking fundamental rules.
It was a highly developed, and usually successful (and therefore threat-
ening) accomodation of the psychoanalytic framework. Ackerman's work,
though psychoanalytic in origin, steps firmly and unambiguously outside
the classical psychoanalytic framework, both in technique and concep-
tualization. While Grotjahn regarded the individual as the patient,
based formulations and change in psychoanalysis, Ackerman's work treated
the whole family, with its dynamics, and redefined the change process
into family terms.
Two further points regarding implicit aspects of Grotjahn's work
that presaged the best of family systems therapy should be mentioned.
First, he was exquisitely aware of family homeostatic aspects, and
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particularly the reciprocity of health previously mentioned. For in-
stance, while discussing the possible uses, including diagnostic, of
marginal interviews, he states, "As the patient progresses, this family
neurosis will also change, and this change will involve and perhaps
endanger the mental health of his mate and the future of the marriage."
(p. 156) Similarly, in the previously mentioned issue of paranoid
ideation in the spouse, his technique served delicate homeostasis func-
tions.
The second such point relates to Grotjahn's recognition that con-
temporary family processes served maintenance functions with respect to
pathology. Oberndorf and Mittelman had, of course, dealt with this in
some measure because of their interest in how neurotic complementarities
served to protract neurosis in the analytic patient. However, their
emphasis was on unconscious constellations that fit in a complementary
manner in the initial stages of relationships (and often influenced ob-
ject choice) having set up marital neuroses, allowed/induced them to
continue; also, both wrote about the presence of individual neuroses in
the partners, antedating the relationships. Grotjahn's work emphasizes
this aspect also, but had frequent undertones addressing the processes
whereby pathology was actively maintained in family behaviors and words;
12
Also see pp. 171-172 for extended discussion of spouse's diffi-
culty in integrating 'relationship' to spouse in view of spouse's
changes and meeting the therapist.
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this connoted a shift in etiology from intra-psychic dynamic processes
to interactive, communicationally-induced pathology. For instance.
Analytic psychotherapy of the family neurosis is based
on an important insight: a person's neurosis may be
anchored to a large extent in a complementary neurosis
involving his marriage or his family. The unconscious
communication or interaction between people can cause
and maintain a neurosis, as another kind of communication
can help to cure it. The family may thus both help and
hinder growth and maturation. (Grotjahn, 1960, p. 282)
and,
The therapist of the neurotic family must understand that
a neurotic reaction in one person may complement neurotic
behavior in another; that a neurosis (or psychosis) may be
the only possible adjustment of a child to a neurotic
(or psychotic) family; that the way in which symptoms
develop in one person may be the result of unconscious
clues and orders given by another member of the family.
In these situations, psychoanalysis of the individual
patient may remain incomplete and may fail unless the
analyst treats the family neuroses, in addition to the
neuroses of the individual. (Grotjahn, 1960, p. 289)
If put to the test and asked whether neuroses are "caused" by inter-
action between people in the family of marriage (not origin) or by
psycho-dynamic processes from family of origin, it is obvious that
Grotjahn would take a modified psychoanalytic position. Nevertheless,
the direction of his flexibility is prescient.
The influence of contemporaneous relationships on neuroses and on
the course of treatment constituted an anomaly primarily of technique,
and also had some implications for the paradigm. These difficulties
were anomalous because psychoanalytic technique and theory of change
demanded treatment in isolation from the world (as mentioned previously,
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particularly with respect to enhancing transference)
. By ignoring
reality factors and remaining a blank screen, the analyst fostered the
necessary frustration, regression, and development of transference,
through which the neurotic repetitions could be worked through. To
take into account reality factors, particularly with regard to relation-
ships
,
would drastically interfere with the development and use of that
therapeutically essential "relationship," the transference. Thus, with
regard to practice, with patients involved in neurotic complementarities,
the analyst was caught between the devil and the deep, blue sea. To
take into account the reality relationships hampered the transference
development and thus the therapy; to not take them into account hampered
the therapy because little or no change came about.
The anomalous aspects with regard to paradigm concerned the thera-
peutic processes of change, and not etiology of neurosis. Psychoanalytic
theory could rather easily deal with even neurotic complementarities;
for instance, it could point to neurotic involvement in object choice
or indicate that both partners had been neurotic prior to their relation-
ship. The existence of contemporaneous influence over neuroses did not
contradict the etiological notions of origin in the past.
The unsolved problems of individual psychoanalysis, then, did not
constitute anomalies with respect to theory of etiology , but were
anomalous for both technique and theory of change , both of which had
had paradigmatic status in the framework.
CHAPTER IV
ANOMALIES ARISING WITH THE EXTENSION OF THE PARADIGM
TO NEW CLINICAL POPULATIONS
The success of the psychoanalytic DM with the transference neuroses
impelled practitioners to attempt applying it to clinical phenomana oth(
than the transference phenomena. Psychoanalysis was applied to dementi;
praecox/ schizophrenia, to psychotic depressions, latent schizophrenia o]
borderline personalities, and to the psychopathology of children. Upon
application, it became quite clear that major reformulations would be
required as neither technique nor theory could accomodate aspects of
these psychologically different clinical syndromes.
This set of anomalies proves particularly important for two rea-
sons. First, the extension of a successful paradigm-DM to phenomena
for which it was not constructed, is another confirmation that Kuhnian
analysis is appropriate, with respect to the sequence of developments
preceding the inception of family therapy. Second, the anomalies that
arose from this extension were more marked than those that arose from
traditional clinical populations; the discrepancy between DM-expected,
and encountered processes, proved just that much more noticeable.
Several authors had drawn attention to the fact that the framework
was largely unsuccessful when extended too far beyond itself. For in-
stance, Oberndorf
,
only six years before the publication of the D-B
theory, stated that.
It is my impression that the proportion of unsatisfactory
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results may have increased with the extension of the
psychoanalytic method to include cases with marked
schizoid personalities or schizophrenia, as well as
those with extremely weak or uncertain superegos
('psychopathic personalities'), and with the use of
the method of physicians whose natural talents are
unsure or training is incomplete. (Oberndorf, 1950
p. 396)
Similarly, attention has been drawn specifically to extension to
clinical phenomena outside the originally intended realm of considera-
tion, "...instances where the psychoanalytic method has yielded unsatis
factory results [include]
... intractable psychiatric conditions for whic
the psychoanalytic method was not originally intended but is now fre-
quently used." (Oberndorf, 1950, p. 396)
Interestingly enough, Don Jackson, one of the double-bind origina-
tors and himself psychoanalytically trained, made note of this process.
Another influence toward family studies, which has in-
directly stemmed from the psychoanalytic movement, has
to do with the disappointment in the results of this
expensive and time-consuming technique and the possible
relation of results to a change in the type of clinical
material with which psychoanalysts deal. The shift in
emphasis from symptom neuroses to character, marital,
and child guidance problems has resulted in a broadening
of analytic techniques with an emphasis on parameters
and on psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. (Jackson,
1961, p. 33)
Perhaps the finest example of awareness regarding both the results
of extension and the response of analysts comes, again, from Oberndorf
(1950, p„ 397).
Psychoanalytic treatment of the more complicated schizoid,
paranoid depressive, or extremely narcissistic personalities
may have continued three to five or even more years by the
same or successive analysts. The unsatisfactory results in
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this group are discouraging and arouse doubts in the
mind of_ the analysts as to whether the inadequacv"Ties
in limitations of the method or in his own skill in
applying it
.
These cases particularly suggest research to determine
more accurately the efficacy and scope of psychoanalytic
therapy; also to judge earlier the type of personality
likely to respond favorably, the suitability of the
analyst to the patient, and to assess promptly the
patient's difficulties. The latter fall into the realm
of transference, empathy, their derivatives and corollaries,
which are of paramount importance. This is always true
whether the therapy aims to make the deeply repressed
unconscious conscious, adapt the individual to cold,
cruel reality, integrate the id with the ego and the
superego, or also, I presume, in the procedure seeking
the goal of 'orgastic release.
'
For this reason the attention of most investigators dissatis-
fied with their own results has centered about the question
of_ technique with the hope that improvements in technique
,
especially the analysis of the transference
, would bring
about better results
. (emphasis added)
Anomalies that Arose from the Treatment of Children
The extension of psychoanalytic treatment to children occurred quite
early. Anna Freud was presenting publicly in the 20' s (1926) and citing
Aichhorn's work (with delinquents) during the second decade of the cen-
tury (1954, p. 607). It is Parloff's opinion that it was in the area
of child analysis that the first serious questioning of the basic assump-
tions of psychoanalysis occurred. Grotjahn apparently agrees, stating
that for many years, Oberndorf's work relating to family neurotic patterns
remained unnoticed.
Then, slowly, some analysts started to report techniques
121
which differed from those their colleagues had reported inGlover s-^ questionnaire. These were the child analysts
In their efforts to analyze children, they constantly had
to deal with problems caused by the help or hindrance of
the parents. (1960, pp. 28-29)
Parents of young patients. The issue of dealing with the effects of
parents in treatment and with the parents themselves was quite difficult,
and actually, could not be accomodated within the psychoanalytic frame-
work. The injunction against seeing relatives forbade it technically,
and theoretically; meeting with parents contaminated the emergence of
the transference relationship. Moreover, particularly with children of
latency age, meeting with parents was regarded as potentially disrupting
any trust the patient might invest in the analyst.
On a theoretical level, mechanisms of psychoanalytic treatment
were involved. The progress of therapy depended upon the elicitation
and working through of the transference neurosis and repetition compul-
sions. The analyst, to facilitate such a transference, attempted to be
a "blank screen" and introduced few reality constraints into the situa-
tion; this included providing only minimal personal information about
him/herself and also not meeting with the patient's relatives, either
to give, or receive information. Success in treatment depended upon
elicitation and working through of transference. Introduction of dis-
ruptions, such as meeting one or more family members could impede either
Glover, E. Techniques of psychoanalysis : New York: International
Universities Press, 1955.
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of these processes (Parloff, 1961), At the time of writing, Parloff
stated that it was still common practice for analysts to refuse inter-
views of family members on the assumption this would interfere with
treatment
.
In spite of these knotty theoretical points, it became increasingly
clear that parents had to be included in the analysis of children—they
were wreaking havoc on the treatment and their effect had to be mitigated.
Melitta Sperling (1949) devoted an article to dealing with parental, but
'especially maternal, anxieties, restrictions, and subversions of analysis
of children with psychosomatic problems. Similarly, Parloff (1961, p. 41)
drew attention to
the mounting clinical evidence .. that parents . .were.
.
so bumbingly diabolical. The patient's mother appeared
to have the remarkable knack of being able single-handedly
to produce neuroses, psychosomatic syndromes, psychoses,
and even juvenile delinquency with equal facility and on
either side of her ambivalence.
Such remarks strongly suggest that theories of etiology were failing,
and that mounting frustration on the part of clinicians was encouraging
a scapegoating of parents, and particularly the mothers of disturbed
children.
Reasons for including parents, even peripherally, into the child's
treatment began to be noticed.
Child analysis failed to fulfil its initial promises as
analysts discovered that even five one-hour sessions a
week could not keep up, in most cases, with the in-
fluence of the remaining 163 hours at home. The number
of child analysts who have stuck to their last is sur-
prisingly small, and this fact must have had some
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influence in giving tacit approval for others to seek
new techniques in treating children. (Jackson and
Satir, 1961, pp. 33-34)
Moreover, since the child was perceived as the victim of the parent's
conscious or unconscious "malevolence," the treatment of the child could
be enhanced by also treating the parents (Parloff, 1961, p. 41). Also,
the child guidance clinics (which almost without exception operated
within the psychoanalytic framework) were finding that in a significant
percentage of cases, children were referred with problems which were
directly, and often dynamically linked to marital problems, and that
treating the child alone was fruitless, and similar in structure to
treating one individual in a neurotic complementarity. (This sort of
finding is, it would seem, partially responsible for the transformation
of some child-guidance clinics to family-therapy clinics).
Work such as Burgum's (1942, previously cited) regarding the father
in relation to child and mother's treatment, indicated that treatment
of child and mother were not enough.
Cognitive structure of children . The necessity of working with parents
was damaging enough to the integrity of the application. Quite as
damaging was the suggestion that, not only was psychoanalysis not very
effective with children, but that child analysis and its formulations,
were not always appropriate to the children themselves as a change process
Dr. Alvin Winder has noted that apparently Fritz Redl found the
psychoanalytic change processes compatible with those children he treated,
and was able to use the framework successfully.
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Auerswald (1972, pp. 87-88) relates his discovery of this shortly after
having finished training as an analyst.
Armed with the paraphenalia of a "child therapist"—
family dolls, dart guns, etc.— I found myself in
various rooms with various black ghetto children doing
'play therapy.' I' discovered at that time that I
had a problem. Nothing I did changed much of anything.
The kids I was trying to "treat" were delighted to
shoot mother "symbolically" ad infinitum
. They were
supposed to respond to my interpretations by entering
into a process. They didn't. They just shot mother.
Furthermore, they shot father, brother, sister and
Jesus Christ with the same glee, depending upon which
stimulus I placed before them. Frequently, they shot
me... I began to understand that the reason I could not
treat "delinquent" ghetto kids with play therapy was
to be found in their general cognitive organization
vis-a-vis my own and the frame of reference I was using,
and not in the structure of psychodynamic defense systems
which, in that particular group of kids, existed at
best in only rudimentary ways.-^
Carl Whitaker (1972, pp. 98-99) too, became frustrated and dis-
couraged when no change developed. Carolyn Attneave (1972, pp. 122-123)
within the context of delivering comprehensive care to children (not
within the psychoanalytic framework, though her experience is similar
to the others in the problems she was responding to) started ' doing family
therapy "because nothing else made sense, although we'd not heard of it
as a separate field."
In case we should consider the case of delinquent children too ex-
treme an extension to adequately judge psychoanalysis ' s efficacy, we
should recall that the first extension of the framework to children was
by Aichhorn, to the same population, that is, delinquent ghetto children.
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Anna Freud's work, as early as her 1926 report also took into account
the differences in the cognitive structure, and existential situation
of the child. She stressed that adults came to treatment, whereas children
were brought for treatment; it was necessary, therefore, to form an under-
standing or to reach a consensus with each child patient about the reason
for treatment. This agreed-upon reason was always in terms the child
could understand and was usually, it appears, initially formulated by the
child. Though she did not elaborate explicitly to any great degree, it
is obvious from her reports that Freud took pains to establish a working
relationship with each child; she was explicit about the need to estab-
lish a working relationship that is different from that with an adult
patient. What she was less than explicit about was that the pains she
took to establish these relationships were directed toward a type of
relationship that depended as much upon its affective component as any
interpretations to effect change. The differences between adult and child
in cognitive structuring were taken into account primarily in her tech-
nique rather than in her theory.
Initial efforts to see the young patient's parents . Eventually, social
agencies dealing with children, and to a far lesser degree, child analysts,
began to see family members, though "only as the backdrop against which
to view the individual" (Sherman, 1961, p. 14). There developed a definite
rift such that some therapists were advocating seeing family members,
as a family and not in concurrent but separate analyses, whereas others
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advocated a more orthodox psychoanalytic approach. For instance, Berta
Bornstein in 1948 contended that contact with parents should not go
beyond mild and supportive adjunct psychotherapy and the analyst should
not use dynamic or genetic interpretations with the parents.'^
We can assume that the rift became recognized in part because there
were enough advocates of both positions to mount an explicit campaign.
By the early 1950 's, caseworkers had had enough experience in seeing
relatives of patients that they were able to identify points of diffi-
culty in their new endeavor.
The trouble has been, as I have already mentioned, that
the theory underlying casework practice with individuals
has not been supplemented with the methodological equip-
ment necessary for the understanding and treatment of the
family constellation
. It is an interesting phenomenon
—
supplying grist for the sociologist's mill—that studies
and experimentation of the family as a group and on family
pairs, conducted by psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, case-
workers, and anthropologists, have been reported in the
literature only recently. Caseworkers have begun to seek
new operational hypotheses on the basis of their own
experience and have also extrapolated related concepts
from the findings reported by other professions.
(Mitchell, 1961, p. 72)
By 1954, Nathan Ackerman's work had enabled him to elucidate these
gaps more fully, (though it would be another four years before publi-
cation of his theoretical solutions)
.
In child guidance practice, the problems of treating the
parents of disturbed children have not been solved. There
^Cited by Grotjahn (1960, p. 30).
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have been many failures. We have not yet succeeded in
formulating adequate criteria for the psychotherapy of
parental role. In examining the causes of failure of
treatment of mothers of disturbed children, several fac-
tors loom large: the complexity of the definition of
mothering; the difficulty of relating the dynamics of
individual personality to the mothering role; incomplete
or incorrect diagnosis; vague and changing orientation
to goals with resulting confusion of the therapeutic
course; failure to properly integrate the treatment
of child and mother; failure to understand the parental
conflict and the fundamental interdependence of maternal
and paternal functioning; and finally, the failure to
relate the therapy of child and mother to a total psycho-
social evaluation of the family as a unit. (Ackerman,
1954, p. 362)
Anomalies in child analysis
. If we recall Masterman's point, that anom-
alies arise because the paradigms have been pushed too far, and Kuhn's
point, that anomalies are obdurate discrepancies between DM predictions/
expectations and what actually occurs, then two situations here can
legitimately be termed anomalies. First, the failure rate in child
treatment if parents were excluded signalled the first anomaly. For,
if change depended directly upon the transference relationship, and if
contact with family members hindered development of transference, the
analyst was caught in a bind. S/he could either see, or not see, the
family members; if s/he did, transference development was hindered and
change jeopardized, yet if s/he did not, then experience had shown
change was hampered in the child. Secondly, the differences between
adults and children in cognitive capabilities dictated the necessity
of changes, both clinical formulations and practice to de-emphasize
transference, interpretation, and many verbal techniques; thus Anna
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Freud set about establishing an emotional working relationship with the
child patients, and Melanie Klein and her group split off from classical
analyses in part because of using play^rather than talk with young
patients. Thus, the techniques were definitely different than in Freud's
paradigm; the mechanism of change, working through the repetitions, con-
tinues to apply, except that transference itself is no longer involved.
Ackerman's response to psychoanalytic-child anomalies
. Nathan Ackerman's
work with families constituted the first psychoanalytic family treatment
publicly reported; that is, his focus was not on the individual but on
the family itself as the unit of conceptualization and focus for change.
He had served for several years as a consultant to a social agency pri-
marily oriented to the treatment of children, which eventually dissolved
to form a Family Mental Health Clinic (Ackerman, 1961a, p. 228). Ackerraan
was concerned about the treatment of children in the light of anomalies
mentioned here. In 1950, he and Sobel challenged the traditional psy-
chiatric diagnostic categories for children and set out to define the
children's personalities as a function of the "sociopsychological con-
figuration of the family unit." (p. 744) Because their unit of defini-
tion was the child in his/her interaction with significant others, they
Dr. Al Winder has brought attention to this important split from
the classical psychoanalytic framework.
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decided that the treatment of the young child should begin with the
treatment of the family group. They observed, however, that no one was
doing family treatment, and the conceptual framework for it did not
exist—in fact, they stated that, "We do not know whether it is in fact
possible to treat families as groups. Perhaps it is not possible." (p.
745). They then proposed a methodology for the study of the pre-school
child with the context of the family (p. 745).
By 1954, concern primarily for the child had shifted to the inte-
gration of the family unit with the child. Ackerman pointed out many
of the difficulties in adjunct treatment, where child "and someone"
would be seen (pp. 361,366). He also began to elaborate what would be
his primary interest for the remainder of his work
finding a better way of conceptualizing the interrelations
of illness in one person with psycho-social processes of
the family entity. This immediately involves a consideration
of three interrelated phenomenological levels: what goes on
inside one person; the make-up of that person as it is
expressed in adaptation to specific family roles; and the
structure and function of the family as a group entity.
(Ackerman, 1961b, p. 256)
In 1954, he again pointed out that an appropriate frame of reference had
not yet been devised to integrate the therapy of an individual with the
therapy of a family group (pp. 367-368).
His Psychodynamics of Family Life : Diagnosis and Treatment (1958)
constituted his initial paradigmatic statement where he provided that
framework for the integration of individual and family he had talked
about
.
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In this book he offered a comprehensive theoretical
approach in which the emerging personality of the
individual is related to the family configuration.
He presented a systematic scheme for organizing and
correlating data on the family group with data on
individual family members. This scheme encompassed
bio-psycho-social factors, patterns of communication,
control of conflict, mechanisms for restitution,
extrafamilial social roles, pathogenic conflicts,
stricings and values, capacity to accomodate to
new experiences, reality testing, learning and
growth. (Mitchell, 1961, p. 73)
The object of the diagnostic family process was to pinpoint the
central conflicts of the family group, and their corresponding role
disturbances. However, both diagnosis and treatment focused on the
family as a whole, rather than the concommitent treatment of several
members in separate analyses.
...if we are to understand the individual, we must also
understand the structure, function, and vital processes
of the group as a discrete system. It is for this reason
that, in this past decade, "family diagnosis" has been
coming to the fore as a focus of interest, replacing an
interest in "family-oriented " diagnosis. It represents
a shift to viewing the distress of the individual as
less the problem than a symptom of the problem of
pathology in the whole family. Family diagnosis is
oriented to "the client ±n the family" and their recip-
rocal interplay; it replaces the separatism expressed
in the phrase "the client and his family." One cannot
overemphasize the basic difference in orientation pro-
duced by the substitution of the word "in" for the word
"and." The "in" orientation is holistic; and "and"
orientation atomistic. These differing orientations
reflect differences not only in personality theory but
also in practical family analysis. (Sherman, p. 18, in
Ackerraan, 1961) [his emphasis].
Ackerman also responded to a number of the anomalies that had
arisen with respect to child analysis, and re-interpreted them accordi
131
to his dual-focus individual-family system.
From a clinical point of view, several considerations
ought to be stressed. First, mental illness is con-
tagious. It is passed from person to person. If we
test this idea, we find some interesting things, some
that ought to have been obvious. Families are rare
in which only one member is psychiatrically disturbed.
Where one is disturbed, one inevitably finds other
members of the same group also suffering a psychiatric
disorder. These illnesses liiay differ but it is hard
to know whether the first person that comes to our
attention is the most sick or the least sick. There
is, too, a very important ongoing interaction between
the psychiatric sickness of one member and the psy-
chiatric sickness of another, where the two are inti-
mately bound in their day-by-day family experience.
In other words, there are complementary relations be-
tween the illnesses of respective family members who
share the problems of daily living. The one individual
who happens to get to us first, the so-called primary
patient, ought to be viewed as one link in the distress
and disablement; but we must also examine the ways in
which his disturbance represents a symptomatic or
functional expression of the emotional warp of the
family as a whole. Often when one looks into these
matters does one find that one part of the family main-
tains a tolerable emotional balance at the expense of
another. That is, if one person is to keep his head
above water, to maintain at least a tolerable functioning
without breaking down, it can sometimes only be done
when another member of the family is made sick or kept
sick, as is the case with some forms of depression. In
a tacit, covert way, other family members behave in a
manner that induces the depressed person to stay depressed.
If we intervene and relieve that depression, we upset the
pre-existing emotional balance in the family relations,
and someone else cracks up. Now, this is generally what
one finds in family groups where there is some degree of
cohesiveness, some partial complementarity among the
members, so that the family functions are carried on.
Despite this apparent unity, on a deeper level, the
family is emotionally divided into competing factions.
In some families there may be open warfare between one
part of the family and another. The fate of such internal
war influences the susceptibility to breakdown and the
outcropping of psychiatric illness. (Ackerman, 1961a ,pp.
233-234)
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Ackerinan's work clearly the most sophisticated form of response
to the child anomalies arising from within the psychoanalytic frame-
work. Many family therapists of a certain ilk credit Ackerman with
having "started" family therapy—others discount his contributions as
adaptations/extensions of psychoanalysis and refuse to regard his con-
ceptualization and methodology as family therapy. It is unclear at
present if his work was revolutionary or evolutionary in Kuhnian terms;
in any case, the influence of his work remains powerful among many
groups of family therapists, who it should be noted, can be regarded as
antithetical in practice and theory to the D-B adherents. D-B adherents
claiming priority of revolution, however, cite the incontrovertible fact
that the D-B paradigm reached public report two years before Ackerman'
s
paradigmatic work.
Anomalies that Arose from the Treatment of
Borderline Personalities or Latent Schizophrenia
The development and awareness of a "pseudo-neurotic" masked psychotic
syndrome . A surprising amount of attention was paid to borderline per-
sonalities or latent schizophrenia (also known as pseudoneurotic schizo-
phrenia or borderline psychosis) beginning, with any frequency, during
the 1930's. "Surprising" because, the syndrome is not exactly one that
seems likely to attract the attention of analysts. For example, it
seems to make sense that schizophrenia should attract their attention,
both in terms of treatment and research; if psychoanalysis was largely
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successful for neurosis and nothing seemed particularly successful
with schizophrenia, the obvious next step is to bring the theory and
practice of psychoanalysis to bear on schizophrenia— to cure or amelio-
rate, and to gain information about the disorder(s). However, even the
existence of a borderline syndrome was not known until the practice of
psychoanalysis led to its discovery/ formulation as a clinical entity.
While schizophrenia was a manifest psychopathology
, latent schizo-
phrenia was exactly this: latent. It became a recognized syndrome, not
through nosological observation or because of theoretical predictions;
but rather, was uncovered, then highlighted, by a psychotherapeutic
process. The reason for analysts' attention to borderline syndromes
rests, not in the intractability or inverted prestige of schizophrenia,
but in the contingencies of everyday private practice. As the number of
analysts grew, and concommitantly , the number of cases treated, there
began to appear an alarming number of patients who appeared neurotic
(of one form or other) when accepted into treatment, then, during the
exigencies of analysis, decompensated into frank psychosis. Even
allowing for the inevitable percentage of mis-diagnoses in early treat-
ment, poor treatment leading to exacerbation of clinical picture, and
"hidden" psychoses, the number of analytically precipitated psychoses
in neurotic-appearing patients began to concern the profession. This
was particularly problematic as most analysts dealt (and still do) with
out-patients; precipitation of psychosis in one's out-patient is
anxiety-provoking, to say the least, with its subsequent need for
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hospitalization and dimming of prognosis. A literature search reveals
a larger body of writings on these borderline personalities in the 1930';
and 1940 than on the treatment of schizophrenia, though both contributed
their own anomalies to the rising sense of crisis.
Though the 1930's heralded the intense work on borderline issues,
Clark addressed himself to what he termed the "borderland neuroses and
psychoses," as early as 1919, commenting that,
I think very few physicians have seriously used psycho-
analytic methods in treating the essential neuroses
without sooner or later making an attempt to employ the
same method in the borderland neuroses and psychoses,
with varying results. (Clark, 1919, p. 306)
Briefly, he reported his work (beginning as early as 1912) with
several sets of syndromes "not ordinarily classed as belonging to the
analytic type of psychoneuroses . " (p. 306) These included dementia
6praecox.
While Clark would use psychoanalytic interpretations in what appear
to be efforts to understand the patient's difficulties, he felt that
...under no circumstances should we really attempt to
require the patient himself to get that insight or
attempt to act upon it as such. In other words, dementia
praecox should not be analyzed, but by a method of
conscious suggestive therapeutics and rationalization
With the dementia praecox cases (most of which were advanced by time
of referral to him) , he was of the opinion that any attempt at traditional
psychoanalysis "invariably does harm," as it takes away the "crutches
of formulations these patients have made by which they can get on with
the realities of their existence. They are then reduced to actual
impotence." (p. 307)
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the praecox individual may be helped to an adolescent
sublimation of work and recreation short of the adult
demands of emotional maturity. (Clark, p. 308)^
It is obvious that Clark had used the term "borderland" to denote
ambiguity in clinical picture; later use of the term refers to a speci-
fic syndrome which should be regarded as a fairly stable personality
integration, which has specific characteristics, one of which is the
potential for temporary psychotic decompensations. The term does not
refer to a process of transiency nor does it connote anything like
"almost psychotic" or "nearly psychotic;" the majority of individuals
or borderline personality type at no time experience psychosis.
Greenacre (1941), in a series devoted to the predisposition toward
anxiety, emphasized increasing the reality hold of the patients and
strengthening the ego through "education" of the patients' narcissism;
she emphasized minimizing acting out and concessions to the patient's
gdemand for activity.
Stern in 1938 drew attention to the reason for regarding borderlines
as a group by themselves, as differentiated from both the psychoneuroses
and the psychoses (p. 488), though he takes pains to point out that his
presentation is unavoidably vague, as the syndrome is neither a variety
^In some respects, Clark's formulations bear resemblance to Harry
Stack Sullivan's a decade later,
g
reviewed by Stone, 1954.
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of neurosis or psychosis (and hence he is elucidating a syndrome with-
out the familiar psychoanalytic processes and characteristic clinical
patterns his readers were accustomed to) and because his efforts were
early in the process, and more time and investigation were required
(pp. 487-488). In part. Stern's difficulty was attributable to the
presence of processes not accounted for within the psychoanalytic
framework making the borderline syndrome both anomalous and important.
His efforts were particularly directed toward diagnosis as, it should be
recalled, diagnosis of borderlines was heretofore difficult and crucial
to the profession so that they would not be involved as patients in
9psychoanalytic treatment. His initial set of statements give a good
indication of the perplexity with which this phenomenon was viewed,
and also the sense of failure, crisis and need for revision.
It is well known that a large group of patients fit frankly
neither into the psychotic nor into the psychoneurotic group,
and that this border line group of patients is extemely
difficult to handle effectively by any psychotherapeutic
Q
Stern (1938, p. 468) listed clinical symptoms to help the prac-
titioner recognize a borderline personality early in treatment, in time
to terminate and avoid the significant potential of a psychosis, or to
make technical modifications in the treatment. Stern's list includes:
1. Narcissism; 2. Psychic bleeding— i.e., psychic collapse at trauma
rather than resilience; 3. Inordinate hypersensitivity— i.e., easily
deeply insulted or wounded; 4. Psychic and body rigidity— 'The rigid
personality'; 5. Negative therapeutic reactions— i.e., depression or
suicidal attempts; 6. What looks like constitutionally rooted feelings
of inferiority, deeply imbedded in the personality of the patient;
7. Masochism; 8. What can be described as a state of deep organic in-
security or anxiety; 9. The use of projection mechanisms; and 10.
Difficulties in reality testing, particularly in personal relationships,
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method. What forced itself on my attention some three
or four years ago was the increasing number of these
patients who came for treatment. My custom was not to
treat them analytically, except when they were suffering
acutely from neurotic symptoms (i.e., anxiety, depression,
etc.) and required immediate therapy. With these I
tried the usual analytic therapy but in the large majority
of the patients, after a more or less lengthy course of
treatment, I had to stop treatment leaving them not much
benefited. In the case of the 'neurotic character,' which
makes up a very large proportion of this border line group,
much more often than not I attempted no treatment at all,
for the simple reason that I had learned from experience
that our knowledge of analytic therapy as employed with
the psychoneurotic patients was insufficient to achieve
good results with this group, especially when their
suffering was not acute enough to justify immediate therapy.
(Stern, 1938, p. 467, emphasis added)
His perception of the failure of classical psychoanalysis for these
patients is reiterated throughout his article (pp. 468,469,488). Specifi-
cally, though he induced and allowed the thorough working through of the
object libidinal material "they nevertheless remained sick", unlike
usual neurotics (p. 468). The mechanism of change in classical analysis,
working through the repetitions within the transference, took place,
but were not effective for this group of patients. This clearly runs
counter to paradigm-induced expectations and, as such, constitutes an
anomaly
.
Stern was to eventually decide that though the disturbed psycho-
sexual impulses were operative and must be included in treatment, the
presence of disturbed narcissism, and not psychosexual difficulties,
were the cause of borderline states (pp. 488-489). These patients
showed the presence of narcissism to a degree not present in transfer
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neurotics and "it is on the basis of narcissism that the entire clinical
picture is built." (p. 469) This clearly, is a significant departure
from the Freudian paradigm with respect to formulation of the disorders.
Stern is positing a new root cause for this disorder, then goes on to
further differentiate the borderline group from the psychoneurotic.
With borderline patients, there is an immaturity and insecurity in the
transference not seen in neurotics (p. 478); it is a transference of
"extreme dependence" (p. 480). This is related to another point of
differentiation; that is, the anxiety of borderlines (which is quite
intense and from which the symptoms arise as defense) arises from the
early infantile period, and as such, at an earlier developmental stage
than neurotics (p. 487). Finally, a significantly greater proportion
of the ego functioning is involved in the disturbance, which of course
contributes to the increased difficulty in treatment and the "more grave"
prognosis (p. 489).
Now, this is all rather interesting as, it might be recalled, the
reason for psychoanalyst's not treating psychotic manifestations involves
the inability of these patients to form transferences. This was dis-
cussed at some length by Freud in his 1914 paper on narcissism. In that
paper, he deduced from his paradigm and DM that the presence of signifi-
cant narcissism precludes the development of transference and hence,
the change processes of working through. Contrary to this rather import-
ant point, Stern and others, began to note that borderlines, though
characterized by inordinate amounts of narcissism, did in fact form
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transferences. Moreover, these transferences were particularly intense,
primitive, dependent, and vivid.
Because of the intensity and dependency of these transferences.
Stern (1938, p. 479, footnote) recommended two technical modifications:
a greater degree of supportiveness by the analyst and "a rather constant
occupation" with diminishing the intensity of the transference. These
modifications are in direct contradiction to the psychoanalytic practice
of fostering the transference. The presence of transference among
patients with marked narcissism clearly constitutes a discrepancy be-
tween paradigm and DM induced expectations and empirical findings; as
such, transference among narcissistic patients constitutes a theoretical
anomaly with respect to the libido theory. The technical modifications
required to deal with borderline transferences constituted a technical
anomaly with respect to the classical paradigm.
His final conclusions were that narcissism was indeed amenable to
not only psychoanalytic investigation, but also treatment (p. 488),
though it was emphasized that the technical modifications required were
substantial
.
Zilboorg (1941) addressed the behavioral picture of what he termed
"ambulatory schizophrenics" (another term at times used for the border-
line types) which captured the quality of their lives rather well, and
which mentioned many of the elements later discussed by Otto Kernberg
(1975) . This includes the "outstanding feature" of the inner life of
these persons.
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...they are literally suffused with hatred. They are
hardly ever free from its pressure, during their waking
hours or in their sleep. This hatred they may not ex-
press, but it appears under two guises. As a rule the
combination of both usually presents itself in one per-
son: first, they are usually tense, almost to the point
of being constantly aware of physical tension, of "being
tied up in knots"; and second, anxiety, of which they
may on occasion be aware, makes its appearance, but even
when these persons realize that they are anxious, they
perceive it not as fear, nor as anxiety only, but as
an inner, violent, helpless anger, even rage. (1941, p. 149)
Zilbourg documents the paucity of friendships, dissociation of
affection from sexual life, propensity for suicide, assaultiveness, and
homicide of those (ambivalently) close to them, and their impulsivity.
His report, he felt, needed more time to be less sparse, as not many
ambulatory schizophrenics had entered treatment, or remained.
Federn published a three-part series on the psychoanalysis of psy-
choses, where he addressed himself to diagnosis, treatment and dynamic
processes in psychosis; (most of that work will be reviewed with the
schizophrenic anomalies, except for some material on latent schizo-
phrenia more appropriate here)
. It was his feeling that in cases of
latent psychoses, one wanted to make the diagnosis as soon as possible,
to avoid beginning or continuing analysis, and that this is what Freud
had in mind when he avocated trial-analyses (1943, p. 15). Four years
later, Federn reiterated this concern, in the interests of preventing
a latent schizophrenia from becoming manifest; though not always possibl
it was to be attempted as the prognosis of schizophrenia is graver than
that for latent schizophrenia and always unpredictable.
He also "sharply separated" early childhood schizophrenia from
latent schizophrenia, a necessary point, in view of the occasional con-
fusion between the two (1947, p. 132).
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He addressed himself in 1943 to exactly the phenomenon of concern
among analysts—how to diagnose the latent schizophrenia early enough
to terminate analysis and hopefully avoid an analytically-precipitated
psychosis. As such, he focused on latent schizophrenic indications
that occurred during analysis, particularly: the patient's intuitive
acceptance without resistance, of interpretations regarding symbols
and primary processes, and quick or even sudden disappearance of severe
neurotic symp tons
Unfortunately, the presence of these two features led analysts to
think the analysand was an excellent analytic candidate; hence, the
relatively large number of precipitated psychoses. In doubtful cases,
Federn strongly advised trial-analysis with immediate interruption if
the indications were present (pp. 41-42). He apparently felt that even
at that late date, 1947, the unwitting precipitation of psychoses was
continuing and not being recognized (1947, pp. 138-139):
No latent schizophrenic should be "cured " of his neurosis
,
and he definitely should not be treated by the standard
form of psychoanalysis . For thirty years cases have come
to me for treatment or for consultation after having been
naively, and apparently well, psychoanalyzed. Their (correct)
Other warning indicators included: a history with different levels
of neuroses such as neurasthenia, hypochondria, early conversion hys-
teria, obsessions, anxiety hysteria and severe depersonalizations (hence
the term "pseudo-neurotic schizophrenia) ; psychotic periods with true
delusions and loss of reality testing in early childhood; lasting
deterioration at work and isolation in social contacts after puberty
or after leaving home or school (as neurotics tend to temporarily
improve with change in circumstances); prevalence of a narcissistic
reaction pattern over that of object libido choices; and typical
physiognomic signs in posture, look, and gesture (which Federn does
not, however, specify), (pp. 15-16)
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diagnosis was neurosis. During all that time the latent
schizophrenic state was not recognized. Seldom did the
psychoanalyst either anticipate the outbreak or acknow-
ledge, after it had occurred, that it was his interference
that precipitated the manifest psychosis. He would in-
variably think the case was too difficult for psycho-
analytical treatment. This kind of error is not a per-
sonal one, but one made by "standardized" psychiatry,
[his emphasis]
Awareness of crisis in the late 1940 's and early 1950'
s
. By 1950, '
the realization of difficulties with borderline personalities had be-
come more acute. Bychowski (1950, p. 407) referred to the "growing
interest in the problem of therapeutic failures" and addressed the
borderline group, who he characterized as superficially appearing to
have made a "rather good adjustment, with only occasional behavioral
deviations and mood swings until this facade collapses 'either due to
a dramatic event in their life, or to the removal of their Ego defenses
as in a training analysis...'" (1950, p. 409). His paper focused on
the concept of ego weakness, i.e., an ego that could not be relied upon
when stressed to continue to differentiate "self" from "other", and
reality from fantasy. Bychowski also considered and required technical
modifications which emphasized active reduction of transference. This
was accomplished by avoiding the "classical analytical reserve" (p. 413),
by stressing reality testing (p. 414) and the inclusion of the "total
reality" of the patient in the analysis— that is, events from work,
relationships, behavior in the "outside world" and projective mechanisms
(p. 414). Adherence to the classical position of enhancing transference
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and reducins the reality "markers" was perceived as dangerous in its
simultaneous elicitation of disturbed tendencies (in the transference)
with decreased controls, (the control of acting-out tendencies, impul-
sivity and intensity of transference being very important in the treat-
ment of borderlines). Bychowski's modifications in treatment can be
said to loosen with one hand and protect or restrain with the other,
the narcissistic libido and the ego, in the service of rectifying the
narcissistic disturbances while strengthening the ego (1950, p. 416).
This working through of primary narcissism will then form
an indispensable basis for productive sublimation of nar-
cissistic libido, a process whose vital necessity cannot
be overestimated. Since investment of the immature Ego
with an unusual quantum of primary narcissism seems to be
an important factor of its weakness, we cannot strengthen
the Ego without freeing it from this load. On the other
hand, however, we know that a proper amount of narcissism
is an important prerequisite of the Ego strength (Nunberg,
Federn)
. Moreover, redirection of primary narcissism
toward productive and realistic objectives, seems the best,
and perhaps the only preventive measure against future
relapses as a result of a clash between reality and unbound
narcissism, (p. 415)
This is clearly not classical psychoanalysis and posits different change
processes as well as different technical processes. For instance, he
even advocated the temporary interruption of treatment on occasion to
allow the strengthening ego to consolidate certain of its gains (p. 417).
In a later paper (1953), also on borderline phenomena, or latent
psychosis, Bychowski addressed diagnosis, dynamics and therapy. (He
discussed psychological testing to aid diagnoses and the problem of
divergent opinion between psychologist and analyst, in either direction.
A year earlier, L. Zucker had devoted an entire and quite good article
1A4
to diagnosis and dynamics of latent schizophrenia based on Rorschach
studies (1952)
.
Zucker also addressed the advisability of diagnosis
to avert psychosis. Briefly, he emphasized its existence as a clinical
entity (p. 484), but one which was usually masked by character-neurotic
difficulties, deviant behavior (delinquency, perversion, addiction), or
psychopathy, which upon provocation "may burst into psychosis"; he paid
particular attention to those psychoses provoked by psychoanalysis
whether therapeutic or didactic (pp. 48.5, 499, 500).
Bychowski also posited a formulation of the dynamic structure of
latent psychosis that departed firmly from Freudian formulations and
appears related to the ego psychoanalysts (a large and important group in
psychoanalysis but one which is tangential to present purposes) . Bychow-
ski states that in the course of early development, a discontinuity occurs
so that early ego states remain untouched under the cover
of later ego formations. Accordingly, archaic constella-
tions remain fixated and preserved, as it were, for future
reference. They form then the psychotic germs which, under
the impact of various dynamic and environmental factors, can
cause the psychotic breakdown of ego defenses and sever what-
ever reality contact and testing have been built up in the
course of later development. (1953, p. 491)
This formulation takes into account the periods of time with non-psychotic
functioning, the relatively rapid decompensation (as he's not suggesting
an accretionary process, but a break-through), the presence of characterol
gical and neurotic signs (serving to keep the psychotic materials in
check) , as well as the peculiar rigid and brittle quality of individuals
subject to these processes. This formulation provided the basis, and
145
rationale, for further modifications in technique; Bychowski reiterated
his 1950 modifications and added several elements. He became more
emphatic about the need to introduce modifications to strengthen and
protect the prepsychotic ego (pp. 500 and 502). ^^^^^^^ testing
grew in importance as the ego became more exposed to "the bombardment
of the repressed id derivatives" (p. 502). The frequency of sessions
and position of patient (recumbent or seated, facing or not facing the
analyst) were factors used to control reality testing also. Similarly,
interpretations needed to be spaced, and careful. "Too deep and too
rapid interpretations, especially when not accompanied by certain re-
assuring explanations, may expose the ego to the onrush of id impulses
well as to the implacable sadism of the superego", (p. 500); some resis
tances were left uninterpreted and free association minimized as it en-
couraged both regression and looseness of thinking.
The primitive transference relationship could show either infantil
leaning and oral dependence with derivative primitive identi-
fication or, negatively, in defensive hostility culminating
in destructive rage...
12
His point regarding the importance of the weak ego for psycho-
analysis appears well taken. Over twenty years later, (1974), Strupp's
report on the Menninger Foundation study of psychotherapeutic success
includes two (of five) concluding statements about ego strength:
1. A high level of Initial Ego Strength represents a good
prognosis for all forms of psychoanalytic psychotherapy,
but especially psychoanalysis.
2. Patients with ego weakness (especially "borderline" cases)
frequently fail to benefit from psychoanalysis or suppor-
tive psychotherapy... (p. 273)
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The dissociation between these various attitudes of the
ego toward the analyst as a temporary love-hate object
may be so blatant as to make for a true split in the object
relationship. In this way, in the transference, the ego
repeats the cleavage by the archaic ego which in its deep
ambivalence had split parental images into bad and good
objects. It is of great therapeutic value to work through
this peculiar situation and to demonstrate it to the patient
with absolute clarity, (p. 501)
The focus of treatment was also shifted from analysis of libido
conflicts to the analysis of primary narcissism and its defensive
"archaic megalomania" (p. 502)
All of the preceding modifications of formulation, technique and
focus resulted in a sophisticated and effective form of treatment for the
borderline personality type, but clearly by 1953, its most sophisticated
proponent was well beyond the psychoanalytic pale. Bychowski had had
to abandon the paradigmatic technique of free association, the change
processes of abreaction, and alter the working through of transference,
eschew interpretation as the primary technical tool, change the emphasis
13
of treatment from verbal technique toward a verbal-relational model,
and even abandoned the traditional recumbent position of the patient.
Though Bychowski clearly regarded this sort of treatment as within a
psychoanalytic context, the psychoanalytic community was not undivided
in its appreciation of such work (as will be seen later)
.
"'"^For instance, when discussing the patient's mounting anxiety,
Bychowski states that interpretation must "be combined with firm
reassurance and... active kindliness [which] should make it clear to
the
patient beyond any doubt that he can count on his analyst under any
circumstances . " (p. 501)
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Jacobson in 1954 discussed the "indistinct but convenient" term of
borderline, which epitomized common features in patients that displayed,
ego distortions and superego defects, disturbances in their
object relations, and a pathology of affects beyond what we
find in common neurotics. For this reason they usually need
many years of analysis with slow, patient, consistent work
in the area of ego and superego, with great attention to their
particular methods of defense and to their affective responses
in which these defenses find special expression. This work
is so difficult because such patients call into play auxiliary
defense and restitution mechanisms which impair their reality
testing to a greater or lesser extent, engaging at the same
time the outside world, and in particular the significant
objects for the purpose of their pathological conflict
solutions. For these reasons they may require modifications
of our usual technique, which neurotic patients do not
need. (pp. 596-597)
Finally, Stone in 1954, while discussing the widening scope of indi-
cations for pyschoanalysis, discussed the importance of early diagnoses
(p. 589) and considered them to be increasingly in evidence and in fact
added, "It is a long time since I have treated an actively psychotic
patient; borderline cases and severe character disorders have been numer-
ous." (p. 581, footnote). He reviewed this experience of the trans-
ference of borderline patients and identified clinical signs and dynamics.
By 1954, the care and treatment of latent schizophrenia, in the border-
line personality, had departed from psychoanalysis in formulation, focus,
technique and paradigm, and had drawn both adherents, and critics ad-
juring a return to the fold. A full examination of these anomalous
qualities will be explicated with the anomalies of schizophrenia (in
the next section) as they appear virtually identical, except that the
aim of therapy with psychotics is to return the individual to a secondary
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process state and with a borderline, not to lose that secondary process
state in the first place.
Anomalies that Arose from the Treatment of Schizophrenia
It is interesting to have brought to one's attention the feeling by
some family therapists, that most of the pioneers in family therapy,
came from the field of intensive individual psychotherapy
with schizophrenic patients; they found, while treating
these severe ego disturbances, that they were treating
the patients in a vacuum. Treatment progressed only up to
the point where insight had to be translated into lasting
behavioral changes, then the whole endeavor would collapse,
primarily because of regressive unconscious collusion be-
tween the family and the patient. These invisible but
powerful outside influences, it was reasoned, could only
become palpable and manageable if they were integrated into
the treatment program. (Framo and Boszormenyi-Nagy
,
1965,
pp. XV-XVI)
Carl Whitaker, an early family therapist, spoke more autobiographically
of this process:
That boy from Harvard that I agonized with for three years
didn't get better. He just got quieter. The boy from
Menninger's got much better in the three years I worked
with him, but he was thrown back into a full-blown psy-
chosis when his parents lured him back home by that new
red Chevy convertible. He did keep on calling every six
months to tell us how well he was and how things were
going so nicely with Mother and Dad, except that between
times he would be in that distant hospital again. (1972,
pp. 98-99)
The history of the treatment of schizophrenia has been replete with
failure; that was one of the reasons, we can infer, that psychoanalysis
eventually addressed itself to the disorder (s). As the most successful
form of clinical treatment available, it would only have made sense
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for the framework to be used, Freud's 1914 paper on narcissism and
psychoses notwithstanding. In fact, Freud's 1914 interdiction can be
seen as an attempt to protect psychoanalysis from the vicissitudes of
therapy with patients of insufficiently stable ego—an extension of
the framework that had already occurred! Federn (1943, p. 3) mentions
that "Bleuler himself was the first to state that Burgholzli could dis-
charge three times more cases since all physicians had begun to deal
with them on the more profound basis of Freudian understanding."
While sympathetic to the future treatment of psychoses, Freud
used the term, "some other plan better suited for that purpose" sugges-
ting how closely tied psychoanalytic treatment and a realiable ego were
in Freud's thinking (Stone, 1954, p. 567). Stone points out that though
Freud was flexible with regard to revision of formulation, he was
basically uninterested in experimenting with extensions to new clinical
groups or devising new techniques, (p. 567)
Another related problem was the difficulty in communication when
dealing with schizophrenia. Verbal production was often unintelligible.
Fromm-Reichmann in 1948, addressed this (as well as Freud's 1914 concerns
about narcissism), with the implication, it appears, that psychoanalysis
was not helpful in this matter.
There seemed to be no medium in which the disturbed
schizophrenic and the psychiatrist could communicate
with one another. The thought processes, feelings,
communications, and other manifestations of the dis-
turbed schizophrenic seemed nonsensical and without
meaning as to origin, dynamics, and actual controls,
(p. 263)
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The use of terms such as "word salad" for the speech of schizophrenia,
and the reliance on symbolism may be taken as indications of people's
difficulty in communicating with schizophrenic patients. This diffi-
culty could not have made the prospects for a basically verbal form of
treatment any brighter. Nevertheless, the framework was extended.
By 1919, Kempf publically addressed himself to the treatment of
schizophrenia using modified psychoanalytic methods, with "hygienic
measures, vigorous, playful exercises, and .. .handicrafts" (p. 58) as
valuable adjuncts. It was his experience that the treatment was success-
ful, given certain conditions.
The psychoanalytic treatment of repressed, perniciously
regressive, dissociated personalities produces astonishingly
reconstructive results when an altruistic transference can
be maintained and the wish for insight is spontaneous , that
is, comes from the patient. This requires upon the part of
the physician, sincerity, insight, technical skill, self
control and the capacity to win confidence and control the
transfer. (Kempf, 1919, p. 58; his emphasis)
Particularly interesting is Kempf 's translation of vivid family dy-
namics into psychoanalytic formulations; he appears to have been fully
appreciative of the role of what he referred to as "this family disaster'
in the patient's decompensation citing the unconscious
"repressive in-
fluence of the individual's intimate associates" (p. 58; his emphasis)
as causing the "maladaptation of every functional psychosis or neurosis.'
At another point, he draws a vivid picture of one patient's predicament.
The two families conflicted right and left about the way
to raise their only grandchild, and the timid, inexperienced
young mother was swept off her feet. Her husband's mother
insisted upon plenty of fresh air for the infant and her
own
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mother protested that they were freezing it. When her
husband happened to be in a nearby city his mother in-
sisted that she neglected him because she did not visit
him, and her mother objected to the visit because she
would be neglecting the baby. (1919, p. 31)
Taken in the context of a husband who was necessarily away from the
home
for large amounts of time and Kempf 's finding af ter"careful study"
that
the patient had not one single adult who felt an encouraging
sympathy
for her efforts, the situation he described is a classic
double-bind,
with all the necessary formal characteristics, the D-B group
elucidated
in 1956! He went on to say that the treatment had
been successful, and
in fact, she was able to leave the hospital with
psychosis in remission,
except that subsequent family pressures and
restrictions undermined his
efforts somewhat.
The treatment of schizophrenia by psychoanalysis,
however, really
began during the 1930' s, and accelerated
during the 1940 's (Jackson
and Satlr, 1961, p. 34). Zilbourg (1931, p.
508) contended that schizo-
phrenia had no "specitlc event, no one
definite pathogenic factor respon-
sible," and that psychoanalysis also, until
just previous to 1931, had
been looking for the special aetiology
or agent In the pathogenesis of
schizophrenia. He argued rather, that
schizophrenias were "gradual
outgrowths of a series of reactions
which at first are not entirely
schizophrenic in nature... one can almost
invariably find a succession
of mental reactions" (PP. 500-501),
usually neurotic in nature, until
overwhelmed or abandoned.
Zilboorg mentions technical
modifications, but they are rather
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slight, amounting to increased caution in his choice of words and in-
creased emphasis on reality testing; the technique of free association
predominated, however, as did the classical analytic change processes
once the patient began to resemble a neurotic dynamically (after approxi-
mately one year of preliminary work)
.
The first period of her analysis (about a year) was devoted
to the testing of reality. That is to say, the patient's
associations, dreams, memories, or any other statements were
carefully analyzed from the standpoint of what was actual or
not. The analyst was quite passive; at no time during the
whole analysis was any technical language used and at no time
was the analytical theory explained to the patient . It must
be borne in mind that the use of technical language, or the
imparting of any theoretical premises to a schizophrenic
patient is rather dangerous and absolutely useless . It is
useless because the schizophrenic is a master of cold abstract
thinking and the more theory you impart to a schizophrenic,
the more abstract material you furnish him for his unreal
system of thought. (1931, p. 502) [his emphasis]
Moderate technical modifications due to un-repressed material . In 1934,
Federn devoted a three-part series (now regarded as a classic) to the
psychoanalysis of psychoses in which he introduced some problems relating
to families of patients and some technical modifications. He dated his
interest in latent and manifest psychoses from his first analytic case,
which Freud had referred to him and for which he served as consultant;
unfortunately, the patient developed a psychosis under the rigors of
classical analysis. In three such unsuccessful cases, Federn states
that "psychoanalysis of the neuroses was the leading cause. In all
cases which I later treated with good results, I followed
the rules
dictated by the libidinous condition of the psychoses,
and not those
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dictated by the claim for analytical thoroughness." Cl943a, pp, 16-17)
He admitted that in some "milder" cases, it had proved possible to
treat the neurosis without precipitating a psychosis, but that was a
"pseudopsychoanalysis which has abandoned the strict Freudian rules.,,"
(1943a, p. 7) which he referred to as a scientifically bad method that
achieved good results; his goal was to base good results on a foundation
of sound theory. He theorized that the metapsychology of psychoses was
based upon,
(1) abnormal narcissistic cathexis, dimifllshed object cathexis;
(2) ego regression through which (3) onto-and biologically re-
pressed mental elements and aggregates have become conscious;
and (4) through which, because of change and diminuition in
ego-cathexis
, the reality test becomes insufficient. (Federn,
1943, p. 3)
This formulation necessitated a number of technical modifications,
primarily with respect to case management and transference. Federn in-
cluded the family of the psychotic patient as the largest factor in case
management, stating that
It is not at all astonishing that most psychotics relapse
at home or elsewhere when left without the continuous
support of transference. Every psychosis is consciously
or unconsciously focusing on conflicts or frustrations in
family life. Unless these conditions are changed, the cure
of psychotics turns out to have been Sisyphean labor which
ends in hospitalization or foster-family life. (Federn, 1943,
p. 5) [emphasis added]
He noted that because the course of schizophrenia was interrupted by
relapses, he refrained from recognizing successes and publishing accounts
of his cases until five years after termination of treatment (p. 9). He
often treated patients while they remained in the home and took care
"not to arouse fear and violence between the patient and the family"
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(1943b, p. 248) and felt that no patient could be cured unless the family
wished it and that prognosis was particularly poor in the face of a
family's hatred, whether conscious or unconscious (1943a, p. 17).
Federn characterized the transference of psychotic patients in the
same terms as Bychowski, adding that the ambivalence is more extreme
(1943a, p. 252) and if not contained by reality-invoking procedures, could
lead to either deification of, or aggression against, the analyst (1943b,
p. 247). To this end, Federn eschewed both the couch and the recumbent
stance (1943b, p. 247), allowed phone calls and extra appointments (1943b,
p. 254), and curtailed free association (1943b, p. 246). Because of the
power of the negative transference, the maintenance of the positive
transference was important, as were the relational elements of the treat-
ment. Though Federn did not explicitly deal in relational dynamics, his
approach to the patient did (1943b, p. 251).
One wins the normal transference of the psychotic by sincerity,
kindness, and understanding. It is a great error to believe
that whenever a psychotic feels that you understand him he is
yours. Frequently he offers opposition at first, but often
by the next day the explanation has been accepted. One must
avoid blame and severe admonition, any smiling superiority,
and especially any lie. There are no white lies allowed with
psychotics. To lie to a psychotic is contrary to the injunc-
tion in the Bible that one must not place a stone in the way
of the blind. To be slapped in a friendly way on cheeks,
shoulder or buttocks, is to be treated like a silly child,
is an indignity. (Federn, 1943b, p. 251)
The final requisite to successful treatment Federn discussed was
a radical change in traditional case management-he used
a "motherly
helper" outside of the analytic hours.
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While every neurotic patient easily transfers from his
mother to the psychoanalyst, the psychotic does not do
so to a male analyst. This demonstrates how the psychotic
depends more on reality than the neurotic, i.e., when he
is forced to transfer his mother-relationship to a man,
he confuses homo- and heterosexual feelings and becomes
more perturbed.
The writer's contention that there should be women helpers
for psychotic persons is therefore well founded, although
the conclusion was reached as a result of simple experience.
In all cases in which the writer was successful, he had
such motherly aid; in some cases, the real mother was
willing to help, because many women, although lacking in
sublimated instinctual motherhood, have a great sense of
duty toward a poor psychotic child. But the real mother
is usually less helpful than a sister or a nurse who becomes
a sister. The relation of a psychotic becomes too possessive
and regresses easily to incest, when nursed by his own
mother. Yet the loving cooperation of the mother is very
helpful, when obtainable. (Federn, 1943, p. 254)
He felt that no psychoanalysis of psychotics could be accomplished
without this assistance. The helper would generally be called into the
final minutes of each analytic session while the analyst, with the
patient's assistance, repeated the problems and solutions dealt with in
the session (1943c, p. 480). The helper was invaluable if positive
transference were lost, as treatment could continue through her (1943b,
p. 256); also the patient received assistance and protection between
the analytic hours (1943a, p. 5). He gives an account where apparently
his own wife and family were used in this manner (1943a, p. 8).
This clearly constitutes a radical departure from psychoanalytic
technique and his case management involving the family, though less
startling, is similarly a departure. The emphasis on increasing the
resistances to psychotic processes and increasing the influence of the
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ego processes stood traditional psychoanalytic processes on their head.
And the implicit emphasis on relational aspects of treatment directly
counter both the technical and theoretical aspects of classical psycho-
analytic treatment.
He added, in a summary-type statement:
The technical innovation does not contradict Freud's
teaching, for he developed his method for the treatment
of neurosis and not of psychosis. Freud repeatedly said
that psychotics were not suitable for psychoanalytic
therapy. Today his thesis still holds true when one wants
to use the standard method; however, it is no longer true
when one wants to know how to modify it. One should not
assume that the modified method is easier and less strict.
As Freud said, "one cannot make a reliable contract with
the psychotic ego." Therefore, it is only with the greatest
precaution that we use a method which brings more psychotic
material to the surface. (Federn, 1947, p. 139)
This sort of statement leaves Federn in a bit of difficulty. He
essentially has put himself in a position of saying that Freud was
correct regarding the unsuitability of psychotics for analysis, but only
for the classical method. A modified method is appropriate, but no long
classical psychoanalysis; however, the modified method involves a contra
diction if both were called psychoanalysis. One uses a method intended
to bring unconscious material to the surface to get just the opposite
effect, that is, to return conscious unconscious material to a repressed
state. Psychoanalysis was designed explicitly to make the unconscious
conscious, for use with latent schizophrenics and psychotics; however,
psychoanalysis was modified explicitly to make the conscious unconscious
The position is not an enviable one.
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Family homeostatlc anomalies with schizophrenia
. During, and immediately
subsequent to, the re-formulation in theory and technique that allowed
a significantly different "psychoanalysis" success with psychotics,
analysts were also drawing the discipline's attention to a rather odd
set of unexpected and unpredicted phenomena related to schizophrenic
patients. It gradually became apparent that family processes contempor-
aneous with the course of schizophrenia could improve or worsen the
patient's condition, and concommitantly that changes in the schizophrenic'
condition at times affected the condition of family members.
Kasanin and Knight (1934, p. 262) pointed out compensatory behavior
on a father's part to a mother's over-protection of a child, who in turn,
looked for and encouraged this degree of protection. In another case,
despite obvious wishes on the part of parents for the recovery of the
schizophrenic adult child, Kasanin and Knight stated that.
It is curious to note that the patients with over-protective
parents remain in the hospital for only short periods of time
because the parents invariably make every attempt to remove
them from the hospital, irrespective of their mental con-
dition, and make every effort to bring the patients back to
their old environment even though they do not fit there.
(1934, p. 257)
For the parents to remove the schizophrenic family member from hospitali-
zation with this degree of regularity, more than coincidence or idiosyn-
cratic faaily patterns are operative; one can infer that it is in some
way important for the schizophrenic member to be brought home.
Cohen and Lipton (1950) reported on three cases of acute schizo-
phrenic psychoses that underwent remission shortly after a maternal
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death. They stated that while this was a familiar phenomenon to clini-
cal observers, their literature search failed to reveal any reports on
the subject. Actually, that is not very surprising, as most schizo-
phrenic patients were treated in a hospital setting and, through a
combination of factors, within a psychoanalytic model, which avoided by
and large contact with family members. The occurrence of these spon-
taneous remissions was probably often overlooked. Also, psychoanalytic
theory could not easily account for this type of contemporaneous occur-
rence, and those remissions recognized as such were probably shrugged
away as coincidental, or not reported as they fit into no recognized
framework and did not fit into the pre-eminent psychoanalytic approach.
It is a safe bet that most of the people in a position to write such
reports were the least likely to "see" the remission, either practically
or through the framework filter.
Cohen and Lipton's study was initiated
by the coincidental occurrence of the phenomenon in two
male patients within a period of a few months on the
insulin service of Brooklyn (New York) State Hospital.
Both patients showed striking remissions of psychotic
behavior within a short time after they were informed
of the deaths of their mothers. A third case reported
here was observed more than a year before this study
was started, but is included because it illustrates the
same phenomenon in a female patient. (1950, p. 716)
Apparently, the multiple occurrences within a short time period increased
the salience and validity of the phenomenon. They reported similarities
in the three patients: all three were young adults with recent onset of
first psychosis; in all three cases, mothers were actively involved in
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the delusional and/or hallucinatory material and all reacted to the
deaths with some degree of guilt (p. 723).
In 1954, Ackerman explicated some of these homeostatic shifts:
It is by no means rare in the treatment of a family pair
that as one member of the pair gets better, the other gets
worse. In child guidance work, as the child improves, not
infrequently the mother paradoxically worsens. Or, as the
child responds to psychotherapy, the parental conflict be-
comes drastically intensified. Similarly, in the treat-
ment of marital problems, it is often the case that as one
marital partner matures and becomes sexually more adequate,
the other regresses; or one may respond to analytic therapy
with an increased capacity for closeness, and the other may
react with depression, (p. 362)
Moreover, Ackerman 's experiences led him to report the presence of
paradoxical shifts in interpersonal relationships that defied individual
formulation. For example,
...a wife campaigns for her husband to enter psychotherapy
for sexual impotence, threatening to leave him unless he
is cured. The husband yields, is treated, and the symptom
of impotence is quickly alleviated. The husband's thera-
pist, pleased with his success, is shocked to discover
that directly after the husband's potency was restored,
his wife deserted him. This is paradoxical behavior,
to be sure, but it can and does occur. Individual psy-
chotherapy may help the individual, but under certain
conditions it may fail to ameliorate the psychology of
a family relationship. The tension of interpersonal
conflict may remain largely unabated even though intra-
psychic disturbance is measurably relieved.
14Similarly, in 1958, Fisher and Mendell reported that significant
changes in the identified patient were accompanied by clear cut changes
"^This study was published in 1958, two years after the initial
double-bind publication but is included here as an indication of the
pattern of the times. Fisher and Mendell cite none of the double-bind
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in other members of their families; this occurred in all ten of the
families they investigated (p. 134).
The issue of shifting interpersonal patterns and reciprocities
in families with a schizophrenic member became so important, and fre-
quently substianted that by 1964, an article had appeared which ex-
plicitly asked, "Can a family which has a schizophrenic adolescent
member have other offspring who are emotionally well-adjusted?" (Fried-
man, 1964, p. 47) Not unexpectedly, the author's answer was "no."
Development of the Relational Aspect of
Treatment for Schizophrenia
Parallel to the elaboration of psychoanalysis and the emergence of
the psychoanalytic anomalies, a psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan,
developed a treatment approach for schizophrenia based upon different
paradigms and assumptions. This alternative DM, unlike psychoanalysis,
was developed specifically with respect to schizophrenia and related
syndromes, i.e., certain types of obsessionalism and paranoia. By the
late 1930 's and early 1940 's the Sullivanian, or interpersonal, approach
had gained a moderate, but influential, number of adherents among
psychoanalysts . Though not an analyst himself, and despite the fact
literature nor any of its antecedents and appear to be reporting from
within a psychoanalytic framework as they mention similarities in fan-
tasies and defenses, as well as in the therapeutic effects. Also, if
this was the second such study they had conducted, and this one reported
on ten families, one can assume the project had been some time in the
making
.
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that Sullivan's approach was not at all psychoanalytic/^ a relatively
large number of analysts working with schizophrenics
, found it helpful.
A degree of controversy arose in the late 19A0's and 1950's regarding
the advisability of treating the psychoses, particularly schizophrenia,
and the differences in technique and conceptualization between the
classical or interpretationist psychoanalysts and the interpersonal or
relational psychoanalysts. Because these events will be seen to be
Important in the inception of the DB paradigm and in understanding the
felt crisis of that time, Sullivan's DM will be very briefly explicated,
then two representative articles from relational psychoanalysts will be
used for illustration and as examples of the relational approach of that
time
.
Harry Stack Sullivan's interpersonal psychiatry
. After obtaining his
medical degree at the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery in 1917
and his discharge from military service after World War I, Sullivan was
sent in 1922 to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. as the
Veteran's Bureau liaison officer for a year (Mullahy, 1970, p. 2). There
he met Dr. William Alanson White, whose flexible approach
Mullahy (1970, p. 7) remarks that early in his career, Sullivan
found Freud's work helpful, but as time passed and as Sullivan increasing-
ly concentrated on schizophrenia, he used Freud less frequently until by
the middle 1930 's, Sullivan had fairly well developed his interpersonal
practice and theory. Though Sullivan's first two articles (1924-25;
1925) were formulated with the classical Freudian DM, Sullivan'
s
own
DM is not psychoanalytic in paradigm, theory, or practice.
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became an Important influence on Sullivan's clinical practice. Sullivan
then went, in 1923, to the Shepard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Balti-
more where, two years later he became Director of Clinical Research,
It was during his five years at Shepard and Enoch Pratt that Sullivan
became convinced of the great importance of social (in the sense of in-
terpersonal) factors for the etiology and treatment of psychopathology
,
particularly schizophrenia. During this five years, Sullivan's papers
became progressively more outspoken in approach. During approximately
his last year at Shepard and Enoch Pratt, Sullivan established a unique
1 C.
receiving unit to treat schizophrenic men (Mullahy, 1970, p. 2) . This
unit was set up according to Sullivan's conception of a social-psycholog
unit (what is now commonly referred to as a psychotherapeutic milieu);
treatment included the effects of such a social-psychological setting,
including contact with attendants trained by Sullivan, as well as the
traditional hour-long sessions with the therapist (Mullahy, 1970, p. 4).
This unit, (during about 1928), was an expression of his formulations
regarding the interpersonal etiology and treatment of schizophrenia.
What can be considered Sullivan's schematic, but well-developed
paradigmatic work appeared in 1931. In this work, Sullivan outlined
16
Sullivan eventually treated only men; his position was that
schizophrenics were difficult enough to understand, he was not going
to attempt to add to this the vicissitudes of understanding another
gender, with what the gender differences implied with respect to
schizophrenia.
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his method of treatment in the unit he had established, and his
formulation regarding etiology and mechanisms of change for schizo-
id •
17phrenia
.
As will be seen, both etiology and treatment of schizophrenia
are conceptualized as interpersonal rather than intra-psychic
.
The procedure of treatment began with removing the
patient from the situation in which he is developing
difficulty, to a situation in which he is encouraged
to renew efforts of adjustment, with others... The
noil: professional personnel with whom the patient is
in contact must be aware of the principal difficulty
—
viz
,
the extreme sensitivity underlying whatever
camouflage the patient may use. They must be activated
by a well-integrated purpose of helping in t he re-
development or development d^ novu of self-esteem as
an individual attractive to others. They must possess
sufficient insight into their own personality organi-
zation to be able to avoid masked or unconscious
sadism, jealousies, and morbid expectation of results...
Given the therapeutic environment the first stage of
therapy ... takes the form of providing an orienting
experience. After the initial fairly searching inter-
view, the patient is introduced to the new situation
in a matter-of-fact fashion, with emphasis on the
personal elements .. .He is made to feel that he is
now one of a group composed partly of sick persons -
the other patients - and partly of well folks - the
physician and all the others concerned. Emphasis is
laid on the fact that something is wrong with the
Sullivan, H.S. The modified psychoanalytic treatment of schizo-
phrenia. Am. J. of Psychia t., 1931, 11, 519-536. Sullivan's paradig-
matic statement underwent revision, of course, but the timing of these
revisions is difficult to ascertain. Sullivan apparently had a horror
of being misunderstood, and so preferred to lecture where he could
correct misunderstandings. Most of his later work was in seminar for-
mat at Chestnut Lodge which was tape recorded and published post-
humously by his adherents and .colleagues (Mullahy, 1970, p. 6). While
lines of development in Sullivan's thinking are discernible, their
timing is usually not. This 1931 article, being a relatively early
work, was published soon after formulation and therefore is relatively
fixed in time.
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with the patient and... that regardless of the patient's
occasional or habitual surmise to the contrary, everyone who
is well enough to be a help will... be occupied in giving
him a chance to get well. From the start he is treated
as a 2erson among persons (Sullivan, 1931; reprinted
in Mullahy, 1970, p. 273; Sullivan's emphases)
Early efforts were directed toward establishing precipitating
factors for the psychosis, and reconstructing a chronology that included
events, experience, and the behavior of people close to the patient.
Efforts were made to point out that however mysterious the psychotic
manifestation that had befallen the patient, they were related to his
everyday living among a relatively small number of people important to
the patient (Mullahy, 1970, p. 28).
To these ends, Sullivan eschewed free association and interpre-
tation (1970, p. 28), preferring a form of guided dialogue, with the
therapist in the role of a participant-observer (1970, p. 41). The
psychotic communication of the patient was regarded as informational,
particularly with respect to maintaining some distance from people and
also in maintaining some degree of "personal security" (the condition
when anxiety was relatively low) . Schizophrenic speech was neither
regarded as "word salad" (i.e., meaningless and random), now was it
interpreted symbolically as in psychoanalysis. Procedurally this was
expressed as a relative devaluation of verbal production and an em-
phasis on the reality relationship between therapist and patient develop
during treatment. The mechanisms of change occurred during the develop-
ment of the reality relationship, which was conceptualized as both
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conceptual and curative
. Through the relationship with the therapist,
the patient emotionally corrected problems in his injured or faulty
narcissism.
The emotional re-learning or re-working of the narcissistic defi-
cits obviously has some relationship to Freud's paradigmatic working
through the repetitions in the transference relationship. The differen-
ces are that in the relational approach the locus of difficulty is re-
garded as concerning self-esteem rather than conflict; the relationship
is a reality relationship rather than transferential
; moreover, the
technique of dialogue rather than free association and interpretation
is directed toward the integration of psychotic events and precipi-
tating factors of significant others rather than the integration of
conscious and unconscious elements.
Concommitantly, schizophrenia as conceptualized by Sullivan, was
not so much the welling-up of id forces, but was rather attributable
to processes wherein the individual had never been able to build up
sufficient self-esteem; when increased stress occurred, (usually
developmental), the already impaired self-esteem crumbled altogether.
The person was conceptualized as having been subjected very early in
life to anxiety-provoking experiences which undermined his sense of
1
3
fundamental personal security (Mullahy, 1970, p. 10). "Cultural
18
In Sullivan's more mature formulations, anxiety grew in import-
ance and was characterized as a "felt threat to, or actual loss of,
self-esteem owing to the actual anticipated, or imaginary disapproval
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distortions" learned in the home were of prime importance in later
developing schizophrenia; these were regarded as erroneous attitudes
and unfortunate occurrences in the family. The early experiences with
anxiety combined with the
various other unfortunate experiences, maldevelopments,
and distortions that the individual suffers m^y all
combine to render him abnormally vulnerable to the
demands and stresses of the acknowledged stage in
Western society ... (Mullahy, 1970, p. 484)
Sullivan felt that though the complex etiology of schizophrenia
culminated in a situation in which the sexual adequacy of the indivi-
dual (according to that individual's learned standards) was found
"acutely unsatisfactory," the cultural distortions learned very early
in the home were of primary etiological importance (Mullahy, 1970, p. 19)
As such, Sullivan rejected the idea that unsuccessful resolution
of the Oedipus complex was of etiological significance and in fact re-
garded the complex, not as a universal, nor biologically based occurrence,
but rather, the result of "multiple vicious features of our domestic
culture." (Sullivan, 1926; cited in Mullahy, 1970, p. 14) Moreover,
not only was etiology based on early family experiences, recovery in
large depended upon the social milieu to which the patient returned
(Mullahy, 1970, p. 18)
of significant other people, or of disapproval of one's self, owing to
the values and ideals one has acquired or developed." (Mullahy, 1970,
p. 484). This anxiety is transmitted by the mothering one to the in-
fant and may be derived from some action of the infant of which the
mothering one disapproves, or from some concommitant anxiety induced
in the mothering one from elsewhere.
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^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^sjS^^ By the later IQAn' .y Ln 1940 s and early 1950's
there were those analysts who retained the classical • tLn C mterpretatlonlst
approach and maintained that rh^ ut e psychoses were not the province of
psychoanalysis, those wHo allowed that technical modifications had allowed
psychoanalysis to he s.ceessfnl with these disorders, and yet another
set Who proceeded alons Oulte different lines, adoptln, the SulU.anlan
interpersonal paradigm and BM for their wor. with schisophrenics. This
latter group continued to refer to themselves as psychoanalysts, and
they had. In fact, received psychoanalytic training, yet they used a
Sullivanian rather than Freudian DM.
Fron.-Reich.ann's writings during the 1940's illustrate this latter
group. She constitutes an example of an analyst who
.oved fro. tradi-
tional psychoanalytic formulations to the changes in what she ter.ed
"the doctor-patient-relationship and the approach to the contents of
psychotic con^unication" (1948, p. 265). She indicated that the results
of psychoanalytic therapy with schizophrenics had been, thus far, "not
too discouraging," but that cures had not been to psychoanalysts'
satisfaction with respect to frequency, or durability (1948, p. 272).
In Fromm-Reichmann's terms, the changes in approach included a
relative devaluation of the verbal productions of schizophrenic
patients and an emphasis on the reality relationship developed between
patient and therapist during treatment. In technique, the emphasis on
symbolism in schizophrenic speech was suspended, and the "overemphasis
of contents was discarded." (p. 269)
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Technically,
.He patient's confusing speech patterns „e.e no longe.
interpreter s^hollcall,; rather therapeutic attention „as focused on
the genesis and dynamics which determined the contents of what was
-Id. partlculary as they applied to the schizophrenic episode.
As a way of accomplishing this, close attention Is oald
pr;se:t t?m?nf
^"^""satlon done about thelollowta^fe n iming and circumstances, the original serM^!
gratitied by the disappearance of psycho-tic manifestations subsequent to their consistent
repetitive generic, and dynamic scrutiny
... this pro-cedure leads automatically toward the inves igation andunderstanding of neighboring symptomatology whicThasbeen linked up with the manifestations orJginaUy underscrutiny. (1948, p. 269)
S-Lu xi
This was not tantamount to free association, which was regarded as
a mistake with schizophrenics in that it loosened up thinking that was
already quite disorganized (p. 270); the form of the interaction was
Sullivanian, emphasizing dialogue, precipitants
, and experience, in
relation to the psychotic episode.
Technically, this collaboration was possible only after patient
and analyst had formed a workable doctor-patient relationship that had
established a consensus about the need for treatment and its reasons
(p. 267). Significantly, in two other extensions of psychoanalysis
to new clinical populations, the therapists explicitly set about es-
tablishing a working relationship, i.e., consensus between patient and
therapist regarding the need and reasons for treatment. Anna Freud
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to the need
and
devoted chapters of The Ps^choanal^ Stud^ of the Child
for establishing the working relationship with the child patient
the importance o£ the needs and reasons for treatment (which is par-
ticularly important with children as it may he their parents, and not
themselves, who are suffering from some of the child symptoms).
Similarly. Jacobson (1954) in a discussion about treating psychotic
depressions, stated that the ,uality in the analyst's responses were
more important than the quantity of sessions (d ftm^ ay yjL , (p. 603) and emphasized
the genuineness of the analyst's response and demeanor toward the
patient (p. 604)
.
In any case what those patients need is not so muchfrequency and length of sessions as a sufficient amountof spontaneity and flexible adjustment to the" moodlevel, of warm understanding and especially of unwaveringrespect; attitudes which must not be confused with over-'kindness, sympathy, reassurance, etc. In periods ofthreatening narcissistic withdrawal, we may have to showa very active interest and participation in their daily
activities and especially their sublimations. I have
observed that analysts who are rather detached by natureseem to have difficulties in the treatment of depressives.Beyond this warm, flexible emotional atmosphere, without
which these patients cannot work, supportive counter-
attitudes and interventions may occasionally be necessarybut they are only a lesser evil for which we have to
pay. (Jacobson, 1954, p. 604)
Fromm-Reichmann's work, based as it was on Sullivan's, explicitly
emphasized the importance of the relational element in which the thera-
pist was the participant-observer in the interaction between him/her
and patient. The existence of this reality relationship of course,
did not preclude the development of transference, but Fromm-Reichmann
took issue with Abraham and Federn that the analyst should refrain in
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and di..o«io„. were co„s„ued as essen.Ul to the
.he.ape.Uc
process; besides the distortion. However, the existence of a
..„al
positive interrelatedness" between the patient and therapist was
'
recognized, and was included in discussion (p. 267).
An important ramification of such an ,n„^„=„K ,n approach relates to the
counter-transferenro nf t-u^ ..t.t ce of the therapist and the elements of the reality
relationship that are initiated h. the therapist. Reactions of rejection
or postures of grandeur were clearly problems in this sort of enterprise
and the personality of the therapist came to he regarded as more i.por-
tant,
Similarly, in 1952, Powder^ker reported on observations fro.
treating schizophrenic patients using the work of Sullivan and Fron.-
Reichn^ann as a guide; Powdermaker regarded their central thesis about
treatment to have been an emphasis on the relationship between patient
and therapist, through which the patient (and often the therapist) was
brought to an understanding and acceptance of the realities of that
situation and eventually other situations (1952, p. 62, footnote //3)
.
In her treatment of schizophrenics, Powdermaker emphasized the reality
relational components and downplayed the classical analytic techniques.
During therapy, it did not seem advisable to have the
patient use the couch since this encourages reverie and
retreat from reality. And as far as possible I tried
to think about the patient's communications without being
influenced by preconceived ideas of interpretation. So
it seemed indicated to have these schizophrenic patients
see and relate to me as a real person, a procedure unlike
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the conventional analytic treatment of neurotics
tent rf'd"/'" encouraged. The mani^^:^
the patifnt h
"'""''^ '^^''^^^ interpreted bye ; e was not necessarily encouraged to
often'^' though he
cnTJT T ! ^"^^ preceding the breakdown wereonsidered together with the conflicting attitudesand feelings involved in them... This procedure ofcourse often could not be carried out in this order
mTnd (V
°' ^'^^^^^ "^^^^
' ^-^^ to k^epm md. Powdermaker
, 1952, pp. 62-63)
From Powdermaker's description of the treatment plan, it is obvious she
followed the Sullivanian and Froimn-Reichmann pattern closely.
What is particulary interesting is the timing of her report, only
four years before the D-B report, and the many ways in which her observa
tions addressed interpersonal elements later explicated and formulated
by the D-B hypothesis and theory.
For instance, Powdermaker considered the "dilemma" of the schizo-
phrenic to lie between the need to communicate, and the fear of doing so
The dilemma of the schizophrenic presented itself in my
observations at the hospital in a thousand ways but
always it was the same dilemma. It is as if the schizo-
phrenic were saying: 'I want to communicate. I'll do it
but I'm^afraid to, so I'll say it so you can't understand
It or I'll pretend not to know you are there.' The schizo-
phrenic calls attention to himself by negativism, flirting,
stereotyped gestures, all of which dare you to communicate'
with him, to accept and understand him; and then he retreats...
His need to relate seems to be second only to his fear of
it. (1952, p. 61)19
The D-B people would add a third disqualifier perhaps ,".. .or
I'll pretent it's not me saying this and such." The point is, Powder-
maker had noted the ambivalence and disqualification as central to
schizophrenic complexity of speech, rather than having emphasized its
symbolic content.
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Si.iXarl., She was awa.e of .He scM.ophrenic
's perplex^,, an.
response, as though nothing made sense.
that has made life s^dUficult foT^h" ^^"^^^^^-dablefirst place. I^en thp . . patients in the
own ideas' the patient '°
'^'"^ his
tnountable The'need of thr^^'""
try to understand I u ^^^^^""^ ^^o will
is made cJeafbv thP J'
endeavoring to communicateuidu x ar by e remark of a Datipni-- "Tfdon't agree, it means you're wrong-.^t J^k.
strength to be a minority of oil' (p' 63) "
"
The D-B people later demonstrated that indeed, nothing much did make
sense in the families of the schizophrenics they were observing.
What is perceived by the schizophrenic patient is the battle to
maintain a self and the need to relate to others at the expense of co^^
liance. In persons who have experienced some acceptance of the self
and have therefore been able to develop some degree of self-esteem,
there can develop some degree of corresponding ability to sustain non-
conformity with those around one (1952, p. 70); however, experience had
led these patients to believe that if they expressed their perceptions
and reactions, they would not be accepted (p. 67). This in fact was
shown to be the case, and the perceived battle between maintenance of
a self at the cost of maintenance of relatedness appears to have been
also accurate. The active ignoring by mothering ones of the feelings
and perceptions of young schizophrenic adults was noted, as well as
the (not surprising) tendency of the patients to hide their feelings
and perceptions. This set of observations went far in explaining one
173
Of t.e ,.e,.en. and
..see.in.x, pa.a.o.ical s.a.e^en.s „a,e aBout ehe
scH.opH.e„,e:
.Ha. ,e .
^^^^^^
and ,et he is s.e^ingl, unable to .ake in and
.eac. to ,he realUy
around him'." (p. 67) The n r r.,. iVP 0/; D-B people provided the rest of the ex-
planation for this Odd immohilit, in the face of perceptiveness
.
Finally, Powderma.er concluded that schizophrenics used fundamen-
tally different defenses than neurotics for wh.t-u , t at appeared to be some
of the same problems, and that the schizophrenic defenses were "related
to a way of dealing with relationships involving perceptions, and the
feelings and ideas about them;..." (p. 69) As will» VF ui-; S lii be seen, that per-
ception about perception would be borne out.
^^2Eii£^tion^_for_g^^
Non- traditional" Anoma1iP<.
This
latter set of anomalies proved discrepant to expectations with regard
to both technique and theory in a number of respects. Freud had ad-
jured against the psychoanalytic treatment of psychoses on the grounds
that the prevailing narcissistic clinical picture prevented the develop-
ment of transference which would necessarily preclude the treatment
mechanisms of change and thus, cure. Psychoanalytic treatment of psy-
choses did proceed, however, often by default with the latent schizo-
phrenias, and subsequent developments proved Freud wrong in relation
to the issue of transference. Psychotics did, in fact, develop trans-
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The occurence of
..ansfe.ence „Uh
.hese paUen.s,
..,a..less of Us
posUion. Because of .He in.es.^en. of UM.o i„ „a„issisac concerns
""le c. „o libido
^^^^^ ^^^^
ferences;
.,a. .Hese transferences
„ere so intense
.erel, co.po.„aea the
degree of discrepancy between paradigm-induced expectation (and actual
prediction In this case) and empirical findings.
Freud's prediction was correct, however, regarding the difficulties
in curing narcissistic disorders with psychoanalytic treatment, though
not necessarily for some of the reasons he advanced, it was found that
thoroughly working through the repetitions In the transferences with all
the object libido implications, did not result In cure; In fact, such a
process ™ore than occasionally exacerbated the psychoses. This was a
crucial anomaly, as It struck at the heart of the psychoanalytic para-
digm, at Freud's final formulation of the change process In psycho-
therapy. According to that final formulation, which had proved un-
precedently successful with neuroses, the affectively laden working-
through of repetition compulsions within the context of transference
constituted the effective change process; decades of success In analy-
sis of neurotics had demonstrated Its efficacy. Yet in work with the
psychoses, it proved ineffectual. This was particularly damaging as
It proved anomalous to the paradigm itself, and not merely to a theory
or DM elaboration.
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This turn Of even, led so.e analysts to
.e,ln focusing on the
narcssuttc core of tHe
.Ist^.anoes. THe.
.e,an to p.pose a new
explanatory complex-that the cause of psychoses had to do^^uiiube , n o, not with
external obiect lihirir. r.^^ujcL.L
-LiDido, as xn neuroses hut- r.^t-ui-ose , b t, with narcissistic libido
processes and that this necessitated a shift In the focus and processes
of therapy fro™ object Uhldo concerns to narcissism, which could he
treated. Thus two .ore theoretical points were changed to suit
empirical circumstances. The consequences for treatment reflected
directly upon Freud's paradigm regarding change. Therapy of the nar-
cissistic core consisted of re-lntegratlon of the split In ego formu-
lation through a re-educatlve emotional process that was not achieved
through the release of object Ubldo; the ego split, moreover, was not
between pleasure (id processes) and reality (ego functions), but between
an archaic unmodified, and primitive narcissistic core, and Its overlay
of learning and development. The focus of change was on Integrating
the unmodified narcissistic core with Its development overlay rather
than on the compromise of pleasure and civilization. With neuroses,
releasing the libido processes made them available for work; with the
psychoses, they were already released from this undeveloped core, and
the other, later developments of the ego were awash In these libido
processes; the operative change process consisted In minimizing their
presence and working with the Injured, but meglomaniacal
,
narcissism.
The shift to narcissism as cause and focus of change efforts had a
variety of technical consequences. The defense of psychoses were
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obviously seen as quite different from those of th.Ln t e neuroses. The
analyst's demeanor and behavior towards patients with • •fdc c narcissistic
disturbances of necessity had to l,„t , be different than towards neurotic
patients. Xf the depriving frustrating processes were instituted
the transference reactions would be over„hel.in,-.i„ part, because of
the difficulty Of these patients in controliin, affective intensity
especially rage, but particularly because this for™ of frustration
complemented and elicited thp ^ff^ ^•e affective structure that constituted the
disorder: ambivalence, rage de^rf^^^.^ nr.. i
,
, pressions almost anaclitic in depth, and
avoidance of personal contact.
For these reasons, intentionally frustrating elements of therapy
were eliminated or diminished as far as possible within reality con-
straints of a therapeutic situation. Similarly, the elicitation of
primary process material was stopped; therefore, technically, free
association was dropped with these patients and a dialogic quality
emerged. Concomitantly, the role and functions of interpretation became
markedly less important-there grew to be less opportunity for it in
dialogue than in free association, and the ralson d'etre of interpre-
tation (to make the unconscious conscious) was not wanted for these
patients. Similarly, "reality markers" were no longer eliminated; that
is, those elements of psychoanalysis that had been designed to diminish
reality testing and increase development of transference were defini-
tely not wanted. Therefore, transference was not allowed to develop
too far without reality correction, analysts eschewed the use of the
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couch and also allowed patients to face the. (or so.e version thereof;
Sullivan preferred, for Instance, to have hi.self and the patient face
the sa.e point through sitting 90° fro. each other so their paths of
vision cut across each other 'q T>^=.^ ,n j u-cn s. That allowed him to see the patient's
non-verbal reactions without having to starP p^•dv u CO e at the person for an hour
at a time, or have the person stare h-in,F^tb c at m — an important considera-
tion for Sullivan)
.
With the decrease in importance of transference, free association
and interpretation, there developed a greater appreciation of the real!
ty aspects of the patient- therapist relationship, and an emphasis on
the realit;^ relationship as both contextual and curative
. As such,
the change process in psychotherapy shifted from verbal to relational;
that is, from interpretation of linking conscious statement to uncon-
scious content, to relational re-education of fundamental narcissistic
concerns. It is for this reason, one can infer, that Sullivan and his
adherents concern themselves repeatedly with the necessity of the
therapist's respect for the patient and the necessity of not appearing
the incomparable paragon of health and holiness. The self-esteem of
the psychotic was already at issue; to appear disrespectful on any
level, or perfect, would serve to push the patient further down into
the already injured lack of self-esteem. In fact, Sullivan and ad-
herents differed from psychoanalysis in attributing psychosis, not to
the welling up of libidinal forces through a weak ego, but rather to
processes wherein the individual was never able to build up sufficient
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self-estee.. At .his point, it is clear that the analysts adhering
to relational concepts and treating psychoses (both ^nifest and .
latent) and the analysts adhering to verbal concepts and treating
neuroses, diverged sufficiently to be different DMs with different
paradigms and paradigmatic elaborations.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The response to the anom-
alies and technical modifications was heated controversy, with each
group further elaborating its respective framework. The ensuing develop-
ments (during the late 1940's through the middle 1950's at least) can be
seen as centering around two major controversies. First, these new
debates about whether family members could be seen as a legitimatic
aspect of psychoanalytic work; for instance, would seeing the family
preclude transference and therefore change? Also, if the family were
seen, could this psychotherapy continue to be called psychoanalyses?
Secondly, there were debates about the technical modifications, par-
ticularly between those analysts who had adopted a Sullivanian relational
approach and those who insisted upon a return to the fundamentals of
classical practice, i.e., interpretation of transference.
As has just been reviewed, this interpretationist versus relation-
ist split occurred with regard to the treatment of psychosis. It also
occurred with respect to child analysis. In Anna Freud's 1946 Psycho-
analytic Study of
_the Child (which includes her 1926 Introduction to
the Technique of the Psycho-Analysis of Children (p. XI), she
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as an "In.e^ediate step" between neurosis and health, and differentia-
ted treatment of the child fro™ that of the adult in this respect.
of^r^i^f"' ^''P^"^^"* l^he Third Lecture, on The Role
lleTSrf—f - i!H Anal^ of Children havrfufisf
d^S^TWer thefr 2reati^^;"
"ho maintain that-fteln^ur
ference which
=how profuse signs of trans-
the analysis oJ ^h"?!' ^" as in
that th r e : 'TnTV ^""^ ^^reed
and variegated^^r^^sl^rred'^e^ctSirorthr^hiu'Sf
rt ror-L:i
-;o:i: i^i-n-ra^^i:
-j^^
place xn the patient's emotional life. It is only a struc-
TeZlls So ,""' "''t
'^^^^^^^ ^^-^ °^ transfer:^:neurosi . far as the author's experience goes, thelatter occurs solely in cases of adult neurotics ;ho aretreated wxth the classical technique applicable only topatients who have reached maturity. (A. Freud 19A6 d
xii; emphasis added) '
The necessity of special techniques for children was insisted upon,
and attributed to the fact that children, unlike most adults, are "im-
mature and not self-respondent." (1946, p. 4) Specifically, the child
patient lacked "insight into the malady, voluntary decision, and the
will towards cure" (1946, p. 5), as the child was often not the
sufferer in his/her disorder. For these reasons, there had to be a
prelininary phase of treatment in which the
small patient [is made] 'analysable' in the sense of the
adult, that is to say inducing an insight into the trouble,
imparting confidence in the analyst, and turning the
decision for analysis from one taken by others into its
own. Children's analysis requires for this task a pre-
paratory period which does not occur with adults. I must
\
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emphasize that everything which we undertake in th-fcperiod has nothing to do with the real InaJyticalwork, that is to say there is as yet no ques Jon ofmaking unconscious processes conscious or oranalvtic.lxnfluence on the patient. It is si.ply a Lt"? of
o~^afl'thr'^"'^^'^^^'^"^^^- -
aduit
^^^^^ disposal of an
?he ••dre'sa'e-'fo^ ' 1'''' '''^ ^^^^ °^ Preparation-cn dressage r analysis one might properly call itwxll last the longer, the further ?he original condition of the child is from that of the Jdeafadultpatient Which has already been descrihed^'u! f.fX
All of the efforts to ready the child for psychoanalysis were
directed toward establishing "a very definite emotional relationship
with it. The harder the work to be done, the higher must be the
strain-capacity of this attachement . " (1946, p. 38). Freud regarded
this attachement as independent of analytical theory and technique
(p. 38), most definitely as the precursor to treatment, and not treat-
ment itself, and characterized this preparatory work as only a more
formal and explicit form of the accomodations most analysts made in
the initial period of analyses with any patient (p. 16) Nevertheless,
she insisted upon its importance as the context for treatment clearly
enough that she drew fire for several years from Melanie Klein and
her group (1946, p. 5); the Kleinian group disagreed strongly with the
necessity of establishing this emotional relationship preparatory to
T . 20analysis
.
20^
As mentioned previously, the Kleinians had also abandoned ver-
bal techniques for play therapy.
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In 1954, Freud addressed the relational issue once again, with
respect to adult neurotic and psychotic patients, challenged the
general conception of transference versus reality relationship, while
acknowledging the unpopularity of any form of challenge to the classi-
cal ascriptions of transference (1954, pp. 618-619)
ferLcr'"^'?: T"" '\-^^--on that the patient's trans-
har?o \ ^^^^ ""'^^^^ treatment, and
until Ir
gradually through interpretation, at the very end of treatment, a real relationship
.nd t . ^^^^ "^^y ^^"^ psychotica borderline cases; for the common neurotic case the
reverse order seems to me to be the rule. We see the pa-tient enter into analysis with a reality attitude to the
analyst; then the transference gains momentum until it
reaches its peak in the full-blown transference neurosis
which has to be worked off analytically until the figure
of the analyst emerges again, reduced to its true statusBut—and this seems important to me—so far as the patienthas a healthy part of his personality, his real relation-
ship to the analyst is never wholly submerged. With due
respect for the necessary strictest handling and inter-
pretation of the transference, I feel still that we should
leave room somewhere for the realization that analyst and
patient are also two real people, of equal adult status,
in a real personal relationship to each other. I wonder
whether our—at times complete—neglect of this side of the
matter is not responsible for some of the hostile reactions
which we get from our patients and which we are apt to
ascribe to "true transference" only. But these are tech-
nically subversive thoughts and ought to be "handled with
care." (A. Freud, 1954, pp. 618-619)
Oberndorf
,
not known as one of the relational analysts though
clearly awake to relational elements, also maintained an emphasis on
recalling and working through unconscious material through interpre-
tation of transference and resistances, but added, "I might add also
those subtle, unobservable and indefinable phenomena which occur in
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the relationship between physician and patient." (1950, p. 39.) That
this trend toward recognition of relational elements across the dis-
orders has continued is obvious; in 1974, Appel stated "...the diffi-
culties inherent in the classical approach to psychotherapy are
apparent... Whatever the orientation, an Increasing consensus of tech-
nical throreticlans appears to be moving in the direction of a thera-
peutic role that is reconstructive primarily via relationship rather
than interpretation." (pp. 103-104)
The relationists during this period, however, were most definitely
not in the majority, and the responses of interpretationists varied,
though none encountered during review, approved of the relational shift.
Eissler (1953) in particular, advocated a return to strict interpre-
tationist lines, and accorded a "special place to a purely interpre-
tative technique." (p. 126) Eissler regards interpretation as the
"exclusive tool of therapy" (p. 109), differentiating it from trans-
ference, which though "therapeutically effective," was considered a
source of energy which properly used led to recovery, but not a tool
of therapy (pp. 108-109). Similarly,
There are other therapeutically effective factors which
may look like tools, such as the denial of wish fulfill-
ment, to which the patient must submit through the treat-
ment or, more generally, the psychoanalytic therapeutic
attitude. I believe that these factors are secondary;
that is to say, they are the necessary consequences when
interpretation is the only tool of the analyst. Similarly,
working through is a specific technique for using inter-
pretation. (Eissler, 1953, p. 109)
The only other tool Eissler acknowledged was the question, but its
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role was essentially different f.o. that of Interptetation (p. 109)
He acknowledged that thete were tl.es when unavoidable departures
from the ideal were necessary, but set nn .y, o up four conditions which must
be ™et for the "parameters" to he valid Introductions to the technique
though parameters were to be eschewed as much as possible as each In-
creased the possibility of f^l q-t f-f ^o^-.- ^ ,^ c t falsification of therapy by substituting
obedience for structural change (n 126^ tHo fciug ^p. i/b;. xhe four criteria for allow-
able parameters were:
"""^^ introduced only when it is provedthat the basic model technique does not suffice; (2) theparameter must never transgress the unavoidable minimum'
iolts'Z^T?- " '° fi-lly lead;to I s self-elimmation; that is to say, the final phaseof the treatment must always proceed with a parameter ofzero. (Eissler, 1953, p. HQ)
The fourth condition, that the parameter must not give thetransference a lasting direction, will be difficult to ful-fill during the acute phases of the disease. If it hashappened that a parameter has influenced the transferencein a way which cannot be undone by interpretation, a change
or analyst may become necessary, (p. 114 footnote)
A parameter was to be introduced only if, after its usefulness
, it
could be dispensed with and the treatment could proceed with the basic
model (p. 110), and must never have been such that its effects on trans
ference could not be abolished by interpretation (p. 113). The command
by the analyst to face the feared object or situation for a phobic
patient would constitute an allowed parameter. However, he decried
any and all of the modifications made to treat schizophrenics.
It is impossible to demonstrate here the consequences which
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3ear-
con-
thae, despite the cLJ?;-;^:',
„ S^^^analysts, I am convinced that it has not Lt Iproved that schizophrenic Patients eve^rLch a
llTrl"' f "^''^ ""^ "-'--1 accordancewith the basic model technique. This i, m =
tIT.\1\ commonly say neuroses can be cured
Pff r'^' '° construed as a denlarof
'
Tf\ri J"""""' °' psychoanalysis in the treatmento schizophrenic patients. (Eissler, 1953, p. 114)
He was particularly critical of those who used, then avocated the
modifications because the clinician "has noticed subsequent disapp.
ance of symptoms" (p. II3 footnote); or "it is a grave mistake to
elude that [a] measure has general validity because it has proved its
usefulness under special conditions" (p. 105) While Eissler, beyond
equivocation, had a point, he stretched it too far, and appears to have
preferred theoretical parsimony over clinical efficacy in the treatment
of schizophrenics.
The full weight of his wrath was reserved for Fromm-Reichmann
though, as he criticized both her theoretical and technical modifications,
particularly her switch to the "face-to-face situation." (p. 106)
Though not so rigid as Eissler, Stone in 1954 also came down
squarely for an interpretationists position. He stated that any psycho-
therapeutic treatment which did not attempt to provide
to the maximum compatible with the situation the conditions
necessary for a full-blown undistorted transference neurosis
and therefore does not mobilize one, or which does not
dissolve this neurosis or reduce it to the greatest extent
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which the patient's structure and the therapist's skill
nlTll^lnlTT''^ ''""^''^ i-erpretatloL. sho^Liiu L De cal ed analvsiq p^ron t <^ t-u^
asDect.! nf 1 ; ' necessary formalpects o the analytic situation are reproduced For
"aU:rof "-"-"."^e p^of'^^d ;eorg m-
• J . -. j-j.-Liies3t) is, m a sensp an in—
Though Stone believed that one should not be rigid about details, he
felt that any tangible deviation fro. neutrality should be handled with-
in the general lines elucidated by Eissler (p. 574), (differing only
with regard to criterion number 4, that any parameter must terminate
prior to the end of analysis). Stone (p. 576) pointed out that this
latter criterion automatically excluded the time limitation parameters
which Freud had used with the Wolf Man. By 1958, certain of the inter-
pretationists were differentiating among modifications, variations, or
derivations of the basic interpretational model. (Greenson, 1958, p. 200;
Loewenstein, 1958, p. 202)
'^'^
Similarly, with respect to the second major controversy of the late
1940's and early 1950's, the dominant group within psychoanalysis, des-
pite anomalies in child work and neurotic complementarities, refused to
see family members. In 1954 Greenacre, with corroborations only slightly
modified by Menninger (1958) strongly advised against seeing family
As will be seen in Chapter VII, this dispute was couched in terms
of technique, the relationalists and the interpretationists obviously
differed, with respect to paradigms, which served as the root of the
disagreement, the methodological niceties being the logical extensions
of each paradigm.
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ipon
members and even physicians, as well as not giving or receiving infor-
mation as this endangered trust and confidence in the analyst, Jeopardized
the analyst's integrity as s/he .ight be "prejudiced" by informat
other than the patient's free associations, and cast aspersions u
the motivation and training analysis of the analyst (cited by Grotjahn.
I960, pp. 25-26)
.
Similarly Glover's 1955 The Techniques of Psycho-
anal^ (using information from questionnaires to analysts one year
prior to World War II) reported that "all persons questioned see mem-
bers of the family most unwillingly, and at the patient's request"
(Glover, p. 322). Moreover, there was a
clear majority against analyzing members of the same
family, at any rate at the same time. A minority would
analyze them at different times, although some of these
say definitely "not husband and wife". Three, however
replxed unequivocally yes, and one of these stated that
she had found it practicable to analyze a husband and
wife. Another who tried this says it has some advantages,
but the disadvantages are infinitely greater.
And in 1959, L.J. Saul, in an exercise in diplomacy stated that there
existed advantages in meeting relatives, especially if they paid the
bills or "in the rare cases which are obscure to the point of opaque-
ness." Saul was clearly not a rabid supporter of family inclusion.
With the official stance and dominant practice in psychoanalysis
unsympathetic to seeing family members, it is little wonder that those
analysts who did see family, did so with little self-proclamation.
Galdstone,. an analyst who did see family members, discussed the reasons
he did so, and some of the reasons why it was a difficult modification
for analysts to make, (in Ackerman, 1961, pp. 130-131). Gralnick
187
(1962, p. 516) stated that until recentlv •y, seeing, never mind treating,
family members was regarded as '^fr-.^strange, xf not heretical" and ascribed
the reluctance to Freud's teachings and his difficulties with^xj.i^uxLxe counter-
transference in dealing with fa,T,-;iim family members, as well as the legitimate
difficulties in the early years,
..n the treatment of the single indivi-
dual." (p. 518) Pramo and Bos.ormeny-Nagy (1965, p. XVI) sum.ari.e
the difficulties, and consequences.
tabool.
.Although\i:i::iro?%.\"
^Ll To^lTT""''understanding of the intrapsychic wo.i'foftL individual
^he tllllZTr' °' involvement of family members '
'
! ? P^"'^^^^ °f individuals and his view of theindividual as a closed system established the prIctLe ofexclusion of the family in most forms of psychotherapyIt IS understandable then, that, certain ea^ly fa^Sf*
riences to the professional community and that their
~t?Uo^ T'^' '^"-'''^^ was disclosed
N:gy:'l965r;^;?)''^^^ ^oszormeny.
Finally, Weakland (1972, pp. 132-133) pointed out that during the
1950 's "there was very little family treatment anywhere and what there
was seldom was mentioned publicly." In view of the disapproval of the
main body of psychoanalytic practice, with its successes and prestige,
there is little wonder the first steps within the framework were ten-
tative. As might be ejected, the revolutionary paradigm received its
major impetus outside the framework.
Status o f the situation in Kuhnian terms
. By the late 1940' s and
early 1950 's, psychoanalysis could be regarded as being in the midst of
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Of a Kuhnian crisi.. The original paradig. se. had been developed and
revised by Freud until approxl^tely 19U and it provided the ^st
clinically successful and theoretically powerful syste. available for
the transference neuroses; there is little doubt that because of certain
modifications, that remains the case. Then, precisely because of its
successes and its position as virtually the successful clinical
framework for several decades, psychoanalysis began to be extended to
phenomena other than those for which it had been designed. As predicted
by the Kuhnian analysis, anomalies began to emerge (Stone talked of
this extension of the psychoanalytic framework as having reached an
"extreme development" by 1954).^^
This pattern emerged during the 1930's and 1940's in the traditional
clinical populations that had the additional characteristic of complemen-
tarity with the neurotic features of another family member, particularly
a spouse. Intentional or default extension of the techniques and formula-
tions of psychoanalysis to the disorders of children, latent schizo-
phrenia and schizophrenia resulted in anomalies during the 1940' s and
early 1950' s, which struck at the paradigm as well as the theory and
technique of the framework with regard to change process, primary tech-
nique of therapy and etiological formulation. Kuhn's schema allows some
22
The timing of the "extreme development" is interesting. This
extremity occurred at about 1954 and the revolutionary DB family
therapy paradigm was published just two years later in 1956. Is this
sequence, so closely spaced in time, coincidental or will it be seen
to be characteristic in Kuhnian analysis of other DMs and revolutionary
paradigms?
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of the difficulties of the psychoanalytic framework to be seen as
structurally similar, and as resulting, not from the disconfirmation
of the original theory as some had thought, but from its extension to
areas it had not been designed for and which had been explicitly eschewed
by Freud. The Kuhnian analysis also makes clear the method of exten-
sion—the technique becomes applied first to a new clinical area, then
theory is impotted to support findings, or to be necessarily modified
in light of difficulties. The priority of technical rather than theore-
tical application has not received the attention that it requires, and
in fact, has not been noticed at times. In 1954, discussing the exten-
sion of psychoanalysis to those other clinical phenomena, Anna Freud,
mistakenly it appears, credits theory with priority.
.
. .by no means all the variations of technique, which we
find in the analytic field today, own their origin to
special conditions in the cases under treatment. An equal,
if not larger, number of them are occasioned, not by a
change in the type of disorder treated, but by a change in
the analyst 's outlook and theoretical evaluation of familiar
phenomena
. The intimate interrelation between theory and
practice in psychoanalysis is responsible for the fact that
every development in theory results inevitably in a change
of technique. To the measure in which classical psycho-
analysis splits up into different schools of thought, the
orthodox technique undergoes variations the value of which
cannot be assessed except on the basis of the value of the
theoretical innovations which have caused them. (A. Freud,
p. 608; emphasis added)
In view of a Kuhnian analysis, it appears that one must disagree
and regard the theoretical modifications as arising from the contin-
gencies of attempted clinical application. As with Freud in the early
1890' s, the applications of technique were directed towards the
\
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alleviation of disorder-the cure was the goal-and thP iax a e explanations
regarding etiology and explanatory concepts of treatment were 1„ the
service of the cure.
By the 1940-s sufficient t»e had elapsed between the attempted
application of psychoanalytic technique and the emergence of patterns
Of difficulty for public reports to accumulate regarding difficul-
ties, necessity for modification of technique, and finally for a new
DM, based upon the Sullivanian interpersonal paradigm, to form. It
appears that at approximately this point, awareness of crisis appeared.
Awareness of the difficulties arising from extensions had existed among
those concerned with such extensions, but the sense of crisis emerged
only during the latter 19W s and early 1950's. The emergence of
problems, presence of controversy and the examination of fundamentals
(interpretatlonist position) characterized a period of crisis. Even-
tually, awareness of the crisis became explicit. In fact, in a para-
graph encapsulating several of these elements in retrospect, Loewen-
Stein stated,
In recent years, problems connected with variations of
technique have aroused a great deal of interest among
analysts. This may partly be due to the appearance ofinteresting modifications of psycho-analytic technique
that have created considerable controversy and thus led
xn turn, to renewed study of
_the base of classical tech-
ni£ue.
..Moreover, this revival of interest is influi^
by the widening scope ' of the application of psychoanalysis,
as well as by the increasing use of analytically oriented
psychotherapy. Thus the need for a scrutiny of the
rationale of all such techniques has become more acute.
(Loewenstein, 1958, p. 202; emphasis added)
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It is unclear, however, whether the strength of the interpersonal DM
contributed to the sense of crisis or was responsible in so.e way for
it. That is, did the sense of crisis arise because of the number and
depth Of the ano^lies, or because of a combination of anomalies and
powerful diverging framework addressing the anomalies? With an alter-
native or rival framework, do people of the established framework sense
threat, or is the presence of anomalies sufficient? These questions,
it seems cannot be answered in the present analysis. Briskman (1972)
points out this sort of difficulty in the abstract.
Kuhn's theory, at its simplest and most elegant, portraysmature sciences as evolving through a serLs ^f paradlL-normal scxence-crisis-and new paradigms. A fundamental
fanu?e%n' Feyerabend, is theil r to recognize that very often important arguments
against the old paradigm may only come to light with the
emergence of competing alternatives and that therefore
the best way to provoke a 'crisis' may often be to offer
an alternative in advance of any serious paradigmatic
breakdown. Kuhn's chronology consistently runs from crisis
to the emergence of alternatives; my point is that very
often this process must be reversed. It is precisely for
this reason that 'critical' (or, if one likes, 'crisis-
oriented ) epistemologies such as Popper's (1963) and
Feyerabend 's (1968) stress the important role of alter-
native theories in the growth of scientific knowledge,
(pp. 89-90) ^
It appears that this is an important unresolved element in Kuhn's for-
mulation.
In 1956, a paradigm was proposed that answered the anomalies and
satisfied the Kuhnian criteria for a revolutionary paradigm. It
responded to the general sense of crisis in psychoanalysis and specifi-
cally to the reciprocation of health and disorder found in schizophrenic
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fa.Uies and „U co„ple™e„.a.U.es,
. ano„.Ues
.He
-a..Uo„al
..eat„e„. an.
,o™.,a.on o. seH..ep..en.a, pa„.c.Un.
..„,euU.e3 e.pe.,ence.
,n .H„, sense o. seK..p..en. speecH
and the persistent lack of success in Its treatment.
\
CHAPTER V
INCEPTION OF THE DOUBLE-BIND PARADIGM
To constitute a revolutionary paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, an
ideal/ technique would have to meet the following criteria: it would hav
to be a (1) problem solution which is (2) a new way of seeing things
and which simultaneously serves (3) an analogue function; that is, it
would serve as a Gestalt with which people could "see" new problems
as subjects for the application of similar thinking and techniques as
the paradigmatic idea. This problem-solution must be (4) sufficiently
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from com-
peting models of scientific activity, yet also (5) sufficiently open-
ended to leave problems for the new, re-defined group to address; that
is, a paradigm would have to form a DM and leave it problems to address
and in fact, would (6) for a time provide model problems and acceptable
solutions that pointed out a direction of development.
These are all necessary criteria that Kuhn has at one time or
another emphasized. At other times, he has added supplementary points,
some of which were proposed by Masterman originally, that have not
appeared necessary, but that elaborate the paradigm concept and as such
are useful. These supplementary characteristics specify that: the
problem-solution (A) resolves those problems that constituted the
anomalies (or at least some of them?), that it can be reached (B)
deductively, during the coarse of (C) normal science activity directed
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toward other Interests and goals, by (B) '.ran. outsiders," that is
by individuals or a group outside the OM in „hicH the ano„.lles hal
arisen; a consec,uence of the last three criteria Is that the problem-
solution is (E) cruder, and probably „ore concrete (than theorizing
or techniques in the DM of anomalies)
.
It is unclear whether these supplementary characteristics apply
to an paradigms to some extent, or. whether their presence means a par-
tlcular paradigm Is revolutionary; this might be especially relevant to
supplementary characteristic
"(A)", i.e.. that the problem-solution
specifically addresses the anomalies; are there problem-solutions that
do not address anomalies, but merely address problems? Or would they.
by definition, be normal science effortq- T ttm^h • i ^.-Lcuc rr s, i would think they would be
normal science in this case. In another case, however, what of those
alternative theories that are said to induce crisis by their own exis-
tence without anomalies, of which both Feyerabend (1968) and Popper
(1963) seem so enamored? These would not necessarily be addressing
anomalies. This particular point-whether paradigms are necessarily
revolutionary, is apparently still at issue.
To present this argument most clearly, the original DB formal
statement will be explicated, then some of the subsequent modifications
will be reviewed (in a manner similar to the review of Freud's formal
paradigm statement). Then, the early work involved in formulating
the DB paradigm will be examined, and an argument will then be made
that the DB work constituted a revolutionary paradigm. The subsequent
development of its DM, both sociologically as a research group, and
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Intenactually, win be reviewed in Chapter VI.
Initial Paradigmatic- <;fai-»„^„>.
toward a Theory of Sc hli^^T;^;,..
The first formal paradigmatic statement tooU place in 1956 in an
article titled "Toward a theory of schizophrenia., hy Gregory Bateson,
Don
.ackson, day Haley, and John Weakland; the article was published
in Behavioral Science rather than a family- therapy Journal as there were
no family journals in 1956.
The authors construed the article as "a report on a research pro-
ject Which has been formulating and testing a broad systematic view of
the nature, etiology, and therapy of schizophrenia/' (1956, p. 251) by
focusing on the "basic family situation, and the overtly communicational
characteristics of schizophrenia." (p. 262)
^-^±J:ILCo^mu^^ Their article began with an explanation
of the theory on which the DB formulation was based: Their formulation
was based on that
"part of communications theory which Russell has called
the Theory of Logical Types" (Whitehead and Russell, 1910)The central thesis of this theory is that there is adiscontinuity between a class and its members. The class
cannot be a member of itself nor can one of the members be
in fact, the first family journal, Family Process, was a direct
product of the DB group and issued its first copy for January 1962 withJay Haley as editor. There had been "child" journals, but none to
that time devoted to the clinical concerns of the family as a unit.
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logic there is an at^P,.n^
Although in formal
between a class and Jtf' k '^'^ discontinuity
psychology ir^eaW "^^^^ers, we argue that in thef^y^n>jj.u^ or real communicatinnQ i-^-i a-
between a class and i>c n,o k ' discontinuity
inevitably
.r.l^^
.^l.TlT. 251-2?^^"^"^
Examples of co^nunlcaUon that Involve multiple Logical Types in-
clude "Play" for instance (among humans and at least the lowet mammals)
There are exchanges of signals that identify certain behavior as "play"
and thus change meaning and consequences of the behavior. These sig-
nals (about the behavior)
they classify. Among human beings, this framing andlabeling of messages
... reaches considerable complexitywith the peculiarity that our vocabulary for such dis-crimination is still very poorly developed and we relypreponderantly upon nonverbal media of posture, gesturefacial expression, intonation, and the context of the
'
communication of these highly abstract, but vitally impor-tant labels. (1956, p. 252)
Similarly, fantasy, humor, sacrament, and metaphor employ multiple
Logical Types. Hunor, for instance, was regarded as a method of ex-
ploring implicit themes in thought or relationship, with "the explosive
moment" in humor occurring when the labeling undergoes "a dissolution
and resynthesis," (p. 252), such that the punch-line compels a re-
examination of the earlier labels that ascribed the statements to a
certain mode (e.g., fantasy or literalness)
.
The falsification of such "mode-identifying" signals (e.g., "this
is real", "this is only pretend") can also occur; they mentioned the
artificial laugh, the confidence trick, the manipulative simulation of
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friendliness. At times, these falcnf.-
'
"-"^s taisifxcations were percpivf^rlrceived as occurring
unconsciously and at times within the self . um , such that the person may
conceal
,,./He. seH, H.s
.e., HcsUU..
.„.e.
.W.pHonc
Sulse o. pu.... (p. ,3.) po.„. U.e.
.ecc.es <,.Ue ,.po..an. „u.
regard to schizophrenia)
Learning to lea„. or learning sees („Ha. Bateson's sys.e„ refers
to as Deutero Learning), involved „.lUple Logical T.pes and were also
relevant to schizophrenia.
^^^^^^^^^^^^-i^^^^^^^^^^^^ in 1,34, Baeeson's group Beca.e
interested in schizophrenia because of its long acknowledged co^uni-
cational oddities— ^^Q "T7r.v-^ ^ t jh ,Its word salad" quality and particularly the in-
appropriate metaphoric and literal qualities.
With regard to the communicational aspect of the paradigm, if
their formal summary of symptomatology were correct, and if schizo-
phrenia were essentially a result of family interactions, 2, then it
should have been possible "to arrive a priori at a formal description
of these sequences of events which would induce such a symptomatology."
(1956, p. 253) Based on their perspectives in learning theory, par-
ticularly with respect to deutero-learning or learning sets, they
^Jackson's contribution to the paradigm was less communicationalthan interpersonal, and will be reviewed later during the analysis ofparadigm development. For what appear largely historical reasons,during the explication of the DB paradigm and revisions, Jackson's
component of the paradigm was more implicit than explicit. The
reasons for this will be reviewed in Chapter VT
.
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deduced that thesp nic»r>f-oi u u-cn e mental habits were the result of uof characteristic
sequential patterns" Cn(p. 253) in the Immediate environment, i.e.,
family. They eliminated
"specific traumatic experience" (p. 253)'
during infantile development as an etiological agent, preferring to
ascertain „hat contingencies would produce the co^unicational patterns
they were seeing. Comhlning the emphasis on learning with the fact
that the context of behavior is used as the "mode indicator," they
deduced that characteristic patterns in the family "taught" the patient
the mental habits (i.e leprn-inf, uU.e., arn ng set) characteristic of schizophrenia.
That is, the patient "must live in a universe where the sequences
of events are such that his unconventional communicational habits will
be in some sense appropriate", (p. 253) They hypothesized that these
characteristic sequences of events in the external experiences of the
individual were responsible for what they perceived as an inner con-
fusion in Logical Types. "For such unresolvable sequences of experien-
ces, we use the term 'double bind.'" (p. 253)
Initial paradigmatic
_statemei^ The "necessary ingredients" of a double
bind situation, as presented in their first paradigmatic statement, were
1. ''Tv^ or more £ersons
,
" one of which was designated the "victim."
"We do not assume that the double bind is inflicted by the mother
alone, but that it may be done either by mother alone or by some
combination of mother, father, and/or siblings."
2. "Repeated experience
,
" such that the double bind is a "recurring
theme in the experience of the victim. Our hypothesis does not
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invoke a .ingle „3u.atic expedience, but such repeated experien-
ces that the double bind structure co„es to be an habitual ex-
pectation." or in Bateson's ter.s, the victim's deutero-learning,
or learning set, was of double bind structure.
•A £rlHary_nesative ini^^
„,i,,
^^^^^^
^^^^^^
"(a) 'Do not do so and so, or I will punish you.' or (b) „ you do
not do so and so, I will punish you.'" The context of learning was
based on avoidance of punishment rather than reward seeking and
they indicated that there was perhaps no formal reason in terms of
Logical Types, for this selection. (During the explication of the
process developing the communlcatlonal part of the paradigm, the
possible origin of this choice will be shown to lie in the per-
sonal correspondence between Gregory Bateson and Norbert Weiner.)
The group assumed that punishment could be either the withdrawal
of love or the expression of hate or anger, or worst, "the kind
of abandonment that results from the parent's expression of ex-
treme helplesness .
"
"A secondary injunction conflicting with the first at a more abstract
level
,
and Uke
_the first enforced punishments or signals which
Ihrea^ survival.'' This secondary injunction is more difficult
to explain than the first for what they state to be two reasons.
The first is that it is commonly conveyed to the child by non-
verbal means. "Posture, gesture, tone of voice, meaningful action
and the implications concealed in verbal communication may all be
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used to convey this more abstract message." Secondly, this secon-
dary injunction may impinge on an^ element of the primary message
and may therefore take a wide variety of forms and directions.
For example, "'Do not see this as punishment'; 'Do not see me as
the punishing agent'; 'Do not submit to my prohibitions'; 'Do
not think of what you must not do'; 'Do not question my love of
which the primary prohibition is (or is not) an example'; and so
on." The discernment of these secondary injunctions is made more
difficult at times when the double bind is inflicted by not one
person, but two, wherein, for example, one parent may negate at
a more abstract level, the injunctions of the other.
A further difficulty not mentioned by the four authors might
be mentioned. Since the secondary injunction is at a more abstract
level, and serves a meta-comraunicational function, it is by defini-
tion and function more abstract and "once removed" from the osten-
sible content of messages. As such, its presence and role would
of course be more difficult to discern.
"A tertiary negative injunction prohibiting the victim from escaping
the field. In a formal sense it is perhaps unnecessary to list this
injunction as a separate item since the reinforcement at the other
two levels involves a threat to survival, and if the double binds
are imposed during infancy, escape is naturally impossible." They
further allude that, in some cases, escape from the fields is pre-
cluded by processes which are not "purely negative, e.g., capricious
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promises of love, and the like."
6. "Finally, the
.o.plete set of Ingredients Is no longer necessary
When the victim has learned to perceive his universe In double
bind patterns. Almost any part of a double bind may then be
sufficient to precipitate panic or rage. The pattern of conflicting
injunctions may even be taken over hv hoii •u by hallucinatory voices...
[quoted and paraphrased from Bateson. Jackson, Haley, and Weakland,
1956, pp. 253-254; emphases theirs]
Probably the best known illustration (and analysis) of a double bind
comes from this 1956 paradigmatic paper. Bateson, et al. provide a
clinical illustration which at least one of them apparently saw (Though
their analysis is rather long, it will be presented in toto, as the
double bind formulation is not particularly easy to recognize in behavior
unless one has had a good deal of experience at it, as an aid to under-
standing the power of the situation and its implications for the patient
and to explicate clearly at least one double bind analysis to make clear
the formulation what all subsequent fuss was about; without a clear
understanding of its unresolvable quality in combination with the imposs-
ibility of "doing nothing," the etiological significance of the double
bind will remain pallid.
An analysis of an incident occurring between a schizo-
phrenic patient and his mother illustrates the "doublebind" situation. A young man who had fairly well re-
covered from an acute schizophrenic episode was visited
in the hospital by his mother. He was glad to see her
and impulsively put his arm around her shoulders, where-
upon she stiffened. He withdrew his arm and she asked,
"Don't you love me any more?" Then then blushed, and she
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said, "Dear, you must not be so pj^q-ti,, u
assa^U.- ^^^^^
^ ^t^^^
Clearly, Che intensity of his upset could have been averted if he
had been able to meta-communicate:
"Mother it lc „k <iiotn , is obvious chat you be-
came uncomfortable when I put my arm around you, and that you have
difficulty accepting a gesture of affection from me'". This, however,
is exactly the point-the person cannot meta-communicate due to 1) train-
ing and the resulting learning set and 2) intense dependency which is
fostered by the double bind patterns. He could not meta-communicate but
was forced to deal with the co^unication of the mother, and listen to
her comments about his communication and behavior. The logical vicissi-
tudes of the sequence are bewildering to the observer (and will be re-
viewed); to one of the participants, the sequence was obviously patho-
genic
.
The logical complications for the patient in that perhaps thirty
second interchange include:
1. The mother's reaction of not accepting her son's affectionategesture is masterfully covered up by her condemnation ofhim for withdrawing, and the patient denies his perception
of the situation by accepting her condemnation.
2. The statement. Don't you love me any more? in this context
seems to imply:
(a) 'I am lovable.
'
(b) 'You should love me and if you don't you are bad or
at fault.'
(c) 'Whereas you did love me previously you don't any
longer', and thus focus is shifted from his ex-
pressing affection to his inability to be affectionate.
Since the patient has also hated her, she is on
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good grounds here, and he responds appropriately
with guilt, which she then attacks,
(d) 'What you just expressed was not affection,' andin order to accept this statement the patient
must deny what she and the culture have taughthim about how one expresses affection. He must
also question the times with her, and with others
when he thought he was experiencing affection and'
when they seemed to treat the situation as if hehad. He experiences here loss-of-support pheno-
mena and is put in doubt about the reliability of
past experience.
3. The statement, 'You must not be so easily embarrassed and
afraid of your feelings,' seems to imply:
(a) 'You are not like me and are different from other
nice or normal people because we express our
feelings .
'
(b) 'The feelings you express are all right, it's only
that you can't accept them.' However, if the
stiffening on her part has indicated 'these are
unacceptable feelings,' then the boy is told that
he should not be embarrased by unacceptable
feelings. Since he has had a long training in
what is and is not acceptable to both her and
society, he again comes into a conflict with the
past. If he is unafraid of his own feelings [which
mother implies is good], he should be unafraid of
his affection and would then notice it was she who
was afraid, but he must not notice that because her
whole approach is aimed at covering up this short-
coming in herself.
The impossible dilemma thus becomes: 'If I am to keep my
tie to mother I must not show her that I love her, but if
I do not show her that I love her, then I will lose her.'
(1956, p. 259)
Their example is particularly vivid for me, as, soon after first
reading the 1956 report, I saw a very similar interchange, with similar
outcome. A hospitalized man in his early 30 's, with a diagnosis of
catatonic schizophrenia, was visited by his father, a man whose occu-
pation had self-conscious "he-man" characteristics. Father came on
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son „a<ie placaUns Sest..es,
.u. could„.. spea. as heM
.een e„ectival,
»ute fo. th.ee
.ears.
.athe. s.a.e. approximate., ten „,„u.es. sta„..„s
in the hall taUlng. then began sa.lns his goodhyes. Son hugged and
or something?" Son stood there, not answering and father questioned,
"Welir-, forgetting that his son had been .ute since father had burned
his son's journals and a manuscript returned by an editor, saying that
It was undignified for his son to be "emoting all over the place."
Thus, the son could not do right coulH nnhtx nc, id not do nothing, and could
not meta-coHMunicate (on one level because that was emoting and there-
fore devalued and on another level, because he was mute and "could not."
Of course, when he had not been mute, when he'd written those Journals
and manuscript, he had been rendered mute by their destruction). Upon
his father's departure, he became assaultive, and self-destructive, and
was placed in temporary Isolation, emerging the next day as if nothing
had happened.
The Induction of double bind
. The mothers of schizophrenics^ were
'
3
Despite disclaimers to the effect that they held no one in par-ticular responsible for inception of double binds and hence, schizo-phrenia, the 1956 article repeatedly lays the blame at mother's door-
step, m formulations anl illustrations; they correct the imbalance
somewhat in subsequent revisions, though because of the 1956 article+s
enormous audience, the mother-as-"binder , " child-as-"victim"
, father-
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hypothesized to be simultaneously expressing at least two orders of
messages, roughly characterized as a) withdrawing or hostile behavior
which is aroused whenever the child approaches her, yet b) simulated
loving or approaching behavior which is aroused whenever the child re-
sponds to her hostile or withdrawing behavior, as a way of denying what
she is withdrawing. The dynamic problem is the mother's need to control
anxiety in the face of intimacy, which she does by controlling the dis-
tance (or closeness) between her and the child.
It's also obvious that any child exposed to this sort of mothering
with any regularity and with little consistent mothering functions from
elsewhere (relative, housekeeper, neighbor), would develop particularly
persistent, but schizoid, ways of attempting to gain that affection,
regard, comfort—any of the guises under which children receive the
steady love that is their necessity, and right. In the face of these
efforts, the mothers would, of course, escalate the double binding, par-
as-"innocent bystander" Gestalt has unfortunately remained powerful.
The 1956 preoccupation with mother as perpetrator is being elucidated
in the interests of historical accuracy rather than clinical veracity,
and as a baseline against which to gauge subsequent paradigmatic re-
visions. The shift from dyadic preoccupation in double bind establish-
ment, to three part, then family involvement, was quite important in
the DM development. This should not be construed to mean, however, that
the original paradigmatic statement was dyadic; it was clearly dealing
in systems terms with family dynamics; for ease of understanding, their
own as well as readers', the project's first statement dealt with the
simplest version of the Interactive system, the two-person system. As
Jackson's tenure in the group increased, the influence of homeostatic
processes in the family became more prominent in the formulation.
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ticularly with respect to approach-avoidance.
The most important point the project members wanted to bring out
was that in this oscillating process, the mother's "loving behavior is
then a comment on (since it is compensatory for) her hostile behavior
and consequently it is of a different order of message than the hostile
behavior— it is a message about a sequence of messages. Yet by its
nature, it denies the existence of those messages which it is about, i.
e., the hostile withdrawal." (1971, p. 12) It was necessary to hypothe-
size, and they did, that hostility and aggression could not be admitted
to by these mothers. (Obviously psychoanalytic-thought had sufficiently
pervaded the general culture to be used, in part, in almost any psychia-
tric formulation, particularly with respect to psychological processes,
and defenses, e.g., denial, though not so much for structure and content
of its formal theory.)
Because of her own difficulties, the mother uses the child's re-
sponse to affirm that her behavior is loving, and since it, in fact, is
only simulated lovingness, "the child is placed in a position where he
must not accurately interpret her communication if he is to maintain
his relationship with her." (1956, p. 257) In fact, the child must
not discriminate among the orders of messages, here the difference be-
tween simulated feeling (one Logical Type) and real feelings (another
Logical Type). In effect, the child comes to distort his perception
of the meta-communicative signals. For instance,
207
she „lght say.
..Go to'l:, ^ fv ° "jJ^L"" ITyou to get your sleep/' This overtW l ^""^ ^Intended to deny a fLn„„ ! l<=vi.ng statement is
"Get out of my sigh b cL's: -'^-"-1 as
child correctly dlscrlm?.^, \. °^ " ^e
Signals, he would have " face
™™"ative
doesn't want him and Is decelvln^\ J """^behavior. He „ould b^" ^Lhed^ £c" llrZ'Tlcrxminate orders; nf J-earning to dis-
would tend to c t h IdL'tSar^^'r
recognize his mothL's deception 5hl. .'"''^^
^^"^
deceive hWlf about hir^L L'ernal sta'^rinsupport mother i^Thi? dile^o^T^S^ """^^^ ^°
must falsely discrimin.^o J
survive with her he
well as falLlv internal messages as
P. 257; f^ptlL'ad^dr^" "^^^^^^^ °^ -^-^ (1^36,
Such a process would help one to understand the sense of bewilder-
ment or vague puzzlement often encountered among schizophrenic patients;
similarly, the tendency to become alienated from one;^ self to maintain
a vital relationship is given some etiological formulation. The just
quoted DB passage is reminiscent of the schizophrenic patient quoted by
Powdermaker (1952), who felt at times that a quarrel meant either the
giving up of self, or loss of the relationship.
It is the inability to hold their own with authorityfigures who seem illogical or otherwise ununderstandablethat has made life so difficult for the patients in thefxrst place... The need of the patient for someone who willtry to understand what he is endeavoring to communicate ismade clear by the remark of a patient: 'If the others don't
agree it means you're wrong - it takes so much strength tobe a minority of one." (1952, p. 67)
A DB formulation would emphasize the bind between integrity of his
own perceptions and possible loss of relationship, as well as the ob-
vious inability to metacommunicate regarding whether disagreement
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necessarily Implied that the patient were wrong.
The tendency toward Internal deception to maintain the relationship
is ahetted by the picture ol benevolence; the
.other Is expressing overt
concern over the "fact" that the child Is tired. The easiest path for
the child is to accept mother's simulated loving behavior, and any In-
clinations toward deciphering or interpreting what is going on, are
undermined. "Yet the result is that the mother Is withdrawing from him
and defining this withdrawal as the way a loving relationship should
be." (p. 257)
However, accepting mother's simulated loving behavior as real is
also no solution for this child as, if he should approach her (having
made the false discrimination) she would of course, be induced to with-
draw; if he then withdrew, she would interpret this as a reflection on
her status of a loving mother, and would either approach, or withdraw
to punish the child. If he then re-approached, she would be compelled
to distance. "The child is punished for discriminating accurately what
she is expressing and he is punished for discriminating inaccurately-
he is caught in a double bind." (quoted and paraphrased from 1956, p.
257)
To say that the child "should" simply desist in his efforts is to
miss the point. First, relationally
, the child must make these efforts—
because he cannot give up what he has never had and continues to require,
and because he is responding to the needs of the mother and, her active
signals are constructed such that he cannot not act.
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Attempts to deal with double-bJ,nl_sltuat^ A variety of means can
be used by the child to attempt to escape from the situation. One is
to rely for the necessary relational ties on someone else-the afore-
mentioned relatives, housekeepers, etc., or the father. A pecularity
of schizophrenic families is the insubstantiality of the fathers.
The "dominating mother" has become a stereotype by now with regard to
schizophrenic families. To turn it around, according to the DB paradigm,
it is because families have one parent (here the mother) who double
binds and another parent who is insubstantial, or weak, or passive, or
emotionally absent (here the father), that one of the children is at
risk for schizophrenia. If the child could gain relational security
with that other parent, the pernicious effects of the binding parent
would be greatly mitigated, particularly with respect to their emotional
consequences
.
The fathers should not be regarded as totally oblivious to the
child's problems in relation to mother. Father is also in a difficult
position. If father recognizes the difficulty and supports some of the
child's efforts, particularly with respect to the mother's deceptions
he would then have to recognize the nature of his own relationship
with her, which he could not do and maintain that relationship (p. 258)
To "help" the child would tilt the homeostatic balance in the triad
and tilt father out of his, at least, tolerable position. The homeo-
static processes in the family preclude intervention or real avail-
ability by the father.
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As to the benign presence of relatives, neighbors, etc., another
peculiarity of schizophrenic families Is their defensive Isolation In
the world. Any atte.pt by the child to get Its relational needs .et
outside the family would be Interpreted by the binding parent as a re-
flection on their "lovlngness" and would produce anxiety, thereby
setting Into play the various homeostatic processes to "right" the
situation and withdraw the child fro™ the outside contact. While this
is particularly true for families with paranoid trends, it is characteris-
tic of nearly all schizophrenic families. (See, for Instance. F.D. Laing's
Sanity, Madness and the Famllj,. 1964. for several vivid pictures of these
families' isolation). Because of this isolation, it is highly Improbable
that the child can gain that consistent relational contact outside the
family.
Meta-communication by the child (another avenue of escape) is ex-
tremely difficult; for children until they begin school, the family con-
stitutes their reality."^ This is not the only way the family functions
for the child. Additionally, the family identifies objects and processes,
and negates others as non-existent or trivial; it establishes the nature
of reality, humans, and time in implicit as well as explicit ways and
The forms of expression here, and some of the ideas, were drawnfrom Mehan and Wood (1975) who discuss "reality constituents." This
section, regarding the child's reality, seems to owe a great deal to
Mehan and Wood, though it is difficult to specify specifically where.
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in fact.
.He WU.,e a„a at.U.,es „e .He
.os.
..„.c„U
.o
cou.e.
.aXU. s..™s au,e.„e
.He., o™ .
,,3,
Children, according to Sullivan, constitute a saving grace by giving
the™ relief and different realities fro„ a
.allgnant ,a„lly reality
system. But It is asking too
.ucH of tHe pre-scHool cHUd to stand out-
side tHe family reality and cogent, of all tHlngs, on Its parent; the
for. of perceptlveness required at tl„es boggles trained adult »lnds
(hence the „lde use of video-taping to study double binds). It Is too
much to expect that a person In the child's position could so cogent.
But. what If by fluke, or genius, or unmitigated bad luck, the
child should somehow meta-communlcate?
"Bad" luck here, because In this
set of processes, the mother would regard His cogent as an "accusation
that she is unloving and both £unish him and insist that his perception
Of the situation is distorted." m effect, the punishment is double-
punishment by Withdrawal and hostility, and insistence upon alienation
of his perceptions. In logical terms, the child received only one
punishment for accuracy or Inaccuracy; for meta-communlcatlon, he re-
ceived two. a situation which one assumes would reduce the frequency
of his meta-communications
.
Also, by preventing the child from using the meta-communicational
mode, the mother cuts off the child's access to correction of percep-
tions of communicative behavior. The ability to communicate about
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communication, and to t&^t no^^es perceptxons about communication is essential
for successful social intercourse (p. 258) It i.VP ^oo; s this meta-coramuni-
cational level it was felf that schizophrenics were perceived as unable
to use (for Instance, the. confused the literal and the ™etaphorlc 1„
their o™ speech,^ and the douhle hind relational
..tralnlns.. was pro-
posed as its source.
Psychosis was viewed then by project members as a final attempt to
deal With double binds. However, by "adopting., or resorting to psy-
chosis, the individual has opted to deal with double binds^ the
double bind framework, rather than by stepping outside of it (as in
tneta-com^unication for example). But, psychosis is a way of avoiding
the worst of the emotional consequences of being bound.
s^ift to'a^met/f '7 "'^^'"^ °^ ^ ^-^^^ bind to
possible ^.^"'fP^^^^^^^l
°-der of message, but in an im-situation it is better to shift and become
s mebody else or shift and insist that he is so:::here
ttrt'
^°"ble bind cannot work on the victim
placT' In o^h '
'^^"^^
- ^ different
'
paUeiit IS ci^ "T"/ -t-^ements which show that atien is disoriented can be interpreted as ways of de-fending himself; either he does not know that his responsesare metaphorical or cannot say so. (1956, p.
patient may wish to criticize his therapist for beins late foran appointment, but he may be unsure what sort of a message that !ctof being late was. The patient cannot say, ..Why were you late? Is itbecause you don't want to see me today?". This would be an accusation
and so he shifts to a metaphorical statement. He may then say, .'I knew
a tellow once who missed a boat, his name was Sam and the boat almost
sunk... etc.. Thus he develops a metaphorical story and the thera-
pist may or may not discover in it a comment on his being late.(Bateson et al
. , 1956, p. 256)
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The .ore f„<,ue„a, encounte.ea and easU, ai„e.en«ate. f.™^
Of SUCH a psychosis (paranoid. Hebephrenic ana catatonic,
„ere re-
interpreted in DB terms Vr^r- ,• .n, . Fo instance, paranoid schizophrenia is cast
into communicational terms.
means and an excessivf concern^ithth ."-""'"" """5'
example, assume that Lh!'^^'"^^"' ^^^^t, for
hidden
.eal ng l.Till^ZZlT", "''^
could not he deceive:!-':s™;rLd°hfr:ii"L': s?:
SJle^rSe^jLd
^^^^ stptiorrde^'i
Similarly, hebephrenia or catatonia were re-case; the particular stvles
adopted in psychosis were portrayed as "like any self-correcting sys-
tem which has lost its governor; it spirals into never-ending but
always systematic, distortions." (p. 256)^
Therapeutic DBs
,
This difficulty in communication, in point of fact,
is one of the reasons verbal therapies proved unsuccessful with schizo-
phrenia, and why "therapeutic double binds" were Initiated. Therapeu-
tic double binds essentially fought fire with tire. The acknowledged
Ihis process of re-interpreting the phenomenon of Interest is
characteristic of revolutionary paradigms; it is a method of re-castingthe phenomenon into terms its Gestalt can accomodate.
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the
Jsses
difficulties of doing traf^^^-;^ ic,xt.o„,l verbal therapy with schizophrenic
patients, the frequency of relapses and fh, t e sense that the more things
changed in these families, the more they stayed the' same impelled
DB project members to fight fire with fire- if fr , the family procei.„„
were so powerful and bindina tha^ ,l g t rational approaches did not suffice
they would try an Irrational approach i . . ., I.e., to double-bind the double-
binding families, in the interest of the patient.
Though the psychoanalytic paradigm had been developed to cure hys-
teria. With etiological explanations secondary and in the service of
Change techniques, the DB paradigm was formulated to solve the problem
Of the ^ti^ schizophrenia as the Issue had been raised by anomalle
emerging In psychoanalytic treatment. Treatment using the DB concept
was a secondary concern, although, gradually the emphasis changed and
DB material is currently used more for treatment than investigation,
ironically, at points Freud had pointed out that psychoanalysis was a
better Investigative than therapeutic process. An interesting question
might be whether, in clinir;?! dmc i ^
,
C nical DMs, it is usual for the primary emphasis
to shift in time; that is, for a paradigm developed to cure (a clinical
application), later to emphasize investigation, and for these paradigms
established primarily for investigation, to later emphasize clinical
application. This might be a common developmental pattern for clini-
cal DMs, which necessarily have the active dual foci of theory and
application. Can the operant conditioning paradigms as elaborated by
various clinicians, for example, be said to change emphasis in time?
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The therapeutic use of thp dr t.^^,-e DB pattern was regarded in 1956 as having
only "therapeutic implicafi nr,o" ^ jx txons and was the last section covered in the
article. Interest centered, not so much in doing therapv a. 1 • •6 cn y, s explaining
it m DB ter^s, as "a context of
.uUIlevel co^unlca ticns . " (1956
P. 263) Double binds, with all thai, formal characteristics.
„ere'
precelved as created h, and within the psychotherapeutic setting and In
hospital settings. Por Instance, picking op on the co^n concerns of
hospital settings and
.others of schizophrenics with the Issue of bene-
volence, they assumed that whenever a hospital (or unit, syste. was
organized for hospital purposes, and the patient was told that certain
actions ware for his benefit, then a double bind had been perpetrated.
Also, the project members felt that the DB and the emphasis on
communlcational analyses had potential for Innovating therapeutic
techniques, and In particular In making the Invocation of benign or
therapeutic binds by the therapist, a matter of Intention and skill,
rather than intuition and luck. With elucidation of the DB 'ingredients"
it would be possible for DB's to be formulated systematically, and
when needed, by therapists.
The difference between a therapeutic DM, and a malignant one was
based on the fact that the therapist was not involved in a "life and
death struggle himself..." and could therefore set up binds to move
patients in positive directions, then assist them in "emancipation
from them." (p. 264)
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I„
.Ha 1956 a.Ucle,
.Ke Ho.eos.a.ic aspect
.n
Which i.pncit fa.n. processes maintained the status
.n.. „as much
less elaborated than the cc„nnicational
. u „as not until Jnst ptiot
to WeaUand and lacUson's 1,60 pape. on three-person Interaction that
the ho.eostatic aspect was explicitly elaborated. But the ho.eostatic
material had been necessary to accQnn^ fov- ^-u ^z ou t for the dependency of the pa-
tient, the passivity of the non-binding parent, the complementarity in
disorder, for the relapses into psychosis and old, unpleasant double
bind patterns. The concept of homeostasis provided the relational
context, as it was only within relationships that double binds could
carry their powerful emotional impact.
Homeostatic processes, unless dealt with, could sabotage, or pre-
maturely terminate therapy, as was often the case with schizophrenia.
In discussing the case of a young woman schizophrenic, the DB group
reported that two times during therapy, the patient's mother showed
intense emotion: once when relating her own (previously concealed)
hospitalization for a psychotic break and during her last visit
when she accused the therapist of trying to drive her
crazy by forcing her to choose between her daughter
and her husband. Against medical advice, she took herdaughter out of therapy, (p. 260)
Homeostatic elements would imply that daughter was improving (as
daughter was improving, mother was worsening, i.e., mother was being
"driven cracy")
,
that the therapist had made moves towards getting
husband and wife closer ("forcing" mother to choose) and that therapy
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raac.
.e„ovi„, aausH.er
^^^^^^^
usual balance. They further pointed out:
The father was involveri in i-u^ u
.he intra-fa.iiy sit::tio„ a t r:::^"" r^"" °fhe stated that he had to o,„-f IT example,
Important attorneyln order to ^"
an area where co^peSn? p^LhLtric'h.r "
Subsequently. actLg on c'Ss t™ he p'Li:nt^i:"^""
Ned")"?hT^h' '° ^ character'na^:d 4«?o;s
"get out fro. r " lo^^^er'the d' 'b^r "^"^
'°
to feel that fha
Howev r, th aughter was madethe move was Initiated for her. (1956,
And again, the theme of ostensible benevolence emerges. Adding other
family members multiplies the variety of maneuvers the system can em-
ploy to maintain its homeostatls (this, ironically, makes the work of
the family therapist easier as [among other reasons], the situation is
more fluid than the relatively rigid homeostatls between two or even
three people)
.
Another facet revealed by the relational approach indicated that
particularly conflictual situations for the patient were related to areas
Important to mother's self-esteem (p. 260) These areas apparently
were most subject to double binding and thus the emotionality connec-
ted to them by the patient was greater than for most issues. According
to their formulation, the communicational system functions to protect
"mother's security..." and by inference, family homeostasis. This
being the case, when therapy helps the patient be less vulnerable to
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a.e
.a.e
. .e.„s.a. usual
.o^eos.as.s. TH. p.^eHol.
was an adapCaUon
.o eo^unicationaX s.s.e.. an. aUowe.
.He pa.ient
certain
.eg.ees of f.eedc. especUll. in .He use of ^etapHor and
disclaimer, al^st fn .He manne. of cou„ Jes.e.. Ps.cHosis is also a
way Of side-stepping some of tHe emotions wHicH are engendered by
.He
double binding including Helplesness, exasperation and rage.
Early Revision.; and ModlfiVai-<nn.
WitHin a short time after its 1956 publication the DB paradigm re-
ceived a great deal of attention. Watzlawick (1963) cites almost ninety
articles addressing, or taking Into account, the DB ideas between 1957-
1961. This number is indicative of widespread Interest, particularly
as the article was not published in a psychotherapy Journal, and was
therefore not immediately apparent to those people with an Interest in
family work (of which there were only a small number in 1956) . Since
then, the DB paradigmatic statement and its subsequent elaborations
have become one of the dominant family therapy frameworks.
During the years Immediately following the paradigmatic state-
ment, several points of revision were Introduced. First the authors
attempted to clarify what they regarded as misunderstandings of the
concept, and to bring Into their framework whatever alternate explana-
tions were being ascribed to the DB ideas. Thus, certain points be-
came elaborated in the Interests of clarity/maintenance of control
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ove.
..e.. ,en„.Uo„s. Second,.
.He.
.as an e.pUcU s.U.
"blnder-.t„..e" a concept of
.W.ual Mnding." XMs
.eflected a
=hif.
.o increasing emphasis on .,e
.elaUonal and Ho.eostatlc aspect
Of the paradigm (.athe. than the co«unlcational)
. This i„pUed the
process of three-party interaction; when WeaUand (I960) developed the
three-party idea more fully it in m,.-,, .^ , I m turn strengthened the homeostatic
aspect of the paradigm.
^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^ Early revisions attempted to
elucidate obscure points and defend the integrity of the DB paradigm.
The DB's historical priority was challenged (Devereux, 1959) as a re-
discovery Of Devereaux's Sociological Theory of Schizophrenia (Watz-
lawick, 1963), and its central concepts were at times, mis-identified
as "equivalent to any kind of contradictory communication, or an approach
avoidance conflict, or difficulty in discriminating messages, or any
number of other things" (Abeles, 1976, p. 115).
The concept of "paradox" and "levels of communication" were the
ones most subject to misinterpretation. For example, Watzlawick (1963)
cites several authors who regarded the DB as equivalent to ambivalence.
As Watzlawick pointed out, ambivalence was usually regarded as the
simultaneous presence of mutually contradictory emotions, in particular,
love and hate; the concept was intrapsychic rather than interactional.
By remembering that the DB addressed multiple levels of communication,
it became clear that one emotion could qualify the other, from some
other level, usually by using the more abstract level as qualifier.
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3i.ilan,, pa.adox was of.en
.istaUen fo. simple co„„a.ieUo„
an error the DB adherents „ere at pains to correct.
112 :r™ni:ad^:tio:s"a^"\^ ""^"^ other
double bind is so of™:
^"terpr^fd^L""^ '""^
communication or contradlctnrv ™I
""eaning inconsistent
Unless such deflnitionTfur? r" p^^JS: Sat'^L"'^diction occurs between different levM= contra-
or different logical types ^hf^ ^ abstraction,
simple contradUion rISe?'than « °f
different feature of"a^adox Js ts' "Ji * "-"""-Ivinvalidation of its referf^s by i self-ro'Z:"''''remains conceptually within the'^fraL'posed rp:raZ.
"":rro1'^;h:xtta:cT:f''i^"~"^^^ ^-^^^ ^^-^ ^-sti-
In^ti--—r^J-e-o-o Fthe unchosen win °ther, though
however! he^r iLlTATul^ ''T'^'' "'^^ P^^^^^'
the illusion of choice e f' t- '"^^^
this Sign " Tn ^^ in ^^^'^ "'^'"^^ ^^^^^ "ignorefti . I this Illusion lies the difficulty since
but that vo'"'''
'''' "''^ ^^-S whatever'^ou do!
^976' ;' -ally do anything at all. (Abeles,
The reflexive feature of a paradox, "the invalidation of its ref-
erences by itself "provided the logically inescapable quality for the
individual. For, if performing either injunction necessarily disobeys
the other, the individual cannot do something, yet neither can he not
do something. Thus, in a family, the demand to "Be spontaneous" is a
paradox, as the person cannot not disobey. If he "obeys" and attempts
to be spontaneous, that is manifestly not spontaneity but rule-follow-
ing. There is essentially no way in which can respond to this in-
junction, as it would involve a paradox, with the fulfillment of one
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referent necessarily invalidating the other. If one follows orders
and "is spontaneous.., he is not; if one does not follow orders to he
spontaneous, again he is not. With the addition of the relational co.-
Ponent. such a paradox gains its emotional intensity for the "victim.'
Abeles (1965, p. 116), fo. instance, has recognised this aspect of DB
paradox and emphasized ''the experiential effects of paradox within
intensely important relationship." This emotional quality is not
sent in the same manner with simple contradiction-only with paradox.
Haley (1959) addressed the paradoxical rather than contradictor
quality of behavior by contending that
.'one cannot not qualify a
age. A person must speak a verbal message in a particular tone of voice,
and if he says nothing, that, too, is qualified by the posture he pre-
sents and the context in which his muteness appears..' (p. 323) The
qualification of messages is literally inescapable and is dependent
upon the miltiplicity in levels of communication.
Bateson addressed yet another misconception of paradox in 1926 -
the misinterpretation of paradox as failure in discrimination.
In the well-known experiments in which an animal subject
xs reduced to psychotic behavior by first training the
subject to discriminate, e.g., between an ellipse and a
circle and then making the discrimination impossible,
the "trauma" is not as is commonly stated, the "break-
down of discrimination" but is the breakdown of that
pattern of complex contingencies which the experimenter
had previously taught to the animal. As I see it, what
happens at the climax of the experiment is that the animal
is penalized for following a deeply unconscious and abstract
pattern which the psychologist previously rewarded. It
is not that the animal cannot discriminate, it is that the
animal is put in error when he thinks that this is a context
for discrimination.
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LLS- ^t^e 1956 statement made ex-
plicit use of "binder" and "victim." By 1958 w ^1 .a , Weakland and Jackson
were documenting the ^ihifh ^^ . .g sh.ft to a positxon where, though there appeared
to be a victim, both or all members of . ^ •a family were perpetrators and
also victims of DBs.
p"r:?'threUcio!f r "^^'^^"^ Postni..ei that
a response to multiple c:S:rr:t°L
, r^i^^.^^^r"
°"
pa Unt^trbe'r"""'' ''^^ scWz^^hre.lc
escape fr' tL 'T °" '"^^ contradictLns or
reJa?ion^M„ Obviously, a double-bind
erouo^M J-
"".^"^^ ""h" a special fa„,lly orgroup relationship, since, for example, a child could
intf ? , f ""^"^ °* handling such contradictory
offlrlnl ="""8 an example ande i g support to the child. (1958, pp. 88-89)
This revised short-form definition emphasized both the relational
elements, and the necessity of the homeostatic element ("if his father
were capable..."). It also implied a later revlslon-Heakland
's three-
party formulation.
Weakland and Jackson perceived the "binder" as being as much a
victim because s/he is as caught up in the maneuvers and consequences
as the child. With this revision, the DB was precluded from being a
one-way relationship and was shifted to an interactional sequence
wherein all parties shared important similarities of behavior (1958,
p. 111).
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Mutual binding „as a logically inevitable revision; as Abeles
(1976. p. 11,) poi«3 out, a„e„pting to tespon. to a patadox witbin
the ter^s set up by the paradox itself "invites, in Russell's language
Vicious Circle reasoning.'. According to tbe authors, any such response
would necessarily be as paradoxical as the situation wbich elicited it.
To illustrate, consider the entire rl^c^Q • •
the X be independent.
:L"e.enJ\r:rorr^1irt;us
raro^de^r^^jri^''^' ^^^^ -'p-
be orderPd^ k that independence cannot
alternatit;s whLh' '° -j-ction impliesve ich are nonexistent, it implies by itsassertion that it is somehow possible to respond with therequested behavior. Any response within tha? context Isinvalidated by being subject to redefinition at anotLrlevel. (Abeles, 1976, p. 119)
Thus, any attempt to respond (including, in this framework, the attempt
to not respond) within the confines of a paradox, becomes necessarily
paradoxical in turn and binds the previous "binder." (This revision,
or shift in emphasis, led to the concept of spirals of binding, which
will be reviewed shortly)
.
Haley, a year later (1959a)addressed the mutual binding concept
in control, rather than logical or purely relational, terms. Working
on the assumption that, if a child learned to relate to people in a
relationship with parents who constantly induced him/her to respond
to paradoxical messages, the child might well learn to relate in these
terms, with parents and others. Haley then inferred that "the control
of the definition of relationships would be a central problem in the
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origin of schizophrenia." (1959a. p. 323)^
Haley provided a behavior^,! n- n ^ .avioral illustration of both mutual binding and
the control issue C1959a,pp. 330-331).
inSLI?"^^^Z^ schisophrenic patients
"ay of qualifying jL statei:: patient's
habitual response mcongruently is a
As an lHus??a?ion sinZf'^r' parents.
child, "Co.e and sit on'l lap " "
made this reguest ir, l\ I' ^"PP°se also that she
wished the cWld wJuld IT Indicated she
be faced with the messa^r'"?"'' '^^'l"
congruently by the Lssa^; "cTr T' ""^""^d7 J message, Get away from me " Thacould not «;p^^of•,7 t-u^ • -^i-uiu Hit;, ine child
bi^a^^^she had inSca?ed hv'h' ' un^^fe^bie
keep away. ifhe kenf!w '"""^ ^^^^
because she . 5^ T^' uncomfortable
cause af?e? all Ih"'"''' '^^^'"^ uncomfortable be-
the child ^n ^H
xnvxting him to her. The only way
respond in an •
''''' incongruent demands would be to
and cufl'v thirrr ^^^^ ^° — near herq alify hat behavior with a statement that he was not
iHn h^ri'^'.-^^' ^-^P^^' — towLd her and
drLs " In th1 r"'"^' "^^^ ^ ^"•^ton on your
quaUfv tM.
"'"^ °^ l^P' he would
to loll T. lulTir " statement that he was only coming
tlo lltll ) ' ^""^'^ h^i"8^ communicatew eve s of message, the child can come to his mother whilesimultaneously denying that he is coming to her-after all itwas the button he came to be near. '
By saying, "Come sit on my lap," in a tone of voice which
^This is Haley's earliest major discussion of the issue of control
luToTllTm'^"' " i-^--st for him throughout the
thfHR P^°J^\t:
It is, after all, a possible interpretationof he DB paradigm, which implies that the world is composed of oppositedichotomies m hierarchy. If at times, one can neither do, nor not do,
a thing, the issue of control is implied.
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.pn?^rhe?-Lu:Lfrwu,;;^^^sjs- ? ----that, she is making it impossible fu' '^^^fine his relationship wx'th her nf^' ''''' '°relationship as one of c^LT ^^^^^^ the
as one of distance if 'he L^o's'^^'/'k '^^^"^demands
.
He can only ^nJLst IT" ^ incongruenthimself and thereby IvTiT/, ^"^^o^gruent messages
her. [emphasis added] relationship with
Weakland's I960 dafipv r^r, <-up per on three-party Interaction dealt even „ore
directly with mutual binding. Weakland presented a su„„ . .Hi-ct,enuea mmary of their
original statement, indicatina th^^x x g that xt emphasized a pattern of messages
sent by a "bindp-r " t,,
• ^"1^ ^h"- was an urgent need to
emphasize this point to ^nQ^o^, i sist, against a climate of opinion focused
either on fantasy or physiology, that real people were giving ,eal
Observable messages that were provocative of schizophrenic responses."
(p. 375)
Weakland proceeded to modify the earlier statement to take into
greater account the duality and paradoxical qualities of the situation,
as responded to and perpetuated by all its members. He remarked that the
total sequence then must be regarded to have the form of a larger and
more encompassing double bind, which progressively aggravates the
situation, (p. 376)^
8
Thxs is not to imply to the topic of mutual binding witheredaway Abeles states that it was later addressed, after dissolution ofthe formal project, by Watzlawick's review in 1963, by Bateson, et al.in their 1963 summary review, and by Jackson in 1965 (1965, p. 116).
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Double bind soirplc TUr. •.spx a s. The xssue of double bind engendered double
bind in return, contributing to the overall f.n,.-iamily communicational
pattern, was a n^^tural corollary of the shift ^o ...y cn mt t mutual binding A
nu„.e. Of people
.ecogni.ea
.he spi.aXln, ,.alU, of .Hese sequences
WeaUand and JaCson addressed U InUUUy In 1,38,
.efer.ins to
"reverberating cyclic sequences" and 'Wtual uneasiness" (p. 115) as
well as e„phasi.ing that in the context of the OB. "a troubled reLtion-
ship begets further troubled relationships." (1958, p. 114)
Weakland extended the treatment in his I960
"three-party" paper.
Wnenever any such message of concealment, denial or in-
o9paJL^-:Liom:-f?L" p^d-i:- s:^^-L^ibind structure, on a wider scale For- i '^" '^^^
occurrence nf I • t
. r example, when theo a pair of mcongruent messages is followed hva further message denying that there was Ly contradictionthis combination comprises another pair of Lcongrue^rmessages, or different levels, whose incongruence is
repfa'tltse'if ^^^^
'™
e t itsel , enlarging each time. (p. 378)
He regarded this pattern as progressive (p. 379) and cumulative, and
responsible for the pervasive quality of binding among the family mem-
bers. Obviously, the number of individuals implied in such a formula-
tion goes beyond the dyad and Weakland in 1960 elaborated the DB for-
mulation for three-party party systems and institutional relationships
(e.g., administrator-therapist-patient or doctor-nurse-patient) .
^
9
Weakland 's article also attempted to relate observations from othergroups investigating schizophrenia to DB formulations, an important DMfunction. Clearly, from the number of issues dealt with by this 1960
article, it was one of the more important of the early project publi-
cations, •r -J C
\
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Application to thp thyc^^
-^^-^il^-^hree^^
extension to a three-
person (or a three-party) interaction was technicallv l.n .L n i y important. Although
clea.l, a systems approach in
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^
cybe.„euc
.odel,
.He OB pa.a..s. ha. eh. a.a.essea opl.
.he .os.
Simple system— the dyad.
The most salient points in the three-party elaboration relate to
the greater potential for douhle-hinding to remain unnoticed as the in-
junctions and qualifications may be distribntPHy a u ed among several people.
Remembering that the rhiiH -f^c ld IS more dependent on both parents than either
parent individually^
perjelief ?hlj°"" " fi>^st-but especially striking when
seem Jnherenfx;
°b=--ng factors that louM
par^n^?! • t"0-P«=on situation may easily haveallels or equivalents In the three-person sltuaMon
TT-^^^. ^ ^
separated. It may be equally difficult
pe ron^'b "Le^'^r^^-^^^
"^^'^^^^ are'^ Lch separated-oy rs , by time, by different style of ohraTTT;^ I^athey still may differ in level: "When the double bind Linflicted not by one individual but by two , . . .one pare^
o^her'-'a956) ' B^^ f^"^^^ injunctions of'^the
of unitv L o course these meta-level indicationsy and these claims of agreement and identity ofmessages are independent of actual similarity or differencexn two messages-i.e., they may be false. Thus, the three!person situation has possibilities for a "victim" to befaced with conflicting messages in ways that the inconsistencyIS most difficult to observe and conmient on that are quite
similar to the two-person case. (1960, pp. 379-380)
Efforts to Plac e the DB in Certain Relationships
to Other Paradigms for Schizophrenia
The DB group appears to have realized the importance of their
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sms
formulation relatively early, and efforts ensued to place the DB In
certain relationships with other formulations. Thus, the OB idea was
extended to new phenomena, and the DB corpus was differentiated fro.
other Clinical formulations especially psychoanalysis. Also, Increased
attention to the therapeutic uses of the DB revealed that the
.echanl
Of change in DB family therapy were radic^^llv H-tff . ryy a ca iy different from those of
individual therapies (whether interpretational or relational)
.
Extensions of the paradi^n,_t^_new^^ Weakland's 1960
paper emerges as important in paradigmatic and DM terms. He explicitly
presented the objective of his paper to be the placing of the DB for-
mulation in relation to rival formulations for schizophrenia.
Ihis pape^.
.
.
centers on applying the approach and insightsthus developed to the analysis of thri^I^^ i^eraction
an^ to _the interrelating of observations reported hv .r..i.„.
othe^ investigations of schizophrenia
. vTh^^n^hiT^
to give further evidence for our previous findings, to
clarify a basic schizophrenogenic pattern common to a
variety of particular situations, and to promote a communi-
cational orientation that has been somewhat foreign to
orthodox psychiatry but that we have found to be most
illuminating. (Weakland, 1960, p. 37^; emphasis added)
Weakland's extension to the three-party system produced what can be
seen as a main-line extension or development of the DB paradigm as it
elaborated aspects already implicit in the early paradigm in the same
direction as the 1956 presentation. His subsequent extension to the
three-party institutional situation constituted a tangent, or parallel,
extension, as institutional dynamics were neither implied nor of a
central concern in the paradigm or DM. Weakland concluded that his
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extension Had p.oved
.elp,.X, and su,,es.ed
,u...er extensions to .o..-
Party s.ste.3 in scM.opH.enia/O
,3
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
and also for co^unication in institutions. (I960, p. 387)
The DB paradig. was extended to a wide variety of psychiatric
disorders other than its original prohle., schizophrenia. Wat.lawic.
(1963) documented that the DB was also extended to delinquency (Fer-
eira, I960) and to delinquency and addictions (Coodley, 1961), and to
different classes of phenomena including: psychiatric training (Appel,
et al., 1961; Coser, I960); humor (Fry, 1963); creativity (Bateson,
1956); and existentialism (Watts, 1958 and 1961). Finally, its univer-
sal role in all psychopathologies was critized (Abeles, 1976, p. 121).
All of the above may be regarded as tangential, or side-line ex-
tensions of the paradigm, which produce parallel lines of work which may
or may not remain part of the DM. Some parallel developments, e.g.,
Fry's work in humor, remained within DB strictures, and as such, remained
a DM side development. To "split-off from a DM, a parallel development
..1
be relevant to many unresolved questions, such as therole of a sxbUng in a schizophrenic's family, or the natu;e of the xn!
invo]vPr.-°'''"r'''^ ""^^^^
potentially schizophrenic adolescent becomesl ed m a love relationship outside the family.
"(p. 387) It'sparticularly interesting in paradigmatic terms, that Weakland refers tothe DB as an analysis of communication patterns," neglecting thehomeostatic element, when during his three-person extension, the homeo-
static element emerges so clearly. This is an example of the assump-
tion by DB people that the formulation was preponderantly communi-
cational; the relational elements appear to have been acknowledged onlyindirectly. Even Weakland, the most sensitive of the three remaanino
members to Jackson's relational view, fell into this pattern at times.
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wouX. Have
. eXa.o.a.e.
. ....
^^^^^
arise and a new paradigm
^o^ula.ed. p.o. view
.hen, a para-
dise, in .He con.se o, eUHo.aUon, even.^aii,
,os.e. seve.ai
l.nes Of development, „UH a ^in-li„,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
If. in .He con.se of nonnal science ac.ivi., an. of .Hese iines of
develop.en.
„e.e eiaHo.a.ed to .He pcin. wHe.e ano,.lles e.e.,ed U
wonid He possiHie fo. a pa.adis^ to He developed f^^ p.,,,
l.ne Of development; then this Une of development
„o„ld He a DM in
its own right. This would directlv imnU.a iy ply geometrical progression
Of DMs .a.He.
.Han linear. Pe.Haps one way of Judging a paradigm's
importance relates to tHe nnmHer of
.ain-Une and side-Une DMs it en-
genders
.
THe extension of .He paradigm to .Herapy, especially Haley's work,
constituted a maln-Une extension as Haley developed ideas important
in tHe paradigm s.a.emen. and s.ayed direc.ly wi.Hln DM concerns. (A
line of developmen. aHou. humor, for ins.ance. appears less cen.ral
.o
DB concern, though it partakes of DB paradigmatic formula.lon regarding
levels of communica.ion). The original paradigmatic statement addressed
the "nature, etiology and therapy of scHizopHrenia" hut inspection of
the 1956 puHlica.ion Indicates rela.ively lit.le treatment of therapy.
(In Chapter VI, i. will become oHvlous that the structural and etiolo-
gical features of schizophrenia were the groups initial Interests;
therapy, though Included in the paradigm statement was explicitly
developed only later.
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Extension to theranv ri-t i-u „—
^^^^'--i£h^Jl-JE-h^^ Within two years
of their paradigmatic statement, the groun had
,
n p begun explicit extension
of the DB to therapy. in 1958 Wp^h ^ ^ .Py eakland and Jackson broached the idea
of the therapeutic DB anH HoI^.,,, d Haley re-xnterpreted psychoanalytic therapy
in communicational terms rh^ f^n. T e following year, Haley addressed the idea
of control in psychoanalytic theranv anH t. iLx cn py d Jackson the practice of con-
joint family therapy with regard to homeostasis.
During 1961, Haley extended his interest in control to brief therapy
(1961a) and to psychotherapy with schizophrenics, (1961b), while Jackson
Joined Satir (Jackson and Satir, 1961) for family diagnosis and therapy,
and Weakland (Jackson and Weakland, 1961) for the theory and techniques
of conjoint family therapy. Bateson (1961) considered research into
psychotherapy. Subsequently, Haley (1962) considered the future of
family therapy, then with Jackson (Haley and Jackson, 1963) reinter-
preted transference in DB terms.
Haley, especially, has continued to write about DB family therapy
(Haley and Hoffman, 1967; Haley, 1976).
Their extension resulted in a form of therapy with different tech-
niques and mechanisms of change, i.e., DB family therapy was revolu-
tionary with regard to psychotherapy. First, there existed a con-
sensus that conjoint family therapy was discontinuous with family-
oriented therapy, or collaborative individual therapies.
One way of narrowing the definition of "family therapy"
is to differentiate "family-oriented treatment" from
"family treatment"... "Family-oriented treatment" usually
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the conslderatLn of otter fLnv°"::\ "? °' ''^"''P^''
parents or spouse) bel^g seconda^v
therapist in the"? i
infrequently by a different
three'or r;;;e of the ?a^-^
of
-thodologies,
i^e •conjoin? yr.r-^3rth:r-i3r:r H:^'^^
'
It: TeS--—t^^--?"- -
Jackson and Satir (1,61, p. 29) regarded conjoint fa.ily treatment as
therapy in which "all fa.ily
.e.bers are seen together at the sa.e
time by the sa.e therapist." Family inclusion is based upon intimacy
and association as well as biological kinship.
The inception of conjoint family therapy rests with the DB group.
Grotjahn's work was obviously
"family-oriented treatment," and Acker-
man's family work was developed historically later, though independently
In fact, for Grotjahn, the individual was primary and the family secon-
dary; for Ackerman, the family was primary with the individual secondary
for the DB paradigm, the family was primary and the individual ignored-
in theory and technique, the DB approach was a purely systemic affair.
The individuals assumed importance only insofar as they collectively
constituted the system, and not with respect to the integration of
individual and systems processes.
Also, conjoint family therapy had been differentiated from group
therapy, the latter of which was regarded by Haley (1971b, pp. 1-2)
as an "artificial collection of strangers." Family therapists worked
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:ures
,
with people who had shared histories and usually shared fut,
To change these sorts of systems. It was necessary to reconcept-
uaUze therapy (Haley, 1971b, p. 3), decreasing the e.phasls on per-
sonality, and appreciating the Gestalt forced by the families as a
system (Jackson, 1957a, p isn vuru ^-u-a p. lai). With this change of focus, a different
mechanism of change developed.
?Ln' If '^^^^"^^"g <^l---er thatfamily therapy was a different concept of change, ratherthan merely an additional method of treatment L be addedto individual and group therapy. The focus of familytreatment was no longer on changing an individual's
thrX''°^' his behavior, but on changinge structure of a family and the sequences of behavioramong a group of intimates. With this shift, it becameclearer that neither traditional individual therapy norgroup therapy with artificial groups was relevant to thegoals and techniques of family therapists. The problem
was to change the living situation of a person, not topluck him out of that situation and try to change him.(Haley, 1971b, p. 4) ^
s u.
The mechanism of change in DB therapy was clearly discontinuous
from those of either the traditional psychoanalytic therapies, or the
later relational ones.
The mystery of what causes change has been only slightly
clarified. Many new therapists beginning to treat
families could abandon the idea that transference inter-
pretations or insight into unconscious processes cause
change. (Often they abandoned these concepts without
realizing that this could also mean abandoning the theory
of repression.) But as former individual therapists began
treating families, they learned that some experienced
family therapists were even doubting that helping family
members understand how they deal with each other is related
to change. It is beginning to be argued by many family
therapists that talking to family members about understanding
each other is necessary because something must be talked
about and families expect this form of discussion, but that
\
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iT.rfr.nll^'ZL^T T''''' processesm particular w:yr ff : r;::Lr"l'' dlrecavely
of the awareness of th^
""^l^y. system and quite independently
behaving. (Ha";, 19nb/p 7)''' "^"^
The goals of changing the family structure and sequences of be-
havior demanded techniques significantly different than had been pre-
viously needed. Interpretations or reality relationships availed the
therapist nothing, except perhaps inclusion in the schizophrenic family
processes. Recalling that early DB revisions addressed the logical
unavoidabllity of mutual binding and binding spirals, it is obvious
that rational, linear attempts at intervention or explanation would
compound rather than ameliorate double binding. In a schizophrenic
family, anj- communication no matter how straightforward, is subject to
an active binding process by the receiver. By implication, the only
therapeutic Intervention is a double bind in kind. If non-paradoxical
communication is made double binding, and if all straightforward efforts
are subject to inclusion In the family schizophrenic pattern, only a
perverse, non-rational, already binding injunction can avoid corrup-
tion into binding.
The natural development in technique was the therapeutic double
bind, broached by Weakland and Jackson in 1958 (p. 120)
We feel that the similarity of circumstances between
original significant events and their re-creation,
review, and reworking in therapy is crucial, and is not
confined to the session presented here. Especially, ...
we believe that something resembling the "double bind"
must often be instituted on the patient by the therapist
to obtain therapeutic change. This "therapeutic bind,"
\
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however, must also diffpr -fn ^ i
The fc^al structure of therapeutic and schisophrenic (or ^1-
evolent) double binds are similar i,, but the pathogenicity of the latter
are due to their role 1„ deutero-learnlns. or learning sets. That is
.he individual learns to respond only „ltbln the paradoxical and dls-'
organizing fra.ewor. of the double bind, and thus learns to trap HI™/
herself,
.s Abeles (1,7,, p. ,,,,
^^^^^^
binds abound In Ufe; response to the. beeo.es pathological only „ben
the individual remains trapped by futile attempts to respond or un-
ravel them from within
.
A second difference between therapeutic and malevolent double
binds is that m the former, at least one person recognizes the situ-
ation, "indeed intentionally (if intuitively), sets it up in order that
the patient shall escape If (Abeles, 1978, p. 122). With the situation
recognized, at least one person has benign control over the spirals;
It is for this reason that the group continually stressed the Importance
of denial or concealment in malevolent binds.
Translated into techniques, the therapeutic double bind could take
asnecf H.1 ^1 ? """" apparently consider the relationalpect, aley explicitly eschewed it. Bateson's position appears to
T„.rTl "l^V'Z t^^ "'^ "^^ ">°« ^= an intellectual,conceptual leader than as a therapist. Almost none of his workdealt with doin^ therapy.
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the form, for instance, of Dreqrri K-fr^r,p sc ibing the symptom. (This is probably
the best known paradoxical strategy.)
Paradigmatic of this approach is the practice of "n.the s^nnptom," i.e., telling the natienr^^ J ^^^^^SIl}}!^havilJ^The already behavL with • f be-
to continue the symptomatic ^ehav^o^' Thr
symptomatic behavior becomes, paradoxically Chosen and bvimplication under the patient's control, ^he pa^^ew can
fuch TllTl'""' "^"-"8 to coop^ra : „Uhs a peculiar prescription-in which case he does then
Interestingly enough, the technique works, and often the patient ex-
hibits a thwarted, "I know you're doing something but I don't know what
and it's foolish anyway."
Another set of techniques lies in exposing covert conflicts that
are verbally covered-over by the double bind patterns. Typically, in
family sessions early in therapy, the discussions revolve around the
identified schizophrenic patient; it is important to deflect talk away
from the patient's condition and toward the anxiety laden areas of
covert conflict. In one family,
the father and mother insisted for some time both that
they were in agreement on all important matters and that
everything was all right in their family—except, of course,
the concern and worries caused by their son's schizophrenia.
At this time he was almost mute, except for mumbling, "I
dunno" when asked questions. During several months of weekly
family interviews, the therapist tried to get the parents to
speak up more openly about some matters that were obviously
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family problems, such as the mother's heavy drinkingBoth parents denied at some length that thL was anyproblem At last the father reversed himself and spoke
ttlt i '^^Jf ^°
"^^^h every afternoon with friendsha she offered no companionship to him in the eveningsShe retaliated rather harshly, accusing him both o^dominating and of neglecting her, but in the course ofthis accusation she expressed some of her own f eeJ ingsmuch more openly and also spoke out on differences be-tween them. This session was reviewed and discussed
with the participants the next week (and a tape recording
of the argument was played back)
. In the following
session, the son began to talk fairly coherently and
at some length about his desires to get out of the hospital
and get a job and thereafter he contined to improve
markedly. (Weakland, I960, p. 383)
What is technically relevant here is that "mere exposure of covert
parental conflicts, even before they are resolved, is accompanied by
patient improvement" (Weakland, 1960, p. 386; emphasis added). By
shifting the verbal processes, the homeostatic aspects of the family
are jarred, the mother begins to appear more disturbed, father more
absent, and son less crazy, as his pathology is no longer "needed"
homeostatically to deal with mother's drinking and father elopement.
At no point are insights gleaned, or understanding shared, or relational
elements recognized. The DB theorists suggest that mother is exposed
as alcoholic and father as neglecting—rather harsh and seemingly
irrelevant to the patient's condition. Yet, by shifting the focus from
the schizophrenic to the covert disagreement and engendering open con-
flict, the patient can systematically improve. Thus, the focus, and
mechanism of change, differed radically from previous therapies. The
family as a unit was seen and the Gestalt of interaction became the
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focus. Mechanisms of change revolved around changing the structure and
the sequential behavior patterns of the family, with the revolutionary
status of its clinical practice as well as theoretical formulations re-
garding the nature and etiology of schizophrenia, the DB paradigm began
the fourth major class of psychotherapy, after Interpretatlonal psycho-
analysis, relational psychotherapy and group therapy.
Differentiation from Psychoanalysis
Relatively early in paradigm elaboration, the DB group attempted
to define Its formulation's role vls-a-vls other formulations, with
respect to both theory and practice.
First, the group explicitly eschewed any organic or hereditary
formulation of schizophrenia, on the grounds that such an approach had
produced little (Bateson, et al., 1956) and it unnecessarily limited
available data (Weakland and Jackson. 1958). Also, a position was taken
that double bind family therapy necessitated a decided conceptual shift,
discontinuous with the clinical work prior in time to it.
For instance, Haley (1971b, p. 9) stated that recent visits to univer-
sity teaching hospitals (he discounted state hospitals here) "illus-
trates how discontinuous the family, or ecological, view is from the
psychiatric orientation still being perpetrated in the better univer-
sities." Haley regarded the usual recommended course of treatment for
schizophrenia (long-term hospitalization and individual psychoanalytically
oriented therapy) as "absolutely contraindicated . " Such an approach,
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he felt, was
The family view a"op?s ,u e'tSI ^= secondary,[patient's] problem is 'h%°PP°s"e vlew-the
internal dynamics are »
'"^ situation and his
(Haley, 1971b? p To"
"'"""^^
'° situation.
This was Clearly a radical Inversion o. traditional etiological formu-
lations, with special reference to psychoanalytic
„or..
.ac.son and
Wea.land (19ai, p. made the same type of differentiation.
In brief, ue are much more ooncernpH ,.,,,-1, • c,
action, and interrelation k., " influence, Inter-
servable In the present fh u"^""'"' «dl"<=ly °b-
1-ginary. ilZTl'e ma e^s"' 1"''!""^^ 'T"'''
concepts and practices.
^^^"^^^ ^^^'^ ^'^her therapeutic
The differentiation from psychoanalytic work occurred in specific
areas of theory, as well as general orientation. For instance, in 1957(a)
Jackson addressed the etiology of schizophrenia, assigning primary etio-
logical significance to continuing or repetitive events which establish
a condition of life for a patient- to-be
, rather than the psychoanalytic
concept regarding the role of trauma or psychological traumatic assault
(see pp. 182 and 193). Two years later Haley (1959a) differentiated
the systems with regard to intra-psychic vs interpersonal processes.
Despite all that is said about difficulties in inter-
personal relations, psychiatric literature does not
offer a systematic way of describing the interpersonal
behavior of the schizophrenic so as to differentiate
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that behavior from the normal ti,„ v
Internal processes ar^ of^ i schizophrenic's
weakness. prJmJuve L.lc 'r^^"^" of ego
but his inLp™i'\\^^;X if^^'^M'the for. of aLcdotes ?hls p "r"wu^ ' fresentei In
cal framework describing all
"^"^^^^ '=^=^'1 O" a theoreti-
(Haley, 1959, p. 321)
^"^rpersonal relationships.
Haley later (1971b. p. 2) addressed differences with respect to
therapeutic Isolation or social Integration and the Intra-psychlc vs
interpersonal element, as well as mechanism of change-clearly per-
ceiving "Clinical change as resulting from changed relationship rather
than insight.""'-^
An essential part of the medical model was the ideal that
soclll^.r^'" plucked out ofh scxa situation and treated individually in a private
to ll: ZATl %^ would returnhis social milieu transformed because he had been "cleared"of the intrapsychic problems causing his difficultJes. In
>a i^^t" ;ith u^'"^''
^"^^^^^ providing ^hepat en w insight into his unconscious conflicts thus
""irrt "^^^^ incapacJ^atL
.in;.
°f the patient was considered secondary
his attuidL" perception of it, his affect,
^^v, i '
objects he had introjected, and the conflictswithin him programmed by the past. While a science of Sumanbehavior was being conceptualized in social terms under theinfluence of systems theory, the people who were trying tochange people were determinedly disregarding the social
environment. (Haley, 1971a, p. 2)
Jackson and Satir (1961. p. 43) clearly differentiated family work
12
•
^^^^ in mind that for the DB project members, es-pecially Haley, changes in relationships followed structural and be-havior sequence changes, not understanding or insight.
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from psychoanalytic with respect to differences in clinical practice
and reception of their work.
We feel that just as events point to increasing unionbetween psychiatry, the family, and social science,
there will be no such union in the main current ofpsychoanalysis for some time to come. Although thereis a small group of psychoanalysts who are interestedin participating in family studies and research, there
IS a much larger group who do not consider this workimmediately relevant to their own interests, and even a
rather hardbitten group who feel that current family
approaches are superficial and tangential and can in no
way be compared scientifically with the depth analysis
of psychoanalytic therapy. There is also a group of
well meaning psychoanalysts who are attempting to cor-
relate and collate family data with their own observations
as individuals, but who unwittingly do the family move-
ment a disservice. This is because some of them feel that
knowledge about family individuals is old stuff and is now
merely being refurbished. Their descriptions of family
work are largely couched in the monadic framework of
psychoanalytic terminology and are still essentially
individual. They have not yet become convinced that the
parts are greater than the whole; their main tenet is that
the treatment of a family is theoretically impractical
because of the difficulty the therapist has in handling
more than one transference at the same time. This latter
observation is part of the reason why family diagnosis
and therapy needs a new terminology since the concept of
transference
.
There are a number of interesting points in their attempt to
differentiate themselves from other formulations, and especially psycho-
analysis which they single out. During this time, there were a number
of competing individual therapists, yet the double bind paradigm was
differentiated with respect to them once or twice and the matter was
settled.
This repeated concern with psychoanalysis could be interpreted as
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the result of Its pre-eminence, and there are o£ course such elements
present. But if one recalls that to be revolutionary, a paradigm must
be revolutionary for a particular sroup, it can be Inferred from these
efforts, that the DB paradigm was revolutionary for the Interpretationist
psychoanalysts, and not tor the relational or group psychotherapists.
Two historical trends support this contention. First, the major anoma-
lies which the DB paradigm dealt with arose from within the interpre-
tationist efforts and extensions, and not the relationists. Secondly,
the DB paradigm "solved" the technical problems of treating schizo-
phrenics and latent schizophrenics that had plagued the interpretatlonists.
but not the relationists. Thus, though the relational therapists were
temporally closer to the DB period, the DB was revolutionary for inter-
pretationist psychoanalysis.
The DB members attempted to maintain control of their paradigm in
a number of ways~by correcting misunderstandings of definitional or
conceptual paradigmatic elements and by emphasizing the impermeable
barrier between psychoanalysis and DB family work. They also attempted
to .incorporate other formulations, by such cognitive processes as re-
interpreting data or concepts from other theories into DB terms.
Jackson (1957a, p. 183) used the work of other researchers to corro-
borate a point regarding codification of perception and identity, but
this is different than the reinterpretation mentioned, Weakland's
important 1960 paper does the latter, at times explicitly.
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ted above are actually encounteLd
^^^^"i" sugges-
schi^ophrenlc
.e.ber and : HeLva" 1711^ r'^' tFor example, although the mA tflT,. the schizophrenia.is oriented and conceptual^L
^fite di^^erentirf"'"^own, many of his observat-,n„=
Hu c a tierently from our
in With our schema ZL:u ° ,hrf ^^"'"'"°"
^Z:jatt.: so^mr^aJLfj:LJL%^:j^- r
ag^LmL b:^ ZllTiilZlll:'''
of apparent parental
terms of co^unj't onrLst I^^L^r^^^^ "
Cd\:a\i-\\-rf- :-:i
Which resulted in perpi;x^nrd ^cr^ a^cL^.^id"":^"'sxstent and contradictory images.' (SeaS^d, J^oT 381)
mieht in Krn.^ ! V ' ^^^""^ ''^^^^ '^hese familiesraxgh , b oad terms, be seen as being in line with ourschema. (Weakland, 1960, pp. 380-381)
Weakland went on to also incorporate some of Bowen's (1959) work with
respect to the formalized ways in which families avoid open conflict
in the face of emotional distance (p. 382) and Wynne et al.'s (1959)
work on "pseudomutuality" or the concealment of conflicts (p. 382)
The re-interpretation of data and concepts can be seen as serving
a number of functions: extending the boundaries of DB applicability;
subsuming other formulations under the DB with the implication that
other formulations are special cases of the more general DB; jockeying
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for a Place in .He sun ada.esaing others „Hc Have already achieved
so.e reputauon and therefore
„a.l„s oneself Known „Uh respect to the„.
establishing the OB boundary as applicable within so^e other £or«-
lauon; testing the li.its of the paradigm's explanatory powers; estab-
Ushing linus With other frameworks to facilitate exchange of informa-
tion. Probably each of these functions has been exercised at some point
in time. The point, however is thaf • ,, IS t re-interpretation of other formu-
lations into DB terms was a feature nf nn a-t of DB paradigmatic elaboration and,
may probably occur in the development of other paradigm-DMs.
A variant of this process also developed; terms and concepts from
psychoanalysis were re-interpreted in DB terms. Por instance,
.ac.son
and Weakland (l,ei, evaluated the psychoanalytic concept of transference
in DB terms.
Transference is a manifestation related to the inactivitv
Iti^nt on th
\^-^-^P^y^ho-alytic treatmenr^hl"'
Ha Tl'
<=he basis of minimal cues, creates a frameworkand embroiders xt with past personal references. In con
i? the'?h
''^^^
^
°f activityrevenIf t erapist xs only acting as a traffic cop. If skiU-fully managed the interaction is largely among'famxly mem-
nroLr T ""-'"^ '""^ therapist. Thus we would consider the
rJbbon/ rr\''°?; "'^^ ^ ^^^^ ^^^PP^-^ ^er husband tox bons not to be "Look what you're doing to the poor man "but to ask hxm if she always shows her attachment to him
and wJllT*.
^"^^
"'u^^^''^
fascinated awaiting his reply
xll be busy with her rebuttal.
That is, with so much interaction among the family members
and actxve therapeutic focus on this, there is no emergence
ot standard transference phenomena. What we do see canbetter be labeled parataxic distortions
, since the data con-
sist of dxscrete examples of expectations on the part of a
taraxly member that the therapist does or does not fulfill.
It xs difficult to explain the difference between these
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phenomena in individual and family therapy unless on.has observed or nari--; r.^,*. j . , x e
therapy. Ts^atement 1 °f P^^^ho-
understood her is act to h! ^ """^ ^ver
tion with her husband 1 .
^^P^^^^i°n of dissatisfac-
should take! and b:?o;e thrtb"' °'
'
self as father tranf?eren?p T^'t'^T ^^^^^ ^^is him-
have to be dealt wJti^ T ^ husband's reaction will
Wife's reac??:i^:t;
(Jackson and Weakland, 1961, pp. 32!33) '
'°
Haley addressed psychoanalysis more generally (1938a), gave an inter-
actional explanation of trance induction in hypnosis (1958b),and used
his development of the idea of control in interpersonal relationships
to analy.e control in psychoanalytic psychotherapy (1961a) then with
regard to the psychotherapy of schizophrenics (1961b).
Finally, the DB group differentiated itself from psychoanalysis by
eschewing any phenomenological or experiential formulations or considera-
tions, and insisting upon the importance of observable behavior and be-
havior patterns. For example, Jackson and Weakland (1961, pp. 16-17)
stated with regard to the DB that the concepts are
.. .concerned with the description and specification of inter-action among actual persons, by various means of communi-
cation, at a level of directly observable behavior. Thisfocus implies further an emphasis on what is real and on whatis current and continuing to occur. Taken together, these
emphases define a broad "communicational" and transactional
orientation to the study, understanding, and treatment ofhuman behavior—including that special class most interestingto psychiatrists, symptomatic behavior. This orientation
while related to earlier work, especially Sullivan's, and
currently increasing in acceptance, still is considerably
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-I
.
uiiuuijervaDie. tantasies or mi<=DerrpnhTono
realxty; past mainly childhood, experience '"d ^n""psychic organization and content fJack^on IJ tt i i ^
1961, pp. 16-16)
Uacks and Weakland,
DB Family Therapy
Family therapy based on the DB differed drastically from psycho-
therapy as it had been done for several decades, and differed most
sharply from psychoanalysis. In Haley's view (1971b, p. 10), traditional
treatment was based on an ideology that assumed that the patient's prob-
lem was internal and his social situation secondary. "The family view
adopts quite the opposite view-the [identified patient's] problem is
his social situation and his internal dynamics are a response to that
situation. These two points of view represent a discontinuous change
in thinking about human problems and how to change them."
The resulting changes affected the unit that received treatment,
the formulations, goals and techniques. The families of schizophrenics
remained the primary focus of intervention efforts by the core group of
authors. Such families were conceptualized as
enmeshed in a pathological but very strong homeostatic system
of family interaction. That is, regardless of their past
history—although that might be enlightening— they are at
present
,
interacting in ways that are unsatisfying and pain-
ful to all, provocative of gross symptomatology in at least
one, and yet powerfully self-reinforcing. Their overt be-
havior may appear varied or even chaotic, but beneath this
a pervasive and persistent pattern can be discerned, and one
that is quite resistant even to outside therapeutic efforts
at change.
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In understanding the occur^L^f ^ 1)"'' ""^ *"=lPf"l
are also helpfui in at?arW =<^hizophrenlc behavior,
level: why does pa"h"o«ca?\eh' f^n^a-ental proble^
persist, even under
behavior or organization
Weaklana, l961 pp! ^8-29)"
"
This resistance to change, or alternatively, persistence of pattern
was attributed to the spiraling effects of mutual binding within the
families; also, owing to the complexity of con^unication, it was possible
to avoid both agreement and disagreement without its being noticed by
•using" incongruent messages. 1„ particular, the group focused on "dls-
qualiflers"-messages that negate what another person has said, but In
an indirect way. so that statements are not really met. (Jackson and
Weakland, 1961, p. 29)
Family members were perceived as bound together in mutually des-
tructive patterns, the primary symptom of which was apparent only in the
patient. In therapy, there would commence persistent efforts to pre-
serve a cohesive facade, usually by focusing on the "fact" that every-
thing was fine, except for the patient's schizophrenia. Once the facade
had cracked (due to any number of techniques, some of which will be
discussed shortly), the covert disagreement, or split, or conflict,
between two other family members became apparent. With its emergence,
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the patient usually i„p„ved sy^pto^atlcally." though naturally the
family renamed U.ely to e^hat. on further double hlnCs unless Inter-
vention continued (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, p. 19).
Obviously, because of these processes exemplifying double bind andhomeostasis, the unit of focus was necessarily the family rather than
the individual. Ihis point was consistently emphasised by the DB
workers, and acknowledged as central to DB family therapy by later ad-
herents (Freeman, 1964, p. 36; Klein, 1963, p. 26). m fact, treatment
of the family as a group or system was necessary to meet the form of the
concepts used (e.g., homeostasis), and group or systems processes con-
stituted the conceptual frame of reference. Haley (1971a, p. 231, even
Insisted that the therapist formed oart of fh^H ai. l c a p t the system and was constituent
in the diagnosis of that system.
Formal diagnoses were abandoned as they were based on individual
psychology, could not be readily translated into DB terms, and contri-
buted almost nothing to the change process (1971a, pp. 232-233). Haley
in particular was adamant that clinical results were the hallmark of
good clinical practice. "Unless the diagnosis Indicates a program for
bringing about change it is considered Irrelevant by the more experienced
therapist.
"
13_
th.r .^.^T''^''^^^
J^'^^^^^ Weakland later remark (p. 21)
t^pL ! '°"'fr ^''^ '^^'^ ^^"^^^^^^ "^"^lly ^-veals not only thathese parents usually have considerable interpersonal difficulties,
exniDics m his symptoms.
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The focus o£ the change process, or the goal, „as neither under-
standing nor abreactlon. but changing of the
•self-relnforclng and
.utuall. destructive networks of Interaction" In families (.ac.son and
Weakland, X961. p. 26). Through the seeding disorganization or the
profusion of symptomatology, the co^unlcatlonal and hon,eostatlc patterns
held the families in frozen positions- thus ,>y j.i.±ons, n it was processes rather than
symptoms that became the target of Intervention attempts.
Jrthft'Ile therapist must experienceis that h will have to deal with the same problem ollrand over again In different forms and guises, as thefollowing example suggests.
Jhp'Jh^^'^'-'^^
father of a paranoid patient complained tot e therapist of his son's obesity and requested a dietfor him. He and his wife expressed futility about "doLanything with him." They occasionally took action of aninteresting sort, considering their son's suspicious nature
•
eLX' 'f'^' -^^^ one'morning to
'
t ll the milkman that he was to ignore any requests for
^h!^''^^'"*
therapist held fast to his recommendationt at the patient would change himself when he was Jeadyand several sessions later the patient announced that he
him th. "Tu '^^"Pi^^ '^--^ to congratulatee mother cut in to discuss her own weight problem
eoisod: \" ^t°PPed her by recounting a rather bizarr"'p e in which he was found unconscious and taken to ahospital m peril of his life.
This sequence was characteristic for this family. The
patient's statements tended to be ignored or rationalized
away, the mother usually sounded a serious note about some-thing, and the father topped it by telling something on him-
self which, while dramatic, inevitably made him out to be
slightly foolish. A kind of closure was usually attained
at the end of these sequences by the father, mother, and
son all chuckling slightly at the father's expense. This
sort of closed sequence, however, constitutes the sort of
pathological family homeostasis that it is the therapist's
business and duty to alter. (Jackson and Weakland, 1961
pp. 25-26)
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In the attempt to induce change, DB family therapy ignored intra-
psychic dynamics for more conscious levels of family interaction (Klein,
1963. p. 26; Gralnick, 1962, p. 519), eschewed content for communicational
and structural concerns (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, p. 26), and concen-
trated on what maintained the form of the current structures rather than
historical concerns (Gralnick, 1962, p. 519; Haley, 1971a, p. 230),
To make these sorts of changes, the therapist had to be quite active
in the sessions-"-^ (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, p. 25; Gralnick, 1962,
p. 519; Freeman, 1964, pp. 37-38; Haley, 1971a, pp. 230-231), often
making interventions in the first session, before full information was
gathered, so that change processes were started while the family is
still in crisis and most amenable to change (Haley, 1971a, pp. 230-231).
(This strategy is also very helpful in establishing some control over
the situation for the therapist and in getting some form of change, which
14
„
"From the discussion so far it must now be evident that active
intervention in and management of family interaction has an important
place in our initial work, and, indeed, this holds true of the further
course of family therapy also. This active orientation, however, grew
out of our experience and was not a predisposition except that experience
in treating individual schizophrenics presses one toward an active and
varied style of therapy. Nevertheless, in beginning our work with
families, we were concerned lest activity on the part of the therapist
would obscure family operations and dim the light of our research.
Actually, it has been so difficult to keep the sicker families involved,
to produce shifts and not mere repetitions of the standard patterns
characteristic of any one family, that we are no longer so concerned
about the therapist remaining a flyspeck by his own design and efforts,
and more concerned with his avoiding being put into such a useless
position by the family. (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, p. 25)
251
o. co.3e
...eases
.He
.He.p.s.s
„e.,BUU. an.
..e.e.o.e HWHe.
'
chances of success)
.
TO do this. tKe DB therapist ™igKt
..fta,.e the therapy" as a
that is. set
.p. ..ten i^pUciti.
.ro. expectations, t.ies an.
guidelines for the fam-ii^r r t im ly (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, pp. 22-23). For
instance, s/he might interrupt the parent.'y n s attempt to focus solely on
the identified patient's sy^pto^tology or history (.ac.son and „ea.-
land, 1961. p.
,
3/he re-fra.e messages within the fa.ily so
their
.eanlng shifts (e.g., fro„ king's "had" to "„ad" or vice-versa)
This experience demonstrated that pointing out double hinds or spirals
did little good; however, the meaning, intent or focus could he shifted
by such re-fra.l„g, and with repetitions of such shifts, the pattern
was said to lose some of its "highly stereotyped repetitlousness .
"
(1961, p. 26). Advice was sometimes given, to accept the help offered,
rather than to do the "right thing."
At times, specific Instructions were given, usually with regard to
a minor matter, but one which Involved a significant pattern or inter-
action "and given an instruction to do A, expecting that the person,
from our knowledge of his reactions, will m fact do B, which will
cause change C in a family relationship." (Jackson and Weakland, 1961,
pp. 26-28) Clearly, however, this form of instruction was not the
straightforward matter usually envisaged by the term. It partook of
the "therapeutic DB," the benign use of double binds by the therapist
to gain change. This technique was especially useful for schizophrenic
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families as it matched their own for-™ ^rm of communicating, enabled the
therapist to avoid entrapment in the familv'.cn t y s communicational pattern
confused the usual homeostatic processes, and necessarilv '
. .,
u y induced change
(as a therapeutic douhlp K-ir^^ •bind IS as impossible as a family double bind
to Ignore, obey or not obey)
.
In other words, these ffltm-i-s^^ u
for "plus ca change plus 0'^% ?" " ^^^"^^^^^^ -Ptitude
increasingly clea? ^o ^s a^ /^"'^ ^PP^^^^
effective'we mu^^'me t he^ Tn IZlrT''
''^"^
.''^^ ^°
different orientation-toward no^ °^
2^°""^' though with
defensive maintenance ofTsIc ^
''T,HPist must himself employ dual or mulM;i. '
such incongruences as wLl serve ^ 1^^^%"^^^^^^^- involving
whole complexity of the messa^L o? thrff
'
must deal with Th^^ ^/^^^^J^^ °5 he family members hecix xcn...inat IS, we have been concernprl vt-i t-v,explicit statements that convey concealed Snr ''^/''^implicit meanings as well unexpected
joined With framing staL^en s wUh\r"''"' "'^'^^^^
whose carrying out^ill^^^.^^jr
rJhf
r
^mL^a^ge^'^^have spoken of this elsewhere, perhaps too narrowly ^s thetherapeutic double bind"; the broad principle dl crJbed
therapeutical?
"^"^^^P^^--^ °ften incongruent-messages
xnvestiga ion ''m' I "
recognition, and then furtheri ti . (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, p. 30)
Collusion in factional struggles was avoided, except as a temporary,
strategic, and explicit maneuver (Haley, 1971a, pp. 234-235). In^plicit
collusion, particularly if denied, with some individual member was
usually an indication of poor prognosis.
Messages were interpreted and double binds uncovered or exposed
(Klein, 1965, p. 26). Feelings or attitudes, however, were most decide-
ly not interpreted, and interpretation as usually construed was regarded
as actively destructive in this form of treatment.
The beginning family therapist tends to feel that it is
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might be. He interprets to f. destructive these
responding to each othe? T ^ """^^^^^ they are
through body
.ove^eSt; Ind o on'^oJt'IS a way of giving xneLing to tie fliT 1"'^' '^'^more experienced family therapist IT]^ "^embers. Thefor the idea that interpretJnrf ^ ' enthusiasm
brings about change. Tpa.tfcnr f attitudesit is helpful to confront ^r ? '''.^^ ^^^1
they hate one another
^ns^L'd' T^'h ^"^^destructive behavior in .^^ tends to interpret
as a protective lcr Uil
Pos^tl^e way, for example,
is not to makrexpUcit n^T" P^^lem
resolve the diffLiux'es in'^h''"^'°'''''^^ to
causing the hostxL y ^h'refo^e" he
'^''^^ ""'^^
therapist is sparser with ! experienced
using them ta^L o PersLT^^^^^^^^^ 'T'' ^^'^behave d i f f^^i^^MTT-^A . ^ ^ ^^"^""^^ members to
be 'o«arin:""faily\'/
:f
™- -
unsavory feelings about each "he^ Th^
'""""^ '"^^
n:"":;hati:e°n" aUv" a^l"jrofff^-l"^ '""^-"^
n^™j"io"\'°V^- ourco"aLfrij^.o\"n;
Double Bind Paradigm as Rp..nl
^
nary
To be a revolutionary paradlg., a scientific development must .eet
certain criteria; It ™ust be: 1) a problem solution that Is 2) a new
way of seeing things (a reconceptuallzatlon)
, that 3) has an analogue
function, (I.e., It serves as a Gestalt with which to "see" new prob-
lems as subjects for the application of similar forms of conceptualiza-
tion and techniques). This solution/analogue must be 4) sufficiently
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from
competing modes of scientific activity (I.e., establish Its "own" DB),
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open-e„ae.
.o Xeave p...,e.s „e„.
.e-<,e..„ea ,.o.p can aaa.ess and
7) provide the ne.us a.o.nd which group co^nlt.ents can be developed.
and thus, provide some criteria k„ u • uby which to recognize adherents to one's
"own" group and to other competing" groups with their own paradlg..
Moreover, a revolutionary paradigm would bear certain characteris-
tics. Such a paradigm would he constituted A) from identified anomalies
Which have developed Into B) a spirit of crisis (i.e., awareness of fun-
damental difficulties With a framework), the paradigm would be formu-
lated C) deductively, in the course of D) normal science efforts directed
at other goals, by E) people with very different perspectives ou^
the framework In crisis (i.e., Master^an's "rank outsiders'^)
, which re-
sults In a solution set that is fresh, but F) relatively crude.
Most of the criteria and supplementary characteristics for a revolu-
tionary paradigm have been demonstrated here to be relevant to the DB
formulations .'^
The DB paradigm directly addressed a number of obdurate anomalies
in classical psychoanalysis. In the traditional clinical population,
comprised of adult transference neuroses, the anomalies included:
^
^^Several such criteria and characteristics have not yet been re-viewed, including the deductive nature of the paradigm, its relative
crudity, and its development by "outsiders" during the course of normal
science activity in pursuit of other goals.
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the presence of necrotic complementarities m dyads and theu a persistently
poor social relation In .an. "successfully analysed Individual patients
and paradoxical reciprocities In Health and disorder In the families of
'
so.e patients wHose clinical conditions „ere Improvlns. These occurrences
hiShllshted the importance of contemporaneous Interpersonal factors. „KlcK
neither the classical change process, nor theory, could accomodate.
Anong the new clinical populations to which psychoanalysis was ex-
tended, the psychoanalysis of children provoked several anomalies with
respect to mechanisms of change and technique, isolation of the treat-
ment from family members was required to foster the transference, without
which there could be no working through and thus no change; however, when
working with children, contact with parents was necessary If for no other
reason than to enlist their cooperation, and precluded their removing
the child from analysis. Thus, technically, the analyst was caught In a
bind; s/he could see the parents and hamper transference, or not see the
parents and endanger the treatment. Moreover, the child apparently did
not form transferences of the classical type anyway, and therefore new
techniques and mechanisms of change were required.
Finally, several anomalies emerged In the psychoanalysis of schizo-
phrenics and borderlines. With schizophrenic patients, the anomalies
Included: presence of Insight and affect but little behavioral change
and thus very low "cure" rates; reciprocities of health and disorder
among family members as the schizophrenic member's condition changed;
change In schizophrenic condition with contemporaneous change in a
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Phrenic co»u„ication
.
Borderiine anomalies Included:
.he fetation o£
transferences despi.e a markedly narcissistic clinical picture, the
precipitation of psychoses mfh^y n,P n rather than cure during analysis; and the
lack of change despite insight and affect.
The DB proposed a problem solution to these anomalies in which
the Batescn ideas on levels of co..unication and paradox addressed the
difficulties of schisophrenic con^unication and Jackson's ho.eostatic
Ideas, the conple.entarity, reciprocity and relapse anomalies, less
directly, the DB was a solution to precitipation of psychoses. (See
Jackson and Weakland, 1958).
The problem solution constituted a new way of seeing things, essen-
tially a reconceptualization of schizophrenia as a psychological, rather
than organic disorder (Bateson, 1956; Jackson, 1957a, p. 181; Haley,
1959a, pp. 322-323), and as behavior that was organized and learned
from an interpersonal context where such behavior was both meaningful
and appropriate (Abeles, 1976, p. 113).^ The new viewpoint emphasized
the interpersonal aspect rather than intrapsychic and held the opinion
that the etiological factors were nondiscrete and continuing rather than
a circumscribed trauma.
1
6
As Abeles (1976, p. 117) later points out, the basic assumption
of the social intelligibility of symptoms in schizophrenia is shared
among several other other formulations; she included those of Laing;
Searles; and Wynne, Ryckoff, Day and Hirsch.
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nder-
The OB se..e.
.He anal.,.e
,u„cUo„ oehe. ps.c.oses,
.He
neuroses (!), delinquency and the Hun^n condition Ituu a . was sufficiently
unprecedented to attrarf -^^o
^""^ °'
"P^lally a^ong tHose
working with schizophrenia or- r.o, . -,. , new to cUnlcal work and as yet unco,™itted
to a particular approach.
Model problems and solutions emerged as the DB n . •^^a paradigm was elabora-
-d. several sucH proHle.s Included: developing tHe Ho^eostatlc aspect
to tHe sa^e level as tHe co^.nlcatlonal. controlling and developing tHe
boundaries of definitions for Important concepts. sHlltlng fro.
Vlctl... to
.utual-Mndlng, moving to tHe »ore-tHa„-t„o-person syste.
developing tHe splrallng concept to account for tHe pervasiveness of
double binding In a fa.Uy, elucidating preclpltants. developing a
Change „echanls. for family therapy, and setting the BB In so.e relation
ship with other formulations.
Finally the DB provided the nexus about which group co™it.ents
and Identity could be developed. The formulation was clear, explicit,
and radical enough that a clinician could not accept It by default or
slide into It; one had to adopt it from whole cloth, or not at all.
Since the DB provided a formulation, change agent techniques and theory,
it was virtually Impossible to re-interpret into any other formulation,
as any component so interpreted would bring in by association other
elements, until the whole system was in evidence.
Finally, the paradigm emerged during a period in which there was
an awareness of crisis and controversy regarding fundamentals of the
classical psychoanalytic framework.
CHAPTER VI
IHE DOUBLE BIND DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
In 1951. Gregory Bateson and Jergen Ruesch published Co^unlcatlon
Ih^Soci^n^of^s,,^
^^^^ Russell^T^;;;^
logical Types to analyse co™„Icatlon.l A„o„g Inslgh.s generated
was the Idea of dual levels of co^unication; each "unit" of communi-
cation was perceived as having both a report and a co^and aspect. The
report aspect conveyed Information ("Nice day, Isn't it?"), while the
command aspect defined nr- inmnt-^a t or limits the conversation (implicitly - "We'll
talk about the weather now."). This dual structure of language formed
the foundation of the DB paradigm and project begun by Bateson one year
later. (Clearly, the report aspect is analagous to the idea of meta-
2
communication)
.
The inception of the DB DM, particularly as it relates to the
development of the communicational and relational aspects of the DB
paradigm will be the present focus. The DB DM had a formal life span
of ten years (1952-1962) and was enormously successful in terms of
originality and productivity ; ^ the project was established, funded, and
^Bateson is customarily credited with this particular development.
2_,
The command function was later developed by Haley in his work on
control over the definition of relations, to be reviewed shortly.
3
Haley (1976a, p. 110) credits the group with more than 70 papers.(He IS including apparently Bateson, Weakland and himself as "group
members" and Jackson and William Fry as "consultants.")
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functioned as a research group for various facets ofi-xou t communication, all
based upon the Russellian level c; tk^s. The project also satisfied the formal
criteria for DM st^fnc- ^^ ^ uatus. 1) a coherent research tradition; 2) a consteUa-
-on Of sroup co„lt.ents ("conceptual, theoretical, and ^ethodoloslcal")
Which define a scientific co^unlty; and, „ore l.pllcltl,, 3) a set of
"scientific hahlts" (Including Intellectual, verhal, mechanical, and/or
technological)
,
A DM also has an internal structure comprised of at least one (or
-re) paradigm(s), symbolic generalizations, values, and heuristic and/
or metaphysical models. Finally, it serves several functions in the
conduct of scientific activity; a DM provides structures and processes
by which paradigms can be articulated with relative unanimity of prob-
lem-choice, adequate solution, and communication. Essentially a DM
provides a "sphere of facilitation" in the conduct of scientific ac-
tivity, as well as a framework of scientific accountability. All of
these functions or characteristics were fulfilled by the DB project.
In this chapter, the focus will be on the inception of the DM,
particularly as expressed in the group's formation around a developing
paradigm, and the DM's subsequent characteristics and development. The
time span considered will be the decade of the group's formal existence,
that is 1952-1962. Although the members continued to produce papers
after the 1962 dissolution, they did so as individuals or occasionally
pairs, but on clearly diverging pathways, and not as a coherent research
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Sroup; „o.eove., no. aU .He,. „o..
.e.ained ecns.s.enUy on BB issues/
Inception of fh. CoMnunlcatlonalJRe
in 1952 Gregory Bateson received a grant fro. the Roctefeller
Foundation to study the general nature of co^unlcatlon In levels (.ased
upon the previously mentioned Russelllan Theory of Logical Types). Pre-
vious to this. Bateson had studied h^an and animal co^unlcatlons and
most recently communication among otters. T.w u id ers. Jay Haley and John Weakland
joined Bateson early 1„ 1953. The group was organized and funded as a
research group Into the nature of co^nlcatlon and In fact Haley (1972,
p. 114) co,™ents. "It was not a clinical project and was housed In the
'
Veterans Administration Hospital only because Bateson was ethnologist
there."
This point meets one of the supplementary characteristics for a
paradigm as yet not met (i.e., the development of the paradigm arising
from normal science efforts directed at different goals)
. By 1963 the
group was quite aware that its work was often seen as exclusively or
most importantly the DB, while they (and especially Bateson) reiterated
that the focus of efforts was toward communication in its various aspects
4,At many points, Haley's 1976a account of the history of the DBgroup has proved invaluable; Bateson 's comments upon it, the DB papersduring and after dissolution, and the family therapy literature ingeneral, has provided the information for this section. Unless other-
wise noted, I am relying on Haley's 1976a history.
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^^^I^'^e^s^^^\~^ ^^ doubling
subject-matters nor this speclfir.f "^^^^T^ l£ecific
core of ^;iirWk-7F ^efif^hfr^—^ ihHiir'
attentloTrTaTTf ileS St^' t """"^ ^^''"''1» o XL tse ms tnat a number of exi^Mno •
work, and nly not have bee;'!'? IcLnn'
"
in our 1956 paner Z /IT """f '"^'^"'^ly emphasized or clear
the study of a "de ranJ '^°™"''""l°nal approach to
^-.irfit^frf^
-
general and inclusive framework. (Bateson, et al., 1963p. 155; emphasis added) ' J-^D-i,
Prior to the 1956 publication, the group had examined "the nature
of metaphor, humor, popular films, ventriloquism, training of guide dogs
for the blind, the nature of play, animal behavior, the formal nature
of psychotherapy, and the communication behavior of individual schizo-
phrenics." (Bateson, et al., 1963, p. 154)
Haley and Weakland joined Bateson early in 1953. Haley had pre-
viously been working on the social and psychological analysis of fan-
tasy, particularly as seen in popular films. Weakland, though earlier
trained as a chemical engineer, had more recently been working in cul-
tural anthropology with emphasis on China. Later in that same year.
Dr. William Fry joined the project as a part-time consultant, immediately
upon finishing his psychiatric residency (Haley, 1976a, p. 61). In a
particularly nasty trick of fate, Fry was summoned by the Navy for a
one and a half year tour of duty in 1955-1956 and was not a co-author
on the paradigmatic 1956 article. Haley says about Fry, "Had he not
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been gone that year he would have Joined the rest of us In siting that
article." (1976a, p. 108)= (.ack.on Joined the group early In 1954 and
was a co-author)
.
With their backgrounds and early training, Bateson, Haley and
Weakland obviously qualify as Master.an's "rank outsiders" with respect
to schizophrenia, a clinical phenomenon which of course meets another
supplementary paradigmatic criterion.
The first year of the group's collaboration was spent primarily in
trying to find what Haley characterizes as "a common approach," (1976a,
p. 61) and Bateson as "an adequate language" (Bateson, 1976, p. 108).
The first difficulty that confronted them was whether levels of communi-
cation and paradoxes were "relevant to anything important in human life"
(Haley, 1976a, p. 61). In particular, the question of truth and un-
truth became controversial; to logicians, truth in reality was often
irrelevant; in human interaction, that was rarely the case. This point
became increasingly important; Haley in particular, adopted a "value-
free" stance in psychotherapy which appears related to this issue. For
instance, using Laing's progression of "from bad to mad", a DB tech-
nique of reframing would shift a family's perception of the identified
patient's behavior from "mad" to "bad" or vice versa. The truth of
One wonders in fact, why he was not so included among the authors.
If he'd been part of the project from 1953 and left in 1955, and if
the article were written in 1955 (as it must have been), it is apparent
that he'd had at least indirect influence on the paper, particularly
during the crucial early years.
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of the characteristics was essentially Irrelevant: the reframing and
shifting of the family's behavior was primary and constituted the goal
of that intervention.
Development of the Communicational Aspect of the ParaHi gm
1953. As a common language began to develop, a set of virtual synonyms
developed (Logical Type, Levels of Abstraction, Levels of Communication,
Message and Metamessage, and Metacommunicative Level) which addressed
the relationship between a message and the message which qualified it.
A beginning development in terminology occurred with theidea that one message 'frames' another message... it became
possible to see a relevance between a paradox such as 'All
statements within this frame are untrue,' and a piece of
human communication where one person indicates with a
framing message how his subsequent message is to be
received. (Haley, 1976a, p. 62)
Obviously, with this development, the project had found or constructed,
relevance for human affairs in the paradox's reflexivity. Bateson used
film excerpts of otters to see if they qualified their messages. (They
did, e.g., "This is play.")
Haley states that the work of that first year was "diverse" (1976a,
p. 62). It is apparent that, in Kuhnian terms, the project did not yet
have a coherent research program. They investigated: 1) otters playing
(a new interest in line with the project's future developmental direc-
tion; 2) an analysis of a popular moving picture (an old interest not
directly relevant to the project's development); 3) a filming of
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Mongoloid children in a aro„r, ( i .
' '° ""J-^ -clear); 4) analysis
..... ana a
.en.Uo.nls. an. p„p,.,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
speech Of a scM.oph.enlc
„Hen a sroup
.e.,e. interviewed
i:;"He^^'rhe^",?:Li"\?:r:::::r - -
self, it was uncertain e™„ f f ""^ =l^s="ied hir,-
from; the authorit.es doubLd h- °" "-'^born "on Mars" and thaft statement that he was
Another patient JnvervLwL'' "^^^^aret Stalin.
culty wi?h class. Lai oT tVZ^'^T^ ^
"hen he did he would rapeUt^velrsfv "fL'T''IS not good." (Haley, 1976a, p! 62) thinking
At this Phase in the project, the members had begun the development
of a con^on language, the kernel of an idea, and appear to have been
casting about for a real, of application. The interview of a schizo-
phrenic patient early in 1,53 appears fortuitous, a combination of being
located in a psychiatric hospital and having a resident half-time psy-
chiatrist on the roster. (The Inference here is that it was Fry who con-
ducted that interview.)
In 1954, Haley presented the project's first papers and a fil. by
Bateson on otters, illustrating paradoxes in a variety of areas^ to
the American Psychiatric Association in Mexico City (Haley, 1976a, p. 62).
In general, during 1953, the group had shifted to emphasizing the poten-
tial conflicts between a message and its qualifier, so that in some
instances, a paradox occurred.
6,
IQSS
P^bli^l;^;^ "Paradoxes in play, fantasy and psychotherapy,'1955, by Haley, and "A theory of play and fantasy," 1955, by Bateson.
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Very Important to this i-la,-if,-„clarification of paradox was Milton Erick-
son's work wltK K.pnosls. Erlckson's work was apparently Introauce. to
the project By Weakland and Bateson; Haley and Weakland Began their
series of what ca.e to he annual meetlnss with Erlckson In 1,53. Krlck-
son^s re-conceptuallzatlon of hypnotic trance fro„ an Inner state or
mtra-psychlc process, to a for. of relationship with Interpersonal
processes, clearly constituted an Important Influence on the project
particularly with respect to the Ideas of control and Induction of
"altered states." "aley s Un_ Thea^i: lis Ps,c|^
of Milton H. Erlckson, M^. (1973) directly credits Erlckson's contri-
butions (as the various group members did at other times as well).
Erickson's work with hypnosis is also evident in Haley's recurrent in-
terest in the notions of power and control (to be discussed later In
this chapter). Erickson's work with hypnosis was a crucial influence on
the DB DM, particularly with respect to induction as an Interpersonal
process, which the DB later used with regard to explaining pathology,
and for therapeutic strategies.
During 1953, then, the project shifted its attention from a multi-
plicity of areas relating to levels of communication, to the communi-
cation of schizophrenics. In the later months of 1953, they began to
record schizophrenic communication (Haley, 1972, pp. 113-114; Weakland,
1969, p. 172). In 1954, the project shifted to a temporary preoccupation
with schizophrenia.
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terminate, an. was not renewed (Haley, l,7ea, p. e4)
, (aUHon.H U Is
unclear whether the. ha. appUed for such a renewal). Hale. Indicates
^hat parti, for
..practical reasons.. (aifflc.U. fnndln^ esoteric co^nl-
catxonal research) and parti v fr-on, ^ -, .a ly tr m a developing tendency in that
direction, it was decided to apply for a Pranr ^. •FFJ- r g t to investigate schizo-
phrenic conmiunication." (1976a nnV-L^/o , pp. 64-65). They obtained a two-year
grant from the Macy Foundation.
During January of 1954, Bateson invited Don Jackson to join the
project and the latter, though nominally a consultant, beca.e a central
member
.
From the development of the project, it is clear that project in-
terest in schizophrenia "was at first only an outcome of Bateson's prior
interest in the general nature of communication" (Weakland, 1969, p. 171);
that is, it was adopted in the course of normal science endeavors in
other directions. Weakland (1969, p. 171) credits Haley with the shift
of interest and the insight that the distunbed communication of schizo-
phrenic patients was of potential interest to the group. During 1953,
the group taped interviews with schizophrenic patients and paid close
attention, not to the content of speech, but to the formal aspects of
communication, which led them to perceive certain confusions in "dis-
criminating the logical types of messages as characteristic of the
schizophrenics we studied," (Weakland, 1969, p. 172); this research was
regarded as anthropological in method, almost like a form of naturalistic
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171 and 172)
.
For the next two years (1954-1,56). the ptoject focused on the
for^l Characteristics of schisophrenic speech. Haley (l,7ea, p. 55)
presents a section of the Macy grant application.
The proposed researrh i
i
aspect of schizophrenir.n ' entirely different
oversensitive to such sipnp1« ^K ^^S^^-^^- They may be
which indicate whether a given utterance Is ujejal of
^etaphoric. jocular or serious, sincere or histrionic etc
(H^lejll^^ef/,^-?^; ""^ '-"^^ ,uaUfler;.^"-
Haley parenthesl.es that during that period, "reality qualifiers" were
also called "mode Identifying signals;" they described the metamessage
that describes, or frames, what sort of message the communication Is.'
During this two year period (1954-1956), when formal aspects of comi^unl-
cation were the explicit focus of their work, the project members had
moved into a revolutionary position with respect to scientific activity.
The focus shifted to schizophrenia and attention was paid to psycho-
constitutes language and concept formation by theUM, and both terms qualify as Kuhnlan symbolic generalization.
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analysis, if only obliquely fe p i ,i ( .g.. symbols
... displacement
, projection,
etc.")
.
The group had begun the shift from what Griffith and Mullins
'
(1972) call an elite to a revolutionary research group.
^
A series of important developments ensued which eventually coalesced
into the 1956 paradigm. After considerable debate the project members
differentiated between
-contradiction" and "incongruence." The term
"contradiction" was used for messages which qualified each other in a
conflicting manner at «^ same level
, whereas "incongruence" was reserved
to described messages that qualified each other in a conflicting manner
at different levels The emphasis rested on this latter case, as it was
an example of conflict in the discontinuity of Russellian class and mem-
bers; it was at the site of this class-member conflict that paradox was
generated (Haley. 1976a, p. 65). The complexity of communication was
becoming very apparent and attention began to be paid to the perception,
or interpretation, of this complexity. Haley (1976a, p. 66) points out
a complementary set of foci: wa^ of communicating and the interpretation
of such communication. He states that when Bateson, in a letter to
_
An elite group is "recognized as being of central importance totheir respective disciplines even while [it was] developing." (1972
p. 960) Obviously, while the project was a general communications
research group, particularly as it was directed by Bateson who had just
published a well-known book of research into communication, the DB
project was an elite research group; with the shift in content area
(schizophrenia) and focus (the formal aspects of szhizophrenic communi-
cation), they entered a transition from an accepted elite group to a
potentially revolutionary one. It is always a question at what point
something becomes revolutionary: with the change in perspective, or with
the publication? Griffith and Mullins' (1972) work proved helpful in
this analysis and will be partially reviewed in Chapter VIH when the
strengths and weaknesses of the Kuhnian applications are delineated.
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of levels of co^unlcatlon, the DB was first formulated.
m wrltins to Welner, Bateso. first discussed
language and metalanguage (,ualiaers). paradoxes, and deutero learning
(learning sets or learning-to-date), then formulated the prototypic DB
paradigm, incidentally casting rh^ ^r.-y t e injunctions into negative rather than
positive form.
to"s"ts°oVtwo't' 'T'''
'''''''
-
whether these
i:ngua\1;°La"ni:r: ^^^^f^^-'^^both independent!? operating ^rsu^^'X^^:!^-^
Doth message and metamessage contain negatives. On thic,prxncxple we can imagine the generation'of pa?;dox in Jhedeutero-learning system when an organism experiencespunishment following some failure and learns that J mustnot learn that punishment follows failure. This would be
?or'?:nure Lt'^
^'^'"^^ °' ^ ^-^"^ been pJni edt failu later is punished for showing his exnert;, t-i on nfpunishment after failure, e.g., is punished or cring"(quoted in Haley, 1976a, p. 66)
wringing.
The deductive quality in Bateson's thinking is quite clear here.
As Haley (1976a, p. 67) has put it: "At this time, there was no example
of a double bind drawn from natural-history data; it was a hypothesis
about what sort of thing "must have happened in the life history of the
schizophrenic given his confusion of Logical Types." The deductive
quality of the formulation was repeatedly alluded to (Haley, 1959b,
p. 358; Bateson, et al., 1963, p. 154).^ At least at this point, in a
9
It scarcely need be mentioned that this completes the supplementary
criteria for the development and characteristics of a Kuhnian paradigm.
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ive
1954 grant application, the paradigm was presented as being both Induct
and deductive; "The theory Is derived In part deductively tro. what has
already been said about the capabilities (of schizophrenics], and In part
inductively fro. experiences with schizophrenics and the literature des-
cribing their conmunicatlon." (cited in Haley, 1976a, p. 66)
By the end of 1954, with Jackson now in residence for several months,
the language becomes clearly «re clinical. For Instance, from that
same grant application:
1. Aetiology. It is suggested that the base for laterpsychosis may be laid in infancy by the experience ofdealing with a mother who both punishes the child for
certain actions and punishes the child for learning thatpunishment will follow those certain actions, i e shegenerates paradox in the child by combining negativelearning with negative deutero-learning
. (cited in Haley
1976a, p. 67)
During this period, the project gradually abandoned the term "para-
dox" for "double bind."^° During 1955, the DB was defined as both a
conflict between levels of messages and a conflict between levels of
learning. The abstract logical puzzle became increasingly tied to be-
havior and the project continued to interview and tape schizophrenic
speech. The unenviable position of the receiver of the double bind
messages was considered and the 1956 "victim" was generated. Finally,
"'^The term "double-bind" was coined by Gregory Bateson (Haley,
1972, pp. 113-114)
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the article was written and published.
Don Jaclcson Joined the DB project early in 1954, at Bateson's in-
Fro^-Reich.ann lecture at the Palo Alto V.A.^^
.ackson had spoken
on his concept of fa.ily homeostasis, and Bateson, a .e.ber of the
audience, approached hi. after the talk to say that the concept related
to work he shared with Haley, Weakland, and Fry.
Jackson Joined the DB group after an important controversy between
Haley
-Weakland, and Bateson over the nature of the paradoxical relation-
ship. Bateson at first apparently argued that the relevant paradoxical
relationship was specifically the mother-child relationship wherein the
child was punished for expecting punishment; Haley-Weakland argued that
this was the specific case of a general form of relationship relating
to double negative injunctions and that the paradoxical relationship
was pathogenic regardless of who the family member or significant other
might be. Bateson, usually the most abstract thinker of the group,
appears to have agreed with this change in content. Haley mentions
11,
,
_
Jackson s talk was in January of 1954 (Jackson, 1968, p. V). Priorto joining the DB project Jackson, Jack and Jeanne Block and VirginiaPatterson had studied the families of neurotic and autistic children
at the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute from 1953, Jackson
ending his commitments at Langley Porter in 1956. (Jackson, 1965 p
2 footnote) . ' ^
\
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that he. Batescn an, WeaUand
"s,.n. t„o days in seclusion in .he mount-
ains outlining the research to be done." (l„6a. p. 67) Obviously
Jackson was not there. He is. however, credited in the 1956 article
Which was developed and written In 195. and 1,55, and which depends
m large part on his ideas regarding family homeostasis. In terms of
a Kuhnian analysis fhp aT•^^o^^ ij, t e article could not have been formulated without
the homeostatic concent hp nT-r,-.T-;^^j a..p e provided. At times, the necessity of both
the co^unlcational and the relational concepts was appreciated by
Jackson and Ueakland (1961, pp. 15 and 16), for instance.
Jackson
-s 1954 formnl
a
_tion. Jackson presented the Freida Fromm-Reichmann
lecture in January of 1954, at which time he spoke of his concept of
family homeostasis. He then presented the concept at the American Psy-
chiatric Association meeting in St. Louis, Missouri on May 7 of that
same year (Jackson, 1957b. p. 79); the formulation finally appeared in
written form in 1957.
In this article (formulated in 1954). Jackson alluded to the work
of Horney, Sullivan and Fromm in elucidating the importance of inter-
personal processes and addressed himeself to interactional patterns
within the family which serve to maintain family constancy. His con-
cept of homeostasis was explicitly based upon Claude Bernard and Cannon's
work on homeostatic mechanisms which maintain relative constancy in
the body through the interplay of dynamic processes (Jackson, 1957b,
p. 79). Jackson regarded "family homeostasis" as "depicting family
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interaction as a closed i.,o.^.io„ syste. 1„ „HicH va.iaMons in o..-
Put o. ,e.avio. a.e ,e..ac. in o.,e.
.o co„ect
.He s.s.e„.s response "
(PP. 79-30) SUCH ho.eostatic
„ec.anis.s operate i^piiciei, and .e-
esta.XisH
.He status <,no. H.a„pies o. sucH
.ecHanis^s in a
.a.ii.
.i,He
occur
.Wnever
.He „i,e sHows a certain degree of resent^en. Her Hus-
band deprecates Hi.seU. whenever.
. .parents ,..rrel,
.Heir cHiid diverts
the™ by becoming troublesome; whenever another child shows a certain
degree of independence, his
.other labels it as dangerous or disturbed..'
(First, 1975, p. 9)
Jackson's purpose in the paper was to address to particular types
of family interaction patterns: 1) those changes that develop in other
fainil^ ine^ as a result of changes in the identified patient during
psychiatric treatment and 2) the relation of specific fa.ily inter-
action patterns to psychiatric nosological categories (1957b, p. 79)
The first category, obviously addressed one of the central anoznalies in
the treatment of schizophrenia, the emergence of pathology or distur-
bance in a hitherto healthy family member coincident with the improve-
ment of the identified patient in treatment. A variant of this is also
considered: "Most of us are acquainted with situations where one person
has started treatment, and soon the entire family has been parcelled
out among the circumambient psychiatric brotherhood." (1957b, p. 84)
(The wording here, as elsewhere with Jackson, is quite Sullivanian.
)
Pursuiant to the question of etiology, Jackson contended that
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schizophrenia orieina^P<^ t^^,*- •xglnated, not xn consUtutional factors, and not In
the Ereudlan idea of the sinni. .single traumatic event, but rather in the
concept Of repetitive trauma. Such repetitive trauma was the result
Of distorted interpersonal processes not Isolated events, and „ere a
contemporaneous rather Mn^n K-r^.-tha historical question "not [of] who does
What to whom, but how who does what." (1957a,p. 184) Bateson, et al
develop this Idea m the 1956 paper deductively, wondering under what'
conditions or continual processes a person must live, to develop schl.o-
phrenia.
Jackson addressed other anomalies as well: the necessity of seeing
a child's
"significant-others," (1957b, p. 81) and neurotic complemen-
tarities. (Jackson's manner of stating the latter was rather different:
"The fact is sometimes overlooked that one reason manj- of us continue
to jgnlfest our neuro^^
2ih2!5 to integrate ™ a neuro^ (p. SU; his emphasis) These
points, especially with respect to the reciprocity of health in schizo-
phrenic families, of course meets the Kuhnian criterion that a paradigm
address the anomalies of the previous system (as the communicational
aspect addressed the mystery of schizophrenic "word salad", Investi-
gating the form rather than the content of communication and homeostasis)
The homeostatic mechanisms Invariably involved interpersonal pro-
cesses and at least two, and usually three, people. Jackson's illus-
trations were always more clear if several people were Involved (and in
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tact, see family therapists prefer worUng with a large rather than
small number of peoole pc, -it- m,i,^cu^ix as I makes it easipr ^o v,r^«-K ^ , .e to both spot and intervene
in typical family patterns') Thno -; ^ n • -,
,
P tterns;
.
is is well illustrated in one of Jack-
son's examples (1957b, p. 82).
The paternal uncle of a woman patient had lived with hpr
seeded to aeflect L„e of^hn^^her'^r s^u u/L^rfher husband away from the husband, and the brotLriave
^rtirr'L°" " uncle's dL
r r'.! " ''""""'^ occurred thast seemed hardly coincl-
^dTa^o :„?"ir= quarreling, th^ ^^hem e a potentially serious suicide attempt, the father
"1 pho^LI: --"^
The role of the third, or fourth, person in a system, and not only the
relationship of patient and symbiotic parent, was repeatedly emphasized
by Jackson; until his work, the dyad had been regarded as a closed sys-
tem; with the Introduction of Jackson's concept of homeostasis, the
system opened up to include the entire family and the theory was cast
in systemic terms.
Subsequent development of the homeostasis idea . The ideas first for-
warded by Jackson in 1954 were developed somewhat in the 1956 article,
then in a number of other articles between 1956 and 1968; though he
wrote many other papers, only a portion were on the DB per se (e.g.,
1960, The Etiology of Schizophrenia ), rather than a development of the
relational aspect of the paradigm, while still others were elaborations
of earlier interests (e.g., 1958, "Guilt and the control of pleasure
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in schizoid personalitipc;"^alxtxes ). Several papers, however, do stand out as
developments of the homeostatic and/or r-ow ,relational aspects he contributed
to the DB paradigm.
in 1957(a), Jaclcson extended his concept of repetitive traun.,
rather than the isolated traumatic event, as responsible for schizo-
phrenia. Two following papers are in some sense collaborations with
Weakland, who seems to have fully appreciated the homeostatic impli-
cations, m 1958, they collaborated on the idea of the repetitive trauma,
by documenting the precipitation of a psychotic episode by double binding
communication which occurred in the father-mo ther-adult-"child" triad.
Weakland wrote a paper on the DB and three-party interaction (obviously
homeostatic) in Tl^ Etiolo^ of Sch^^ (I960) which Jackson edited.
The extension in that paper was from the dyad to triad, an elaboration
of Jackson's 1954 work on the third person in relation to the usual
pathologenic dyad. Later, in 1965, Jackson published "The study of the
family," which was a further elaboration of the homeostatic theme.
Soon thereafter, (1965), Jackson and Janet Beavin wrote and pub-
lished "Family Rules: Marital Quid Pro Quo" in which they examined the
12_,
,The dates of publication might engender some mild confusion about
iQ.?ur^*u ""^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ 1957a a paper could elaborate upona iy:3/b/ The problem dissolves when it is recalled that the 1957b
paper was published in 1957, but written and at least twice presented
to public forum in 1954 (once in January at the annual Freida Fromm-
Reichmann lectures and later in May at the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion s annual meetings). The article on family homeostasis was pub-
lished in part for historical reasons, in 1957 and only by accident
later than its progeny.
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some of the
development of family rules hm-h i • ., bot xmplxcit and explicit and
—
^
(-t.la.ie. and Wea.land, 1.7, p
""^^
—
-
-tension of his 1.3.
.or.in which his second focus was the correlation k .between typical inter-
personal patterns and nosological categories ThP • •c . eir primary point with
respec.
. .„.es „as ..a.
_ .... „„e .He
.es... 30..H.„, u..
individual decisions o. acUons. so .Ha.
.He pa..ne.s „e.e
.a.ei, awa.e
of them and neither could be perceived as having any real intentionali.y
In .heir establishment (Watzlawlck and Weakland, 1977, p. 20).
What is regarded as Jackson's final comprehensive presentation
(Watzlawick and Weakland. 1977. p. 193), "Schizophrenia: the Nosological
Nexus," was initially presented
.0 the Pirst Rochester International
Conference on "The Origins of Schizophrenia" in March of 1967." In
this. Jackson developed several points demonstrating
.Ha. individual
personality theories and
.rea.ment were insufficient for schizophrenia
and also demonstrated
.he correlation be.ween
.he Identified patient's
behavior and typical family in.erac.ion patterns; this latter point is
an extension of both his work with correlation between family patterns
and nosological categories (e.g., 1954 and 1965b), and also of Jackson's
d Weakland 's 1958 paper on the precipitation of an acute schizophrenic
1371
"Dr. Jackson died suddenly on January 28, 1968." (Publisher's
te, in Jackson, 1968, p. viii)
an
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episode
as a
Finally, he introduced the concept of
'rastrlctlveness"
.^ior factor in family systems processes. Restrlctlveness" applies to
an Implicit family rule against changing la„ll, roles, which are In
themselves tacit. This in ifc:c.ifm xtsel creates a paradoxical situation
(Watzlawick and Weakland, 1977 n ]9^^ tkp. 193). The concept of restrictiveness
is operationalized by homeocjf^ ^ ^„ u .y n eostatxc mechanisms, and constitutes one of
Characteristics of particularly powerful sets of homeostatic mechanisms.
This point both extends the homeostatic notion, and addresses a charac-
teristic of schizophrenic families recogniaed by several researchers-
a marked tendency toward difficulty in changing an almost obdurately
dynamic system in which, the more things changed, the more things stayed
the same. Wynne, et. al., (1958) refer to a "rubber fence" by which
such families seem to allow the therapist to enter, but not in fact
allow him/her any impact. Bateson (1961, p. 119) also addressed this
point with regard to family development over time.
The families containing schizophrenics exhibit a stabilitythat is, m general, not present in normal families. Manydescriptive statements about the relationships between
members remain true much longer than in usual families.
Indeed, these statements may be said to be stable under
the impact of the processes of maturation of the indepen-dent members. The growing up of the identified patient
and the senescence of the parents scarcely seem to affect
the patterns of behavior between parent and offspring.
Overprotectiveness, if present, continues undiminished
and the incessant inconcistencies of relationship that we
have called "double binds" continue unabated.
Obviously, the homeostatic mechanisms that comprise restrictive-
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ness acoun. one o.
.H.
..ass.c e„o.aUes „U. scM.opH.enU
^.e.. tHe low
.a.es o^ pe^anen. cu.e o. su.s.a.Ual a„eX.o.a.,o„ an.
the very high rate of relapses.
in shc„. Jackson's p.i„a.y Unes of development
„1,H rega.d ,o
homeostasis,
.e.lnnln, m 1„., addressed tH.ee-pa„, Interactional
processes (wit. some elaboration WeaUand here) and systems dynamics
family rules and cybernetic patterns of feedback and correction the
correlation between repetitive Interpersonal patterns and certain noso-
logical categories and the rule of homeostasis and restrlctlveness In
relapses and poor therapeutic resultq w-ffh ..k-K ux s it schizophrenics. By his 1967
paper, Jackson was explicitly referring to cybernetics, particularly
with respect to homeostasis; he appeared comfortable and facile with
General System Theory, referencing von Bertalanffy and using several
of his systems concepts, (e.2 "eani f i n^i nf > vc g., quitmality ) as well as Garfinkel
(1964) and the ethnomethodologists
' (also in California) concepts (e.g.,
"constitutive rules"), and Sullivan with respect to interpersonal patterns
and clinical nosologies. He was clearly attempting to provide, or to
tie-in to, a meta- theoretical framework; the DB project had dissolved
and many of the differences in scientific and/or clinical approach he
had had with other members had widened and become elaborated. By the
time of his death, Jackson had widened the conceptual and clinical
breach between himself and the mainstream DB position to such an ex-
tent, he was developing an intellectual approach traditionally at odds
with that used by the DB. As review of Jackson's precursors, and
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development will make clear ^h;,^C , t at separation was not at all coincidental,
Precursors and influences nn t.^i i'
-JiSSSes^ILiaSksonls^. Jackson's background and
influences were quite diffprpr.^erent from the other three paradigm-makers'
intellectual antecedents,
.ackson, first of all, was an experienced
Clinician. Neither Bateson nor Weakland had had any such experience
and Haley had begun some clinical work around 1952 or 1954 (though it
is unclear where or when he received his training or what type of clini-
cal work Haley was doing),
.ackson's experience as a clinician, of
course, provided the basis and the empirical ^terial for his homeo-
stasis concept. It also apparently impelled him to deal with the clini-
cal community years before the other three paradigm authors. It was
Jackson who, as early as 1957(a), addressed the issue of repetitive
traumatic conditions vs. the classical psychoanalytic single traumatic
event, for instance. Similarly, analogies and differences between DB
therapy and other traditions, especially psychoanalytic, continued to
interest him. (See, for instance, Jackson, 1961a, pp. 270-278).
His clinical experience also contributed greatly to the success of
DB therapy; Jackson provided a perspective that the three others prob-
ably could not have brought to treatment. For instance.
Manipulations or interventions must not be employed if the
therapist has any negative feelings toward the patient and
if they are especially counter-indicated as a way out of
some sort of therapeutic impasse. That is, when the therapist
feels that he does not know what is going on, things bog
down and then a bright idea occurs to him. This is exactly
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be wrong if his intervenUo?f^^L^o^
'I'lZTel'
"
becomes angry... He should accept his DoSiMnndefensively and be free to lose a patJent
'
b'ook'co^^:r-T"'' T'' interpreted as a "cook-o k course, designed to get around the need for inten-
s the c^'s^for
'° '° Psychotherapy; the op osi^ex ase, fo only an experienced therapist can tailoran appropriate intervention to each individual pa^ienj!
This is one of the paradoxes, and one of the stumbling
best ^bie ?f^^°^^-^Py^ the experienced therapist isa l to conceive and execute innovations; yet hisexperience is apt to render him chairbound and a devoteeof his own style. (Jackson, 1961b, p. 259; his emphasis)
Jackson had, according to his own account (1957a, p. 181) become
interested in the etiology and pathogenesis of schizophrenia since 1943
when Jacob Kasanin first introduced him to this area. During the en-
suing years, Jackson saw schizophrenic patients in a variety of thera-
peutic modalities ("...I saw schizophrenic patients in collaborative
therapy, group therapy, intensive individual therapy, and multiple
therapy.", 1957a, p. 181), yet felt he'd not any real understanding of
the origins of the disorder until the DB project.
His own concept of family homeostasis was sparked by an early
paper on the treatment of schizophrenia by R. Laforgue (1938).
Laforgue mentioned that at a significant point in his
female patient's therapy her sister (with whom she lived)
became severely depressed. He attributed the sister's
difficulty to a manifestation of the same unfortunate
genetic structure that had caused his patient's schizo-
phrenia. He did note that the sister's depression was
coincident with a sudden improvement in his patient. (1957b,
p. 88)
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in point of fact, laforgue's article did so.ewhat »re than that
AUhoush he did Identify the processes as ho^eostatlc.
.aforgue clearl,
described two ho^eostatlc sltuatlons-one In „hlch the "health.- fa^U,
member declines with Improvement of the Identified patient, thus re-
vealing latent depression fusuanv^ ^r.A i^ ually), and also a situation wherein the
individual patient's disorder serves as a screen behind which another
family
.e.ber can avoid a loaded developmental or interpersonal task.
In this admirable excerpt, Laforgue also draws attention to substitution
for lost objects which Normal Paul and also Peter Mueller regard as
important in the etiology of schizophrenia.
any Z'^afTJ"'
^^^^l-
' ^
t^dentifled patient] behavior when faced withsort of danger was different from what it had formerly been Tn
: a'^o'^d r?:^ she ^1 T ^^^^^^-^^^^— ^ion fortrbSt-nofShe v i ed it. had become as timid and fearful as a child.
unJoJoTK/^': ^"^^^ "^^ °^ highly satisfactory but for onecomfortable obstacle. For some time I had been reflecting on tSereactions which Odile's progress might possibly produce S?he eldersister who was still looking after her. The more the patient improved
in'od'^r:.'
her sister become and. after the latest transf™';Odile, the gloom deepened into definite depression. This reactionmight seem paradoxical to anyone who has not studied family-neuroses
very closely. But it did not, in fact, take me by surprise. I had
noticed at the beginning of the treatment that the elder sister who
cared for Odile so devotedly was terribly jealous of her authority overthe patient. This devotion, manifesting itself in a spirit of complete
self-sacrifice on behalf of her sick sister and in a strong inclination
to give up having any life of her own, had struck me as suspicious. When
examined more closely, these symptoms revealed a powerful attachment to
her sister, an attachment which she had in the first instance displayed
towards her mother and which, when the latter was taken from her, had
prevented this daughter from developing in the direction of a normal
family-life. Like the patient, the elder sister, though quite capable
of an occasional flirtation, had eliminated men from her affective
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vited this girl to stav vn>h I '5- -i.x Lu bc y wit them. Barbara Pvhi K-;
goxng to ten hL'Shat : 4°=" ^ hfho h'^whphhav on in t e use and
e^c ?o tMs"r\°' ^^^^^ ^hild,
"Ye;'" ^ ' ^^1^ ^-Ply quietly,
of h;rs ^LrirwL 'nr'^^'^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^--^
sincrtL d?vorce"::3\:i' La?"' ' ^^^^
might ask for ^h! J'''/ ^^^^1' since the husband
nofsiUv In ^ t °^ "^^1^' P^^haps it was
^ed thl/.^ u Genevieve with suspicion. I sugges-t at they have her stay in a nearby motel rathef thanxn an already crowded house. They also had no Sea ofhow long she would stay because they failed to clarifythis. (Jackson, 1961a, p. 284)
i t
Essentially, the double binding and homeostatic maneuvering served
to reinforce the idea of the patient's lack of decision-making ability
and the idea of her as impaired or disordered, while maintaining her
in a non-adult position, thus making it well nigh impossible for her to
leave or disengage.
The homeostatic concept also addresses two important clinical issues
regarding the etiology of schizophrenia. It helps to answer the questions
about what researchers concerned with longitudinal risk for schizophrenia
refer to as "high-risk invulnerables, " that is, those individuals at
risk for schizophrenia along some number of dimensions, who do not
develop the disorder. Jackson (1961a, pp. 281-282) facetiously points
out when the sibling of schizophrenics have been investigated, they are
usually preceived as "fine" and the conclusion has been that schizo-
phrenia is a recessive disorder, since it only strikes one in four or
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importance of the connAr^t-cacepc of lo„ self-estee™ in schizophrenia and con-
comitantly, the Importance ofO havxng and showing respect for the patient(.acson, l,3.a. p. la.) -
^^^^^^^
papers Is vl.ldl, reminiscent of SuUlvan's rather „r„ and at times
notoriously difficult style. (Por Instance, „hen
.ac.son refers to
.he "clrcu^namhlent psychiatric brotherhood. " or when he describes the
expression of hostility towards one's mother as an activity "which
among sophisticated people is a .-,,1,IS a rather common Indoor sport," (1961b,
p. 258.) Examination of Jackson's work before the DB project (e.g.!
"Some factors Influencing the Oedipus complex," 1954), during (e.g.!
"Guilt and the control of pleasure In schizoid personalities." 1958)
and after (1963-1,69) clearly reveals Sullivan's influence and Jacksl's
retention and elaboration of the Interpersonal approach in systems ter.s.
It was this factor, more than anything else, that resulted in the split
in the DB DM in 1959.
Jackson's shift from primarily individual clinical work to family
work followed his change in working context from Chestnut Lodge to
Palo Alto.
I became interested in family therapy about seven and ahalf years ago, when I went from Chestnut Lodge to Palo
Alto. At Chestnut Lodge, we had treated schizophrenics
15^ u ,My thanks to Dr. Harold Jarmon for pointing out that Sullivanfrequently alluded to the dynamic equilibrium of relationships, thequid pro quo" aspect of relationships and the crucial role of communi-
cational processes in relationships.
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with psychotherapy, so T of
But, at the Lodge we had L r.^''' "° Alto,
their families.' ihls ? undT% ^ ""^'^'"^ ^° -i^h
what now. But in my ^aJ "^f
^as changed some-
the therapist to\:Lu:^;r\^r:aJ::L'' \t'''''''thing he avoided and always left to\h' .''^^In Palo Alto, which is Hli? administrator,
avoid the reiativ:s;^:nd Ti ^ed^^^fSt^r; ^
most n.arked\rt^rfaLli"'
''k
"^^^^
-^"^^^
was able to iL at home If k".^ schizophrenic patient
therapy and benefi ed f?;. anv u'"'^""^' P^^^^^"
usually produce all lr^° J °^ P^^^ would
ly, there is ver^ i ?L .r 11"'"'';^"' Surprising-
It was in early 1954 that r-h-«^x ly^^ Bateson approached Jackson after the
latter 's Fromm-Reichmann lecture in Pain A^^o ^ • •t:L.Lur m F lo Alto, and invited his partici-
pation in the just developing DB project.
I^^^^^^^n^^o^^he^^ The importance of the homeostatic
aspect occurs in two different areas: the first in Kuhnian ter_ms and the
second in clinical terms
.
First, Jackson's concept of homeostasis add-
ressed several anomalies including: reciprocities in mental health,
(particularly wherein the identified patient improved and a family mem-
ber became disordered); the exceedingly high relapse rate in schizo-
phrenia, and the general lack of therapeutic success with schizophrenic
patients
.
Homeostasis served three functions with respect to a Kuhnian para-
digm, which the communicational aspect alone could not. First, homeo-
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one
a
-Sht Have a sch..op..e„,c o«.,..„,
^^^^^ ^^^^
family, even If double binrlint,ndx g, had a reasonably healthy parent
or even parent surrogate who eould intercede, a child „as decldlly
less lively to become schisophrenic than In those families where the
homeostatlc mechanisms precluded rather than fostered that be„l,„
third-party contact. Such third-party contact could ameliorate the
pathogenicity of the s^^l,^,^-,•^r, a.tuatxon desprte the fact that It did not eliminate
the double binding.
secondly, the homeostasis provided the foundation and operation by
Which double binds could be ^de applicable to human affairs 1, a ^.
-iXi^
-Z. Bertrand Russell had been concerned that, while the Theory
Of Logical Types was Interesting it imVhr hi-Lxn , I mig t have been irrelevant for
anything significant (Abeles, 1976, p. 118). Bateson apparently suffered
Similar qualms Insofar as he, WeaUand and Haley felt the first import-
ant question facing the early project (after they had developed a
common approach), was whether the "paradoxes of abstraction were rele-
vant to anything Important In human life?" (Haley, 1976a, p. 60) Homeo-
stasis provided the non-trlvlallzlng element by providing the DB with
an Interpersonal, or relational arena. A common source of bewilderment
wlthttie DB hypothesis has centered around the question: "Why don't
these people just leave?" That Is, If double bind communication Is so
pathogenic and aversive, why don't the "victims" merely leave the .scene?
\
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Such questioning revealq ^ ^
r
s a lack of understanding with respect tothe homeostatic element. Abeles (1976 pp 115^'0, . -116) appears to under-
stand this element quite well c:u^
^ . She emphasizes:
so imbedded in the reUtLn^h f doublT-biT^dT^
that they are hard lo slT jT °' '""'^ ^ P-^
history, the factors arP
^""^ relationship with a
observe; is likely norL w '° ""^^^'^ ^^^^t an
of a given stat:L'nr:ay"be'°:v:n\'f^"^ ^^^^"^^ ^^^-^^
were the main means of com^^nilation ?h \'
^^^^alizations
communication savs ',n^^^\T I T ough every
co^unlcants. ZlZTlTl L^nWt'^^^T °'of a relationship with a few ITr^. . ""^ l^^Udatlon
tures are difficult to filT T °^ "'^'^''^ 8«-
referring to isolated i ^ """^s" In
However/the oo^" epfcaTbfbeljr"' '""^ P^""""
more encompassing appUcatlon
^P?""""''
^" P'^"?"'
Isolated example! of donhir^ '^^ ili21i£!12MP Is a bind.
the relations^! 1 ac i ed aTlt"1^"^"°" "'"^""^
of Invalidation, (her e.phasL)
If it is further recalled that any appropriate within-paradoxical
frame response is necessarily paradoxical in turn, then an implication
is that over the course o£ years, a person has learned that structure
of relationship (the reverberating cycles, or spirals of binding). To
leave a DB, essentially „eans to leave the relationship. The person in
a double bind remains in a bind "to preserve an essential relationship."
(Abeles, 1976, p. 120) The relationship is essential because by nature
of the DB, neither party in a dyad can gain closure, nor have the re-
lational needs been B,et, particularly if one of the participants had
been double bound as a child. As Abeles points out (1976, p. 121), this
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has of.en been
.isconst.ued as
-dependence." More abs^ad,. bu. Ju..
as inev..abX„ U an
.nd..,dnal „e.e . s.o„ np ,n a ,a.U. be.n, donMe
bound, s/he would learn both rh^t ,k,-t a this was the structure of relation-
ships, and would learn to double bind in turn, as a participant In the
spiral. II such a person could gain enough closure, seU-estee„. n.tu-
ratlon (whatever) to begin a relationship and fa.U,. naturally both
his/her expectations and co-unlcatlonal pattern would lead to another
double binding family.
The third function served for the paradigm Includes areas of sensi-
tivity in each ta.Uy. Those areas around which ho.eostatic ^echanls^s
co.e into play, and with which double bind co™,unlcation is used, point
to particularly sensitive family areas. (This is potentially an area of
link-up with another family framework through the concept of the "family
secret.") Jackson provides an illustration of both such mechanisms
being brought into play around the area of the patient's ability to make
decisions
.
One of the most rewarding occurrences in family therapy
IS the concordance between a symptom in the patient and apiece of family interaction that explains the symptom. In
this sense, I am stating that schizophrenia or schizophrenic
symptoms are adaptive behavior. For example, Barbara's parents
complaxned more about her indecisiveness than about anything
else. Evidently, it is a problem when she gets up in the
morning as to what she will wear and everything else in the
day becomes a similar crisis. When one listens to the
sessions, it is striking that when Barbara makes a decision,
the parents refute it in some fashion and then she backs out.
Yet, they in no way see themselves as having anything to do
with her indecision. One striking example was an incident
in which a friend of her ex-husband was going to visit them.
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so siblings. His ho.eostatlc view would ,ues«on both the well-being
of the Siblings and the etiological formulation. For those family
.em-
bers „ho remain well even if the patient improves, homeostasis would
predict the presence of a relationship with a third-party which attenu-
ated the effects of the ^DGr^;^^ r-oi^^-; i. •cn special relationship to the symbiotic parent.
Similarly, this explanation accounts (at some level) for why one
child in a family is chosen or overlooked for the symbiotic relation-
ship, or the ameliorating third-party bond. At a more fundamental level,
however, the homeostatic process cannot, it seems, account for parental
choice in symbiotic object."^^
DM Development from Paradigm to Dissolution
Between 1956 (paradigmatic statement) and 1962 (dissolution), the
DB DM was extremely productive; from 1959-1962, it was divided into two
institutions, yet maintained its productivity. It was during the 1952-
1959 period that the paradigm was elaborated and the major portion of DB
work done, yet the differences in intellectual traditions eventually
resulted in a schism between Bateson's Communication in Schizophrenia^^
project and a project formed by Jackson in 1959, the Mental Rsearch
16, ^It does seem to me, however, that I. Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s (197 0)
framework can account for such a choice,
"'^This was the official name by which the project was known.
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Institute. In retrospect at .
'™
'-"-is in early and
middle DM development emerge- thpr„ ^ ,. ' e e developed an Increasing emphasis
on describing family organization then changing It (I e d • .
, . ,
s u ic u.e., oing therapy)
and with this shift camP ^ •a widening split between the adherents to the
coinmunicational and the rel;,t-ionaila io l aspects of the paradigm.
^^^^^^-^^-^^^^^=^::L^I^^ During 1953 thP •, e project had begun to tape
schizophrenic communication as nart of t-i. •n p their early communications re-
search (Haley. 1,72, p. u,)
. „3,, ^^^.^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
Kosen. (a therapist „ell-.„o„„ for his approach „lth schisophrenics, and
began to study a nu.her of psychotherapists (Haley. 1,72, p. n.). During
1935, a good deal of time „as spent In formulating and refining the para-
digmatic 1956 statement, hut In Pehruary, 1956. the project Brought In
the parents of a patient who consistently panicked within several minutes
of each parental visit to the hospital (Haley, 1976a. p. 72). This first
in Vivo family session occurred in 1956 Un m hh-;. • .xyjo. up to this point, research on
schizophrenia had been largely deductive, with some Induction work on
the audio-tapes. With the Inclusion of this particular parental pair,
the DM embarked on their future mode of focusing on the actual behavior
of families. At this point, they began using video-tapes, in response
to the need to adequately capture the multiple levels of communication,
particularly the non-verbal aspects (as they often functioned as quali-
fiers)
.
Their first documented full-family Interview occurred sometime
during 1957.
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1. .a.U. sessions.™ p^,,.^^
.e,a„
and vocal intonations, but these apparently became dead-ended (Haley
1976a. p. 73). The 1,58 WeaUand and aac.son article on the precipi-
tation Of a schizophrenic episode appears to he an expression of hoth
the atte.pt at description and the ne„ly „or.ed out specific connection
between double binding and acute psychotic reactions.
With the new focus on actual fa.lly behavior, differences a^ong
DM ™e.bers which had been Inherent but quiescent became „ore evident
and divisive. Haley (1976a, p. 73) perceived the differences In ter.s
Of "...what aspect of co^unicatlon to focus upon and what terminology
and theoretical models to use " A Qni-r.- .1^, ^i j ^. split developed between a "strictly-
communicational approach dealina xiitu ^-k^ aFHi-ud n a img w th the description of observable
messages in terms of Logical Types," and an "internal processes wing"
which emphasized the codification of messages, or the internal processes
of the receiver, and centered on perception and learning." (Haley, 1976a,
p. 73). Though implicit, it is obvious from Haley's account that he
belonged to the first group.
The first group, termed the "behavioral wing" by Haley, argued for
attention only to observabl^s, (in this case, "strictly observable
messages") (p. 74) in the interests of avoiding "age old problems of
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the interchange of messages.
tion must and there 1?^?. '""""" "-"^ =''==«iP-
in terms of message tL H "'P""^^ also described
complete, (p '
"'^ descriptive system becomes more
Sucb a series of descriptions could lead to a systems tbeory of Human
beings (Which was the explicit goal of both wings, according to Haley
fp. 7M0. They also preferred to not generalize the DB pattern, feeling
it would lose explanatory power.
The "internal processes" wing argued that this appellation was a
misnomer because the distinction between a message and the codification
of a message by the receiver was fallacious. They later argued that the
terminology should be established as a higher level of generalization
than the description of messages (Haley, p. 73), in other words, that
there be developed "meta" concepts. (For this reason, they were charac-
terized later by Haley (p. 74) as the "higher generalization" wing).
Thus, they objected to restricting the double bind specifically to the
interpersonal patterns pathogenic for schizophrenia and preferred to use
it more broadly, even to help explain evolutionary processes and the
telencephallzation of the brain (p. 74). Concepts used comfortably by
this group apparently included: "learning, perception, awareness, ex-
pectation and the language of emotion" (P. 73). At Issue were such
concerns as whether the receiver was aware, or was perhaps mispercelving
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or Misinterpreting, and what his/her experience was. Clearly this wing
included a pheno.enological element. One infers Jackson helped consti-
tute this wing, because of his occupation with interpersonal processes
and clinical work; Bateson
.ay also have had so.e participation here-
the emphasis on higher generalization would appeal to hi.. Though it
is .ore difficult to guess what his stance would be with regard to
phenomenology, he differed sharply with Haley (Bateson, 1976, p. 106)
over the power dynamic, so perhaps he was not averse to pheno.enological
concerns. Balanced against this is his predilection for abstracted
systems approaches, and the integration of experience and systems might
or might not have seemed dubious to him at that point. Obviously,
Bateson's position here is unclear; so is Weakland's. It is difficult
even to speculate about the latter's position here, though it would not
be surprising if he were wholly identified with neither wing and in
fact, served a mediating function which helped the project to produce
as much as it did over the next six years. Certainly, some cohesive-
ness remained; it would not be surprising to find out that Weakland
had supplied some of it.
What is surprising is that the rift continued. "The higher
generalization wing argued that the behavioral wing was too narrow in
approach and the behavioral wing argued that the other was too diffuse
and ambigious to have useful application to the data." (Haley, 1976a,
pp. 74-75). These differences in approach began to appear in papers
in 1958, the next year that the project members published (Haley, p. 75)
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The next expressed Use„
.^j,,,,,
.bout fa.U, organization during 1936 and probabl. 1957 also. Again
the pressures ol e^plrlcall, observing ia.lUes brougHt out fundamental
Characteristic differences a.ong project members tbat tbclr earlier
.ore abstract work bad allowed to re„ln submerged. Haley (1976a.
P. 89) points out that within a general framework of agreement there
was considerable agreement. Disagreement arose over choice of theore-
tical model. Whether to focus on total family processes or partial family
processes, and differences In assumptions regarding motivations of fam-
ily members
.
^^^^I-t-i^ti^^I^^ With regard to family organiza-
tion, Haley (1976a, pp. 89-90) has pointed out that any description of
a family must hang upon
-some implicit or explicit analogy" (paradigm?)
and with the shift from individual to family processes, the previous
psychiatric analogies were inappropriate. Though there was project
consensus that the preferred model was some form of homeostatic system
that involved levels, there was debate about what specific form it
should take. Bateson wanted to use some adaptation of Von Neumann's
Theory of Games despite protests from other project members and his own
awareness that the assumptions of Game Theory would not work for family
interaction. Haley wanted a model using homeostatic organization where
rules for the family were Level I and rules for who was to make the
family rules at Level II; Bateson objected to the assumption that a
family should be described in terms of members seeking to control other
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Jcused
He p„.e„ea
.Ha. ... „
^„ ^^^^^
""""""
"
,.,,,.3. pa„e.ns
-»U.. „a.e..s po3U.o„ ,ra..n.
.ec.e
«p,.3.e.
.,,.3o„.m the DM, except In Bateson's own work.
With regard to what aspect of^ or,,ni^ should he fo.
"Pon. Bateson.s preference was to e„phas..e the OB as a characteristic
-anSSCe in schizophrenic families, then to generalize tZtcu i hat sequence to
other phenomena whereas ofhp-r t,v-^ •t e project members preferred to focus on
patterns of families' oreani 7;,h-,'^r. ig zation, almost a set ot typologies. Though
Haley does not elaborate on the origin of this latter position it
appears related to
.arson's interest in correlations between characteris-
tic interactional patterns and psychiatric nosology. Here Bateson's
position apparently prevailed.
Each project member had a different position on the issue of indivi-
dual motivati^ that is, on assumptions about why people in families
did what they did. Haley preferred the idea that people did what they
did in order to control, govern or influence events in relation to
other people; Weakland proposed no motivation for parents posing a
double bind to a child, but emphasized the motivation of attempting to
conceal it once it was done; Bateson posited both his original idea that
a central motivation was concealment, (with punishment if concealment
was breached) and also ascribed to more traditional concepts for moti-
vation, e.g., fear, hate, love, threats of punishment and avoidance of
pain (Haley, 1976a, pp. 90-91). Jackson's position is not reviewed by
Haley.
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ations and a
ey
What is quite obvious, however is thaf th., IS t e positions taken by each
member durine thp^^i i-nrs ™^ •
8 two n^jor controversies was characteristic tor the
Individual and relatively consistent i,y with his previous and future work
For instance. Bateson's position favored abstracted fornul
largely (though of course not completely) deductive approach; Hal
has what see.s to „e an apt description of Bateson's approach.
Bateson's lifelong preference, in general w,. t„ v,
CO generalize that sequence into the field of evalua-tion, biological processes and so on. (1976a, p^gol
.
It would ^ke sense that Haley in particular would notice Bateson's
abstractedness. One of the prevailing values of the DB DM was a strong
positive valuation on efficacy; the practical, effective and/or productive
was highly regarded. Therapy was regarded as a for. of problem-solving
(e.g., see Haley's Problem-Sol^^ 1976b) and the project prided
itself as having had success with families that had been therapeutic
failures in other therapies. The positive valuation on efficacy was
certainly held by all the DB members, but none with such a single-
mindedness as Haley. Haley's style was to home in on a problem and ob-
literate it, often with what feels like paradoxical judo, always re-
framing a situation into the guise of a problem circumscribed enough to
solve. Haley was particularly good at getting change in obdurately
irrational and paradoxical families.
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was
ing
One Of .he conco.i.ants to this concern for efficacy, however
Haley's lasting preoccupation with the power dynamic. His work dur
the for^l life of the DM and afterwards centers ahout the issue of
control. His early interest in hypnosis displays an interest in con-
trol, particularly of the paradoxical kind. In 1957(a),
.ackson (foot-
note, p. 184) Cites Haley's help for "the idea that the control of the
definition of a relationship
.ight he used as a descriptive tool for
depicting family interaction. m 1959(a), Haley developed the con-
trol issue .ore fully, crediting Bateson with the communications hypo-
thesis that it is difficult for a person to avoid defining, or talcing
control of the definition of, his/her relationship with another (1959a,
p. 324). In other words, a person cannot not qualify a message (1959a,
pp. 323-324).
A person must speak a verbal message in a particular toneof voice, and if he says nothing, that, too, is qualifiedby the posture he presents and the context in which his
muteness appears
... For example, if a person is silent whenhe is expected to speak, the silence becomes a qualifying
message, and if a man neglects to kiss his wife good-bye
when she expects it, this absence of this movement qualifieshis_other messages as much as, if not more than, the presence
The only way, according to Haley's analysis, that a person can
avoid indicating what is to take place in a relationship and therefore
18-.
Note the 1956-1957 concern with descriptive language for family
processes.
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avoid defining ^^ nc-
-ns .t.
.3 to xnco^gruently negate sc^e crucial part of his
statement along any of the four formal characteristics of a„v"-ci-xiaLxcs £ ny message
(19593, p. 325):
(1) I
(2) am saying something
(3) to you
(4) in this situation
A person can Incongruently negate any of these characteristics and
avoid defining the relationship. However, a sugary of these ploys reads
like a list of schizophrenic symptoms:
^e^nifh^rLrLia^ttghf
.°:ir^h'head is in good shape; orlhe"
, ^smxle or odd tone of voice. If the patient desJes thlttIS speaking, either by referring to himsel in he h"person or calling himself by another name, the psychJatristnotes that he is suffering from a loss of ' identity ?f heperson indicates that "voices- are saying these things he
nis message is a message, perhaps by busily spelling out hiswords the psychiatrist considers this a maniLta^Ln ofdissociated thinking. When the patient denies that Msmessage is addressed to the other person, the psychiatristconsiders him delusional. If the patient denies his presencein the hospital by saying that he is in a castle or a prisoSthe psychiatrist notes that he is withdrawn from reality.
'
When the patient makes a statement in an incongruent tone ofvoice, he is manifesting inappropriate affect. If he respondsto the psychiatrist's behavior with messages which qualifythat behavior incongruently, he is autistic. (Halev 1959a
p. 327) '
These linguistic maneuvers are implicit ways to avoid defining a
relationship or the behaviors to take place as constituents of it. In
fact, Haley (p. 324) regarded interpersonal relationships as classifiable
300
with regard to the ways people used to deal with H f •^^^1 definition (i.e., con-
trol), problems.
The strategies and ploys devised by Haley in hi. ^.y n i m s therapy with schis
phrenic families exemnlifv -;
-P x y the issue of control to the point that the
DB approach has been critici^PH •zed m this area (First, 1975). Haley's
more recent works, (e.g Prnhi^,. c i •
.g., Proy^-solv^l^ The^ 1976b) use the issue
of control rather unabashedly, excusing ^^y, it as merely explicit in DB
therapy and implicit in other therapies R.^.n . Bateson, again being consis-
tent With his position throughout DM development, took serious excep-
tion to the concentration on control.
Tbi ie::d"tt-°f.L"t::^^tj " --^-1^-:!
the m^ of po'er alway ^rruoL^h strongly- that
a falfr(thou^gh conir^^iona^ire^ls^eL^ly:^
all such metaphors derived from pleroma and applied lo crea
direction, and the direction is not less wrong or lesssocially pathogenic because the associated my^hoLgy is inpart self-validating among those who believe it andIt. [his emphasis] (Bateson, 1976, p. 106)19
'
Obviously, the differences between Bateson and Haley over the
issue of control ran deep. To look at a broader perspective for a
moment, it was Haley who did a greater share of therapy where the issue
of control and strategies is, of course, more pressing than in theory.
Moreover, the structure of reality in the DB framework is conducive to
in this vein, see also Bateson, 1976, p. 86.
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a po„er interpretation. If one cannot not cogent on a message, and U
such cedents hold so.e power, (which they do), then a power Interpre-
tation is a consistent interpretation.
Jackson's primary line of development has already been reviewed
With regard to the development of the paradigm's relational element.
Weakland's main interests are persistently more difficult to discern.
He published fewer papers than did the other project members, yet a high
proportion of his works were landmarks (especially 1956; 1958 with Jack-
son; I960; 1972 with Fry; and 1974). He presented a chameleon-like
image, extending Jackson's homeostatic concept (1960), and also Fry's
work on third-party and institutional double bind (1962). m 1974, he
attempted to tie the DB to a larger framework and cast a perceptive eye
on its history. He appears to have been equally facile, with therapeu-
tic work, at least toward the later years of the project after dissolu-
tion, when he concentrated on brief family treatment.
Organizational schism
. Suffice it to say, there were persistent and
fundamental differences among project members. Although these differen-
ces probably included personality frictions, it is also apparent that
these individuals were approaching the project from disparate intellect-
ual traditions. They differed in their assumptions about human nature
and motivations, the nature of relationships (e.g., Jackson's position
vs. Bateson's vs. Haley's power dynamic), and epistemologies ; their
view of what constituted important problems differed somewhat: Bateson
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stressed abstracted vlewpoint.j H=i.pom s, Haley strategic and Jackson experiential
-er t.e pressure empirical contact, t.e differences In tempera-
ment and tHe co™it.ents to disparate Intellectnal traditions developed
into an organizational schism. In November 1958 t v .o , ly^B, Jackson founded the
Mental Research Institute. Jackson (1968 p v) a^v-L^oo, . ; t one point briefly
described MRI's inception:
Our first grant started in March ]9Sq
consisted of
.yself. J.les ^ul^.T,] Xr^iltliT'"
tt;so^;rotcr.:Sd^"=f' ^^^^""-^ sTZVrTi..
working relationship ?he l^t
l>"' had a close
of the Palo Mto Medical R. TT'"' '"^ umbrella
Marcus Krupp) ^J'^^^T^^;::^'^ Dr.
an autonomous reqppi-r-h j ^- """'.""'^^-^ it split off as
tlve staff a^d^^of^Dl^e^to":.""'^ adminlstra-
Desplte numerous efforts at clarification (Bateson, et al., 1963;
Haley, 1976a and 1976b; Jackson, 1,68), the two projects and the relation-
ship between them was often confused. It may well be because they
shared membership to some extent, and even at one point, the same build-
ing. Jackson, 1968, p. V) has said that Haley and Weakland subsequently
(after 1962) joined MRI as full-time principal Investigators and that
Bateson became a research associate, participated in treatment, and
served as an Informal research consultant. Haley (1976a, p. 92 and 1976b,
p. X), however, has indicated that Bateson had no part in the MRI.^"^
After the 1962 DB dissolution then, Jackson, Haley and Weakland were
"Although the two groups have been confused with each other in
actuality Mr. Bateson declined to be a member of the Mental Research In-
M^Q7^^^ T'^ "^^^ ^^^^ ''^^ project to be confused with that group."Uy/bb, footnote, p. X) "...Bateson would not allow his project to bepart of the Mental Research Institute and so no personnel or proiects
were shared." (1976a, footnote, p. 92)
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urse
once
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^
MH.
. app„..H. p3«.e..„.,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
indirectly relevfln^ hr. ^ ito a larger conceptual view, is Satir's Conjoint
Family Therapy (1967).
The organizational schls™ gained expression in late 1,58 and
early 1959 and was based on fundamental differences in te.j-j.it:rence m mperament and
intellectual framework >/n?T. mi has continued to the present time. The DB
project continued to function „„j ^- ,t , productively and creatively, from 1959 to
1962, elaborating the paradigmatic elements laid down during the early
years. The ability to do so speaks clearly of the ability of the DM
members to work concertedly towards certain goals while screening impor-
tant differences. If nothing else, the DM functioned to allow that
collaboration, at the expense, no doubt, of the refinement of individual
positions, but With the result that the productive life of the research
g^^ouP was extended by a third.
Haley (1976a, p. 91) has given a clue to the DM validated standards
that facilitated the collaboration: that is, he later articulated the
"framework of consensus" within which the members could work. To this
extent, the DB project remained a coherent research program during its
last three years.
It would seem apparent that the disagreements within the
project appeared when there was an attempt to look at real
people communicating real messages. At the more abstract
level, there was surprising agreement. All project members
believed the best approach was in terms of some theory of
systems with an emphasis upon rules and patterns and upon
stability and instability over time. All project members
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Additionally, all consldekd If
8°vernln8 process.
that the sch zophrenL's behai,- """^""^
to the particular uli of " """^ "^5' '"i^P"ve
was raised. It was also aff^ organization In which he
responded in errorfactlva^ed w ' '""'"5' "^''-rs
the governing proce:rsL: Tdes^rlhel "'^''k^"'way. (Haley, 1976a, p. 91)
describ d in an hierarchical
The list Of consensual points reviewed by Haley reads like a su^-
-ry Of the paradigm's characteristics. There are Russell's levels, the
ho.eostatic mechanisms, and the reconceptualization of schizophrenia as
adaptive and meaningful.
That this set of consensual beliefs facilitated the continued exis-
tence of the DM Is Obvious. The schis. occurred when the DB had turned
fron, almost exclusively abstract work to .ore empirical concerns, par-
ticularly with respect to the issues of family organization and family
therapy. The consensual beliefs allowed them to pursue these issues in
concert
.
Second shift: famil^_the^ With the attempt to describe family
organization, the DB project began to think about changing it. It is
very clear this was a derivative goal, as they had originally had no
plans for family treatment (Jackson and Weakland, 1961). Haley (1972,
p. 114) portrays the shift as the idea occurring to them that the way
to change schizophrenia would naturally be to change family organizations,
This occurred in approximately early 1957.^^ Later in the year they
21
The project began seeing families with a diagnosed schizophrenic
family member in 1956, but Jackson at one point (1961, p. 272) indicates
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discovered that several other people had al.oP x n s begun to try and changeWUes (Hale,. 1,72, p. 115,, ,3 fa^lly-o.lented cUnlelans
.ather
than in collaborative 1„.1.«„,,
.He.aples.^^ 1„ ,3c.,
.ac.son and
WaaUand. writing 1„ 1951, state, that though fa.lly treatment was a
growing trend, there wa=: Qt-in ^ is s ill only a limited amount of such work being
done, and even less published.
In 1958. they applied for a grant to change fa.Ules, and began to
further reconceptnallze adolescent (and early adult) schizophrenia as
an outcome of difficulties in disengaging fro™ the family (Haley, 1972,
pp. 115 and 116). During their efforts to change families, the DB DM
developed a clinical therapy and theory that was both consistent with
the paradigm and DM characteristics and was easily differentiated from
other, later forms of family therapy developed around different para-
digms
.
For instance, they point out that as a clinician moves from indivi-
dual work to family treatment, s/he will become more active, less in-
terested in psychiatric diagnoses or dynamic formulations and more in-
terested in describing the identified patient in terms of an inter-
locking milieu in a social or subcultural context; s/he will also
that just prior to joining the project he had been seeing patients and
parents together. The patients in this case, however, were neurotic
and autistic children, not schizophrenic adults. (See Jackson, 1965,
p. 2 footnote) '
22
In fact, I. Boszormenyi-Nagy had begun his experimental family
treatment unit for schizophrenic women at Eastern Pennsylvania Psychia-
tric Institute in 1956, and Bell and Ackerman had been seeing families.
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increase the number of peoole in .p x the treatment (per case) (Jackson and
Weakland, 1961, p. 31) .
A bo.y Of technique and
..eory „as developed, „Uh .he e.pHasls on
the ^Hucu^e Of the fa^l, and the interpersonal co^unieatlons, not
the content. Thus, a well-tested fltst session ga^hlt Is to asse.hle
the fa.113,, ask the™ to pick one of thelt problems and negotiate a
solution. The family therapist then listens, not for the content of
their process, but for the structure-the characteristic sequences of
interaction that occur. These can take a variety of for.s: Individuals
blading each other "or a child [„ho raises] his demands each tl.e the
parents are about to agree, or one person [who "Invalidates") another's
perceptions." (First 197S n Q^ tt,
^
, ly/:,, p. 9). The structure of these interactions
become the focus of the change efforts.
A favorite DB change technique is "reframing" or "relabeling,"
which by changing the context of a behavior, changes its meaning, and
thus often changes people's behavior. Thus, behaviors of the identified
patient are relabeled as normal, as rational tactics, to look positive
if possible (First, 1975). At times "mad" behavior is reframed as "bad",
or vice versa; either shift in direction can take the identified patient
out of pathological position. First (1975) points out some spectacular
examples of reframing.
Probably the boldest example of this was the husband who
chased his wife with an axe, and was told he was trying
to get close to her. Candide was clearly a talented
relabeler, and so too was Tom Sawyer, whose "reframing"
of the task of whitewashing a fence is quoted as exemplary
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by the authors of Chanop Ho».^
labeling in practiSf^' "^^"^P^^^ °f re-
1. The family of an anorectic is askpH "h^ iyou had this fasting problem?" m^^t'lgy^P 9)
'^^^
Other techniques were frankly irrational:
Don Jackson, asked how he might try to produce insight
thJ i^^ugh^^rihi^rsif ' r^^^ ^^^^ ^h:rj?^t;eat
let them dLc^^r'^LrL y'^ e^L^a^ J^fLr"^^'r^^^"
they.re^doing!:!'^.i.t: i9?r;!ir ^'^^ ^'^^ ' ''''''
At times, the irrationality could culminate in a full-blown thera-
peutic double bind, such as prescribing the symptom.
Accompanying, or following, the efforts at therapy, were develop-
ments in family theory, e.g., Bateson (1961, p. 139) pointing out that
when they attempted to determine the location of control in schizophrenic
families, they found "something very peculiar- that control and responsi-
bility are not located in the same person."
Several issues emerged during the development of their family
therapy. Weakland directed his attention to a particularly behavioral
concern, one consonant with the communicational aspect at a technical
level, and to the relational at a meta-theoretical one.
This increasingly appears as
_the most important question
in family therapy, or even for schizophrenia or psycho-
pathology quite generally. Unless one is to fall back on
some idea that people by fundamental nature are oriented
toward disease, so that pathology is inherently self-
sustaining, rather than "normality is normal," the central
issue is not the question of the original root causes of
schizophrenia. It is not even the question of what sort
of present family interaction leads to schizophrenic symptoms
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in one member. Instead, the central issue concerns the
makes for the fundamental stability and persistencP ofthese family systems that is so st^iking'in'he"ace of
hli?^:::t d'd::irefr^'T
^^^^ --^^^^^'^^^ of%h'rL:bers,
nTJft r ^""^ ^^^"g^' ^nd often the best effortsof a therapxst? (Weakland, 1962, p. 68; his emphasis)
Also of theoretical concern was the effect of family therapy on a
variety of areas; the prognosis of the identified patient, other family
members, long-term change. The issue of therapeutic efficacy was re-
peatedly addressed (Haley, 1976a and 1976b; Jackson and Weakland, 1961,
pp. 34-35; Weakland, 1962). Also, the shift the DM implied, from disease
and medicine to the social sciences, was of particular interest to Jackson;
he and Satir pointed to some developing family concepts they thought par-
ticularly promising, including: "family homeostasis, coalitions within
the family and their stability, role-playing, acquisition of family models,
three-generation theory, the theoretical applications of the game theory,
decision-making [and] recognition of resemblance..." (Jackson and Satir,
1961, p. 46).
Another, less insistent, concern was the nature of change. The DB
notion of change, according to First (1975) originated in Bateson's work
with Russellian levels and levels of learning.
As I trace it, this notion of change first appears,
innocently enough, in Bateson's thoughts about a por-
poise: the experimenters were trying to teach the porpoise
to produce new behavior. Each time it did something new
accidentally, they would reward it. The porpoise would
begin each show by displaying its latest "new" trick, but
it wouldn't get a reward unless it did something still
newer, by chance. The porpoise grew understandably moody.
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of behavior never be oje observe^""."""""'
learned to learn.
served m the species. It had
This corresponds with the cvKo^n.^-
is "first order- chaLI thL T'"" °* T>^<=^-
Item of data (or behavior) L T^" ^"''"i'^^ing one
second order change: Sis if° T "^"'^
Clon that is carried ou" "I ch " ^ 21 opera-
way of behaving." Second „r/ T ™"P"t«'s]
"meta-level" of prog^^^L":'" ''"^"^ ^ '° ^
This second-order change corresponds to Bateson's
"deutero-learn-
ing." Fro. accounts, it would appear that families treated with DB
therapy would be Induced into first-order changes, but Ironically, not
second-order?
These theoretical concerns continued to be articulated throughout
the development of their mode of family therapy until the DMs dissolu-
tion, and to a lesser extent by some members, afterwards.
Wldlssolutio;^l^m2, Word reached the professional public of the pro-
ject's dissolution in Family Process
.
Gregory Bateson is disbanding his research group after
nine years of research on the nature of connnunication
.
His Family Therapy grant terminates in August of thisyear and he plans to release his associates. He willthen prepare a book on the project work and study the
metacommunicative behavior of the octopus. (1962, p. 13A)
At the time of dissolution Bateson had remained Director, Haley
and Weakland were Research Associates, Jackson and William Fry were
Consultants (Haley, 1962, p. 69 footnote). Haley later (1972, p. 117)
stated that Bateson had plans to study communicational phenomena in
\
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In 1967 Hale. wen.
,He PKUadelphla CMld Guidance CUnic. to hi.
and Salvador Minuchin's mutual benefit.
Bateson (1976 n ln';lf., p. 105) aptly considered the ten year project "enor-
mously and nontrivially productive...
„e, as usual. „as ,uite correct
In ten years time, they produced: a revolutionary paradig. for a mys-
terious disorder; a productive BM that elaborated the paradigm itself.
extended it to new areas and .^h-ifi-o^ pi-cdis a snitted focus twice ( tn f^m-ii,,LW .CO tamily organization,
^hen therapy); a clinical practice-one of the forms of family therapy-
wlth its theory, techniques and rationales; and a body of related work
that fills out the framework. Xn addition, mi was established and con-
tinues its „orU to the time of this writing. Also. Jay Haley founded
PiScess. the first Journal for clinical family concerns; he served
as its editor, from 1962-1969. The DB project pubUcally reconceptuali.ed
a human psychological disorder and helped to open up the family therapy
field as a field (along with such other '.pioneer-types., as Ackerman,
Boszormenyl-Nagy, Whitaker. and Bowen)
. This opened up family work in
schizophrenia as both a content area and a reconceptualizntion of the
disorder. Their reconceptualization. interestingly, did the same
thing for schizophrenia that Freud had done for the neuroses: defined
the behaviors as adaptive, and meaningful, then provided a revolutionary
reconceptualization.
Formal DM characteristics. Another Important point is the congruence
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between DM develoomenf inp a t x the DB project and Kuhnlan DM characteristics
is ohvlous. nrst Of an. that the BB project had a paradl,™, l„
a revolutionary one, and a coherent research structure, as well as a
constellation of .roup co™it„ent3-those consensual points, especially
"scientific hahlts-lncludlng Intellectual, verbal, mechanical and/or
technological" Is also the case, except for "Intellectual." There.
the members clearly differed and differences in rho=„ ,j-iierenc t ese intellectual habits
developed into an institutional split. Also, the.e was only the ,,1^
unanimity that Kuhn and Master.an so practically qualified, in proble.-
choice, adequate solution and coiranunication
.
The project met the criteria of internal DM structure. It had
heuristic models-levels or hierarchies and Logical Types, as well as
closed-system homeostatic devices. Its symbolic generalizations included
such terms as: message and meta-message, reality markers, double bind,
therapeutic bind, incongruence, identified patient, and reframing. Its
values included: the positive valuation of efficacy in treatment, and
a bent toward problem-solving; delivering care to as many as possible
as quickly as feasible; as well as the ambivalence in values between
science and clinic work, complexity and purity with triviality. It
even had the prescience to provide instrumentation; the project made
extensive, and early, use of video-taping in clinical work. Finally,
it provided theories for both schizophrenia and clinical practice.
\
CHAPTER VII
During the preceding chapterq Tg n s, I have used a modified Kuhnian
analysis to elucidate and internrp^p et the emergence of family therapy.
It is now necessary to ev^ln^ho +-u •y a uate this interpretation with respect to the
emergence of family theranv m.^ ^c-y py, the efficacy of this form of modified
Kuhnian analysis and, in Chapter VIII the nn.m •F viii, implications and applicability
of such an analysis to the contemporary felt crisis in n. .1r J- j-cxL m psychology.
of_the Shift to Family Th»_^
It is my contention that a modified Kuhnian analysis allows an in-
formative interpretation of events preceding and co-existent with the
emergence of family therapy, and that the analysis provides a useful
interpretation of at least one family therapy approach, the DB, from
inception through formal dissolution. Such an analysis allows us to
interpret some events in a different manner than previously, and
occasionally, to find sense in what had appeared to be random processes.
This analysis has identified and interpreted certain problems in
classical psychoanalysis as related to the emergence of family therapy.
This set of problems the anomalies were obdurate discrepancies be-
tween framework-generated expectations and empirical findings. Though
psychoanalysis encountered a variety of problems, not all were anomalies
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nor were they related t-no the emergence of fa.Uy therapy. The analysis
pewits the
.l„ere„tlatlo„ o.
..anomalies-
.ro„ ^ohle^s as a ,e„e.al
Class... the laentines those „hleh „e.e
.elatea to the lesO's fa.Uy
therapy shift.
Similarly, the „aifled Kuhnlan analysis e^phasUes out of all the
controversy swirling ahont psychoanalysis, certain controversies
.nrln,
the early and middle 1950's as rp^=,^^^ .elated to the appearance of family
therapy during the latter part of this period A v ^Lnx . Kuhnian interpretation
allows us to View these controversies as constituents of a '.felt crisis.,
during the first part of the IWQ.s In classical psychoanalysis. The
interpretation highlights the presence of controversies, the re-exa.l„a-
tlon Of fundamentals and the awareness by the people Involved that there
existed a crisis. Although the question of parameters in psychoanalysis
is often regarded as important, only within a Kuhnian interpretation is
it related to the emergence of family therapy and is it identified as a
bona fide crisis for classical analysis. Moreover, a Kuhnian analysis
provides an interpretation for the emergence of family therapy in the
1950's; with the emergence of anomalies in the mO's and 1940's and
risis in the early inO's, the Kuhnlans would interpret this sequence
s probably evolving toward the emergence of a new paradigm, and would
predict this paradigmatic emergence as occurring soon after the aware-
o£ felt crisis. Previously, the timing of the emergence of family
c
a
ness
therapy had remained obscure, even to the participants; Halye, for
example, speaks to this issue:
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meetings, so their ^ork was knoL""' " ^'""'^Curiously a decade later^! ^ locally, if at all.
pists stLi harn:tt're:cTo:^:r'\"rth'^"i'^ 1'"^-
Introduced, thev still h=j
°'^"er- If they had been
cuss thelr'work a d eek a ^olo'" °"" '°
a family Is all abou^! " °" 'changing
I"? rhinh:
=c^L"-^"jrthrindr"j"r ----psychoanalytic treat^len^ individual, and
the Psychia^rL esLwLLeft I^terTl '""^''''^
one who was respectablP struggle. Every-
or at least ^n u '° Practice psychoanalysis
(^aLy' ! lb f^^.P^^^^-hoanalytically oriented treatLnt.V li^/xD, p. Z; emphasis added)
The Kuhnian interpretation places the emergence of these nearly
Simultaneous family therapy groups within an intellectual and historical
framework. The analysis identifies the inception of at least one of
these approaches, the DB. as a revolutionary paradigm. The "paradigm.,
cancept expresses the combined conceptual and technical power of an
innovation like the DB hypothesis. A Kuhnian interpretation helps to
explain not only why such a "paradigm" becomes so influential (it answers
questions, solves problems and attracts adherents) but how (through
elaboration by normal the science activity of adherents into a DM).
The paradigm concept also provides a crucial perspective by which to
differentiate the DB family approach from the classical psychoanalytic
(and also the relational); the paradigm in these clinical approaches
depended upon mechanisms of change and the techniques by which to gain
such change. Their criterion serves to differentiate approaches more
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reliably than disciplinary name, or the trainin. .n g and credentials of
therapists
.
A Kuhnian analysis usinp th^ ^ • „g e paraaign." and "DM" concepts allows
an interpretation of the DB ernnn'og oup s work as the elaboration and protect-
ion/nuturance of the nar^r^^c^p adigm. This analysis allows a non-intuitive
interpretation of the 0„ „as ahle to function fro„ 1„,-1,« aes-
P"e its institutional division; the structure and functions of the 'W.
provided the hasis for sufficient consensus, and the ^echanis^s h. „hich
divisive concerns were suhdued, so that productive „or. ^ th,
could continue.
The Kuhnian analysis, however, cannot explain why the DM underwent
this institutional snlit ^a,,p . (An attempt will be made to do so in Chapter
VIII)
.
A Kuhnian analysis allows an interpretation about the relationship
of periods of fundamental innovation in science, with periods of accre-
tionary progress, highlighting the dialectical relationship between
them, and implying a model of scientific development more complicated
than the linear accretion of facts. It is particularly interesting to
note that though normal science is "usually considered the real, or usual,
(or
-normal')", a DM both begins and end in revolutionary science.
Finally, it should be noted that members involved in the same
processes for which the Kuhnian schema was designed, have found it
helpful in interpreting their own activities to themselves
. At least
some of the DB adherents, for example, have late in their work referred
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to KuHnUn concepts elation to
..ei. own (Wa.Uwic. an,
Weakland. 1977; Weakland, 1974).
ControversipR
A ".odlfied Kuhnian analysis of long-standing controversies can
provide interpretations particularly relevant to debates between the
adherents of different approaches. I.e., m Kuhnlan ter.s, 0„s. The
analyses allows us to Interpret certain of the controversies Involving
BB „e.hers. Interpretatlonlsts and relatlonlsts. (As this Interpretation
has not, to
.y knowledge, been done previously. It will be explicated
in rather more detail than the preceding section).
There were a number of controversies which were carried out in
methodological terms, but which upon examination with the Kuhnlan schema,
are more productively Interpreted as debates between DMs; that is, they
are only ostensibly methodological. If this type of controversy con-
tinues to be debated at the methodological level, it Is unresolvable
.
If it is debated at the DM IpvpI ^^ in un le el, it is at least potentially resolvable.
One such long-standing, sterile controversy took place between Kurt
Eissler. an interpretationist, and Freida Froimn-Reichmann, a relational
analyst
.
Ostensible methodological controversy between the interpretatlonlsts
and the relationists
.
A good deal of the disagreement between these
two groups took the form of ostensible methodological debates. To
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illustrate, a segment of the Eissi er-v-rr.^Tn t> un i^xssier-Froimn-ReichTnann ostensible methodo-
logical controversy will be reviewed, with consent pointing to the
implicit DM vs. DM quality allowed by a Kuhnian interpretation.
Over a period of several years, Eissler and Fromm-Reichmann argued
in the literature, Fromm-Reichmann emphasizing the techniques which
fostered the therapeutic reality relatior^ and Eissler concentrating
on the crucial role of interprtation
. Occasionally, Fromm-Reichmann
would take a swipe at interpretation (and Eissler), while he would more
than occasionally criticize her technical innovations, rarely confrontin;
directly the differences in mechanisms of change. Also, Eissler had a
number of colleagues, also interpretationists, who took up the debate;
their comments and positions on these subjects will be included with
Eissler 's, as will some small examples of true, intra
-DM debates. These
intra-DM disagreements are actual methodological or semantic contro-
versies (not ostensible) and thus, argument at that level can produce
resolution; these will be included to provide contrast with the inter-DM
debates.
Fromm-Reichmann 's position
. In 1943, Fromm-Reichmann discussed
"technical requirements" or modifications to classical psychoanalysis,
which had gradually developed during clinical practice with psychotics.
Since the ostensible methodological controversies largely involved
these seven "technical requirements", they will all be reviewed here.
As will become clear, many of the modifications were directed towards
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facilitating the therapeutic reality relationship.
The first technical modification concerned "the couch." It
was Fro^-Relchn^nn-s contention that the "couch regulation Is neither
understood nor followed by the psychotic patient" (p. 133), and sitting
behind the patient In the heglnnlng of treatment was contralndlcated as
It fostered unreality, the therapist serving a hrldge to reality for
the psychotic patient.
Moreover, depending upon Ufe-hlstorles and habits of neurotics.
It may or may not be appropriate to lie on the couch and so, she recom-
mended any position that allowed patient and analyst to look at each
other whenever the patient wished. Seated behind the patient, either
participant may mentally "wander away" from the Interpersonal relation-
ship
.
Fromm-Reichmann (1943, p. 133) also elaborated on the analyst's
position, which later drew fire from Eissler.
Freud remarked that he could not endure to have patients
gazing at him for eight hours. This suggests a change in
the eight-hour system rather than the maintenance of invis-ibility for those who share Freud's feelings. Personally,
I have found a ten- or fifteen-minute interval between
interviews most helpful.
Froimn-Reichmann's second technical modification addressed what she
felt to be the rote, unspontaneous, going-through-the-motions quality
which at times was found in the free association pattern, where for
the most part the patient talked and analyst listened. She felt that
such an attitude at times masked the analyst's personal timidity. The
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quire
s
the atteneion of a ps.cMat.tst
„Ho is ca.eful
.o s.ow
.Hat He ,
Senu.„el. eonee.nea „UH .He paUen.. „.„„e an.
.Ha. He ,3
.e.Hoa.-
call.
.r..n,
.0 .e-es.aHUsH
.He .os.
.po„..„.,,,
acive i„.e.ac.io„. s.^icl, „UHin
.He reference f.a„e of
.oc.o.-
pa.len. relations. " (1943_ p. jj^,
Fromm-Relchinann's
.hird terh„i^.i
. cHnlcal modifica.lon was .he abandonmen.
Of free association; she feU
.ha. 1. „3S 'VUe unnecessary"
.0 en-
courage free association
„lth ps.cHo.lc pa.lents as the, e.Hlhl.ed
wi.hou. probing or pro^p.lng.
.he ea.erlal
.Ha.
.he
.echnl,ue of free
association was used
.0 ellci.. she elabora.ed, moreover,
.ha. „1.H
increased experience, Insigh. and s«U, 1. „as of.en possible
.0 pro-
ceed
.0 the sa.e goals "by an utterly unconventional, direct, and precise
questionning." (p. 134)
Fron.n-Reich.an also abandoned the technique of interpretation, which
It soon will be seen, was crucial to the practice of psychoanalysis to
Eissler and other interpretationists
. Fronun-Reichmann felt that psy-
chotic patients were able to understand their verbal productions far
more clearly than the analyst, and as such, Fronnn-Reichmann felt it to
be
-crudely redundant for the psychoanalyst to explain what he believes
he has understood." (p. 134) Rather, an appropriate response would be
indicated. At the time of writing (1943), she felt that interpretation
of content had largely been abandonned and interpretations regarding
transference, resistances, and defenses had been reduced. Fronun-
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5sive or
)een
anal.e.c
.„3.,.., .Wae„ p..,en...
.ess nee.
.He ,„3..H.
provoking interpretations. Further th.i^urth , ere was a danger of inducing
what she termed
"anti-therapeutic self con. •F cic seif- sciousness by excess
untimely interpretations" (p. 135) ,^P l-i^), a process she felt had not he
sufficiently attended to in the literature nm .xL . Only dynamic and inter-
personal processes
.^ed.a.el,
.eU.e. .
.,e eUolos. o. a ps.cHos.s
required interpretation (p. 135). . a^P- -LJ^), If I understand this correctly the
in.e.p.e.«o„3
„o.la p.ov..e assocUUons
.e.„ee„
.eU.onal
..na^.cs
and/o. events an. .He
.e.elop.en. ps,.Hos.s. P.eCpUaUn,
.ac.o.s
would be very Important In tHls form of clinical «rk«-xxnic ± wor . It appears that
the form of Interpretation referred to Here Has to do „ore „ltH re-
lational than intrapsychic dynamics, thougH both produce InslgHt. In
the relational DM, however inq^c.h^ a^a, sig t did not occupy the same central role
in the change mechanism.
Fromm-Relchmann's fifth modification concerned etiology, and par-
cularly "repressed content." SHe felt tHat the contents of repression
were not "all sexual m nature nor all due to hostility, as advocated for
awhile by some psychoanalysts." (p. 135) Rather, all emotions, thoughts,
impulses, etc., which the patient Had experienced regarding significant
people In his life can became pathogenic and the contents of repression.
If they are Incompatible with the patient's private standards-learning
from the social standards of significant persons in his/Her life. "It
is not the biological aspect of sexuality but the pathological features
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Of .hei. interpersonal relations wHlcH „ore
,re<,uentl. create sexual
problems." (19A3 n tu^-L^'^-^, p. 135) Thus, the etiological clac,c-,v.iv^i^iudi xassica sequence is
stood on its head.
Fro™-Reich.ann-s sixth change In technique „as to •allow" acting-
out Impulses to so„e extent. Acting-out was regarded as a not un-
con^on necessary preliminary to verbal expression; the latter should
never he forced, as any heglnnlng rapport
.Ight he destroyed and pre-
clude the possibility Of further treatment, m light of this, Pro„™-
Relch.ann questioned whether analysts should continue, 1„ all cases, to
suppress acting-out hy neurotic patients during Interviews, and whether
this suppression was always directed to furtherance of therapeutic a«s
or to fear of what the patients would do If the acting-out were per-
mitted
.
Fronun-Reichxnann's last major modification in technique involved that
the therapist examine his/her value system and be aware that it inevitably
influenced the treatment of the patient; psychotherapy, according to her,
was not a value-free enterprise and could not be. "Psychoanalysts pre-
tend in vain that their values are irrelevant in therapy or influen-
tially non-existent in the psychotherapist. There are legitimate values
for every psychoanalyst." (p. 136) In particular, Fromm-Reichmann
stressed examination of the degree of conventionality held by each ana-
lyst; she felt that for psychotic patients, particularly schizophrenics,
recovery did occur, within somewhat unconventional expectations, (p. 136)
The analyst whose values included a marked conventional set was often
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disappointed In the adjustment of former patients, and by establishing
these somewhat arbitrary guidelines, at times Impeded that very adjust-
ment.
Five years later, Froirnn-Reichmann presented the changed engendered
by the relationalists as "changes in the technique of psychoanalytic
treatment during recent years [with] regard to both the establishment
of the doctor-patient relationship and the approach to the contents of
psychotic communication." (1948, p. 164; emphasis added). By now, with
the assistance of the paradigm and DM concepts, it's clear that these
modifications were far more than only methodological or technical
disagreement. The differences in the doctor-patient relationship were
at the heart of the relationalist position; the reality relationship,
not the transferential, was held to be both contextual and curative
,
and as such, constituted a different mechanism of change, and therefore,
a different paradigm. Similarly, the differential treatment of verbal
content, with the relationalists eschewing interpretation, is related to
the relationalist paradigm and is an abandonment of the psychoanalysts'
therapeutic mechanism of change. Interpretation was held to be un-
necessary (as the problem was a surfeit of insight rather than too littl
in psychosis), and "inadvisable if not much of the time redundant."
(Fromm-Reichmann, 1948, p. 167) With the abandonment of interpretation,
and the change in the doctor-patient relationship (from transferential
to reality-based), Fromm-Reichmann was clearly commited to a different
paradigm and DM, the Sullivanian interpersonal. With a Kuhnian analysis
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see Of the controversy between Fro^-Reich^nn and Kissler can be
seen as controversy between two different DMs
.
In 1948, Fronnn-Reichmann defended the reality relation.! 1'.^aj.xL al element
from one of Eisslp-r'c •i^i sle s criticism, adopting a technical stance
^L°L°L^"ie^:r:Lra"- ^^^^^^^^
wo.id
:t:-a:rorr--n.
i^rwa" :ft^';:t':?^L^S:e r
''-'^ P^-isslveness, treat-
as Kurt Eissl^rhar'i^tLled! ZTs^^^ ^''^^'^
Fromm-Reichmann here, argued in terms of technical points in clini
cal practice to avoid while establishing a therapeutic reality relation
ship. She did not deal with any of those interrelated commitment as-
pects of scientific practice now termed as DM and she certainly could
not have talked in terms of differeing paradigms.
Eissler's position
.
In 1953, Eissler responded to some of Fromm-
Reichmann's technical modifications. Her modifications, particularly
with regard to the use of the couch, provoked his ire; for example
(1953, p. 106):
1
Kurt R. Eissler, "Limitations to the psychotherapy of schizo-
phrenia, ' Psychiatry
. 1943, VI, pp. 381-391.
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Freud reported some of ^ho o u-
Influenced the evolv^n
'of
'"'^^"^^ which
in explaining his requL? that ^''^"Pl^-
supine position durlnnLi Patient take the
dislike Of belng's-tLldTL^^^evI^al-hr™""^
p^o°:u°o"„':.eit:ht! --rLt-'j^s:-
-
analyst L"^:r^ihlh tlo^fr^nH^ "^^^
a face-to-face technique What^ve^ t^^ P^f^'may devise can be used in '^hnique a therapist
principle. The valu" of a JechnJLT
°'
objective factors If if ' measure must rest on
pleasure all the better but'^h therapist's
decisive factor ,•„,!• coincidence is not a
technique: ^"^ evaluating the given
Eissler continued in this fashion regarding Freud's reasons for
instituting the couch and supine position. Besides the slightly inap-
propriate air When attributing the face-to-face seated position to the
therapist's possible exhibitionism, his rejolner in the debate Is cer-
tainly strong, and put in technical ter.s. With so .any fundamental
points of disagreement between the., representing different DMs and
ranging through mechanisms of change, diagnostic categories appropriate
for treatment, mentors, and roles and approaches of the therapist, Eiss-
ler waxes wroth about the couch, a relatively minor point of technique.
Neither Eissler nor Fromm-Reichmann discussed the differences between
the respective mechanisms of change, or conceptualization of disorder;
they skirted the fundamental differences differentiating their DMs, and
debated about relatively minor technical points as though they were
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indeEendent of their respective frameworks.
This is an example of an ostensible methodological controversy that
can more helpfully be regarded as expressing inter-DM differences. Ob-
viously, the techniques were embedded each in their own DMs, and the
differences in technique expressed (at least in part) differences be-
tween the DMS. When the debates revolved around only these technical
differences, no resolution was possible for several reasons. First, each
debator was hearing the other's technical argument in terms of his/her
own DM, and thus it probably, and necessarily, made little sense. Second,
the technical differences were an expression of several interrelated
points of difference, so that continuing to debate only on the technical
level continued to obscure the other points of difference, impeding
their clarification and possible resolution.
At a different point, Eissler (1958, p. 222) disagreed with Loewen-
stein regarding use of the couch
...whatever Dr. Loewenstein
' s final decision regarding
terminology may be, I think we ought to distinguish
strictly between variables and constants within the
classical technique. I would count the patients' recum-
bent position as a constant and not as a variable—as
Dr. Loewenstein does at one point.
This small debate, contrary to the above, is a valid, resolvable
intra-DM methodological debate. As both Eissler and Loewenstein shared
an interpretationist psychoanalytic DM, a disagreement about a tech-
nical point could be debated with recourse to the same network of
commitments, paradigms, meaning sets and goals. The crucial difference
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is whether the participants share a DM or are a^^<^ uii, ttempting to settle
a technical point across DM boundaries.
Addressing a more important point. Eissler (1953 p 136)v,-l:?->j, . ijb considered
the lack of distance or persDer^^.,«pective, or rather, the lacR of ability in
schizophrenics to dif f erenti k^-rt ate between the possible and the real at
times
.
that of neurotics if one extenrlQ i
'-^''^^^^
treatment of the ego
.odifL^t n '\rir::^L" to^notice^ technical problem_which is mos ;p a ofthe treatment of schizophrenics is barely mentionedin the contemporary literatnrp cuL a
schizophrenia.
"literatu e on the psychotherapy of
In a footnote, Eissler (p. 136) continued:
Fromm-Reichmann seems to claim that there is essentiallyno difference between the technique of treatment of schLo-
^s'tei^bl'"' -
P°-t of View which Tn my p nIS na e only if the field of therapeutic action is
l^Zl T ^^he patient's interpersonaj, relationships withdisregard of the patient
'T^iii^^^dlfii^^
.dded)
Obviously, Eissler was addressing the two differential ^oals of
treatment for the respective DMs under the guise of "technique of treat-
ment." In point of fact, that "technical problem" was rarely mentioned
in the contemporary literature because it was not a technical issue.
If an analyst dealt only with patients of basically reliable, or un-
modified, ego, s/he was not seeing schizophrenics and the issue for
him or her was largely irrelevant. If an analyst were treating schizo-
phrenics, the classical objections regarding the treatment of modified
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egos generally held little salience for th.x e therapist; this was the
case partially because the theraDi..^apist would very probably not have em-
barked on treating schizophrenics if the classical nr • •C proscriptions had
been saUen. Mo.eove, U ..ea..„, scM.opH.enics, e.e
.He„p,s. was
U.el,
.o be heavily Influenced
,He SulH.anlan Interpersonal fra^e-
work, and thus would have haH Hi-n„d little use tor a concept like the modified
ego. The schisophrenic patient's lack of distance on his/her phenomeno-
logy was not the technical issue as presented hy Eissler, hecause it
was not an issue for those treating or those not treating schizophrenia.
The inability to achieve distance was not a technical issue for the
relationists and was an issue only for the interpretationists, who
most often did not treat this sort of patient in the first place.
The basically reliable ego. or, the unmodified ego, was a central
concern for Eissler's and the other interpretationists' approach. In-
terpretation was efficacious only with the basically reliable ego, both
theoretically and in fact.
The set of technical arguments regarding the "basically unreliable
ego" or the "modified ego" is largely an ostensible methodological con-
troversy about DM differences in subject, goal and change mechanism of
treatment; the latter were rarely, if ever, discussed at their appro-
priate level of discourse. Their expression was usually limited to the
technical level.
For instance, according to Eissler (1953, p. 116), the legitimate
clinical population was comprised of those individuals for whom, despite
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"their symptomatologv, the Pon u^a i_gy, ego had not been noticeably modified..."
by trauma or whatevp>T- tv.^,hatever. They were appropriate since the "basic model
technique- could be used "without emendations."
Tt TlTZlT"' preserved its integrityI will make maximum use of the sunnorf ^ ^ >- ^''.""^^^^y'the analyst in thp fnr-^ . pp t it receives from
technical problem in sucS i't^''^'^''^"^' -elusive
^^^^^a?ion Which ro^"dr?he"ego^1j; thphases of the treatmsnf .h^k ^ ' ^" restitutive
emphasis added) ' ="PP°"- (1«3, p. 116;
Such an ego would be able to enter into the therapeutic work. The
patient's ego would be sufficiently strong to worR towards recovery and
the tool with which the analyst can accomplish this recovery is Inter-
pretation. With the reliable ego, "The problem... is only when and what
to interpret; for in the ideal case the analyst's activity is limited
to Interpretation; no other tool becomes necessary." (Elssler, 1953,
p. 108) Eissler then considered the modified ego, and ruled it out of
DM activity (in a process similar to the DB DM's ruling out phenomen-
ology as metaphysical).
At the end of the scale is the ego of the psychotic, with
whom the analytic compact is impossible. There is scarcely
anything to say about this end of the scale
... (1953, p. 122)
Turning to schizophrenias, where the ego modification is most ob-
vious, Eissler stated that the most remarkable difference in treatment
2
.This IS not to imply an analogy of content, merely a parallel
in process; this process was discussed in Chapter 1.
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concerned
..essentUU,
ference" (p. X34) Specincall,, he feU ,hat „Uh u„™o«fled e.os
transference developed spontaneously,
„hereas with the schisophrenics
It had to be produced. The technique of free assoclatlr^M j-Lc i ion could not be
used as the patient would probably be incanahlp ofux o p b e cooperating and the
technique might precipitate
"resresqion" n,. op 1-^ g s m any case. Lastly, inter-
pretation was "thrown out of cear" ;,nrl a^ag a d did not convey insight to the
patient. (1953, p. 113)
Eissler's reasons for discouraging the psychoanalytic treatment of
modified egos were perfectly appropriate of course. Within the frame-
work of his DM, his DM arguments were logical, meaningful and helpful;
they can be construed as "true." For instance, free association often
did produce "regression" (or a recurrence of the psychosis) in schizo-
phrenic patients; similarly, interpretation was not efficacious in
clinical practice with this population. It is perhaps a difficult
point to appreciate how "correct" Eissler was within his DM and how
completely besides the point his arguments were for those adherents to
other DMs who were more successfully treating schizophrenic patients.
Yet, from within his DM, Eissler continued to pose their differen-
ces in methodological terms (as did many of the proponents). Thus, he
defended the role of interpretation and its eventual goal, the struc-
tural change of the ego, from recent pressures (1953, p. 126; emphasis
his)
.
It is well known that the proper use of interpretation is
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difficult and complicated. But so central is thistool that any proposed variation or addition s^o^Lbe scrutinized with the greatest care. The int^oduction of parameters, even of such simple ones as
ITr.^'lVT'''' °^ contains dan-ge s which must not be overlooked. Each parameterincreases the possibility that the therapeutic processbe falsified, inasmuch as it may offer the pit
"
'sego the possibility of substituting obedience for astructural change . ~ ^
The term obedience, not entirely an accurate one, isused here to designate all those improvements which
a patient may show under the pressure of the therapybut which are not based on a dissolution of the corres-ponding conflicts. A patient often prefers to produce
adjusted behavior instead of a structural change.
Moreover, he later implied some deficits in the skill of those
therapists who introduced modifications into the classical interpretative
technique (1953, p. 127)
Again, this paper is not the place for a discussion
of what a proper interpretative technique is; it is
mandatory, however, that a warning be raised against
the quick introduction of parameters under thejustification that interpretations have been of no
avail. There is a great temptation to cover up, by the
introduction of parameters, one's own inability to use
properly the interpretative technique.
The issue of expediency particularly disturbed him. Eissler at
several points (1953, pp. 113, 125, 126, 127) felt that expedience was
often followed, rather than a stricter course dictated by theory.
Remembering that the goal of interpretationist DM is ego recon-
struction (rather than the disappearance of sjrmptoms or changes in
interpersonal relationships), both the DM meaning of Eissler 's next
comment and the ostensible technical quality are obvious.
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The content of this footnote is of fnr-™-;^ ui -
of thp%h ^'^^ ^""'^ ^ safeguards against the efLte therapist's personality- in situations where astructural change, induced by the analytical process
lilt i: lit foiziT' ^^^^-^
Other interpretationis^ Eissler was not alone aiBong the inter-
pretationists who were concerned about the relationalist modifications
in treatment. With the Kuhnian analysis at our disposal, it is possible
to interpret their differences as fundamental because of the different
paradigms; at the time, however, the controversies were couched in
terms of technique, though the veheiivence of the debate partially ex-
presses the realization of the participants that a good deal was at
stake.
For instance. Stone (1954, p. 567) takes a position similar to
Eissler 's, regarding the reliable ego, and the modifications in tech-
nique and goals:
We would, while acknowledging that other psychotherapeutic
agents play an important role in the psychoanalytic process,
assign to interpretation the unique and distinctive place
in its ultimate therapeutic effect. We would, I think, require
that the interpretations achieve this effect through the
communication of awareness of facts about himself to the
patient, with the sense of emotional reality that comes only
with technically correct preparation, rather than through
certain other possible effects in the transference counter-
transference system, which occur so frequently in other
psychotherapies. (Certainly, they occur also in psycho-
analysis, but they are regarded as miscarriages of effort.)
(Stone, 1954, p. 574; emphasis added)
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_ts about the
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.e.e. to „Hat tHe
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"oula can the
..tHe.ape.t.c
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.e^a^.e.
as essential to
.eeo.e., an. not as
..sca„,a,es o. e„o.t... XH.s so.t
Of debate is obviousl, an inter-BM ostensible
.etbo.ological contro-
versy, and Just as obviously, Is not likely to be resolved at this
methodological level.
m 1958. the papers were published fro™ a sy„poslu„ on the widening
scope Of psychoanalysis and the need to adequately differentiate classi-
cal analysis fro. analysis with certain variations In technique arising
fro„ the exigencies of treating unreliable egos. The sy.poslu™ used
Elssler's 1953 paper on parameters as their starting point. The panel's
task was to help differentiate a.ong "variations of technique which In
no way conflict with the basic rules and goals,
.odlticatlons which ™ay
be necessary but temporary interruptions of our procedures and aims, or
i-iatlons which lead to a permanent change in the psycho in the psycho-
analytic method with a consequent renunciation of its results." (Green-
son, 1958. p. 200; his emphasis) This symposium can be Interpreted to
be a response of concerned Interpretationists to the Increasingly in-
fluential (and adherent-attracting) relationalist group. Greenson,
Elssler, Loewenstein and Stone, among others, participated. That there
were fundamental agreements among them was recognized by the partici-
pants themselves (see, e.g.. Elssler. 1958. pp. 223 and 227; Greenson.
1958, p. 200; Loewenstein. 195fb.p. 241) They agreed on the InadvisabiUty
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.He.
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.HouH He as inf.e.uen. an. „a„e„ as poss.Hle
and sHould wa, aUer
.He classical re-s..uc...ln,
.He ego
thro.sH in.erp.e.a.lon and „o..ln,
.H.ousH. XHe. „e.e unaHle
.o a«.
dlrec.1,
.He p.essu.es f.c.
.He rela.lonaUs.s In .e^s of para.l,-
matic issues. Instead, Eissler et ali , ., became increasingly concerned
with classifying any "devipt-ion"y ati from classical technique and controUin.
its effect in
.rea.ment, particularly with respect to interpretation.
In this symposium, several definitions and explanations of the
classical approach were made (e.g.. Greenson, p. 201; Loewenstein, pp.
202 and 205). all stressing the role of interpretation. (Loewenstein, 1958a
.
In fact, went on to elahorate the various aspects and types of inter-
pretation (pp. 207-208). The symposium expressed both their awareness
of the necessity of in some way addressing the new clinical populations
With their non-classical treatments, yet also their commitments to the
classical approach. This duality is expressed in the form of the pre-
sentations: an opening statement explaining the classical position,
consideration of a new clinical population (usually schizophrenia and
very occasionally delinquency), reiteration of the classical approach
with some small modification to accomodate the non-ideal patient. Very
clear boundaries were erected around these small modifications and they
were portrayed as unfortunately necessary at times, always dubious and
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not address the important Inter-DM differences relafl ating to mechanisms
of change or role of the therapist.
The resurgence of interest in classical techniques at that par-
.xcular time is not surprising if a Kuhnian analysis is used. The 1,58
symposium was a gathering of respected and concerned interpretetionists
coming together to thrash out a response to .hat must ha.e seemed li.e
.issuided, ,uic. and easv.personali.ed therap,. Simultaneously, the
symposium was obviously designed to meet the challenge and put it to
rest by establishing those conditions under which modifications were
necessary, and those rules under which modifications of technique could
be made, yet still be classical analysis, in the course of the efforts.
the symposium members ensaeed in ^ n,,n,K«>- ^ •g g m a number of mter-DM ostensible metho-
dological controversies with respect to differences with the relational
DM; they also engaged in some valid intra-DM methodological or ser^ntic
debates among themselves that were resolvable when argued on that level.
i^l^-l5M_sol^^^^ Eissler conceded that at times, "para-
meters" might have to be introduced and gave four criteria under which
they should operate. Briefly, a parameter was a modification of tech-
nique introduced onl^ if the basic model did not suffice; it must "never
transgress the unavoidable minimum, must lead to its own self-elimina-
tion" (1953, p. Ill) and the parameters' effects on the transference
must never be such that they could not be abolished by interpretation
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(1953, p. 113).
stone (1954. p. 576) engaged in a s^U mtra-DM technical debate
With Eissler's fourth point.
o? Zr^rTZ^^^^j:^ for acceptaMlUy
exeenent. The exceptorIs^he^^e i0^?:,^^"^;the parameter must terminate before the end of^n!^
stone felt that the fourth criterion was "altogether too severe" and
that if the usual conditions of a classical psychoanalysis had been ad-
hered to, he would consider the patient adequately analyzed.
The Important point here is that these two analysts were differing
on a technical point that was Imbedded in a shared network, and as such,
was potentially soluble.
Several of these intra-DM debates arose in the symposium, albeit
about small points. For example, Loewenstein (1958, pp. 202-203) pre-
ferred the term
-intervention" to "parameter", as the former was more
neutral and thus pointed "more clearly to the need for greater precision
and differentiation with respect to these various actions." A little
later, (1958, p. 222), Eissler challenged Loewenstein' s recommendation
of "intervention", stating that interpretations are interventions, they
might be confused rather than specifically differentiated and there-
fore, "in order to avoid further confusion," Eissler suggested that
Loewenstein "coin a more neutral term." Loewentsteln then rebutted
(1958b, p. 241) Eissler with regard to the intervention/interpretation
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debates, while explicitly recognizing that there was "so.e basic agree-
ment between [the.]." 1 would regard the basic agreements between the.
to be their shared DM. m Kuhnlan terms, this minor skirmish would be
an mtra-DM debate with regard to symbolic generalizations (those con-
sensual terms used across the DM)
.
In response to gentle pressure from Loewenstein who pointed out
that some tools which could not correctly be termed interpretations,
nevertheless had the effect of interpretations (Eissler, 1958, p. 224).
Eissler proposed the term "pseudo-parameters" (pps) . These were used
when resistances were sufficiently high to prevent interpretations from
being useful (p. 224), and helped the analyst to "smuggle interpre-
tations into the pathognomonic area with a temporary circumvention of
resistances." (p. 224) Examples would include the right joke told at
the right moment or, the repetition of what the patient has just said
(p. 225). According to Eissler, when resistances once again decrease,
interpretation can once again come to the fore.
Eissler 's pps strike me as a device for acknowledging those actually
therapeutic processes that do occur, without according them therapeutic
status and without dethroning interpretation as the sole therapeutic
tool. The pps concept was an intra-DM accomodation to empirical find-
ings that did not impinge on the paradigm.
Finally, Stone's (1954, p. 572) account of change in classical
analysis can illustrate an intra-DM theoretical debate.
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iLtiTf'll". f"'^'" and .ake the ego
s'^ego conten ultimately of Id'Ldupticgu uu c cs and operationq TViT-rM,r>u *-u •
awareness. Implemented by the pr;cess of "w^^J' ..we expect the effect of abol, f^^n 5 through",
ness of intrapsychic conflict in .enllal .nd f-
extension of the eeo's do<,-!m-,,o inally the
stinctual life wi?h !h !
^^^^^^^^gnty over the in-oux uLUdj. x r , t the freeing or facilitaM'on r.f -rt-
synthetic, adaptive and other afflrmfuie a a™ s In
ho d,Tc:n?;af:r"",S"r °' '"^ transference n;uro:is
theo^etl :ily"as' s eitlfllr^ £S£ «S« this £h_on
tow;irr1^h77rK~^~r ^"^^
necessary therapeutic phenomenon.Inward which joiterpretation and recall are direc"Eid~f^7Thl£f the patient fro. Ju^ i^ilSit-^d-Th^ol^nTifnalMI£Ht^ re^resentati^ is ]^rEEl^T-^^itl^ori,T^^
This small theoretical debate about transference exemplifies the
potential solubility of theoretical issues if they are embedded within
the same DM.
A Kuhnian analysis of these controversies of the late 1940' s and
the 1950's allows an interpretation that they are in part, ostensible
methodological controversies, that is, debates about important DM vs.
DD issues expressed in methodological terms, with little awareness that
the differences were not primarily at the methods level, but rather at
the paradigmatic and DM level— the one fundamental, the other interrelat
and both implicit.
Thus, the relationalists and interpretationists debated in technica
terms: about the couch; free association; dealing with acting-out para-
meters vs. deviations and other modification necessary in treating un-
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reliable egos
-
but rarely addressed their fundamental differences.
A Kuhnlan analysis of these debates would lead to an interpretation
that these two DMs differed fundamentally with respect to their para-
digms and early technical problem solutions; thus, their fundamental
differences would include: change mechanisms (working through repetitions
in the transference ys emotional re-learning in a reality relationship),
locus of change (the ego vs narcissism); techniques (free association
and interpretation vs dialogue and relationship; etiology for schizo-
phrenia, unreliable ego vs lark nf coip ^. ± ctc ot self-esteem); conceptualization of
disorder (intrapsychic vs interpersonal).
In the debates just documented, these fundamental (inter-DM) differen-
ces were expressed in primarily technical terms and the inference is that
these are not soluble.
Kuhnian analysis of other controversies is similarly helpful; for
instance, another, different group of interpretationists engaged in
ostensible debate not with the relationalists, but with the growing
trend toward family work in the late 1940 's and the early 1950 's.
Ostensible methodological controversy between interpretationists and
therapists. During this same time, the growing trend toward seeing
family members began to draw fire from interpretationist analysts;
their criticisms were quite often of the ostensible methodological
category. That is, rather than addressing the fundamental differences
concerning etiology, operative change processes or mechanisms, and locus
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of disorder (individual historical inty.r.. wintrapsychic vs. contemporaneous
systemic and intraosvrhiV ^ t-u^ .p yc c), the criticisms focused on methodological
issues
.
yst s
some
Thus, (as reviewed in chapter III, Edward Glover, Karl Mennlnger
and Leon Saul were all critical of seeing fa.ily „e™bers of the identi-
fied patient. They believed that such contact would be disruptive to
the transference or would impede its development altogehter; the impli-
cation of course is that not seeing the family members facilitates the
development of the transference neurosis, which is probably correct.
Similarly Kubie thought it unwise for the same analyst to conduct the
analyses of both marital partners simultaneously as this practice could
well induce one or the other partner to lose confidence in the anal
impartiality. Grotjahn replied in technique terms; that is, when
degree of paranoid ideation emerged in such arrangements, he recommended
either the immediate resort to separate analysts, or planning a "joint
family interview" of patients and analyst. He felt that this technical
change made the paranoid distortions less destructive; though the
technique could not avoid some degree of argumentation, he felt that it
did protect the sanity of saner partner by providing some reality test-
ing (Grotjahn, 1960, pp. 68-69, 273 and 281).
At other points, interpretationists criticized the loss of the
one-to-one relationship which was regarded as the foundation upon which
analysis was built. Its disruption was ascribed to the lack of skill
and as obvious attempts to correct the countertransference difficulties
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to the analyst. Criticises progressed fro. attacks on an analyst's
technical expertise and facility to attacks on his/her personality,
motivation, or mental health.
^^T^ '^^^^^^ unresolved interestin watching the primal scene. He may be accused of havin!a papa complex," or of attempting to become the pater
'
familiae, who God-like guides his flock of sheen kaccused of a great unconscious need to pLylhe'^mnLofent
rthe'T'' f God-like, father-motLr Beca: ;of the dependency phobia of our time, he may even be suspectedof^trying to enslave whole families. (Grotjahn, 1960, p^ 276-
Grotjahn's rejoiners regarding the necessity of seeing family mem-
bers all revolved around the increased efficacy that technique lent to
psychoanalytic treatment, especially with intellectualizing patients.
Differences in fundamental areas regarding change processes in indivi-
duals as family structure were not discussed, rather, seeing family mem-
bers as a techni^ was bandied about, as either facilitative of working
through emotional material or as destructive of the transference neurosis
Ostensible methodolo gical controversies involving the DB DM
. Some of the
controversy which swirled around the DB work could also be characterized
as ostensibly methodological. For instance, while referring to the early
period of family therapy. Freeman (1964, p. 36) describes seeing the
family unit or group as a whole in these terms: "...group problems and
group goals are of primary concern and the group process is the pre-
dominant methodological frame of reference, with the intent being to
exclude the "one-to-one" therapist-individual interventions", (his
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emphasis) While no one would quibble with Freeman that seeing families
as a whole involved methodological innovations, in light of the DM
concept, it's fully as obvious that the "frame of reference" is not
merely methodological, but also conceptual.
At times, the controversies have been both very specific and some-
what besides the point. A case in point was an exchange between Jay
Haley and Frederic Schlamp regarding some "family experiments" designed
and conducted by Haley before dissolution of the DB DM as a functioning
group
.
Haley and Weakland vs. Schlamp ostensible methodological contro-
vers^. Haley's two "family experiments (1962) responded to two separate
issues: Haley's interest in the classification of families by charac-
teristic, stable transactional patterns rather than by the diagnostic
categorization of an individual family member; and recent criticism the
DB hypothesis had met, particularly around the lack of "scientific
verification" for its observations and hypotheses. Haley's experiments,
by attempting to demonstrate stable and statistically significant diff-
erences between schizophrenic families and normal families in a
laboratory-experimental situation, can be seen as a foray into providing
that "scientific verification".
3
"Schizophrenic families" in Haley's experiments were families
with one so diagnosed child or adolescent member; Haley, it should be
noted, was well aware of the difficulties in nomenclature and inter-
judge reliability regarding schizophrenia.
\
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Haley's experiments were pu.Ushed in Pa^
.he con.ove.3.
.
Be expiiea.ea occ.„..
.e.ween
.3. Haie. an.
..e^e^cSchW
.esarains
.He a.s. Haley's
.„o pn.iications
. Us Haie,
points on., eHis ,i.s. e^e.i.e„. Ha. pa„s,
.n. as .He
.e.Ho.oio.y
was al^s. identical i. „as puHlisHed and nsnali,
.e,e„ed . as one
large experiment. Its two segments will .e reviewed.)^ ScHlamp also
critiqued Weakland and Fry's Ciqfi?^ r..r.C1962) paper on "Letters of Mothers of
SchizopHtenics" Hnt as ScHlamp includes tHeir papet in the critiques
for the same reasons as Haley's and does not elaborate, Haley's work
will be emphasized.
ii^i^Z^sJesisn. Haley presented a series of assumptions to family
Study which read like DM tenets:
WHICH family mem.ers^'':^^ro::i uL^fair^^to'pa^^^Jn":^^
and wm in?i ' P-=i=t Within a family for manv years
tTth ^ = expectations of, and iehaviorwi other people when he leaves the family and (d) Ihe
wUh him Tl " °' Paren s do
p 266)
co-creator of family patterns. (1962,
Elaborating on these assumptions, Haley (p. 266) pointed out that
the various family groups working with schizophrenia were in general
agreement that there were similarities across schizophrenic families
4
^
Haley's experiment will be reviewed only extensively enough toprovide explanatory background for Schlamp's ostensible methodological
argument and the Haley-Weakland replies.
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(othe.
.Han .he inclusion of a schisophrenic
.e*e.,
. All
.hese groups
had attempted
.o find see way of describing
.he unique
.Ind of Inter-
active process observed when these fa^U, „e.bers are brought together
Haley's further goal was to "phrase such a description In a way which
»ould Ultimately per.it cuantltatlve validation of descriptive state-
ments (pp. 266-267). He went on to consider the proble. In experi-
mentation posed by working with families, problems of the Individual vs
the family as a unit, the family as opposed to the small group, sampUn
problems Of "normal" and "schizophrenic"
"families" and the search for
experimentally testable hypotheses. A saving grace in all this was the
assumption that the formal structure of Interacting patterns were
stable over time within each family; this was possible because homeo-
static factors came into play whenever any behavior or interactional
process deviated outside the limits of a family's usual range.
To verify the DB view of families, the incongruence between levels
of messages had to somehow be expressed or operationalUed
. Haley hy-
pothesized that if Incongruence were In fact at work, and family mem-
bers at some level disqualified what each other said, they would have
difficulty forming and maintaining coalitions in the family. Clinical
observations supported this train of thought, and Haley devised an
experimental procedure that allowed family members the opportunity to
both form alliances and to communicate at two levels. (Haley, 1962,
p. 281).
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Briefly, Haley chose to work, for simplicity, with a thtee-person
system of father-mother-formerly schizophrenic child.
?he paitiMon R ^k'' °" °^her side of
examo^e ^
^"'^'^^ ""'^"^ °^ ^^"^^ buttons, forpl , mother can signal father or child. All of thLebuttons are connected with pens on an event recorder in the
th^e^xperrn?!
'''' ^^^'^'^^
^^^^^^ ^-^nl
The table is wired so that the counters begin to add up ascore whenever two people choose each other by pressing
each other s coalition button. When mother presses thebutton labeled husband,
'
nothing happens until father presseshxs button labeled for her. When both buttons are pressed
at once, then both counters add up a score at the same speed
and continue to do so (making an audible sound) as long asboth buttons are pressed. Therefore each person can gain a
score only if he joins another person, and then he and thatperson gam exactly the same amount of score. Each person
can signal another with the signal button to invite a
coalition. The family is asked not to talk together during
the experiment so they can only communicate by button pushing.
Father, mother and child are placed at this table and told
this is a game they are to play together. They are instructed
that they should each try to win by getting the highest score.
They may push buttons one at a time or two at a time or not
at all. The only rule is the prohibition against talking
during the game.
The 'game' consists of three rounds of two minutes each which
are begun by the experimenter and ended by him. At the end
of each round the family members are asked to read off their
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?hr:::.?:^3tc\t ::To ith:- ^^^^^ -"-^
In addition to the three roL ^^"^^^^^ive . .
.
to have a fourth ro^nd Rpf ^T' .'^^ ^^^'^^^ ^^^^^
they are asked to talk' to^pf^' ^^e fourth round,
tha^ round and who ? 'to fose" ?h n'^f
another two
.inute rou^d aL' ^ee' ^ ^c^n^Ike'^h:scores come out the way they planned ^h?is recorded. (Haley, 1962, p. 284"
tion
The design, according to Haley, would reflect the family
.ember's
difficulty in forming and maintaining stable coalition in the family,
as an expression of their disturbed family structure and co^ication.
Haley's sample consisted of sixty families; the thirty normal fami-
lies were selected by random choice from students in a high school direc
tory. The parents were telephoned and the sample was comprised of those
families whose members had not had psychotherapy and who would be willin-
to come in to their laboratory for the experiment. The children ranged
m age from 14-17, with thirteen girls and seventeen boys in the sample.
The thirty schizophrenic families were chosen by availability from
a family therapy program, the records of state hospitals and other in-
cluded children actually hospitalized at the time. The children ranged
in age from 11 to 20, with only three girls and twenty-seven boys,
Haley adds that a more equal distribution could not be found. The
educational levels were slightly lower in this group.
Of the sixty families, twenty normal and twenty szhizophrenic were
instructed that they could push buttons in any way they pleased and
therefore they could form coalitions with either one or two people
simultaneously. This was the first experimental condition. In the
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Les were
.ns..c.ea
.Ha.
.He.
..1.
^ ^^^^
fore coula no. score „UH
.„o people a. once. (Hale,. I,e2, p. ,35,
Schlamp's methrvWi^^T^^i critinn^ c ui , ,^_ai_critiaue. Schlamp's (1964) critique is
interesting for a nmnber of reasons. First several of h-xL^L, is comments
were of methodological interest; these will he pointed out as the. ar.
encountered. His appreciation of the two papers ('.etters" h. Wea.land
and Pry and Haley's first "Pamil, Experiment" paper) is evident, and he
points out that among those in family therapy, only the DB group had
produced "controlled experimentation." (p. 229) He is generally very
approving and focuses immediately on their research methodology, citing
the two papers for having presented "meaningful, systematic and testable
hypotheses within an experimental frame of reference." (p. 229) At no
point in his analysis does Schlamp step beyond the consideration of
methodology and at no point does he take the DB system as a system in-
to account, preferring to critique the system via methodological
criticism, especially of Haley's paper. My impression is that Haley's
paper is particularly singled out as it is couched in Schlamp's view of
legitimate science. It is an experiment, in a laboratory no less, and
as such approaches a form of discourse resembling Schlamp's. Thus, he
would be on familiar territory and also more likely to attend to this
particular form of demonstration.
Schlamp then presents his description of a normal family, then
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son^e alternative interpretations of Haley's data soe f-Ley s , p ci ic methodological
criticisms, and. f±na^^^r
,
diiu, ix iiy, some suggestionq fnr "m^ • .SStibti s to more critical research
designs .
"
Because Schlamp's descri nt-i o,. o j up n and characterization of a "normal
family- is absolutely central to his critique it will u-Li-xque, I be reviewed as
he presented it.
Let me first describe what I will call 'r. i - rLet me further hypothesize th.l \ normal' family.
family has been ^osDita^H h ^^^^^ '^^^ 'nor^^V
phrenL. The parents a^d ^h
diagnosis of schizo-
-ther, is qui^rc^o^^e n dtr^L' ^-/-^^-^^-ly the
illness is not out of the ranL nf ^°^^^Pt of mental
The dread, fear, awarene s"f' ociars'^^rings of personal inadequacy arS felt bv f^f •
'""^
that it is felt ^.r.-, T ... ^ ^^"^ ^'^ the same way
individua s Ove? thTpe^iod '^^^^^^^^^^ P^^^^otic
up a deeo 1 ov. f
^^^.P^^^°^ °f y^ars the parents have built
nkelihood of hfr concerned about the
lesseJ extent ^h'
^oth of the parents, and to a
lu
Siblings, of the psychotic patient wish todo all they can to help him recover and to hejp Mm sha^e inan active outgoing life. They are unaware, however ofthe
a?tUude% 'T'°''^- ^^^^ -ny^ superltJ^ioust itud s and unspoken feelings conceTiu^ psychotics and are
'sL Id ''r''^r''"^'^^^ "^"^ about'what ?h;y
shares thp°' ^ ^^^^> although in remission,e customary aftermath of a psychotic episode in that
^^n^M
^P^thetic, has problems with communications,probably centering around his own ambivalent feelings, and yetonce having committed himself to a method of action, he can
maintain this adequately for some time before his own selfdoubts and recriminations (partially unconscious) blockfurther single purpose behavior.
In such a situation we introduce the family experiments of
Haley. Essentially this consists of father, mother, and the
schizophrenic child forming various 'coalitions' with each
other. This means that a button is pressed signalling a
desire for a coalition with another partner and leaving the
way open for a mutual scoring between these two partners.
Implied in the instructions to the 'players' are that each
person is supposed to try to 'win', probably with some
3A8
reference to seeing how they work as a familvleast there will be imnl-fo^ ^
y, or at
are vou^' Jn tt
"^Plied to most parents "how good
cr^h^H
^^tuation the parents I have des-ibed would be most solicitous towards their "sick"son, and yet also anxious to do well rhT u
That is, once having responded, he would tend to ner-severate for a neriod r>f t-^r,.^ , ^d p a ot time, as is characterictMV ofmany schizophrenics in partial remission r^K^
1964, pp. 229-230)
. (Schlamp,
Schlamp then specifies thrtt ho rr-mF r a e x^ill examine the hypotheses and
conclusions of the Haley article "nnH^r- i-u^y dTL i , u der ^hese circumstances. " i.e.
under the circumstances he has just added, wtUc^^^^^^^
a rudimentary M
3^,^^^^
has introduced several assumptions that the DB DM does not; these in-
clude: the mother being particularly concerned, the operative presence
of deep love developed over the years, the efforts to help the identified
patient recover, the uncertainty about the best course to take, the
£uasi-superstition, the son "in remission" with this "customary after-
math" of apathetic behavior, including problems in communication about
ambivalent feelings and finally the capacity to function in a concerted
course of action once committed. While the DB DM might well "allow"
some of these assumptions (e.g., mother's particular concern), they are
irrelevant to the DB formulation. Moreover, many of them partake of
"internal processes" which the DB DM explicitly eschewed.
Essentially, Schlamp' s description establishes for him a DM and
allows him to view Haley's data through his own (Schlamp 's) DM, which
makes possible the alternative interpretations he makes of the data.
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By arguing over these alternative interpretations ti.. .Fi-cLdci , me and energy is
spent on what appears to be a process of «i •elucidation wh€lereas it more
rean.UcaU.
.ese.Mes
. 3HcoUns an a..ow a. .He seen
crossed e.es
.
B. exaelnln, Haley's
„ethodclog, and data through his
own DM, it is not surprising that Srhl,mnbc a p comes up with different in-
terpretations, conclusions and methodological demands.
He initially considers Haley's first hypothesis, that schizophrenic
families would have more difficulty forming and maintaining coalitions
( and would therefore have a higher percent of time when no member of
the family was in coalition with any other member)
. Haley reports this
hypothesis to be supported at the .05 level (1962, p. 286). Schlamp
counters with:
It is not surprising that a significant difference at the nslevel was found. All that would be required™ be I slower
diffiLtv "^^^^^ -ill that in this case thefficulty of maintaining any continuous coalition is reducedby two-thirds. (Since of the three coalitions possible
mother-son, mother-father, father-son, two of these ar;
reduced or eliminated.) Under such circumstances one would
thT'ns ? '"f difference was significant only atrne .ui level, under such circumstances. (1962, p. 230)
"Under such circumstances" anything might be possible. The point
is that Haley was not operating "under these circumstances." His t)M
did not include the presence of an apathetic post-psychotic button-
pusher, and thus Haley's interpretation and significant
.05 finding
stand legitimate, notwithstanding Schlamp 's re-interpretation and statis-
tical critique.
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Me..oaolos.caX... ScH.»p..
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
even
..... „.
^
^^^^^^^^^
to what economists cal 1 a "ou i-Lsc l a shock variable." Shock vpr-iaKion K ar bles are those
variables introduced to exnl;,-;r. uplain why a prediction or analysis did not
function as anticioafpri tt,cipated. Thus, tha soybean Projection ^ould have been
accurate i. it had not been
.or the 1,„ dronsht, the dro„,ht
..^c^i
as the shoe, variable, or, the 0,. would have achieved such and such
levels had it not been for an unexplained coal stri.e (oil e.bar.o
unexpected sovern„ent policy, etc.). Sehla^p uses apathy in .his way
It allows his analysis to answer empirical events, even though the
Shoe, variable has no integral role in the rest of his analysis, and
certainly not arr^ role in Haley's DB DM "ADarhv" Ky UD un. p t y bears no relation to
Schlamp's other assumptions and in fact i c= ^, .diiQ x r , s tacked on to the end of his
description, with no connections to the rest of the analysis. Vet it
allows hl„ to interpret, into his own DM, Haley's first finding and then
several subsequent to it.
so, he again uses apathy, to re-interpret Haley's second hypothesis
that the family of the schizophrenic would have longer continuous periods
of tin,e when no two family members were in coalition. (This hypothesis
was supported in Haley's study; Haley's Interpretation, in DM ter.s,
is that this demonstrated the difficulty schizophrenic families had In
forming and maintaining coalitions con,pared to "normal" families. Though
Schlamp does not in this case dispute the method, or the empirical find-
ing, he re-interprets the finding so that it "fits" into his own DM; he
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ass^pao..
.....
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^Thus
^^^^s^^^i::"^^ - -p— The
account for the difference In
'1''^'' """^'"^ ^^^^^ ^^^ily
we must remember that the Darpn^^ ""/^ however,
schizophrenic son. L a resuU thp' f'^''^"^ °^ ^^^^^up too high a scorP .L .J ' ^ ^ish to pile
that they are taking it on^ fP^^^''
^he experimenterK I ut on the son. (Schlamp, p. 230)
Schla.p
.,e„ uses
.„o othe. of Haley's «„.i„,s .o supp„„ His
interpretation. B. „-interp„ti„,
.He «nai„, i„
.He «rst pUce.He
supports His o™ DM using Haley's empirical results essentially out of
context, i.e.,
"i„,ported" into Schlamp's DM. As such rHf = "11. S , they supposedly
lend strength to his own view in actual, f,, fity of course, they do no such
thing. Though both .en are talking about coalition behavior, the
a-ina Of each Instance of this behavior is very different, and the
Implications for the re„.inder of each of the two respective DMs are
similarly different. This is because sub-sets of concepts and empiri-
cal findings are of course, not necessarily the same across DMs and
thus "coalition behavior" has a different "place" in each DM, with a
different set of articulations to other concepts, different meanings
and sources of verification.
By supporting his interpretation through the use of two of Haley's
findings, Schlamp compounds both the spurious support of his own inter-
pretation and the illegitimate form of methodological critique. After
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ecu.. Have
.a.en
.He
.0™ a...e3..n,
.He
.e.HoaoXos.cal
critique (as Haley did), addressing
"errors" 1„ ,he critic •^" quer's approach,
cit.„s f.nd.„,s supporting one's o™ „or., or e.Har.lng on a searcH to
ana tHe "crucial e.perl.ent"
„HlcH „in convince HotH sides tHat one's
approach and Interpretation are, In ,act, correct. Uhat aU ol these
partake of structurally Is ostensible methodological dehate. And as
^he debate becomes „ore and ™ore elaborated
„lth critique, counter-
crltlque, and supporting data taken out of context. It beco.es easier
to focus on one tiny methodological point of difference and Invest It
With terrific Importance, as l^pUclU, It carries the burden of an
entire DM behind It, and expresses the multitude of differences between
two DMs in conflict.
This is What occurred with the Schlamp methodological critique.
At no point does he deal with their DM differences (in any vocabulary
or system of thought), but rather he presents His methodological critique
as though he were within the same system as Haley. Any indication of
their basic differences must be Inferred by reading between the lines,
as Haley sometimes does.
For instance, at several points Schlamp reinterprets findings in
such a way that the explanatory concepts are placed within the schizo-
phrenic child. Haley's second hypothesis predicted "the family with a
schizophrenic [member] would have longer continuous periods of time
when no two family members were in coalition." (Haley, p. 286) Schlamp
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addresses the second half of the experiment, where individuals could
was Significant at the
.01 level in support of the hypothesis that the
schizophrenic famlies would have longer continuous periods of no
coalition. Schlamp challenges Haley's method, then his interpretation,
subsequently forwarding one of his own.
...the difference was significant at the .01 level on thishypothesxs. This may mean logically that the differencedbetween famxlxes is greater in the latter experiment. Butwhat would cause this greater difference? If the parents
really had difficulty communicating with each other andwith the son, as well as the admitted difficulty of the sonin communicating with the parents, the experimental restrictionof being allowed to score with one person only would not havemucheffect upon this family since they are having difficulty
scoring anyway. That is, since both coalition buttons maybe pressed by any player without penalty the restriction of
only score with one at a time' would have less effect upon
a group of players that already was having a difficult time
scoring. This is true because the restriction does not fine
the two who would have been scoring together anyway. Withfamilies who have no difficulty in mutual scoring, their
responses will be sensitively and mutually regulated between
one and another.
The normal family thus should be more seriously impaired by
this restriction since they are communicating more sensitively
and accurately to determine their own and other member's score.
Thus the differences, when tested for this particular hypo-
thesis, should be less in the second experiment rather than
greater. This can be resolved by imagining, as we have done
here, that the difficulty lies not with the family
,
but with
the schizophrenic son. (Schlamp, p. 231; emphasis added^
If Haley's method is examined in the light of Schlamp 's DM, the
latter 's methodological critique is well taken and in fact, the differ-
ence should indeed be less in the second experiment rather than greater.
However, that is not the point. The point is that in the research
\
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critiqued, the differences were greater in ^h
-ai^l m t e second experiment as
they "should- have been in Haley's system S.hl •y s . c amp is attempting to
explain away a predicted ^.nrix and demonstrated finding within Haley's sys-
tem because it does not aeree ^h c uig wxt Schlamp 's own interpretation of what
should happen. This occurs inm the process of what is titled a ^ethodolc
Sical orit.,.e. SchXa.p has ta.en his o™ OH as a sta.ti., poi„t here
and has huUt a method and interpretation around it, fauitins Haley's
for not being the same! In these <.^^„.^-,•m situations, a Kuhnian analysis would
i»ply
.hat hecause of the stron, and nsuali, i.pUeit co™it.ent to one'
BM. it is very difficult for participants to notice that their
.ethodolo
glcal disagreements are embedded in DMs based „„„nH-„o upon different para-
digms, of which they fundamentally disagree.
At issue here are two DMs, and particularly the differences between
them that relate to the issue of individually vs. family based psycho-
Pathology. schlamp specifies that the methodological difficulty about
hypotheses "can be resolved by imagining, as we have done here, that the
difficulty lies not with the family, but with the schizophrenic son."
(p. 231) Haley picks up on the conceptual discrepancy between the in-
dividual and family approaches somewhat, but also attempts to counter
Schlamp methodologically.
Conceptually, Haley does address the individual vs. family approach.
He addresses the necessary conceptual shift a "family caused" process
requires and the "century of investment in the idea that psychosis is
produced and persists independent of the current life experience of the
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patient." (p. 240")\f' ^HKj He also DOinfc *-u
crucxal axpar.„ent to demonstrate once and for all „H t.
"has a V. . . "he her psychosiscause'
„,thln the Individual or whether it in n s a product of i
network of relationships." („ 2km h p
the
explicitly refers to
shift m Viewpoint necessary to seek the" ""^ ""=e: in the
"context
relationships rather than within the individual." (p
Haley.s co™„ents ahout Schlamp's methodological
reco^endations at
points hi,hli.ht the difference hetween the individualistic vs. family
orientation,
.hus. he is ahle at times to counter Schlamp. methodology
suggestions with conceptual points v.. For instance, Haley objects to
Schlamp.s recommendation ahout havin, non-schi.ophre„ic parents partici-
pate With schisophrenic hoys on the hasis that his task was "not to
measure the differences which occur when an individual from one family
.3 Placed in circuit with another family, it ,was, to measure his
habitual patterns in his own family." (Haley, p. The tenor of
schlamp.s recommendation indicates that he was an individual theorist
and did not really understand the underpinings of the family approach
Moving a disordered child in to a "normal" family would not suggest
Itself to family therapists as a way of finding out ahout the disordered
family. Actually, it probably did not occur to Schlamp either; his
focus was on the child rather than the family.
As mentioned previouslvPi iy, Haley at times responded conceptually,
giving some sense of resolution to an issue; in the preceding example,
by pointing out that the methodological reconunendatlon was inappropriate
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dat.o„ is ae.e.
.pon sue. a „a,
.Ha. a aec.s.on Has
.een
.eacKe..
The recommendation is useful.
At Che.
.i„es. Hale.
.e. ScHU^p's
.e.Hoaologlcal crlM,.es „UH
.e.Hodoio,,eal defense. „Uh
.e^a.a
.o ano.He. aspec. of .He sa^e iss.
(the individual vs. fa^il, f.,„s) ScHla.p c.i.ici.es Haley's
.esea.cH
using a chicken-or-egg argument.
a^^rijutJ!;: - "r^r^JL^rtSir
bind
communication within the schizophrenic flmUv Jrih ^
"Sd r-j; Se"fa\?r"°^" Postps.c^hfuc^LdivS::i IT
psychosis or whether the psychosis has caused he LeaLownin communication. Exactly the same dilemma was presented Inan earlier article by Weakland and Fry (1962) "Letters ofMothers of Schizophrenics." (Schlamp, p! 233)
While Schlamp's basic question is of course valid, his use of it
here as a methodological critique is not. Haley's experiment was desig-
ned to measure and quantify certain family interaction, not to assign
causality. To answer Schlamp's question, the researcher would need a
long-term prospective study - an enormous effort in time, energy and
money entirely appropriate to the etiological issue, methodologically
powerful, and directed
_to criticisms leveled at
_the DB DM as a whole.
Schlamp's critique here is demanding that Haley's experiment meet
criticism applicable to the DM as a whole. If Schlamp had directed
this point to "the DB hypothesis" or any such rubric, his point would
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Have .ee„ vaU.. Co.H.n,
„e.o.oXo,.ca.
...
.3
not vaU. ana sa.aUs tHe e.pe..„e„.al
„eeHo.
... „ea„.„,
ha. aisc.e«o„ ove.. U„.o«u„a.el„ Hale, encase. ScHU.p.. cnu,.es
here on a methodological rather m,.„g al than conceptual level. At one point
for instance, Hale. (1,«,
^^^^ ^^^^
^j^^
Of View 1. pnrsned. the next reponse Is to loo. lor a
..crucial., experi-
ment Which will conclusively demonstrate whether psychosis has a
..cause.,
within the individual or whether It Is a result ol a network of relation-
ships.
ITnZ 'f''
'""^ conceivable that either of twokinds o investigation might answer the question rn T
amount of research has f,??J I f""^ ^" overwhelming
this tn l^^^^""''
ailed in the endeavor to demonstrate
he interactfrhL'"'" ^""^ '° 'hat
from"h"rL'rera':::a\rp^^'S.ra'„5\^hUd"%h'^"^
the hypothesis that the^hLd L^p^ ch^Uc'he sTo'fT^a^r-'"^ticular sort of relationship with his parents. In ?his en-deavor we face a difficulty which is becoming more ev dentIt the psychotic child Is Included in the test interactingWith his parents, it can always be argued that he '.caused"whatever results are obtained, yet the child must be "eluded
JZ\"^ S *"= ^^''1= ""h his parents and theyWith him. (Haley, p. 240) "
In the DB DM, the schizophrenic "child" necessarily had to be in-
cluded in the interaction, yet that left any research design, but the
long-term prospective project, open to Schlamp's criticism. Unfortunately
instead of pointing out that the critique was an inappropriate demand for
research already completed,^ and that it criticized a point he had, in
Haley (p. 240) indicates that his experiment was a "first attempt
to provide families with a similar context to see if measurable differen-
ces could be found between supposedly different types of families."
358
no.
....
^„
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^
a.,™e„.
.... .^e scM.opH.en.c c.Ua
..eau3e3..
..e
....e.enee
.e-
-e„
.,pe3 o. ,a.n.e3
e.pe.,„en.3
.3
.„e.„.Me (p. ,
-
sense
.,a. U eanno.
.e p_„ no.
.,3p„.en ana .3 essenUaU. a
unive.3aX exp.anaUon (p. „, . HaU. po.n.e. on.
.Ha. e3sen..aU.
wha.ever Un^.n^s „e.e oH.a.nea
.n .He e.pe...en. conU He expU.ne. H.
the dl3turbed cHUd interpre.a.ion.
3\'o«e\'°::a!uio°f3''-.l3T''^""^<= ^^""^
unresponsive StoilH.H "'^ "'^ aHnormal cHlld is
had 3Ho™ ::;e r n r '^Zll^ '^^^ """"^^
that .he dis.ress of .h! ^ " ''^gu'^d
If the Paren.3 a e L \n Jo iu°:n*'^H'''"It is because
.heir relaMo^^hr .. ^" """"^ parents,
have gotten together Uss J. ^o " "^"^y ^f""""
trying to gain a response 'fJo "an
'"'^
father wins the game U i,T ""f P""^^^'^ <^hlld. If the
lem that the flflv / "^^^"^ ^"'^h ^ Ptob-
fa.her. If the falha? 2o"l"u""^''"' "'"'^'^ ™" lean upon
couid be said''L^rL-H:xi^ Xr::«:;i:dii.t\r:ifir
tiL' 5^ 3s".h\" »?::r^r"' h'^^-- " 'ofiuion
=,^A
normal, it xs because the child is erratiV
press her buttons it would be because of apathy resultingfrom having a disturbed child. (Haley, p. 242)^
^^«"i
Obviously, Haley was nettled by Schlamp's re-interpretation of
findings. However, instead of pointing out that the re-interpretations
were irrelevant to his point of view, or that they constitute a per-
ceptual and conceptual system of their own, Haley engaged in a methodolo-
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Sical .epx.
,e..
.He conve.an. an
..passe, Ha.e.-s
Poin.
.esa...n,
.„e...aMU., o.
.,e
..3.„,e. cHUa
.n..p.e..o„
" ""ue". U is u„do.b.edl, not the so„ of
^^^^^^^
(particularly as the distu.bed-chil. idea is ^l to ScHXa^p's
position. He cannot
..aifo.a to abandon i.)
. This ieaves Haie,.s
.athet
nice point not convincing Schla.p, Schla^p's intetptetation not convincing
Haley, and the methodological argument untesolved and available for yet
another round of ostensible methodological debate.
Lest Schlamp^s other methodological criticisms be overlooked It
Should he noted that he further criticizes Haley's overlooking of a sig-
nificant chi-sq^re for hypothesis 6 (p. 233), proposes four designs
necessary in follow-up studies (pp. 234-235), for Weakland and Fry's
paper (1962) as well as three "critical experiments" for Haley's work
(p. 235) and "a more appropriate method" based on three-person non-zero-
sum non-negotiable games (p. 235) He ends with the common left-handed
compliment regarding the experiment's usefulness in generating new
hypotheses and stimulating further research, (p. 236) Within the context
of his own DM, it should be emphasized, his points are well-taken and
potentially helpful. Directed across Dm boundaries, they are irrele-
vant and obfuscatory.
Haley responds methodologically more often than not. For instance:
A reply to these alternative explanations could only be
made with data on individual families which were not in-
cluded in the article. To some extent the total figures
do not reflect the great variation found in the schizo-
phrenic families, and although the schizophrenic child
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Haley^ further criticizes Schlamp's alternative experiments (p. 243).
and then proposes an experiment that methodologically controls for the
disturbed Child influence, but which would «t give him a measure o,
parental response to their child.
"stiEll is. £resumabl£ the^ of
tZE£ of research." (p. 2A4; emphasis added). Thus, to meet Schla.p's
central methodological criticism. Haley must give up the central goal
of his research! That, it appears to me Is the hallmark of an ostensible
methodological controversy.
Inter-DM symbolic .enPr^ alization^dj^^ When two DMs differ
as drastically as those represented by Schlamp and Haley, with differen-
ces in crucial areas (e.g., individual vs. family interpretations of
data), it is relatively easy to see why ostensible methodological con-
troversy can lead to long-lasting sterile controversy. Yet at times.
•
""^^^^ appears fairly evenly split between pointing outthexr (Weakland/Fry and Schlamp) conceptual differences and engaging in
methodological debate. Thus, he comments on conceptual differences
regarding individual or family approaches (pp. 236-237 and p 237)
addresses the disturbed child alternative interpretation (p. 237) Indlater objects to it as an "alternative line of explanation" (p. 238)
and finally comments that there is no crucial test yet and there is
not likely to be one (p. 239) Methodologically, Weakland quibbles about
Schlamp 's definition of normal family (pp. 235 and 237) and defends the
letters as "interactional" against what he terms Schlamp 's "scientific
objection" (p. 239) On the whole, however, Weakland managed to avoid
a good deal of the ostensible methodological debate.
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usion
,
even less crucial i„.er-B„ differences add t.eir weish.
.o .he conf
A case in point is an interchange between Jackson (1963) and Pan! eve
symbolic generalization.^
In 1963. in a cogent in Pa^u^ p^o^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
iect of language, i„pl,ing ,hat when family therapy gained a better
theoretical base, the necessity for a new language would arise; in par-
ticular, differentiation frc„ the language of psychoanalysis would be
necessary (p. 182) Interestingly enough. JacUson cedents that the
"individual-oriented framework" of psychoanalysis and the "group inter-
actional" framework of family therapy are essentially
"discontinuous sys-
tems" and that the language of one will not be appropriate for the other.
Moreover, the two systems are not strictly comparable and therefore, one
cannot be better than the other (p. 182). (These are remarkably Kuhnlan
views to be appearing in 1963. While Kuhn's first edition was published
In 1962, it seems unlikely that Jackson could have so quickly encountered
and Integrated it into something published early in 1963. In any case,
Jackson's view here is quite like Kuhn's 1970 revision).
Jackson felt that psychoanalytic terminology was often too imprecise
to risk further imprecision or confusion by its being "dragged into
Symbolic generalization" was the term used by Kuhn for a DM com-ponent. Symbolic generalization" denoted those terms or expressions
used consensually within a DM; thus, within a DM, such a term referred
to the same thing for everyone, and it conveyed the same meaning. The
same term used in a different DM might refer to something else, or adifferent aspect of the same thing, or mean something else.
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another field of usage" (p. 182) ; he demonstrated his point by dis-
cussing some of the confusion engendered when terms were applied to
fanaiies (pp. 182-184), mentioned such terms as "transference and
countertransference, sadism and masochism, ego strength and Oedipus
complex, "(p. 184) Finally, he recommended that the temptation to
borrow a language ready-made be resisted, and that family therapists be
gin constructing their own language system.
In the next Issue of Family Process. Paul challenged the necessity
of a new language, pointing out that "there Is a language available In
which human conduct, passions, relationships and dealings with one
another can be described. This Is the everyday language." (Paul, 1963.
p. 397) This was also an example of an obvious and Irrelevant point.
Jackson was arguing against Che use of psychoanalytic-terminology (and
by Inference, language from other psychiatric thought systems); he was
not recommending neologisms.
Paul's recommendations and illustrations run afoul of just the
problem Jackson was addressing. Among Paul's recommendations is the
term "role." Jackson points out that the usual individualistic orien-
tation of this term, its connotation from other systems and the diffi-
culty of using such a term for interactional processes. He finishes
by commenting that "The usual definition of role is quite different
from the one I have offered." (Jackson, 1963, p. 397)
While not strictly a methodological controversy, this small debate
is valuable in highlighting what happens when one person in a debate
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reaU.es
.Hac che.e is a
..sc.epanc, i„ 3...oUe sene.aU.aUons
enough. A .e.„„
,oUo„ed appa.enU.
..s.eaa J.e.son's „ea„.„,.
or If not, that was patently irrelevant- r-P.y xi i , recoimendations were made and
Jackson connnented on^ symb^^ generalization~ discrepancy
. ("The
usual
.eunluon of .ole is <,ui.e aiHerep.
, „
(.aCson, i,S3. p. 3„> ,3 such, .e ave»ea a pcssiMe s.e.iie cou.„-
vers, ova. a DM component. Such a con..„.e.s..
,0. instance, coul. ta.e
the fo™ Of two people arguing that their respective tern, was the
appropriate one for such and such (-such and such" of course helng not
Identical across the DM boundary and therefore though both are "correct"
for their own leaning of "such and such," neither will prevail and con-
vince the other to adopt their usage, as that usage will be "incorrect"
in the other DM)
.
When DM differences are dealt with on a DM level, however, the con-
troversies are resolvable.
A Kuhnian analysis, of certain methodological controversies, then,
has allowed the interpretation that what differed between each of the
pairs of groups arguing was paradigms and DMs; method or technique also
differed, but were not the sole area of difference, nor necessarily the
only such area. A Kuhnian analysis allows us to infer a number of things.
First, the debates were between Dm, based on different paradigms. Second,
method or technique was a focus of debate as it was a relatively ex-
plicit component of what we have termed the DM; thus, it at least was
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available fo.
.e.ate. Thi...
„eeho.olcs.cal de-
bates „ni not Be
.esolve.. type
.e.ate
.s an expression o£ „o.e
fundamental differences (paradig. and DM, „Mch „ould re^in even if the
technical debate were resolved, which It necessarily could not he, as
technique and method are not Independent of either paradigm or DM.
Differences In technique hased upon different paradigms cannot productively
be debated as though they were Independent of their respective paradigms.
For these reasons, the debates about technique between the relatlonallsts
and interpretatlonlsts, and the debate about method between Haley and
Schlamp were unresolvable at the technical and methodological level.
The fourth possible Inference Is that this is the case for some other
methodological and technical debates; some of these, if analyzed with
the present modified Kuhnian schema, will be seen to be Inter-DM
differences being argued at the wrong level. Fifth, Inter-DM differences
debated at the DM level itself will probably have greater potential for
resolution. While the attitudinal and commitment aspects of DMs would
of course, make .agreement or conversion unlikely, these aspects would
not necessarily preclude resolution. A successful such resolution might
be the Identification of points of difference, differentiation of trivial
from crucial differences, and the avoidance of protracted sterile osten-
sible methodological controversies. Because these controversies are an
expression of often fundamental differences, they are often Invested
with acrimony and frustration; as they are essentially unresolvable, they
continue and continue, draining effort from more fruitful endeavors and
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further obscuring the issues.
A sixth inference would Hp ^be that controversies likely to fall into
the "ostensible" cate^orv ^t,^ ug y, and hence to benefit by this type of inter-
pretation, would be controversion th=f.es that: were long-standing and protrac-
ted; appeared acrimonious at ti.es. too. place between what appeared to
be adherents to so.e sort of rival approaches or "schools"; and had
produced no resolution or progress toward resolution
. More subjectively
these debates ^y have a so.ewhat
"ostensible" feel to the™, as though
the participants were going over old ground and they were well-rehearsed.
With the present modifications of Kuhn's schema, these types of
controversies can now be Interpreted such that resolution is at least
possible
.
Group Structure of Scientific Activit
Use of Kuhn's scheina to examine the emergence of family therapy
emphasizes the group structure of research and practice. Particularly
because of Kuhn's DM concept, with its procedural, theoretical and
conceptual consensus across a group, the analysis allows several ele-
ments to emerge.
Facilitation of consensus, cooperation and productivity
. First, as has
been mentioned with respect to the DB .commitment to the same DM allows
several individuals to work together, despite some level of individual
differences. Obviously, the differences, if too great, preclude ad-
herence to the same DM, or contribute to its splitting; nevertheless.
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Within ce...n U.Us, a OM se.vas a cc.es.ve
,..nUa»„,
for a sroup of individuals anC as such, engenders
.eU.ivei,
.a.es
Of "productivity... An interesting question would be to inquire what
constitutes, specifically, these li.its. Also, presupposing DMs to
differ in their ability to '.tolerate., individual differences, what
characteristics would „ake for greater and lesser
'.tolerance?"
A group of people, working in concert, is often ™re productive than
those Identical people working in Isolation; the existence of several
individuals working in concer^ xrnhh-ir, ^ u j r-^ __ t withm a shared framework was very import
ant to the DB's development and influence.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^21^^ The DM concept also
emphasizes how interrelated its various components are, and thus, in-
dicates how interrelated the commitments are amon^ practitioners that
share a paradigm. To take an illustration from the DB DM, it becomes
clear that one reconceptualization necessarily leads to another, and
another; thus, the concept of homeostasis led to the extension from
"victim" and "binder" to three-party systems, then family rules; more-
over, reconceptualizations became operationalized through the DM's
particular set of methods and techniques. (Conversely, it will be
pointed out later, different techniques and methods between DMs are
often expressions of different sets of conceptualizations.)
Thus, for the DB DM, one change in thinking inevitably led to others
When one accepts the idea that a problem involves more
than one person and is a response to a current situation.
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it necessarily fnllnTic t-v,^*-
appropriate d^llllT Z sZTeTZT' ^^T"'"'fimpM-nr, nr, , ystem has an adaptive
Is not iri^f r""""" " '-""'^"^ "l-"onship and
.ind Of adaptatL:!"po1 raT^oHs""depressed, Che question for the family ^heJaplst
r;.:.'
•sr.r.sK-S
?hat a nerinn r'"'- ^^"^^^^^1^' ^^^her than assume
because of T ''"'^ °^ relationshipshis inner dynamics, it is assumed that his
Uvr^Wha't ' '''"'^f relationships in which Llives. What was considered primary and secondary gainIS reversed. (Haley, 1971b, p. 282)
The internal coherence of a DM points to the internally consistent
set of commitments which underlie the activities of scientists working
on the same (or a very similar) set of problems from the same perspec-
tive, and as such, underline the often implicit group structure of such
activity. As such, recognition of the group structure of science and
the internal coherence of DMs can help to avoid a prevalent situation
in what Masterman has called the social and information sciences.
Masterman talked about the lack of long-term progress in these areas
as the result of multiple paradigms. In a multiple paradigm area,
Masterman points out that technology develops to high levels, with
little in the way of guiding framework or goals. If the interrelated-
ness of DM commitments is kept in mind the willy-nilly extension of
methodology and high technology from a DM to some problem outside it
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will seem less valid and legitimate nr.i-^cgj.txmat , unless the DM'q o^Ko>.
^ other components
no. t.ea.e. as
.Housh tHe, a„ inaepen.en.,
,,,, „^
were independent, we end up with a sort- nf "P rt o mercenary methodology."
Similarly th.^ c xmxia i , e present Kuhnian
analysis Has e.pHasi.ed
.he .acU« or procedural aspects „, sclenUflc
actlvu.. Hsuall,.
.He e^ll.u aspects, „He.He.
.Heo.eUcal o. ™e.Ho.-
ological receive
.He Uon's sHa.e ac.en.lon. an. a.e In so„e „a.s
better understood. Hence. Anna Freud's (see CHapter IV, p. 58) argu-
ment that technique follows theory.
A Kuhnian analysis hy emphasising the Implicit procedural elements
particularly with respect to the prohlem-solvlng
..trick", wHlcH Becomes
a paradl^, obviously turns this priority on Its Head. Technique often
develops prior to theory; at least, the
.'early technical problem-solu-
tions" that in part comprise paradigms are prior to the theory. The
theory usually emerges during the elaboration of the paradigm. Then
obviously, more techniques and procedural elements follow as part of the
DM.
The application of Che Kuhnian analysis to the emergence of the DB
DM demonstrates the priority of procedure. So, In 1971b(p. 4), Haley
rh.
"bvlously, being Michael Polanyl's well-known term fothe non-explicit aspects of what a person knows or what s/he can do.
r
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stated:
struggUng to find a theory to fit their practicesThere was no theoretical model which could be "sed'to describe behavior In natural, ongoing groups andthere was no language for describing thii? rel^k^n-
Similarly, when Beels and Ferber (1972) watched family therapy
through one-way screens, examined video-tapes and Interviewed family
therapists, they decided that "We avoided the evaluation of theory be-
cause we believed that in many cases the theory advanced was a rational
zation for the practice..."
Also, once a paradigm has been developed, the DM is often extended
procedurally, with the theory following.
It would be preposterous to claim that from the outset
our work was oriented along such advanced epistemologicalprinciples. Rather, what led us in this direction, for
which we may invoke epistemological justification a posteriori
were eminently practical, mostly clinical considerlti^^^i
'
which we were able to conceptualize only after Gregory
Bateson and his original research team at the Veterans
Administration Hospital in Menlo Park had begun to apply
anthropological and cybernetic rather than psychiatric
principles to the study of families with an emotionally
disturbed member. (Watzlawick and Weakland
,
1977, p. l)
During DM development, or when an individual attempts to "enter"
or "learn" a DM, these tacit, procedural elements may be very difficult
to articulate and may require a good deal of trial and error by the
"outsider" attempting to join the group structure.
Attempts at formal training in family therapy also began
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T^eTsMlll he f ions, such as "What
knows how to do but Sas H ?f
^^^erapist teach what he
iTH Tl^ol^ifld^arf ^if^i^ describinir- When
treatmenr?.^r ""^^^ therapy iF^^^FTl^thod of
students like to have a "method" which thej can learn* f ^
o\^;ri;a?nid^Lr:- -ar^rnro^T.t;-i-h^Lv^::
(HaL„ i9nrpp"T7r:^;h\":L\^^\^;"-^"
Essentially, rather than being taught the approach, Haley is advising
learning by"ostension", Kuhn's version of learning by relevant and re-
petitive problem exposure. Rather than explicit teaching and learning,
the process resembles socialization over time, similar to what is found
in professional or graduate training programs.
Similarly, the tacit elements often include values, a DM component
recognized as influential in scientific activity, but usually disregarded,
at least, by other meta-scientif ic systems. Values operate across a
scientific group, influencing problem choice, approach and standards of
solution. These values in fact, operate as one of the few "automatic"
points of agreement; that is, they are usually not subjected to verifi-
cation or debate, in part because they are seldom recognized.
:ure
DM rather than "discipline" helpful
. The emphasis in group structi
is helpful in two more respects on different levels. First, by regarding
scientific activity as usually occurring in a group structure, formerly
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ey s account
to
chaouc suuaeions sain co.p.ehensiBUUy.
.o. e.a™ple,
Of the
.He.ape«ic i„„o..,.„3 in .He X,50.= ien.s UseU
remterpracatxon along DM or group structure Une=.
Ti:nT:il.°l IZT:, j= ^n-^^ons opener up
In the 1950 's a number'ortheraDj'tJT'" ^PP^^-^hes.
families Into treatment seS^^r . ^*^" '° '"'^"8 "l-ol^
the relationship among the ?amnV" K' '^'''"'^"Splat began to do this „^fh„ ^ members. Often a thera-
dolng It too wltMn r ? 'hat others were
distfnct sctool! of Lmllv^r"' J"""' ""^ '"^1-^
approaches con Luf o appea^'to'^ ^^^^^-l^P^^ -"d different
therapists do not necessa?itv ,^
""^^ different family
they share the Idea chaf^he^
=hare a common method, but
Finally, as Weimer and Palermo C1973 n 9^q^ up. 239) have pointed out,
Kuhn has made this point well in 'Reflections' A^.n
tizTf:::::, ^,^—^^^^"8 a part-^ui^rLcideTt- r"'uuimax or revolutionary. To d^riAt^ t n i-k ^- ,
o°ra:r!y\L"th"^ h°™^^ or^ret^^i^LL^rf^r^hr^^hru^t
sfientifl. I""
'^^^^^ ^"""^^^h g^°"P than a
d™!!,:;"'^^'^' """^^ °^ institutionalised academic
This shift in focus, from "scientific subject matter" or "institution-
alized academic discipline" to a particular research group proves helpful
when perusing the scientific landscape. For example, early in this
essay (see Introduction), I found it intuitively necessary to choose a
"school" of family- therapy, the DB group, as my focus, rather than all
of family therapy; moreover, a disclaimer was necessary, to the effect
that "family therapy" as an activity spanned a number of academic dis-
ciplines and professional groups (i.e., psychology, sociology, education
and Ph.D.'s, M.D.'s, M.S.W.'s, R.N.'s, etc.). Attempting to delineate
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Wl. .He.ap...
.3.„s .he usual
.eco,„..ea ca.e,o.,es uot „o..
Whereas focussin, on one of ehe groups which comprised family
.he.apy
did wor.. The fa.Uy therapy aeld is .ore helpfully categorized or
viewed
,y OM rather than hy academic or professional discipline; family
therapy Is comprised of several distinguishable DMs, none of who. re-
spect disciplinary boundaries, sociologically or conceptually.
This view is helpful In other areas of the social sciences as well;
for instance: psychoses tics, forensic psychology and psychiatry, neuro-
psychology. While It is quite possible that any of the above can be
investigated or scientific activity can proceed within one discipline
(e.g., medicine, psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, stress research
for psychosomtlcs, etc.) the relevant structure is usually not the
name of the discipline (or even sub-discipline) but rather the problem
addressed and
_the ^roup workina £" it. In scientific practice, these
groups are often interdisciplinary and individuals identify themselves
with the problem/working group rather than the disciplines at large.
To a large extent, the ability of the Kuhnlan schema to highlight
the group structure of science was made possible only after Kuhn began
to explicate the DM Idea. While the paradigm concept implied a group
structure, the relationship was sufficiently ambiguous and tenuous
that no one wrote of Its possibilities in terms of group structure.
With the DM obviously a group concept, the group activities and pro-
cesses in scientific activity emerged. Using the DM concept as the
relevant structure of scientific activity, a Kuhnian analysis allows
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interpretation of the rp^;,^.•^ u-elat.onshxp of the Interpretatlonl.ts,
relat
al.sts. and fa.lly therapists than an analysis In
preclude.
ion-
academic terras would
The
DB
was not,
^^^^^^i^^^^^^i2-°i-DB_Jan^ theranv to .1 • .
Kuhnian analysis allows us to interpret rh. i •t e relationship between
farail,
.herap. and classical psychoanalysis; BB Wly therapy
contrary to an often-found misconception a reactio ^inio , n to psychoanalysis
or else how coula one explain fa.Il, therapists (and founders of para-'
<iiS»s I„ their o„n rl.ht) li.e Hathan
.e.er^n or l.an Bos.or.en.I-«as.
both of „ho„ can ha regarded as psychoanalytic In the larger sense.'
ACer^an and Bos.or.enyl-.agy responded to certain ano^lles In psycho-
analysis hut neither rejected psychoanalysis In toto (as have^ of
the behaviorists) nor did they establi<.h i-h.-n blis their paradigms in reaction to
it as a system.
Neither, however was DB family therapy Independent fro. psycho-
analysis. DB family work was related to psychoanalysis In that the
9
By this I mean that both dp^l t7H-u -fr,*-^
as family structure and dynamics both are co'^T^" P^°f-^<=^ as well
analytic concents thonph fh. , f omfortable with psycho-
n the rict 1 e 'c?™""; ^^^^^^^ ^ Psychoanalytic
theirML ' classical or Interpretative sense, by virtue of
not thHeasr bv" th b"' P-cesses, as well as lnt;aplychlc:andhe le t, y eir eing founders of family therapy DMs.
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la... p.ovi.ed
.He ano^aUes
.pon „hUh
.He OB pa.aa.,„
we.e THe OB ,.o.p
.esponae.
.o ee«a.„
.„„..aes
PsycHoa„al,si3. an. no. .o
.He ,.a„e.o.. a. U.^e. Po.
.ns.ance
„3s
no.
.He case
.Ha. psycHoanaiy.is
"did no. „o.,... Hecanse nsoally, u
Clearly did and was successful bo.H conceptually and clinically. THa
Kuhnlan analysis allows ns .o perceive
.He connec.lon He.ween OB fa.Uy
therapy and specifically psycHoanalysls did no. wor., under wHa.
circumstances (ex.enslon). and „Hy (concept of anomaly). Kor Instance
extension to borderline patients produced anomaly (discrepancy between
paradlg^-lnduced expec.ancy and .He empirical findings) wi.H respect
to the psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism and transf
j .
:erence.
Lassical
Relationship of tJ;e^elaMonaL_DM^^
,1,,,^^^
i^SlahH-alXsls. The analysis also Helps to clarify the relationship of
Harry S.ack Sullivan and .he rela.ionalis.s to both psychoanalysis and
family therapy DMs. The relational DM, founded by Sullivan, originated
in different circumstances
.Han .He early psychoanaly.ic framework,
.hen
developed parallel to .he classical psychoanalytic line of development.
Wi.H the extension of classical psycHoanalysls, problems in clinical
work impelled the more adven.urous of the psychoanalysts to cast abou.
for assis.ance in dealing wi.H .Hese difficul.ies and many of chem en-
countered .He Sullivanian interpersonal approach. By the 1940's, when
anomalies were apparent (a. leas, among those analysts treating the
new clinical populations), Sullivan's system was well articulated, and
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clmican,
..ecess.ul. an, s„U,va. M.seU was a. C.es.n..
,o.,e al
ready an Influential psychiatric facility.
A Kuhnlan analysis in DM ter„s allows the observer to identify
^hose analysts and therapists who are relationalists. and to differen-
tiate the„ fro. Classical analysts and other therapists. The criteria
Of differentiation re^in the paradises regardins how to effect cure
Keeping the criteria in
.i„d, it heco.es clear once again that the
OB family therapy paradig™ „as revolutionary and responsive to prohle.3
-
the classical interpretationist DM. and not the relationalisfs.
The Kuhnlan analysis highlights another important, and related point.
The problems in individual psychoanalytic treatment discussed here, were
iHt a disconflr^tion of the psychoanalytic paradigm, DM, or clinical
practice. They were not areas of error or mistake or theoretical
clumsiness in an otherwise adequate framework. The framework remains
confirmed in a number of theoretical aspects over almost a century of
clinical work. The anomalies occur onl^ i„ areas of extension to new
phenomena and only during that process of extension. Anomalies occur
as the result of a framework being pushed too far; essentially, they
identify the phenomena beginning with which a particular paradigm and
DM do not work. It would seem that each paradigm and DM must have such
a "border of applicability" that in time and extensions, becomes in-
creasingly obvious and eventually acknowledged. A Kuhnlan analysis
allows differentiation between disconfirmation at the heart of a
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framework, and anomalies at ^ uxts perxphery. Both processes eventually
result in the replacement nf io at least parts of the framework, but the
route is very different n-; ^ r-. Disconf
.rmaticn can occur at almost anytime;
but anomaly can occur only aftpr fh„i e the paradigm has preyed Itself success-
ful and was then extended to new phenomena.
in Short, evaluation of a modified Kuhnlan analysis would In-
dicate that It is enormously useful historically, sociologically, and
intellectually. The modified Kuhnlan analysis allowed a productive
interpretation of the events surrounding the emergence of family therapy
it provided a potentially helpful form of Interpretation for certain
sterile controversies, and the analysis highlighted several important
features related to the group structure of scientific activity.
CHAPTER VIII
PROBLEMS, REQUIREMENTS AND USES OF THE KUHNIAN ANALYSISFOR PSYCHOLOGY'S FELT CRISIS
""^"^^^
In the preceding chapter, a revised Kuhnian analysis was said to
be helpful in a number of „ays. In .his chapter, two Important deficits
in the Kuhnian schema will be discu^spH a,.^ ^e a s ed, and two proposed solutions
presented. Then some conclusions will follow.
'-^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^
of Scientific Activity '
As was pointed out in Chapter although Kuhn's concept answered
several of the criticisms which had been levelled at his overall schema,
it introduced some new problems in turn. Of particular importance, Kuhn's
DM statements merely implied rather than defined, the size of a DM. Two
sorts of boundaries are required to determine the "inclusive perimeter"
of a DM: one sociological and the other conceptual (or structural). Neither
the size (structurally, conceptually or sociologically) nor the boundary
criteria were explicated by Kuhn.
Thus, Kuhn was not quite clear as to whether the DM was constituted
by the adherents to the same paradigm(s) (a sociological criterion) or
by the network of commitments (a conceptual or structural criterion).
My strong impression is that he favors the latter; hence, he explicated
the internal structure and constituents of a DM (i.e., the paradigms,
symbolic generalizations, models and values, as well as habits, instru-
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-tation. etc.) an. also speciUcall,
.e.e„ea . i^eUectual HaMts
neewor. of 0,™^^.
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^
his conceptual/s„uot..al
.ea„i„, (,.e.. ,He "network of co^u^en..'
sense of .He DM concept, „as used as the BM. ,^en usin, this version
a %oundar/. is available which helps to differentiate one DM £ro„
another and within which a single paradig™ (or paradi,™ set) .ay he
elaborated
.
This boundary was Introduced earlier as the
-border of
applicability."
S^ll-^l^EElicabillt^. Such a "border of applicability" Is established
by the gradual emergence of anomalies as the paradigm is elaborated and
extended to new phenomena. With successful extensions, that Is, where
empirical findings are consonant with paradlg^-lnduced expectations, the
DM constituents remain productively applicable and the DM Is extended.
When the extensions continue "Into" new phenomenon-areas where anomalies
begin to occur, that is, where there occur obdurate discrepancies be-
tween paradigm-Induced expectations and empirical findings, then the DM
framework Is no longer applicable or helpful and a gradually recognizable
limit is reached. As the DM matures and is extended by adherents to new
areas then a boundary will begin to be discernible, to those who think
In such meta-sclentlflc terms, and the real limits of the paradigm DM
will become obvious.
If a DM is visualized as a framework extending either as a circle
(or sphere), or as a "fan-shape" from the paradigm as focus, then the
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"^or,.r of
.ppUcaMUt... „ui .e ei..e. close, o. ,„.Her aependln,
upon
.he congruence between t.e characteristics of the phenomena and
^hose Of the paradigm and OM.
.ot alx gto.ps of phenomena „ould lend
themselves as easily, or as poorly, tc a particular DM.
.or example,
-th respect to Preud's classical paradlg..e«enslons to other neuroses
fro. hysteria, and to psychotic depression reached the borders of
applicahllity
.uch later than in schizophrenia. Almost as soon as
schizophrenia was investigated by the classical psychoanalytic DM
anomalies began to emerge. With respect to the borders of applicability
When the DM extended into the area of schizophrenia, the border or
limits occurred quite soon and "clo<5e" tn ^hoC os o the paradigm. Viewed in this
-ay a DM seems amoeba-liUe, gently extending its boundaries and finding
some areas more congenial than others. Structurally, the limits of a
DM's applicability become discernible with the emergence of anomalies.
There are no criteria in Kuhn for the sociological size of a DM.
In what ways can the number of DM adherents be ascertained and where is
the limit set by which one can assign individuals in or out of a DM?
Taking particularly a paradigm as the focus, and surveying a geography
of researchers, at what point from that paradigm is an individual a DM
member? How directly must s/he work with the paradigm to be functioning
within a particular DM? At what point do the problems, methods and
solutions of that researcher cross over into a different DM? Kuhn's
analysis requires answers to these questions, but does not include any
starting points. A series of studies about coherent group structure
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m science, however, provide this element and ts not incompatible with
Kuhn's analysis.
Coherent grou^^tructure. Recent work by Griffith and Mullins (1972)
provide a necessary supplement to the Kuhnian schema. ^ Griffith and
Mullins (1972) and Small and Griffith (1974) have investigated small,
very active scientific research groups that had proved scientifically
••successful." Based on Crane's (1972) work on "invisible colleges" where
she "mapped" the structure of some specialties, Griffith and Mullins
(1972) contend that major scientific changes are generated within small,
"socially coherent" groups with similar characteristics. They differen-
tiate between the "loose networks" that appear normal for science and
the occasional formation of small socially coherent groups that formu-
late "radical conceptual reorganization(s) " (p. 960) of their field.
Loose networks
.
Across these loose networks, different groups used a
variety of means to facilitate communication. Hence, one research area,
speech perception, was small enough that few communicational problems
arose despite the relatively low level of social organization (p. 959).
In other groups, conference series and exchanges of papers before pub-
1_
.
This is not to imply that Griffith and Mullin's material must
necessarily be subsumed within Kuhn's; my impression is that it can well
stand on its own. ITowever, since it does meet a perceived need in the
Kuhnian analysis very well, I will present it with special reference to
this problem of the "inclusive perimeter."
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lication
.e.
_icational needs (p. 959). However, Griffith and •
Mullins found that the adoption or development of a particular pattern
Of co^ication within these specialties was determined, not solely by
the structure of any particular group, hut also by the problem it was
currently investigating. (The importance of the problem under investi-
gation Clearly provides a point of compatibility with Kuhn's schema which
also emphasizes problems and their solutions.)
For example, psycholinguists seemed to develop differpn^
in the process of applying psychological theories and methodology to studies of language (as they did afte^ the deveL;.
ef? ct oTdr'T' Tr^^- research in Ih
°'
tte s f ugs on behavior formed a small specialty in which
r ^^aJc'h: s'^Sd'th'^'^ ""t^'T^' '^'"^''^^ °^ Indivilu f
tlon ^
membership of groups in close communica-
Interes?s' T^f^"^''^ ^° - —-^T
nlll . ^
""^^ particularly well served by jour-a s thus informal contacts were not supplementing or re-placing publications. (1972, pp. 959-960)
Griffiths and Mullins (p. 960) regard these loose networks of re-
searchers as resulting from "'normal' scientific activities" and thus
conforming generally to the conventional scientific wisdom of objectivity
and emotional neutrality.^ They mention that a Kuhnian might regard
such groups "as working to fill out existing paradigms" i.e., to be
DMs. This appears to me to be a legitimate identity to make.
2
A Kuhnian analysis would of course disagree regarding their point
about neutrality and objectivity.
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^^^^^iil^oUer^BL^,^
^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^
further di«er.„„a.ea between the loose networks of „o™al science
and
.o.e tl^htl,
.nit sronps tHat appear to .e essential!,
.evolntlonar..
They studied six of these Prnnno- ^.g oups, the phage workers In biology. Skinner-
ian psychologists, the ,uantu. physics group m Copenhagen, the Coettlnge,
mathematicians, the audition researchers in psychology and the ethno-
methodologlsts in sociology (p. 960)
.
All six groups achieved a "radical conceptual reorganisation within
their field... The
.e.hers of each group were convinced that they were
achieving either the overthrow of a .ajor position In their field, or
making a ™aJor revision in methodology, m fact, each of the six groups
did offer a distinctively different theory or methodology which both
countered the currently dominant approach and became influential in its
own right. Each group maintained its beliefs over a protracted period
and each eventually demonstrated substantial achievements. According
to Griffith and Mulllns (1972. p. 960) none of the groups consistently
maintained the attitude of "disinterested objectivity that Is regarded
as a norm of science..." m fact, these groups often entered the politics
of science to further their beliefs by obtaining or protecting appoint-
ments and research supports. Finally, each group operated through
close and continual interaction..,.'
...when an audition researcher was asked whether he and
others in his field exchanged preprints (prepubllcatlon
copies of papers), he said that such exchange was usually
unnecessary because they followed one another's work so
closely that often a single, newly found constant sufficed
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to inform others of an important advance. (1972, p. 960)
internany, all six groups were characterized by the presence .£
an acknowledged intellectual and organisational leader (or leaders) a
geographical center, and a brief period of comparatively intense activity
(P. 960). For instance, in quantum mechanics, Bohr was both the in-
tellectual and organizational leader; the geographical location was
Copenhagen and the period of intense activity from 1920-1934 (inclusive)
(p. 961).
toong the Skinnerians, Skinner was the acknowledged intellectual
leader, while organizational leadership was assumed by what Griffith
and Mullins refer to as a "cadre of students and postdoctoral fellows"
at Harvard. The period of Intense activity occurred at both Columbia
and Harvard from 1947-1960. (Palo Alto was clearly the DB's geographical
center
.
)
The intellectual leader was conceptualized as laying the original
conceptual foundations for the work, as making public statements of
theory and research, resulting in an acknowledged theoretical break, and
as approving or validating other members' work (p. 961). The intellec-
tual leader was largely responsible for establishing the innovative
conceptual base. Clearly in the DB group, Gregory Bateson fulfilled these
roles and can be regarded as the intellectual leader.
The organizational leader in all six groups was a respected researcher
in his own right, (e.g., Klein in the Goettingen mathematicians with
Hilbert and Minkowski as the intellectual leaders.)
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tacilities for research and means for conununicatine
Internally, the organizational leader functioned to maintain
scientific activity within the group's program. Griffith and Mullins
(p. 961) felt that their findings generally indicated "a conscious
effort to direct the group's work toward a specified series of prob-
lems, from a particular perspective, with a stated goal." (p. 961)
In Kuhnian terms, the organizational leader could be said to maintain
the focus on the elaboration of the paradigm, within DM boundaries (with
regard to models, values, etc.). An inference could be made that while
the intellectual leader could be primarily credited for the paradigm
(as s/he established the innovative conceptual base), the organizational
leader could be credited for maintaining and guiding the DM, in both
the sociological and conceptual aspects. Thus, the organizational
leader, according to Griffith and Mullins. arranged appointments, con-
ferences, and research programs - fostering the research activities.
At the same time, s/he would maintain that activity within paradigm-
directed boundaries, e.g., the organizational leader functioned with a
"conscious effort to direct the group's work toward specified problems,
from a particular perspective, with a stated goal." (1972, p. 961)
It appears to me difficult to tell which of the central DB members
fulfilled the role of organizational leader. In later years (after the
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1962 dissolution) WatzlawlcU filled this position In organizing con-
ferences, publishing reviews and editing compilations. More personal,
and/or detailed information regarding the Internal organization and roU
Of the DB DM would be needed to accurately ascertain who. and whether,
there was an organizational leader(s).
Each of the six groups established theoretical and sociological
boundaries and provided identity and In-group versus out-group lines
(p. 960). (Thus, for the operant conditioners, the HuUlan learning
theorists were the out-group. For DB members, the individualistic psy-
choanalysts constituted the out-group). Also, the boundary served to
severely limit the range of Incoming information regarded as relevant.
Griffith and Mulllns (p. 961) refer to "their general Indifference to
the work of other researchers..." which, naturally, helped to generate
antagonism.
Each of the six groups also concerned itself with recruitment of
new members (p." 962), facilitation of communication (p. 962), and the
protection of priority rights of discovery of its members.
There are several points of compatibility and complementarity be-
tween Kuhn's schema and the Griffith and Mullins work on "invisible
colleges." Both emphasize the importance of "the problem" as a focus
for organization of the research group; they emphasize the group struc-
ture of science and the importance of the "socially coherent" work group
with respect to communication, productivity, originality, and identity.
They appear compatible in seeing science as having "normal" and revolu-
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tionary phases, with progress ^it^^r. ^alternating between the accretionary and
the revolutionary (or "innovative") Griff." ^h ^ m;
.
i fit and Mullins make a
differentiation Kuhn does not - between innovative revolntiona., an.
innovative elite but do not identify „,at is fu„dan.entail, different
about the..3 ^uhn's sche^ i^pUes that the
.evolutionary groups Have
a truly revolutionary paradigm for a large proportion of the relevant
disciplines, whereas for elite groups, the innovative paradigm is not
so Clearly opposed to the dominant framework in so.e way (whether con-
ceptually or proportionally to number adherents of the dominant approach)
Finally, both analyses perceive sceince as conducted In groups
Which have developmental aspects: inception, intense activity and either
dissolution or absorption as beliefs gain adherents and respectability.
Supplen-enting Kuhn's sche.^ with the work of Crane, and of Griffith
and MuUlns and S^ll provides both direct information and also some
heuristic uses. For Instance. Small and Griffith (1974, p. 35) Indicate
that the structure of biomedical literature differs from that of the
physical sciences, they provide a methodology using citations in publi-
cations they had found useful. Taking Into consideration their point
w^.„
Elite innovative groups such as Bohr's quantum mechanics groups,ere recognized by other members of their field, as being of central
(r°Mm" ^"^"J ^"i^^ly diverging from those other researchers(p. 960). The audition researchers and the Goettlngen mathematicians
were also in this category. The Sklnnerlans, phage biologists and
ethnomethodologists were perceived by Griffith and Mullins (p. 961) as
revolutionary: as both more highly organized, and more clearly opposed
to the outgroup. Their criteria appear not as firm as Kuhn's for his
revolutionary paradigms.
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resa.d.„s dU.e.en.
...c..es, o„e can
.peculate
....
.He s.^e...
-
Xite.a.u.e in .He
.ocUX sciences
.a. He au.e.en.
.Ha„ eUHe.
.Ha.
of the physical or biomedical sciences.
The
..invlslHle collese.' „or. also sheds some 11,H. on .he unresolved
problem of DM "inclusive perimeters" in th. v u -P e Kuhnxan analysis. Kuhn does
no. specif,
.He average "si.e.. or Incl.siveness o£ a CM, nor how closely
a researcher «s. work with
.he paradigm
.o He a legl.ima.e memHer of
a DM. Griffi.H and Mullins' work suggests
.ha. revolu.lonary DHs are
rather small in number and .hat researchers deal with the paradlgm(s)
rather directly. Normal science DMs appear larger and more diffuse, with
more permeable boundaries and less antagonism He.ween in- and ou.-groups.
Need for the "Meta" DM Con^Pp ^
Kuhn's formulation of the DM concept brings up a second major prob-
lem. This problem is pointed to by two different types of issues. The
first concerns the relationship of "clusters" of DM's within the family
therapy field. The second concerns controversies that appear to be
either methodological or inter-DM debates, which, upon closer inspection,
cannot adequately be accounted for by either method or the DM concept.
To take the first issue first: it is obvious in perusing
the family therapy landscape that there are a number of DMs. The DB DM
is one. Others include the DM developed around the work of Nathan
Ackerman in New York City, and that around Lyman Wynne's work in Rochester.
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in Philadelphia, Salvador Mlnuchin's „o.. Has been developed i„o a
weU-.„o™ OM. a„d I. Bos.o™en.l-«a...3
„o.. I3 heco.in, l„e.easl„,l,
influential. Mo.eove.. several other 0„s are belns. or have heen. deve-
loped (e.s.. around
.he Ideas and practice of Hurra, Bo„e„, of SpecU and
Attneave, and of Bell.)
several of these separate and differentiable DMs in fa.ily therapy
see. to "belong with" or cluster with the DB DM. Such a DM would be
Minuchin-s structural fa.ily therapy DM. Though the two DMs are based
on different paradigms and use different symbolic generalizations, heuris-
tic .odels, techniques and goals, there are so.e affinities between the™.
Structuralists can be comfortable with DB techniques and vice versa.^
Both groups stress problem solving, change, and short-term work rather
than insight, explanation, and "deep- change. Both groups exclusively
focus, in conceptualization and clinical practice, on the s^ and not
with the individual. Yet adherents from each group would bristle at being
asked to cross their respective DM boundaries into the other DM. and their
own DM identities are firmly maintained. Kuhn's DM concept can neither
explain the ways in which these two DMs cluster with each other, nor why
this cluster is so far removed from another found in the family field.
4
In fact, after the dissolution of the DB DM and Minuchin's estab-lishment of his DM, Jay Haley left Palo Alto and joined Minuchin in
Philadelphia. They apparently worked closely together for some time,
then parted their association, neither one of them "crossing" into the
other s DM. and both continuing after the separation, to exemplify and
develop their respective DMs. Minuchin staying in Philadelphia and
Haley going to Washington, D.C. (Minuchin. 1974)
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This second cluste. of DMs Includes Ivan Bos.o^enyl-Nagys DM
m Philadelphia, AcUe^an's in .e„ York, „el„ sti^rlin's in West
Ce^an, and R.o.
.ains's in C.ea. B.i.ai„.=
.u of these B„s deal „itK
the integration of the fa.ily s.ste. and the individual, and allow
phe„o.enolos, in their practice and conceptualisation. Ml these groups
emphasise understanding, insight and explanation in relation to change-
also, treatment tends to be longer than in the first cluster and is
directed toward
"deeper-changes. There exists a good deal of acrimony
about this issue; the DB and related DMs deride Nagy, Acker^an, etc..
as being psychoanalysts, while this second cluster usually regards the
techniques of the DB and Minuchin cluster to be conducive to only the
most superficial of changes. Also, this second cluster will occasionally
address larger issues, (e.g., role of childhood, adolescence in the
20th century, changing role of the fa.lly, etc.) while the first cluster
will almost never engage in such discussion. Those in the second cluster
often have their conceptual roots in psychoanalysis (e.g., Acker„an.
Boszormenyi-Nagy)
,
though they are obviously family therapy and not
psychoanalytic DMs.^
^Although I am not very familiar with Norman Paul's work reeardineunresolved grief reactions across generations, it seems that hL DMalso belongs here.
6
It should be pointed out that the conceptualizations and values
fK^^^.^ ^''f^^P ^° psychoanalysts; nothing is being implied hereabout the training of the therapists before they became family thera-pists. Thus, Salvador Minuchin and Donald Jackson were both trainedas analysts. Minuchin's paradigm and DM, however, are not related in
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Kuhn-. DM concept, unfortunately, cannot explain the basis under
which these clusterings occur, nor what n«.es the two clusters so ob-
viously disparate ,ro™ each other.^ «,at is obvious is that so.a 'Wta-
DM concept is re,uired-one which provides both the criteria of inclusion
within cluster and the criteria of disparity between DM clusters. For
instance, about what kinds of things do the Intra-cluster DMs agree?
One example
.Ight be that the DMs .ust agree with regard to metaphysical
models; while Kuhn has included both metaphysical and heuristic models
as DM components, I would reeard hP^r^Q^^r> m^^^il g a neuristic models as appropriate to the
DM concept level (e.g., cybernetics as a heuristic model for the DB
homeostatic aspect of the paradigm), but metaphysical models as in-
appropriate to that DM level. The other DM components are rather
narrowly focused: thus, "values" relate, for Kuhn, primarily to good
theory construction. Heuristic models, like cybernetics, are appropriate
at this DM level. Metaphysical models fall outside this type of narrow-
concept, practice or concerns with Ackerman's or Nagy's, but is relatedto the^ DB s. Apparently when Minuchin formulated his paradigm, he "leftbehind the psychoanalytic thinking. Jackson, on the other hand, did
not. Though he formulated the DB, his continued adherence to his former
training eventually resulted in a split between him and the mainstream
DB formulations; for instance, his insistence on the legitimacy and
necessity of phenomenological issues is similar to a psychoanalytic
position, but resulted in the 1959 DB DM split. This insistence upon
phenomenology is also present in Ackerman's and Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s work.
am not implying here that there are only two of these DM clusters
in the family therapy field; there may be several more. These two are
the only ones I have discerned.
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focus conceptualUatlon. The function served by DMs do not use or requir
metaphysical models. They belong probably to that "meta-DM level; a
further point of Inquiry should focus on a comparison of metaphysical
assumptions across the DMs within one o£ those large clusters and then
between these large clusters.
Another issue that suggests the need for a meta-DM concept concerns
ostensible methodological or inter-DM controversies which, upon close
inspection, are actually debates about typical and repetitive inter-
cluster issues which are fundamental and often pre-logical. An example
of this type of "meta-DM" controversy took place within the DB DM in
the guise of a methodological debate, and led directly to the 1959 split.
"Meta"-DM debate. The debate very probably occurred in late 1956 or
early 1957. Haley (1976, pp. 72 and 75) states that early in 1956, the
project shifted to emphasize actual family behavior and that differences
surfaced with the pressure of dealing with actual families; also, he
states that these differences in approach did not begin to appear in
publications until 1958, "the next year that project members published
papers." (p. 75)
It became obvious to the project members that there was a large
gap between their conceptualizations, particularly the double bind idea
itself and the raw data of family interaction. They felt that some
8
It might be recalled here that the DB paradigm had been formulated
deductively; as such, when the group came to "test", compare or apply
it to actual data, some degree of bridging material would almost inevi-
tably be lacking. It is probably only a point of curiosity but, if all
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type of theoretical ^odel „as necessary to describe both fa.il, patterns
during conversation and also those characteristic patterns of behavior
of families Which contained a schizophrenic ™e„ber. They agreed that
the "theoretical
.odels and terminology of psychoanalysis and other
psychological approaches were Inadequate for the proble." (Haley, 1976a,
p. 73), but began to disagree upon what sort of approach to use fro.
there.
tro"^"''^! P^°je^t Which had been in-
?here hid
beginning became more evident.
llTt .t t 7" - controversy ove;
Itl ^°"«>"^i-ation to focus upon and what termin-£i21Z £nd .theoretical models to use. A schism devel^^S^between (a) a strictly-communication approach dealing withthe description of observable messages in terms of LogicalTypes, and (b) an approach which emphasized the codificationof messages, or the internal processes of the receiver and
IZl learning. 9 (Haley, 1976a, p. 73;emphasis added) jf-
The debate centered upon the paradigmatic "levels of communication",
particularly with respect to the message and its qualifier. According
to Haley's account (1976a, pp. 73-75), the "internal processes wing"
argued that the distinction between a message and the codification of
a message by a receiver was fallacious. Later they argued that the
revolutionary paradigms are developed deductively, as Kuhn has implied,
IS there always this difficult point of convergence, when empirical
material is brought to bear on the idea? This process certainly occurredin relation to the theories of relativity forwarded by Einstein, whoseparadigms had been deductive. Whether this is also the case for less
widely known paradigms is unclear.
9
The first of these approaches was labelled the "behavioral wing"
and the second the "internal processes wing" or the "higher generalizations
wing.
"
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terminology should be maintained at a higher level of generalization
than the .ere description of messages. The terminology of this vlng
included such concepts as "learning, perception, awareness, expectation
and the language of emotions." (p. 73) Important questions for then.
were whether the receiver nf hV.o ^^^^o the messages were aware, whether s/he was
mispercelvlng or misinterpreting, and what his/her experience might be
••was he suffering trauma, was he experiencing grief, was the experience
hurtful, and so on." This wing objected to restricting the use of the
DB to specific interpersonal situations and preferred to use the concept
quite broadly; thus, they felt the term to be applicable to evolutionary
processes and telencephalization of the brain as well as an interactional
pattern in families conducive to the development of schizophrenia. From
the positions argued by this internal process wing, it can be inferred
that it was comprised of Jackson and very probably Bateson.
Haley was clearly a member of the "behavioral wing."^^ This wing
believed the preferable approach to be the study of
-strictly observable
messages" (1976, p. 74), and argued that an "age old problem of psychology-
could be avoided if they studied only those things which could be direct-
ly observed and verified. This wing believed that the concept of levels
of communication made it appear possible, for the first time, to develop
10O^nce again, Weakland's position is more difficult to discern here.
He might not have had a firm position but rather may have served as a
mediator and helped the DM to produce as much as it did from the split
in 1959 to dissolution in 1962.
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a systematic description of human behavior To on ^
•
n . continue to deal with
metaphoric statements about the internal processes of the individual
even if conceived in a different (p. perceived as leadini
project bac. to psycholosy^s preoccupation
.ith the individual
and away from its identity with the study of inter.n^•^L a r active processes. It
was argued that the more the focu^ ^^<.s was upon the interchange of messages
the more complete the description.
The .ore highly general S the' deflnuZ^rras the double bind the r,r,r. °' such
develop a systematic
di«icult it would be to
the daL.lfcSyriS^^^p^Nl? ^PPli<=d to
The internal processes wing argued that the behavioral wing was too
narrow in its approach, and the behavioral wing that the other was too
diffuse and ambiguous to have useful application to actual data (pp. 74-
75).
The two Wings differed with respect to: type of approach, admissible
types of data, degree of generalisation for the DB concept; also whether
certain processes fell into their own. or the other, wing. Thus, they
debated upon where "learning" belonged: the behavioral faction argued
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.hat the te™ 'learning..
„as not a co^icaticn te™ for descriptive
'
purposes, while the Internal processes group
..argued that It certainly
was and should be wae^A -i-n ^ ^used rn a description of the data/' (Haley, 1976a, p. 75)
It is apparent that Haley recognized these differences as very
serious and perhaps fundamental, certainly „ore than methodological.
Haley remarked that these differences were Inherent
.'from the be-
ginning., (p. 73) of the project, and that the positions taken antedated
the DM Itself. These positions ware increasingly reflected in the work
in progress when It was subjected to the pressure of direct empirical
application.
Methodology develops within a DM and is related to the DM's other
constituents. Arguments about methodology can be resolved within a DM
as the adherents share other DM constituents, especially the paradigm,
and as such have a shared context, set of goals, terms, etc., through
which to argue the specific differences of method. It is specifically
because method is not independent of DM that inter-DM methodological
debates are fruitless. Each side is arguing a DM-dependent methodology'
to another DM-dependent methodology as though the methodologies were
DM-independent
.
In the present case of the behavioral vs. internal processes de-
bate, the differences stem not from different DMs, but rather from
antecedent and fundamental differences in conceptual-philosophical
orientations, which will be designated as "meta-DMs" (MDMs) . Questions
regarding whether behavior or phenomenology is more important, and
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Which can be studied and why, are answered at .he M,„ level and not at
the DM level of symbolic generalization, heuristic ™dels. paradigms
and values regarding theory construction. The choice between behavior
and phenomenology occurs because of prior adherence to a M,„. Haley
identified their differences as predating the project, as Inherent in
the position they took, and as persistent through time.
These are the sa„e MDMs alluded to in the foregoing discussion of
"clusters" of DMs. The cluqtPrQ nf hmo • , .m C s e s of DMs occur within one MDM, and the
two MDMs provide the criteria fr^y -tr.^! , ,for inclusion and the boundaries between
those two family therapy clusters.
^^^^i^-£^^ii5linar^^ Some preliminary constituents of
MDMs can be identified by examining what is shared by DMs within their
respective MDM's and also by examining the areas of consistent diff-
erences between the two identified MDMs. It should already be clear
that the MDM constituents would have to include both explicit and
implicit aspects, and both intellectual and atcitudinal components.
In the following discussion the cluster of DMs formed by the DB
DM and Minuchin's DM will be referred to as MDM I; the cluster of DMs
formed by Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s , Stierlin's and Ackerman's DMs will be
12
referred to as MDM II. Reviewing the DM clusters several patterns
12
This IS not to imply that other family therapy DMs do not or
cannot fall within one or another of these MDMs, or some other MDM.
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emerge
.
'-^^^l^^^^l^iS^^ ri.3t, the DMs Within ^^.M I ascribe to a
logical positivistic orientation, whereas those DMs in the second >.M
all ascrihe to a dialectical orientation . ^3 This difference in philo-
sophical orientations corresponds to differences in what Radnit.Icy has
termed the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition (for logical positivism)
and the Continental intellectual tradition (dialectics). (Parenthe-
tically, the Continental tradition in this country is markedly less
powerful than the Anglo-Saxon, and most of the DMs which adhere to it
occupy a counter-dominant position in their fields. Thus Boszormenyi-
Nagy's DM is counter-dominant to Minuchin's in terms of influence,
number of adherents and to a certain degree, their perception of their
own positions vis-a-vis each other. The way in which these two MDMs
conceptualize what the problem is and what their goals are, is heavily
influenced by their (usually implicit) adherence to either pisitivism
or dialectics. One of the constituents then differentiating the two
is a difference in philosophical orientation
. This point receives some
support if one recalls the reservations mentioned earlier regarding
metaphysical models. My strong impression was that, while heuristic
13
Sanity
For instance, with respect to MDM II, see: Laing and Esterson's
r»
Madness and the Family (1964); Boszormenyi-Nagy and Spark, (1970)
;
and Stierlin (1968) for family therapists who could be considered to
cluster in MDM II; for MDM I family therapists, see Haley (1973), and
Minuchin. 1974.
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models were indeed constituents of DMs, metaphysical models had no
place in the DM as narrowly defined by Kuhn and Masterman and as used
in the present analysis. There is obviously a similarity between the
ideas of "metaphysical models" and of "philosophical orientations",
and they appear to occupy the same, more abstract level of thinking
than the heuristic models. For this reason, heuristic models appear
appropriate to the DM level of conceptualization and philosophical
orientation (and metaphysical models) the MDM level.
Value systems. Secondly, they differ with respect to the values to
which they adhere and these values are consonant with the philosophical
orientation of the respective MDMs. A particularly strong contrast in
values between the two MDMs corresponds to the differences between
predictive understanding and interpretive understanding. Thus, MDM I
values prediction, control, results as measured by change in family
structure (either as expressed in communication or subsystem coalitions
and splits)
. MDM II on the other hand values understanding, insight,
and dialogue and what Radnitzky (1973) has called an "emancipatory
,,14interest
.
Thus, DB and structural family therapies have been criticized by
14
An "emancipatory interest" is usually defined as a concern with
the forces influencing or acting upon an individual in his/her social
and economic context; the well-being of the individual is of concern.
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non-aahe.en.s fo.
.a.n.ainin,
..e oppressive s.atus in so.e
.a.iUe
and for .he fact that it is not at all unco^^on for the. to reinforce
cultural, social, or gender stereotypes in what they state is in the
service of change. They are often criticized by the II adherents
for
.aking only '.surface" changes which either back-fire or dissipate;
I adherents clai. that the MDM II therapists are really psycho-
analysts and in their pursuit of "deep" changes, require either a
select population of families or lose .any families to premature ter-
mination. In general, MDM I therapists use a rapidly
.oving short-ter.
approach while the MDM II prefer longer treatment.
Focu^of^ttentio^ Related to the above two differences, these
two MDMs differ with respect to their foci of attention or their choice
or level of phenomena. Thus, MDM I DMs focus on behavior while MDM II
emphasizes (though not exclusively) phenomenology. Similarly, the DB
and Minuchin's group focus exclusively on the family systems level for
both conceptualization and clinical practice whereas MDM II groups dis-
tribute their attention between family systems dynamics, individual
phenemenology and the integration of the two. In the latter MDM there
appears to be an attempt to balance the roles, prerogatives and ob-
ligations of the individual with those of the family. In the first
MDM, the individual, particularly with regard to his/her phenomenology
is actively ruled out, e.g., the "internal processes" vs. "behavioral"
debate in the DB group. The "behavioral" wing prevailed and the DM
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renamed in the same line of development in which it had started.
This issue raises an important point. How, if both MDM 1 and
II were represented in the DB DM, could the DM function and survive.
the group debated and why Jackson eventually established his own group
at mi (the Mental Research Institute). Jackson's orientation was ob-
viously toward MDM II while the dominant group orientation was MDM I.
While Jackson contributed to the paradigm, it should be recalled that
his contribution, the homeostatic aspect, was consistently downplayed,
and the communicational aspect emphasized and more fully elaborated.
My impression is that the newly emerging paradigm and DM could not
"afford" to elaborate the homeostatic aspect because it implied a
return to traditional individual psychiatric thinking rather than the
family-systems viewpoint. If the DB DM had not subdued or de-emphasized
the MDM II component and instead elaborated its dominant MDM I aspects,
my impression is that it would not have been revolutionary-not because
the MDM I Gestalt is revolutionary, but because their paradigm within
it was. As it was, Jackson joined the DM in 1954 and the debate erupted
only two years later; this set of differences between the two ^©Ms is
best exemplified in the behavior vs. phenomenology issue, the set of
differences Haley refers to as "inherent" from the beginning.
In short, a DM cannot be split between two MDMs and any elements
of the counter-dominant MDM must be vigorously subdued, particularly
in the early paradigm-DM stages. Griffith and Mullins (1972) refer to
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.his suppression function f.o. another angle; they indicate that one of
the functions of socially coherent research groups, and especially one
of the leaders, is to suppress tangential or alternate lines of inves-
tigation within the group and to provide a relatively i.per.eable
barrier to such information fro™ outside the group. Research generated
Within or by other M)Ms than that MDM dominant in a particular research
group is precisely the sort of research which "should" be subdued, par-
ticularly in early phases of the DM; its presence is divisive in the
extreme, as the fundamental belief systems of any two >ms are different
To be articulated, a paradigm requires a period of uncontroverslal and
consensual effort, and this Implies the operation of only one MDM. If
the two clusters of family therapy DMs are any measure, MDMs differ
sufficiently to effectively preclude concerted effort for any reasonable
period of time.
Models of explanation. A final discernible constituent of MDMs
is a preference for a particular model of explanation. The MDM I DM's
characteristically preferred mechanistic explanations and conceptualiza-
tions. The fact that they deal with family systems should not be taken
to mean the MDM I DMs deal with "open" systems; the characteristic
system found in their conceptualization is the simple, closed system.
("Closed" systems are usually defined as those systems with no in-
coming or outgoing elements, whereas "open" systems exchange elements,
across the system's boundary, with the environment)
. Their systems
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approach is limited to the cybernetic model of closed rather than open
systems and while this is a far cry from the linear thinking of their
predecessors, it is also a far cry from the conceptualisation required
for the open system. It is the second MDM that prefers the open
systems as a model of explanation. This latter group characteristically
will deal with the system formed by family-individual and individual/
family nexus, as well as the individual-family-society configuration.
11-im.^-talt. It becomes increasingly clear that the constituents
within each MDM are closely related. For instance, predictive rather
than interpretive understanding is often associated with logical positi-
vism, which is in turn usually associated with a preference for mechanis-
tic types of explanation. Similarly, many of the MDM II characteristics
are often associated with each other, e.g., dialectics, phenomenology,
an interpretive understanding and an emancipatory interest. What this
suggests is that the constituents of MDMs are neither random nor in-
dependent. They probably function with some degree of integration and
certain characteristics are much more likely to be found in concert
than others. For instance, though probably not necessarily impossible,
it seems that predictive understanding (as a value) is much less likely
to be found with phenomenology (as a focus of attention) or with organis-
mic types of explanations. However, the combination of predictive
understanding, focus on behavior, and mechanistic explanation is more
likely, makes "intuitive" sense, and is in fact encountered, for ex-
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ample, as MDM constituents for behaviorism.
Though arrive, at Inductively lro„ a review of fa.U, therap, o„
Clusters and though preUmlnar,. the constituents for the ^.„ concept
fit each cluster and appear to "fif" T,-!^KciL CO t t with each other nv^n •L-iicL
. AS a preliminary
hypothesis, MDMs could be said to be constituted of:
1. a philosophical orientation
2. preferred model or type of explanation
3. a value system, and
4. phenomena of focus (focal phenomena of observation)
independent corroboration for the presence and Internal coherence
of such conceptual constellations comes from such „ork as Coan's (1963).
Factor analysis of characteristics of important works in the field of
psychology demonstrated six contlnua, which split up into three sets
of complementary, or antagonistic, pairs. The first pair of charactarls
tic tendencies in these major works was termed a synthetic vs. analytic
approach. The synthetic continuum was characterized by a subjectlvlstic
holistic, and qualitative approach, whereas the analytic continuum was
characterized by what was seen as an objectlvlstlc, elementarlstic, and
quantitative trend. Coan regards this pair of approaches as roughly
equivalent to Allport's Leibnitzlan and Lockean categories.
The second pair of antagonistic approaches was a functional vs.
structural dichotomy, roughly exemplified by William James and the
experimentalists respectively. In Coan's study, the functional approach
was comprised of a dynamic personal approach which emphasized internal
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or biological sources of behavio.. wHe.eas the struc^.^'s tendency
emphasized a static, t.anspetscnal approach. Finally, a wea.et, yet
still distinct pair of contlnua „as the fluid vs. restrictive tendencies
Along the
-fluid" continuum there was a "basic" predisposition
latxon of entities and events. (1973, p. 240)
Coan's work demonstrates the presence of the tendencies identified
in the mns. Clearly, Coan's analytic, structural, and restrictive
tendencies would be associated with the MDM I DMs, and their predilec-
tion for a logical positivistic orientation, mechanistic models of
explanation and predictive understanding. On the other hand, the
synthetic, functional and fluidity characteristics are associated with
MDM II and their dialectical, phenomenological and organismic preferen-
ces. What is particularly useful in Coan's work is the demonstration
of the presence of these characterizing tendencies, their non-indepen-
dence from each other, their close correspondence with the MDM con-
stituents and finally, their arrival by inductive means.
The MDM constituents were arrived at primarily deductively; the
DM clusters were examined for the aspects which allowed certain DMs to
cluster and those that differentiated the clusters. Then, these cri-
teria were used as MDM constituents. Coan's continua, however, were
arrived at largely inductively in a factor-analytic study. As such,
very similar conclusions were reached from two separate directions and
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this underscores the substantiality of these tendencies and the i„por-
tance of investigating them further.
Moreover, these tendencies were found by Coan to occur in several
areas of psychology and the present dissertation found the. to occur
in family therapy as well, it is apparent that these divisions or
continua hold for areas besides family therapy, if these continua, and
M.MS are appropriate for other areas as well, this would imply that such
a Kuhnian analysis which included the MDM concept, could appropriately
be applied to an endemic, dialectical tension in psychology
. While
the Kuhnian schema implies some sort of progression (if not necessarily
progress) or evolution of DMs, from one to another through time, the
MDM concept and Coan's work imply a continuing dialectical tension
between MDMs. There may be no progression from MDM to new MDM, but
rather the persisting tension between constellations of belief. It
may be that, in the social sciences, this conceptual structure per-
sists and should be recognized.
MDMs as "constitutive realities." MDMs could effectively function as
what the ethnomethodologists term "constitutive reality." (Mehan and
Wood, 1975) Briefly, ethnomethodology is described by some of its
adherents (Mehan and Wood, 1975) as a reality system that investigates
15^ u 1My thanks to Dr. Park for pointing out this important MDM
aspect to me.
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those common features of all realities. A central thesis is that
realities do nor merely occur, they are constructed and maintained by
ceaseless activity. These constitutive realities are based on incorrigible
propositions, on "unquestioned and unquestionable axioms" (Mehan and
Wood, 1975, p. 9) which establish the facticity of the world for the
holder of the proposition. The incorrigible propositions of a reality
system serve as criteria to judge other ways of knowing (1975, p. 14).
Thus, if an individual knows the world in mystical terms, s/he cannot be
convinced or persuaded out of that reality system, and in fact, many of
the arguments used in the attempt will be re-construed by the individual
into mystical terms, which process functions as additional support for
the incorrigible propositions. In other words, the arguments will be
translated into the person's reality system and as such, will serve to
^"PP°^^ rather than relate his/her particular reality system.
The alternative reality is filtered through the individual's own
reality system, which is effectively incompatible with the alternative,
and the reality work justifies the incorrigible propositions, upon
which it rests. Mehan and Wood (1975, p. 12) see this as a self-
preservative reflexive process which occurs in oracular, scientific
and commonsense reasoning. All the features of reality systems dis-
cussed by Mehan and Wood (e.g., coherence, interaction, fragility and
permeability) are maintained reflexively; so, for example, research
questions are asked in terms of the system's incorrigible propositions
and investigated with methods of that system
,
which "prove" the
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factlcity or existence of the reality syste™ ltsel£. regardless of whether
the hypothesis Is confirmed or dlsconfInned
. MDMs function as reality
systems; with their philosophical orientations,
.odels of explanations,
values and relevant phenomena, MDMs define, delineate and constitute
a reality system for the scientist. MDMs provide the basis for what is
perceived, and what Is "known" to exist in the world; as well, they pro-
vide a preferred, correlated type of approach or explanation and the
values within which to negotiate. Further, MDMs display the same fea-
tures Mehan and Wood attribute to reality systems, e.g.. internal co-
herence, interaction, etc.
The contention that MDMs function as reality systems for scientists
implies that often, or usually, their effect is implicit and they can
function both before and after the development of a paradigm.
MDMs can both precede and follow paradigms. As Masterman has
pointed out, something precedes the paradigm; it is my impression that
it is the MDM that precedes the paradigm. An individual, or set of in-
dividuals, perceives a particular problem through the filter of his/her
MDM and is able to arrive at a problem-solution. As was the case with
the DB paradigm, the revolutionary problem-solution was reached by a
group that approached the problem with a different MDM than had been
, 16
^used. By essentially re-constructing the problem, it is able to be
16
I^n terms of the two MDMs explicated here, psychoanalysis would
appear to adhere to MDM II; it is primarily interpretive, dialectical,
phenomenological, etc.
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solved. The mn concept as so constituted would help to explain Master-
-n's point (corroborated In the DB DM) that revolutionary paradigms are
achieved by "rank outsiders"; these paradlg„-.aUers probably adhere to
a different ^mM, one which can successfully handle the problem at Issue.
This was the case with Freud. His perception of hysteria In a primarily
dialectic framework rather than neurology's logical posltlvlstlc, mechan-
istic approach allowed him to reconstruct or repercelve the proble. and
propose a fruitful solution.
This type of situation leads to an interesting question. Is it the
case that an^ change in perception (or problem re-construction) is help-
ful or is it rather the case that some approaches are more conducive to
solving certain types of problems than others? That is, are all MDMs
equally helpful with all types of problems, or are some approaches more
conducive of solution? For example, Freud approached hysteria with a
primarily dialectical MDM^^ and was successful in his problem-solution;
prior positivistic mechanistic approaches had not been successful. Is
it the case that the opposite change would have been similarly success-
ful: if, after viewing hysteria dialectically with no success, a mechan-
istic approach were suddenly brought to bear—would just the shift in
MDM have been successful? Or is it the case that for certain reasons
a dialectical, interpretive, phenomenological approach was more likely
17
For arguments that Freud's conceptualization was primarily dia-
lectical despite his early efforts to inject logical positivism
,
see
D. Bakan's Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition. (1958)
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to be successful?
It seems difficult to believe that a change in MDM £er se Is
sufficient to induce or allow such a solution; in this hypothetical case
of an anomaly with hysteria if dialectics were being used, It is diffi-
cult to imagine that a change to a positivistic, mechanistic approach
would be helpful. Instead, the constituents of mH II rather than MDM
1 seem more conducive to dealing with hysteria. In general, the charac-
teristics of various MDMs appear to make a difference in approaching
different types of problems and there is some indication that some
MDMs may be more suitable, or more helpful, with some problem types
than others.
The idea of a science for meaningful phenoT^
, The ethnomethodologists
can again provide some insight into this issue. One of their central
tenets is that some distortion is inevitable in investigating a reality
system because one reality cannot investigate another without "running
it through its own knowledge and reasoning system." (Mehan and Wood,
1975, p. 70). In particular, the imposition of one reality on another
necessarily distorts the reality being studied. (1975, p. 38) During
scientific activity, the approach of the scientist imposes a structure
on the respondant "that may not be consistent with the respondant's
daily life." (1975, p. 62) Mehan and Wood are not objecting to the
abstracting from phenomena which they perceive all scientific work as
doing, but rather they object to the dissonance between features of the
approach and features of the phenomenon under study. Here, they are
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some
considering sociology specifically.
tema^1^"n'
sociology is that its abstraction sys-tically distorts what common sense tells us was Se
social life of human beings. In the sociologist's tablesof data, and even more in the theories made up abou thosetables, one cannot find a sense of the person's da^lv
^^-^P-duced-thTTIrious ph™a\h:se^ablestdiK about. (1975, p. 48; emphasis added)
Essentially, what is being proposed by Mehan and Wood is that
distortion is inevitable while investigating one reality system through
another, there are degrees of distortion. The
-fif' between the two
reality systems is either more, or less, conducive to distortion. When
the "fit" is fairly close between the investigating and the investigated
systems, the findings convey a sense of the original phenomena of in-
terest. If the fit is poor, the phenomenon will either be unexplainable,
or its sense will no longer be apparent.
They proceed further, by stating outright that ethnomethodologists
are agreed that methods borrowed from the "natural sciences are inappro-
priate for the study of meaningful phenomena" (1975, p. 150). They
apparently demand a new methodology, one that is "more becoming to the
phenomena realities display" (1975, p. 225). This new sort of metho-
dology retains, or allows, the retention of the "meaningfulness" of the
phenomenon being studied; that is, they demand that those qualities
the scientist seeks to study in a phenomenon he retained and revealed
by the method, not obscured or "controlled out".
If the MDMs are indeed closely related to, or roughly identical to,
411
:es ex-
these reality systems, the sa.e observations and conclusions would
apply. To wit, methodologies imported from the natural scienc
cessively distort meaningful phenomena (e.g., dialogue, psychotherapy,
Psychopathology, social behavior, political practice) whereas methodology
designed to take into account these meaningful aspects could be less
distorting. If this is the case, then Bateson's point that the DB was
an epistemology and was therefore not testable in the "usual" scientific
manner is very appropriate. On the other hand. Haley's family experi-
ments attempted to impose a natural sciences MDM or reality structure
on meaningful interactions-a process conducive to significant distor-
tion of those meaningful elements.
Essentially, what is being argued is the necessity of an appropriate
science for meaningful phenomena. The idea has been presented before
(Hudson, 1972; Raush, 1974), and deserves discussion. The MDM concept
provides an expression of scientific reality systems in such a way that
conceptualization and method are linked to the scientist's reality view.
As such, it provides a framework within which to evaluate scientific
approaches to see whether they distort, or reveal, the meaningful aspects
of human phenomena.
The MDM concept, then meets a number of needs. It helps to explain
the basis of DM clustering, and also the differentiation between clus-
ters in family therapy, as well as assisting to unravel some contro-
versies (e.g., "behavioral" vs. "higher processes" debate) and research
group splits; it answers, at least in part, the question of what it is
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that precedes the paradig., while also answering Shapere's la.ent that
with revision, Kuhn deleted the paradig. of its "overarching" power in
scientific activity. The physical sciences share not an overarching
paradig., as Kuhn and Shapere have implied, but an overarching MDM;
specifically, the physical sciences subscribe to MDM I, which is
mechanistic, positivistic and prefers predictive understanding. The
MDM concept, by thus subsuming
.any DMs with a nu.ber of co^on charac-
teristics, serves some of these "overarching" functions.
Moreover, it is at this level that the "conversion" experiences
occur; Kuhn's critics have been correct in not understanding in what way
conversion experiences relate to methodology a paradigm. It does not;
"conversion" experiences occur at the MDM level. Conversion at the MDM
level has direct implications for the DM used, in which is found con-
crete and specific methodological functions. Finally, the MDM concept,
when joined by the paradigm and DM concepts, can also help to inter-
pret the present day felt crisis in psychology.
Implications fo r the Present Felt Crisis in Psychology
Essentially, I am proposing that the modified Kuhnian analysis
developed here would be helpful in understanding the present felt crisis
in psychology if used as a framework of interpretation. Using the para-
digm, DM and MDM concepts, and emphasizing the group structure of
scientific activity, the analysis would shed light on several facets of
the crisis.
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ion
The felt crisis has been documented to be a complicated and multi-
faceted situation, with a history of its own. In general, it can be
characterized as a search for guiding and limiting frameworks. Para-
mount is a sense of impasse, of enormous effort with little advancing
knowledge. The lack of long-term progress is a manifestation of this
duality; on the one hand, enormous effort has gone into the accumulat
of mountains of "facts", upon which few can agree, and even fewer can
state to what goals this accumulation leads. Psychology's high tech-
nology and advanced methods are often used in the services of ambigious
goals. This sense of impasse is often expressed in controversy. Upon
examination, some of the long-standing repetitive methodological con-
troversies will very probably show themselves as amenable to a Kuhnian
analysis; some will appear to be searches for an appropriate DM and
others for comfortable MDMs. For instance, the psychologists who write
of crises of identity for their sub-disciplines will often be drawing
attention to the search for a viable DM. The identity of individual
scientists and of groups focuses on the problems they address and the
approaches evolved to solve these problems. These clearly are paradigm
and DM issues, as such, and amenable to a full Kuhnian analysis. On
the other hand, other types of controversy appear to point to MDM
issues: including such issues as the increasingly elaborated difficul-
ties with the traditional subject-object split in research, or with the
observation that a large proportion of significant and original con-
tributions have come from practitioners who have dissociated themselves
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-ssues
we
fro. formal psychological research methods. These two crisis 1,
are clearly related to WH concerns; when the •scientific
.ethod-^^
is being questlonned and/or abandonned for alternative approaches,
are seeing individuals change their mUs. What is particularly striking
about these doubts and the occasional MDM changes, is that scientists
are ^king the., not because of persuasive philosophers or meta-scien-
tlsts. but because their approaches have Increasingly proved unsatis-
factory to the scientists themselves. As Mehan and Woods (1975, p. 210)
point out,
lliTatT/^l^ r'-^^ convinced by opposing philosophiesthat demand abandoning a form of life that demonstratesIts power^daxly. To tell scientists that their proofs
are only reflexive accomplishments does not alter the
experiential validity of those accomplishments. Science
as an activity does not rise and fall on the consistency
of Its reconstructed logics".
The fascinating point here is that the scientists themselves have
begun, in sufficient numbers to bring about a crisis, to openly doubt
the appropriateness of their approach and some are casting about for
what they refer to as a "new methodology." What should be obvious by
now is that when such a term is used, what is actually being referred to
is a conceptual constellation of intellectual and attitudinal components
with which certain methods and designs are related. Some of these "new"
18„
Scientific method" here refers to the dominant MDM I approach
which, in this country, is or has been virtually synonymous with
science itself. Because of the preponderance of MDM I scientists,
changes in approach would usually be from MDM II, which is, I believe,
actually the case at present.
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methodologies" will in f^^i-u act turn out to be DMs, and others win be this
ae„ conceptual constellation I have proposed, MDMs.
Conclusions
In the course of using a Kuhnian analysis for the emergence of a
family therapy group, 1 have found it necessary to .alee several modifi-
cations or additions to Kuhn's revised schema. Using Mastern^n's criti,.
I have regarded psychology as a multiple paradigm and multiple-DM dis-
cipline, and have chosen to use a narrow rather than broad interpre-
tation of the paradigm and DM concepts. Thus, both are used only with
respect to characteristics and criteria delineated by Kuhn, or Masterman.
Additionally, I have emphasized the relationship of DM and methodology,
drawn attention to the problem in identifying the "inclusive perimeter"
of a DM, and proposed a "border of applicability" which delimits the
practical and conceptual bounds of a paradigm and points to an import-
and difference between disconfirmation and anomaly. While using the
narrow interpretation of the paradigm and DM concepts, I found that this
usage was quite compatible with events in the development of the DB
family therapy group, though not sufficient to explain the behavioral-
internal processes controversy, the 1959 split, or DM clustering within
family therapy. For these reasons, I have proposed the meta-DM concept.
With this concept included in the Kuhnian analysis, the emergence of
the DB DM was fully interpreted and an analysis of the present felt
crisis will very probably be productively interpretable and helpful in
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resolving certain aspects of the crisis If the distinction between,
and relationships among, methodology. DM and HDH are kept clear. This
type of Kuhnlan analysis will require detailed knowledge of the par-
ticular controversy, problem area, or Issue; as such, these Kuhnlan
analyses will probably be most helpful 1, carried out by individuals or
groups close to, but not directly Involved In the particular Issue. If
such an analysis were attempted by someone not Intimately familiar with
the Issues and the history or development of the problem, the results
could miscarry, what is required is a detailed knowledge of this re-
vised Kuhnlan analysis, keeping the levels of conceptualization quite
clear, and a specific and detailed knowledge of the relevant problem
area. Under these conditions, I would see such an analysis as highly
beneficial to the relevant area, and as at least one way to begin dis-
solving the Impasse and developing a psychology of many MDMs, all of
which would be appropriate to the meaning of the phenomenon they were
attempting to study.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"'""^"m I-Steln^'^fEd"'^) 1 ^^^^^"herapy on the present scene".
Ackerian N "Further coiments on family psychotherapy, " In M.I. Stein(Ed ) Contemporary Psychotherapy, Ne« York: The Free Press ofGlencoe, 1951b, pp. 245-255.
Ackerman, N.W and Sorel, R., Family diagnosis: An approach to the pre-school child, Am. J. Orthopsychiat
.. 1950, XX, 744-752.
'''"'ih^:, '1^72:1(5), ^5!^^^:^
engineering psychology. Am. Ps^-
'"''i97o!-25a2):?S7"!o8of""" °' "^^^'^"^"^^ ' '
Appel, G., An approach to the treatment of schizoid phenomena, Psychonal
Rev., 1974, 61(1), 99-113. —
Appel, K.E., Goodwin, H.M., Wood, H.P., Askren, E.L., Training in psycho-
therapy, the use of marriage counseling in a university teaching
clinic. Am. J. Psychiat.
, 1961, 117_, 709-711.
Attneave, C
. ,
We became family therapists. In A. Ferber, M. Mendelsohn
and A. Napier, The book of family therapy
.
New York: Science
House, 1972, pp. 122-132.
Auerswald, E., We became family therapists. In A. Ferber, M. Mendelsohn
and A. Napier, The book of family therapy
.
New York; Science
House, 1972, pp. 86-89.
Bakan, P., Sigmund Freud and the Jewish mystical tradition . New York:
D. van Nostrand Co., 1958.
417
418
Bateson, G.,^A theory of play and fantasy. Ps^. r^s.
,„3_
'"''°Lu;/\\'j!l:reri:"r\"°? ^^^^^^^ ^" -hl.ophrenic
Exploring the base f« fal:i ^. ' ^'^'J''-).
^SJSSISlfo—lUlf iffril^^^^- ^-k: Family service
or-hi-h-i!-|^: S.n-n ^
A note on the
Bateson G. Weakland J., and Haley, J., Comnents on Haley's 'history'In C. Sluzki and D. Ransom (Eds.), Double Bind: The foundaUon of
ifall—itflt^f« ^ e„-^rkr&a^
^^^^^'m^";
^"^/^^ber, A., What family therapists do. In A. Ferber NMendelsohn, and A. Napier, The book of family therapy. New Y^rk:Science House, 1972, pp. 168-232.
Bertalanffy, L. von. General sj^stem^ Foundations, developments
applications. New York: George Brazilll^ 1968^
'
Boneau C. Paradigm regained? Cognitive behaviorism restated. AmerPsychol
. , 1974, 29, 297-309.
Boszormenyi-Nagy, I., A theory of relationships: Experience and trans-
action. In Boszormenyi-Nagy and J. Framo (Eds.), Intensive family
thera£^: Theoretical and practical aspects
. New York: HarpeF^^
Row, 1965.
Boszormenyi-Nagy, I., and Spark, G.M., Invisible loyalities: Reciprocity
in intergenerational family therapy
. New York: Harper and Row,
1970.
Bowen, M., Dysinger, R.H., Basmania, B., The role of the father in
families with a schizophrenic patient. Am. J. Psychiat. 1959
115
,
1017-1020. ~ '
419
Breuer, J., and Freud, S riRQ?! r\.^ ^ ,
liaSd Freud
, Vrr^oSTH^rlfBs^^^ ^
Breuer, J., and Freud q n«Q-3i
teriial phenomeM ^rlw™, n ' V^^ P=y<:hical mechanism of hys-
Ihe standard Lltion of ttrcL^lT"'"^""- ^" ^'^-^h-y (Ed-),n: IS^SS^TH^iiTtrpffsf^llfEi^ iSrks of Slgmun^ Freud , Vol
.
Breuer, J and Freud S FIRQ'^i c*-j-
BrisU.^t.B.,^Is a^Kuhnian analysis applicable to psychology, s^.
iir^nar ---- ^- ^-
Bychowski,^G., The preschizophrenic ego, Psychoanal. Quart
., 1947, 16,
Bychowski, G., Therapy of the weak ego. Am. J. Psychot
., 1950, 4, 407-418.
Bychowski G The problem of latent psychosis, J. Amer
. Psychoana l. Assoc.,iyoj,
_1, 484-503.
Clark, L. P., Some practical remarks upon the use of modified psychoanalysisin the treatment of borderland neuroses and psychoses. Psychoanal.
Rev., 1919, 6i, 306-308. —'
Coan, R.W., Toward a psychological interpretation of psychology, J. Hist
Behav
.
Sci
., 1973, % 313-327. *
Cohen, M. and Lip ton, L., Spontaneous remission of schizophrenic psychoses
following maternal death, Psychiat
.
Quart
.
, 1950, 24, 716-725.
Coodley, A.E., Current aspects of delinquency and addiction. Arch. Gen.
Psych
., 1961,
_4, 632-640.
420
Coser, R.L., Laughter among colleagues, Ps^chlat
. ,
I960, 23, 81-95.
Crane, D., Invisible colleees- nTff„o,-^ ^ ,
Devereux, G., The nature of the bizarrp- . c^ ^ ^
pseudo slip of the tongue Hn i' . °^ ^ schizophrenic's
Cited by P. WatzlLick aV7'--^^^^¥^^'' 266-278.
''"''I;4l''^^:l8T39J!
'° P^ychotherapy of schizophrenia, Psychiat.,
''"'";chr;ije' f'Z'j\"\''''T'''' °' - psychoanalytictechniqu . J. Ainer. Psychoanal
. Assoc
., 1953, 1, 104-145.
'''''";t'''}
variations in psycho-analytical techniqueint. J. Psychoanal
.. 1958, ^9, 222-227.
--ecnni ,
Farberow,^N., The crisis is chronic. Am.
. Psychol
., 1973, 28(5), 388-
Federn P. Psychoanalysis of psychoses: I. Errors and how to avoid them.Psychiat
. Quart
., 1943a, 17, 3-19.
Federn P., Psychoanalysis of psychoses: II. Transference, Psychiat.Quart
., 1943b, 17, 246-257. ^
Federn P. Psychoanalysis of psychoses: III. The psychoanalytic process.
Psychiat
. Quart
., 1943c, 17_, 470-487.
Federn, P., Principles of psychotherapy in latent schizophrenia. Am. J.
Psycho ther
. . 1947, 1, 129-144.
—
Ferreira, A.J., The "double bind" and delinquent behavior. Arch. Gen.
Psychiat
. , 1960, 3, 359-367.
421
so£hj, of sclLe
. Orfo"d!'l968!
'""Feb:'2J!:\?75,"lI! t^^^-^y. 2i£ York Review of Bocks,
Fisher, S. and Mendpll n tk^
tha patle« to i ; ^lil^^ ero^ir P
Psychotherapeutic effects frcn,nis ramiiy g up. Psychlat
. 1958, 21, 133-140.
"^^^r;e«'i; th?uS?:rst:Lr ^-^^ tnerap, approaches pro-
1964, 2, 35-46. '
—
'
- -ISI£hiSl-
.
S£a£- M •
"^"^^e^™ufa^t^i!S^.f3l^.«f^ - -r.
^"":int;;iL'^2i if.fSifrfs^eSfTtl-Mt!t^: s^:The Widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis J LPsychoanal
. Assoc
., 1954, 2, 567-594.
i , j. Am.
^""^""^Aati^nlr^n
^'^"^""^"^'^''
-
-
^^"^^"^^"^ ^ children. New York: Inter-national Universities Press, Inc., 19467^
Freud, A., The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis: Dis-cussion, J. Am. Psychoanal
. Assoc., 1954, 2, 607-620.
Freud, S. [1894], The Defence Neuro-Psychoses
, Standard Edition of the
^°"^P^^^^ £i 5±mund Freud , In J. Strachey (EdJTv^ ~
London: Hogarth Press, 1955. '
Freud, S. [1908], Character and anal erotism. In Collected Papers.
Vol. II, Edited by E. Jones, London: Hogarth Press, 1933, pp7'45-
50. Cited by L. Stone, "The widening scope of indications for
psychoanalysis, J. Am. Psychoanal
. Assoc., 1954, 2, 567-594.
Freud, S., [1914a], Further recommendations in the technique of psycho-
analysis: Recollection, repetition and working through. In
E. Jones (Ed.), Collected Papery. Vol. II, London: Hogarth Press,
1956.
Freud, S., [1914b], On narcissism: An introduction. In E. Jones (Ed.),
Collected Papers
,
Vol., IV, London, Hogarth Press, 1956.
Freud, S. [1950]], Letter 2. In Editor's Introduction. J. Strachey (Ed.),
The standard edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. II,
London: Hogarth Press, 1955.
422
Fried, S., Gumpper, D. and Allen T
Bullard (M.yf'tlfll^i^.fffifi^ lelected Papers.B-^. uuxversity ot Chicago Press, 1959.
Fro™-Relchn«nn, P., Psychotherapy, Psychlat.. 1948, U, 263-273.
Fry. W.F., Sweet Madness: A stud^ of hu^cr
, Palo Alto: Pacific Books.
Gadlln, H. and Ingle. G.. Through the one way mirror- THb «
experimental self-reflection. A,. PsyioI^r?9;5:'lo!^lSS3-1009.
'"'Mel' u' 225
5°^^i^^.~s of everyday activities, Soc. Prob.,
Garner, L The acquisition and application of knowledge: A symbioticrelation. Am. Psychol
., 1972, 27, 941-946.
'''''";73;'26.1o9!Lr''°'°''
"
^^^''Teac;.!\'972!'9? J';^^-'^"^^
inq-i^Y on education, J. Res. Scl.
Glover, E., Techni^e of psychoanalysis
. New York: International Univer-
sities Press, 1955.
Gralnick, A., Family psychotherapy: General and specific considerations,
Am. J. Orthopsychiat
. . 1962, 32, 515-526.
Greenacre, P., The predisposition to anxiety, Part II. Psychoanal. Quart.
1941, 10, 610-638. ——
Greenson, R.R., Variations in classical psycho-analytic techniques:
An introduction, Int
.
J. Psychoanal
. , 1958, 39_, 200-201.
423
Griffith, B., and Mulling? m r^u
SHl.. 1972 (Sept isj/ily^l^n^!"'''' " '^^^-""^ change,
"^"'co^^a";: fi^Xai. ^ the
"^'''ie^:: 195nr52-58'!^=''
Psychotherapy. Ps^. ^.
"'''V;'3n-322!""'°""' iPtlon of schizophrenia. Ps^chiat .
, 1959a.
"'''"k^:; l959h:""lM,°357-37:!"^°^'^'^'="^^^ ^ """^^ ^S-- M^ni.
i/;39-!53!°'
psychotherapy. Arch. Gen. Psychlat.. 1961a.
"^'^'^^TlleiVt TJo-tsT"''' schizophrenics, A^. c^.
"''""1962; i^I^I'm!""""^ * °' -P-l-ntatlon. Fm. Proc.,
Haley, J., Reply to Dr. Schlamp, Fm. Proc., 1964, 3(1), 239-244.
Haley J
,
"Approaches to family therapy". In J. Haley (Ed.) Changingj^i^-^^^l^ £hsr^ reaier. Ne. York: Grune and^E^fjifn,
9, 233-242
"riginally appeared In Int. J. Psychlat
.. 1970,
Haley J
,
A review of the family therapy field. In J. Haley (Ed.) Changingl|alie£: A family therapy reader
. New York: Grune and Strat ton,1971b, pp. 1-12.
Haley J., We became family therapists. In A. Fester, M. Mendelsohn, and
A. Napier (Eds.) The book of family therapy
. New York: Science
House. 1972.
424
Haley, J., Unconmion therapy: The nqvrhn =. t-r--,- ^ - u •
t^;;a5f^;T^ '^^^ — ^SiSiSSiSa effective far^lyl>era2Z. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass PubUshe7I7 19765:
tigue of the discipline.. New York: Harper aTaTto^TTigTi:
'''''^o^^;^^^J^-:^^^ I-~ .ew
'''''°|k^:,'l954ri|:i6ll8r^'"' Oedipus complex, Ps^anal,
Jackson D., A note on the importance of trauma in the genesis of schizo-phrenia, Psychiat., 1957a, 20, 181-184.
Jackson DD. The question of family homeostasis, Psychiat
. Quart. Supp.,1957b, 31 (part 1), 79-90. ^ ——
Jackson, D., Guilt, the control of pleasure in schizoid personalities
Br. J. Med. Psychol
. , 1958, 31(2), 124-130.
Jackson, D., (Ed.), The etiology of schizophrenia. New York: Basic
Books, 1960. ~
Jackson, D., Family therapy in the therapy of the schizophrenic. In M.
Stein (Ed.), Contemporary psycho therapies
. New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1961a, pp. 272-287.
Jackson, D., Interactional psychotherapy. In M. Stein (Ed.) Contemporary
psychotherapies
.
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961b, pp.
256-271.
Jackson, D., "Family Affairs", Fm. Proc
. ,
1962, 1(1), 153-155.
425
Jackson, D., Cogent. Fm. Proc., 1963, 2(1), 182-184.
Jackson, D., The study of the fan^ly, ^. p^. , ^_
'''''"^^t^-io^^Srir^isr^hT"'"^'"' iMsMedica
Watzlawick and J. Weakland fFH ^xi ''<=P'^"«<I in P.
of the Mental Research ?nst tu ;^ 1^ ^T^^^^ct^ Studies
Jackson D Cs^HniSSiloa, laEi^ ^ co^unlcatlon1, i-alo Alto. Science and Behavior BookJTTges:
Jackson, D., with Beavln, J., Family rules- Marital h.mMGen. Psych iat.. 1965 12 5RQ%Qr o -^'I'^ 1"^<i Pro quo. Arch.
—Weidsia-fEL rTL^^era^lo;^, -""'1 " "«-l»l^nd
Research Institute ^irSrEfT5Kt^77^; ^^^^ ^
C^^ri977~^iriB'30— New York: W.w. NorWT^d
Jackson, ^B.,^d Haley,^.., Transference revisited, d. N^. ^.
a?f,^::^:'a:d'tLr:S!" ?f r^A^i:r::^ i-j-r-- -S. Sherman ^ r i • , Actcerman, F. Beatmen and
'"'"o"; th;orT t::hn?:u;s'- 'r'°r
'^""^ "-"^"^^ considerations
Z "=7°^^' f^^hniques, and results. Psychiat . 1961, 24, Suppl. to
reldl; r,ll\oll r
""''^^
^l"-^ Chi^ii^nisiliSi: rtamily th ragva er. New York: Grunec and Stratton, 1971, pp. 13~3T.
^^'"""'seierJIv J^^^"^""^"^^
P^^^l--^ the psychoanalytic treatment of
2r595-606
patients, J. Amer. Psychoana l
. Assoc
., 1954,
Kasanin, J., Knight, E. and Sage, P., The parent-child relationship in
Jg^Jr^grSglzeS
°^""-P^°^^^ti°"-^^J-^tion, J. Nerv. Ment. ks.
Kempf, E.J., Psychoanalytic treatment of dementia praecox: Report of a
case, Psychoanal
. Rev
.
, 1919, 6, 15-58.
Kernberg, 0., Borderline conditions and pathological narciss ism. New York:
Jason Aronson, Inc., 1975.
426
Kuhn, T., Reflections on my critics In T T.v .
Laforgue, R., a contribution to the studv of ..k • u
Psychoanal., 1938, 17, 147-162?
^^^hizophrenia, Int.j.
Laing, R.D. and Esterson A q=,r,-;*-,, j
Loewenstein. ^-M.. Ra^arks on so^e variations In psycho-analytic tech-nique. Int. J. Psj^choanal.
,
1958a, 39, 202-210.
Loewenstein R M.
,
Variations in classical technique: Concluding remarksInt. J. Psychoanal
.. 1958b, 39, 240-241.
,
in\tLl§S,«f^3f^»^- -n-n: Cambridge
McGuire, W., The Yin and Yang of progress in social psychology: Sevenkoan. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol
., 1973, 28, 446-456.
Minuchin,J.,_^|^mi]^es an^ Cambridge: Harvard University
Mittelmann B., Complementary neurotic reaction in intimate relationships.
Psychoanal
. Quart
., 1944, 13, 479-491.
Mittelmann, B., The concurrent analysis of married couples, Psychoanal.Quart
., 1948, 17, 181-197.
Moscovici, S., Society and theory in social psychology. In J. Israel
and H. Taj fel (Eds.), The context of social psychology. New York:
Academic Press, 1972.
427
Press, 1972. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^212^^ New York: Academic
°'^^"l938,'2l^r3!,1r^^^^^^
Of
.arriea couples, P,,^.
"'^^".^^^^^^ Psychoanamic
.herap,, p^.
'"^^ik^'lik': !9n:i:ij3-i35!'""" ^^^^^^ ^^-^
a: 'is-In.'^"^''^
psychotherapy. Arch. Cea. Ps^. i,ei.
Letters to the editor: "Reply to Jackson"and Reply to Dr. Paul's Letter," Fm. Proc. 196?, 2(2)^597
'
Pereboom, A Some fundamental problems in experimental psychology Anoverview, Psychol
. Rep., 1971, 28(2), 439-455.
P^ ^^^^^g^-
Popper, K.R., Conjectures and refutations
. London: 1963.
Powdermaker, F., Concepts found useful in treatment of schizoid andambulatory schizophrenic patients, Psychiat
. ,
1952, 15, 61-71.
Radnitzky, G Contemporary schools of metascience
. (3rd Edition, en-larged;
.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1973.
'''"'''2^0) !'678-68i. and accountability. Am. Psychol.
,
1974,
Rogers, C, Some new challenges. Am. Psychol
.
, 1973, 28, 379-387.
Ruesch, J., and Bateson, G., Communication : The social matrix of
psychiatry.. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1951.
Satir, v.. Conjoint famiJ^
_d2^ Palo Alto: Science and Behavior
Books, Inc., 1967.
Saul, L., Technic and practice of psychoanalysis
. Philadelphia: J.
Lippincott Company, 1958. Cited by Grotjahn, M.
,
Psychoanalysis
and the family neurosis
. W.W. Norton & Company, 1960.
Schlamp, F., Comment: Family experiments: Some alternative hypotheses.
Fm. Proc
, 1964, 3_(1), 229-236.
428
Shapere, D., The structure of scientTf-,V i •
73, 383-394.
ntific revolution, Phu. Rev., 1964,
Shapere, D.. The paradigm concept. Science 1971 -, , ^709. ^ ' ^£i£H£e, (May 14), 172, 706-
Sherman, S., The concept of the faTnilv -fr,
Ackerman, F. Beatman and I lu" therapy, in n.
for fa^n^ tlJ^t^'N^w^^^^^^ T''^.'
Exploring the base
19617177^14:^8:^ ^"'^^y Assoc. of Ame^,
Signorelli, A., Statistics: Tool or master of ^ho
Psychol
.. 1974, 29, 774-777 Psychologist?, Am.
Singer, B., Toward a psychology of scienrP An, u .
1010-1015. ce.. Am. Psychol .. 1971, 26(1),
Small, H., and Griffii-Vi n r ti,
uruers, ^^uart. J. ChiJ^ Behav.
, 1949, 1, 12-17.
Stern, A., Psychoanalytic investigation of a therapy in the border linPgroup of neuroses, Psxchoanal._Quart
. , 1958, 7, 462-489
'"'''and ti ^^^^^^'^ reconciliation : A study in human relations
^ ^-o"^or-B^ki7^-
'"^"p^,^!1^r"5^ psychoanalysis, A^.
''"''ie^:: l'974ri(2r24?-256!^"'''^
psychotherapy, Psychoanal.
Sullivan, H.S., Schizophrenia: Its conservative and malignant features.
Am. J. Psychiat
., 1924-1925, 81, 77-91.
Sullivan, H.S., The oral complex., Psychoanal
. Rev
.
,
1925, 12, 31-38.
429
Sullivan H.S., The modified psychoanalytic treatment of schizophreniaAm. J. Psychiat
., 1931, 11, 519-536.
n ,
'"'''Norto^^Co^r953"^'''°""' ^ £s:Zchiatr^. New York:W.W.
Sullivan, H.S Cli^d^ stu^ New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 1973. Originally issued by the William Alanson WhitePsychiatric Foundation, 1956.
Sutherland, J.
,
A general systems philosophy for the social and behavioral
sciences
. New York: George Brazille
,
1973.
—'
^^^^^I'nio' 3
hopeful psychology, Am- Psychol
. 1973, 28, 1021-
Viteles, M., Psychology today: Fact and foible. Am. Psychol 1972 ?7601-607. —
Warren, N., In a scientific revolution taking place in psychology - Doubts
and reservations, Sci. Stud
.
, 1971, 1, 407-413.
Warren, N.
,
Normal science and the normal standards of scholarly debate
Sci
. Stud
.
, 1974, 4, 195-197.
Watson, R.I., Systematic presciptions for psychology. In W.A. Hillix
and M.H. Marx (Eds.), Systems and theories in psychology
. New York:
West Publishing Company, 1974.
Watts, A., Psychotherapy
,
East and West
. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.
Watts, A.
,
The meaning of happiness : The quest for freedom of the spirit
in modern psychology and the wisdom of the East
. London: Village
Press, 1968.
Watzlawick, P., A review of the double bind theory. Fra. Proc. 1963 2
132-153. —
Watzlawick, P. and Weakland, J. (Eds.), The interactional view : Studies
at the Mental Research Institute
,
Palo Alto
,
1965-74
. New York:
W.W. Norton & Co. , 1977.
Weakland, J., The "double bind" hypothesis of schizophrenia and three
party interaction. In D. Jackson (Ed.) The Etiology of schizo-
phrenia . New York: Basic Books, 1960.
Weakland, J., Family therapy as a research arena. Fm. Proc
.
,
1962, 1^,
63-68.
430
Weakland, J., Reply to Dr. Schlamp, Fm. Proc
. , 1964, 3(1), 236-239.
Weakland J., Schizophrenia: Basic problems in sociocultural investi-gation. In S. Flog and R. Edgerton (Eds.) New York: HoU Rine-
iTnl ^rT- ^^P^-^-d - Watzlawick and j! Weak-la d (Eds.) The interactional v^: Studies at the Mental Researchi™^,^Palo Alto, 1969^-l^Iw Y^TCT.^ I^.-^o^^^
Weakland. J We became family therapists. In A. Ferber, M. Mendelsohn
Ltt;Sr;p^3l?il3-^»-
Weakland, J. The double bind theory by self-reflexive hindsight. FmProc. 1974 13, 269-277. Reprinted in C. Sluzki and D.^anso^T(Eds ), Double Bind: The foundation of the communicationa l approach
to the family. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1976, pp. 3071314:
—
Weakland J., and Fry, W.
,
Letters of mothers of schizophrenics, Am. J.Orthopsychiat
.
. 1962, 32, 604-623. — -
Weakland, J., and Jackson, D., Patient and therapist observations on the
circumstances of a schizophrenic episode. Arch
. Neurol
. Psychiat.
.1958 79, 554-574. Reprinted in D. Jackson (Ed.) Communication
,
family and marriag e: Human communication
. Vol. I, Palo Alto:
Science and Behavior Books, 1970, pp. 87-121.
Weimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S., Paradigms and normal science in psy-
chology, Sci. Stud., 1973, 3, 211-244.
Weimer, W.
,
and Palermo, D., Standards, scholarship, and debate: A
rejoinder to Warren, Sci. Stud
.
,
1974,
_4, 198-200.
Whitaker, C, We became family therapists. In A. Ferber, M. Mendelsohn,
and A. Napier. The book of family therapy
.
New York: Science
House, 1972, pp. 96-100.
Wynne, L., Ryckoff, I.M., Day, J., and Hirsch, S.I., Pseudo-mutuality
in the family relations of schizophrenics. Psychiat., 1958, 21,
205-220. —
Zangwill, D., In A. Pryce-Jones (Ed.) The new outline of modern know-
ledge
. London: Gollancz, 1956.
Zilboorg, G. , The deeper layers of schizophrenic psychoses. Am. J.
Psychiat
. , 1931, 88^, 493-511.
431
Zilboorg, G., Ambulatory schizophrenics. Psychiat
.
, 1941, 4, 145-155.
Zucker, L.
,
The psychology of latent schizophrenia: Based on Rorschach
studies. Am. J. Psychother
. ,
1952, 6, 42-62.
DATE DUE
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
LIBRARY
LD
3234
M267
1978
G317


